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The Lahawiyin: 
Identity and History in a Sudanese Arab Tribe 
 
Tamador Ahmed Khalid Abdalla 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the Lahawiyin of northern Sudan, and it explores 
the relationship between identity and history in this Sudanese Arab tribe since 
the late nineteenth century. The history of the Lahawiyin reveals continuous 
crossings of borders and boundaries through a period of substantial political 
and economic change, much of it driven by external forces.  
 
The thesis demonstrates that the Lahawiyin Arab identity has been central to 
the way that Lahawiyin leaders have sought to develop and maintain their 
authority, and the ways in which ordinary Lahawiyin have tried to maintain a 
particular way of life and patterns of social relations. Arab identity has been 
used instrumentally to make claims or assert rights; but it has also shaped the 
way in which Lahawiyin have understood their interests. The emphasis on 
Arab identity has been closely linked to the prolonged campaign by some 
Lahawiyin for a homeland (dar), and in the way that Lahawiyin have 
negotiated their subordinate status within larger Arab confederations – first the 
Kababish, then the Shukriyya. It has also shaped Lahawiyin relationships with 
their own subordinates, particularly slaves. Though the Lahawiyin campaign 
for a dar has not been successful, and their lifestyle of most Lahawiyin has 
now changed irrevocably away from pastoralism, Arab identity has continued 
to be important in current contests over the political status of potential leaders, 
and the group as a whole.   
 
The thesis makes use of a range of archival sources in the UK National 
Archive, in Sudan Archive at Durham and at the National Records Office in 
Khartoum. During the fieldwork various academic sources were consulted in 
Khartoum and Gedarif which form an important aspect of the narratives 
together with the many stories which were generated from the oral histories 
told by the Lahawiyin. 
 
Using these materials, the thesis discusses how the Lahawiyin, have utilized 
their Arabness, and the way they present their history, to negotiate their status 
with a series of regimes, from the Turco-Egyptian state of the nineteenth 
century to the current regime of the National Congress Party.    
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Introduction 
Arguments in the context of literature on Arab Genealogy, 
identity and land in Sudan 
 
History is not concerned with the past as past. It is concerned, in the first 
instance, with the actual structure of the society in which we live; the 
manners and customs which we share with people around us.1 
 
Collingwood’s words, recently cited by Mark Leopold, in his study of the lived 
significance of the past in northern Uganda, are equally suited to the position of the 
Lahawiyin, an Arab group in northern Sudan. The Lahawiyin are not numerous.  In 
1931, the Lahawiyin in Butana – by that time the principal area of their occupation - 
were estimated to be around 14,000 persons;2 in 1996, the Ration Cards Section in 
Showak Rural Council – as the principal area of settlement was then called - 
estimated the Lahawiyin to be approximately 45,265 persons. 3   But the idea of a 
distinct Lahawiyin identity has been developed and maintained over a long period, 
and has persisted even though the livelihood of nomad pastoralism ideally associated 
with it has almost vanished. The presentation of the past has been central to this 
persistent, yet changing idea of Lahawiyin identity. This thesis argues that the history 
of this identity – and the stories of the past which have been told around it – offers a 
new insight on the nature of Arab identity and the complex relationship between 
authority, land and group identity.  
 
Why study the Lahawiyin? 
 
The bulk of the Lahawiyin tribe are currently found in Gedarif State, in the eastern 
part of northern Sudan, in the vicinity of al -Showak Rural Council (RC). Some 
inhabit areas of the neighbouring al-Fashaga province, and the rest are scattered on 
                                                 
1 Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, with lectures 1926-1928  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), p.66, quoted in Mark Leopold, Inside West Nile: Violence, History and Representation on 
an African Frontier (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), pp.3-7. 
2 P.B.E. Acland, ‘The Butana during the present government’, handing-over notes 1939, 
SAD.777/14/1-23. 
3 T. Khalid, I. Dalmau and C. Miller, ‘The Lahawiyin in Showak Rural Council: Imposed Boundaries 
and the Quest for Political Recognition,’ pp.314-316,  in Catherine Miller, Isabelle Dalmau and 
Francois Ireton (eds.), Land, Ethnicity and Political legitimacy in Eastern Sudan: Kassala and Gedaref 
States (Cairo: CEDEJ, 2005). 
2 
 
either side of the Atbara River and around the smaller Setit River.  The area of al-
Showak is roughly the valley of the River Atbara from Safawa to Khashm el Girba 
Dam. It has a low to medium rainfall of 200-300 mm per year, mainly concentrated 
between June and September.4 This area changes topographically from the flat plains 
in the north to more undulating parts in the south. The plains between the Blue Nile, 
River Nile and Atbara river and Ethiopian boundaries are known as the Butana; this 
has been described as ‘one ecological, economic and cultural unit’.5 The Atbara River 
flows from south to north, intersecting the Setit River. Both rivers run through 
valleys, forming a particular kind of clay known as karab. Furthermore, the vegetation 
in the area has three forms: the Butana plain, a semi-desert grass land; the Showak 
area is largely characterised by Acacia Melifera, with a belt of Acacia Seyal in the 
south alternating with grass. Another environmental feature is the seasonally flooded 
Jerif - the rich silted soil, formed after a flood descends - found on the river banks, the 
deposition of which changes seasonally depending on the rains.  
 
The Lahawiyin have moved over time, as this thesis will show; but also there have 
been changes in the administrative nomenclature of the land across which they have 
moved. The current area of Lahawiyin residence was known as Butana District from 
1898 to 1940s; in 1942 the Gedarif Rural Council was created; more recently, the area 
has become part of Gedarif State.  Gedarif State is located in the east of the Sudan 
between latitudes 12° 40' and 15°40' N and longitudes 33°30' and 36°30' East and 
which covers an area of about 71,000 square kilometres with 17 persons per km. 
Gedarif borders Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east, Gezira State in the west, Sinnar State 
in the south and Khartoum. Gedarif, Kassala and Red Sea States constitute the 
“Eastern Region”. 
 
The history of the Lahawiyin “tribe” is a remarkable story of movement and migration 
since 1885. It is also a history of resistance to assimilation and absorption by a larger 
tribal confederation, and of the development and survival of a pattern of tribal 
leadership within one section, or umudiyya, of the Lahawiyin, who are known as the 
                                                 
4 The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for 
April 1996), p.8. 
5 Mohamed I. Abu Sin, “The Regional Geography of the Butana North of the Railway,” (MA thesis, 
University of Khartoum, 1970), p.3. 
3 
 
al Faki.  They offer an example of a group which has resisted integration, and they 
have retained their distinctive identity up to now. The history of the Lahawiyin is 
therefore revealing of the interplay between government administrative policies, 
resource competition, processes of identity formulation and political alliances, with 
relevance to the wider context of Sudanese history.  
 
For much of the twentieth century the Lahawiyin were nomads; however, their 
position has changed somewhat. This thesis argues that the “Arab identity” of the 
Lahawiyin has been the central tool in their search for a dar (homeland). The 
Lahawiyin offer an important case study of the ways in which an ‘Arab’ identity has 
been constructed or maintained, which differs from, or is more complex than, many of 
the general studies of Arabization and identity politics in Sudan. Their use of this 
identity is bound up with their historical lack of administrative autonomy or their own 
homeland, and conversely with their slave-owning status. It is thus driven by long-
running internal factors as much as or more than by a postcolonial, government-led 
‘Arab supremacist’ agenda highlighted in existing literature. However this also 
demonstrates the ways in which land and Native Administration policies have 
contributed to identity politics.  
 
Before going on to a historical discussion of the Lahawiyin Arab genealogy, 
migration, boundaries, land and identity, it is necessary to make clear that the use of 
term ‘tribe’ throughout the thesis is limited to the convention mainly established by 
the Lahawiyin themselves to be identified as a ‘tribe’ and so used by other groups 
who were involved in any kind of relations with the Lahawiyin. A tribe has been 
defined as ‘a group of people bound by common language, territory and custom.’6 Yet 
significantly, the Lahawiyin have not had their own territory, and their self-
identification as a tribe related to their perception of others.  From the Lahawiyin 
narratives it is apparent that they manipulated the concept in an attempt to depict their 
Arab identity and Lahawiyin distinctiveness in ‘creating a political culture’.7     
 
                                                 
6 Roy Richard Grinker and Christopher B. Steiner (eds.), ‘Introduction,’ in Perspectives on Africa: a 
reader in culture, history and representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p.6. 
7 Leopold, Inside West Nile, p.163. 
4 
 
Academic literature usually avoids using the word ‘tribe’ because, as Richards and 
Herskovits argued, the concept of ‘tribe’ had divided the world into a ‘west’ and 
‘others’ who lived in tribes. 8  But because the word is commonly used in both 
historical and contemporary sources on Sudan, the term ‘tribal groups’, rather than 
‘ethnic groups’, is used here in the interest of historical continuity. Most of the 
unpublished reports and the secondary sources as well as the primary archival 
materials in the National Record Office (NRO) Khartoum and Sudan Archives, 
Durham use ‘tribal groups’. In these sources the population of colonial Sudan, 
especially those inhabiting the respective dars, were conceived as discrete bounded 
and self-contained stable entities.9 Unlike the use of the term ‘tribe’, the vocabulary 
regarding livelihoods gradually changed from ‘nomadic’ to ‘pastoralist’, as the 
political set-up moved from Condominium to post- independence. 
 
This thesis draws very heavily on this range of sources. Although the Lahawiyin were 
numerically a small group, and so did not attract the level of official attention given to 
some larger tribes, they did offer some significant administrative challenges, which 
have generated a substantial written record. This is very largely a record produced by 
outsiders; it reveals relatively little of debate amongst the Lahawiyin themselves. The 
research for this thesis has therefore also involved the collection of oral history, 
relating to the whole period of the study itself. Spear has argued that oral history 
played a role in passing on the “history, literature and general knowledge” of the 
African people over time, but he and other scholars have also noted the interpretive 
challenges which it offers; which now include ‘feedback’ from published sources.10  
The way that Lahawiyin have talked about their past – the distant past of immigration 
from Arabia, or the recent past of disputes with the larger Shukriyya tribe - is very 
much a part of their negotiation over identity. But it is possible to use this oral history 
to extend and develop the information in the archives, and particularly to offer an 
insight from the perspective of Lahawiyin themselves.   
                                                 
8 Audrey Richards, Land, Labour, and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: an economic study of the Bemba 
tribe (Oxford: OUP, 1939) and Melville J. Herskovits, Dahomey: an African Kingdom (1967 [1938]), 
quoted in Grinker and Steiner (eds.), ‘Introduction,’ in Perspectives on Africa, p.6. 
9  Gaim Kibreab, State intervention and the environment in Sudan, 1889-1989: the demise of 
communal resource management , in Studies in African Economic and Social Development, Vol. 18 
(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, c2002), p.13. 
10 Thomas T. Spear, Kenya’s Past: an introduction to historical method in Africa (London: Longman, 
1981), p.xii; Justin Willis, ‘Feedback as a “problem” in oral history: an example from Bonde,’ History 
in Africa 20 (1993), p.353. 
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Arab identities and histories in Sudan 
 
The history of ‘Arab’ identities in Sudan has been greatly debated, both among 
scholars and among ordinary people in Sudan. Much of the scholarly work, 
particularly in the first half of the twentieth century, gave great attention to genealogy 
(always reckoned patrilineally) and presented the history of Arab identity in Sudan as 
the accumulated history of multiple descent groups – which are usually called tribes. 
This approach characterized the work of scholars including Harold MacMichael (who 
was also an administrator); Yusuf Fadl Hassan; Richard Hill; and Rex Sean O’Fahey 
(whose work focussed on Darfur). 11  These scholars drew on a range of evidence, 
including travellers’ books such as   those of W.G. Brown 1806; Muhammad ibn 
‘Umar al-Tunisi in 1803 and H. Barth 1855. 12 The writings of al-Tunisi, for example, 
revealed that in western Sudan in the early nineteenth century some of the population 
were considered Arabs and some were not; and some of those who were not 
considered Arabs nonetheless spoke Arabic.13 
 
But these scholars also drew on the testimony and writings of religious leaders and 
sheikhs, including al Tahir b. Abd Allah, a local historian whose manuscripts were 
collected by Richard Hill in 1966.  Al–Tahir provided detailed descriptions of Arab 
tribes in Sudan, and he established a genealogical order which embraced all the Arab 
tribes in northern Sudan.  He made a distinction between ‘Juhayna’ and ‘non-Juhayna’ 
tribes according to this genealogy. The Lahawiyin, for example, he categorized as 
Juhayna, on the basis of an alleged genealogy going back to ‘Rekab’  b. ‘Sultan’  b. ‘ 
Shutair’  b. ‘Zebian’ of Juhayn. This genealogical order could define continuing 
                                                 
11 Sir Harold MacMichael, A history of the Arabs in the Sudan: and some account of the people who 
preceded them and of the tribes inhabiting Dárfur, Volume 1  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1922);  Peter Malcolm Holt, The study of modern Arab history : an inaugural lecture 
delivered on 2 June 1965 (London: University of London (SOAS), 1965); Yusuf Fadl Hassan, The 
Arabs and the Sudan: from the seventh to the early sixteenth century (Khartoum: Khartoum University 
Press, 1973); Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); 
Jay Spaulding,  ‘The Chronology of Sudanese Arabic Genealogical Tradition,’ History in Africa 27 
(2000), p.329; J.O. Hunwick and R.S. O’Fahey (eds.), Arabic Literature of Africa, Volume 1: Writings 
of Eastern Sudanic Africa to c.1900  (Leiden: Brill, 1994). 
12 William G. Browne, Travels in Africa, Egypt and Syria from the year 1792 to 1799 (London: printed 
for T. Cadell Junior, W. Davies, T. N. Longman and O. Rees, 1799; reprinted by Nabu Press, 2005); 
Muhammad ibn ‘Umar al-Tunisi,  Tashhidh al-adhhan bi-sirat bilad al-‘arab wa-al-Sudan / 
haqqaqahu Kh.M.‘Asakir, M.M. Mus‘ad ; raja‘ahu M.M. Ziyadah (al-Qahirah : al-Mu'assasah al 
misriyah al-‘ammah li-a l-ta'lif alkh, 1965); Heinrich Barth, Travels and discoveries in North and 
Central Africa: including accounts of Timbúktu, Sókoto, and the basins of the Niger and Bénuwé 
(London: Ward, Lock, 1890).  
13 al-Tunisi, Tashhidh al-adhhan bi-sirat bilad al-‘arab wa-al-Sudan, pp.68-69. 
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relationships, as well as antecedents: it meant  that the Lahawiyin were blood relations 
of the Nurab, the ruling family of another northern Sudanese Arab tribe, the Kababish, 
who originally descended from Rekabiyya.14 
 
MacMichael’s work was the most ambitious venture in using this kind of genealogical 
material to try and write history, and has continued to inform some subsequent 
scholarship, though it has been much criticised. 15 Making use of a range of evidence 
collected by himself, and his fellow administrators,  MacMichael  presented his study 
in the  archaeological and anthropological setting of Sudan and using this to locate 
Sudanese history in what one (critical) commentator has described as a  “classical 
Islamic Literature of migration and descent”.16 By focussing on genealogy and the 
idea of each Arab tribe as a descent group, MacMichael implicitly – and often 
explicitly – presented the history of Arabs in the Sudan as one of immigration – 
indeed, sometimes, of ‘invasion’ - and the steady replacement of one population by 
another.   
 
A later generation of scholarship, while maintaining the interest in genealogy and the 
movement of Arab tribes, modified the implicit notion of population replacement by 
emphasising the process of ‘Arabization’, by which is meant acculturation through 
migration and contact.17 This viewpoint assumed that Arab identity had a basis in 
migration, but was also cultural. This is how Yusuf Fadl Hassan puts it “the slow 
Arab penetration which commenced in the early decades of Islam in the form of 
frontier clashes reached a climax in the 8th-9th/14th -15th c., when the Arab tribes 
overran most of the country. By the tenth/ sixteenth C., a culturally Arabicized stock 
emerged as a result of at least two centuries of close contact between the Arabs and 
the inhabitants of the Sudan. Regardless of a few exceptions, the term Arab was 
                                                 
14 al Tahir b. Abd Allah, ‘Kitab marif turu’ usul al- arab wa’l- hasab wa’l-nasab’, manuscript lithograph 
collected by R .Hill June 1966, Box 97/5/76-83, Durham archives [AR] pp.1- 8. 
15 Representative studies of recent times include the large compendium of' Awn al-Sharif Qasim, 
Maiust'ata l-qaba'il w a'l-ansab fi 'l-Sudan (Khartoum, 1996); Ahmad' Abdal- Rahim Nasr, Hadha 
Jamiiniasab al-Ja'aliyyin (Khartoum, 1981) and al-Fiki al-Fahl al- Tahir, Tn'rikhtv a-tusla l-'Arabb i'l-
Sudan  (Khartoum, 1979). Title to the contrary, no serious critique of Mac Michael's scholarship may be 
found in Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, "Breaking the Pen of Harold MacMichael: The Ja'aliyyin Identity 
Reconsidered," quoted in Spaulding, ‘Chronology,’ p.327.  
16 Spaulding, ‘Chronology,’ p.329. 
17 Hassan, The Arabs and the Sudan , pp.135-76. 
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progressively being emptied of nearly all its ethnic significance.”18 From this point of 
view, Arab is a cultural identity. Whoever speaks Arabic and partakes in “Arab” 
cultural practices is an Arab - regardless of ethnic origin.  
 
Migration was, however, at the root of this process, and Yusuf Fadl identified three 
different types of Arab migration to Sudan. The principal one was attributed to the 
influx of the Arabs southward into Sudan, up the line of the the Nile, to take refugee 
from the intensified warfare of the Mamluk  period in Egypt, in the 15th-16th centuries 
CE. This was what Yusf Fadl called ‘the Arab breakthrough’, for it coincided with – 
and helped to precipitate - the collapse of the Christian Nubian kingdoms.19 Yusuf 
Fadl also identified an earlier migration which had led to the settlement of some 
Arabs in the Beja lands in eastern Sudan.  A later cohort of migrants found ways to go 
further south and moved to Butana and the Gezira, and also went further west, 
crossing the Nile to Kordofan and Darfur. On arrival in Kordofan and Darfur they met 
other groups of Arabs who had taken a different route along the dried watercourses 
which cross the desert and have long provided trade routes – the “wadi al-Malik and 
wadi al-Magdam” - to Kordofan and Darfur. 20 
 
Yusuf Fadl argued that the second Arab migration was largely composed of nomadic 
Arab tribes. Their interaction of the Arabs with the existing local inhabitants (Nubians 
and Beja) took the form of a gradual transformation of the local inhabitants, and 
happened through the adoption of Arab customs and intermarriage between them. The 
process was uneven; though the Nubians and Beja had responded to the influx of 
Arabs by adopting Islam and intermarrying with the Arabs they kept their languages 
intact.  Most of the migrants were probably, like all nomads, poorly Islamized, but 
they were largely responsible for Islamization of northern Sudan. This was achieved 
primarily by intermarriage with the local population. In other words the process of 
Arabization was accompanied by a process of Islamization. 21  The progress of 
Arabization and Islamization could be dated to this time in the early sixteenth 
                                                 
18 Hassan, The Arabs and the Sudan , p.176. 
19 Ibid., pp.90-134. 
20 Yusuf Fadl Hassan, ‘Main aspects of the Arab Migration to the Sudan,’ Arabica T.14, Fasc.1 
(February 1967), pp.30-31. 
21 Hassan, The Arabs and the Sudan, p.177. 
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century. 22 Peter Holt’s work similarly offered a combination of migration/geneaology 
and ‘Arabization’ to explain the development of no rthern Sudan’s Arab population. 23  
 
More recent scholarship has reacted against this fascination with genealogy. Jay 
Spaulding argued that MacMichael’s assumption that there had been an Arab 
‘invasion’ coloured all of his interpretation, and that MacMichael had made a basic 
epistemological error regarding the nature of the evidence which he was using. Most 
of the manuscripts were religious works central to the Islamic discourse at that time 
which was the Sufi one. 24 These manuscripts included valuable genealogical 
information which substantially related to the time of its creation and to the history of 
ancestors. In Spaulding’s words, “It is therefore not surprising that MacMichael 
decided to abandon history for Orientalism”.25 Spaulding’s critique echoed in some 
ways the earlier work of Ian Cunnison, whose writings on the Baggara of Darfur and 
Kordofan claimed that there were many ways of constructing genealogies. Cunnison 
compared the examples of the Humr, who claimed their genealogy to be ten or eleven 
generations from the Prophet, and the Juhayna of the Nile Valley who claimed as 
many as twenty–eight or more generations from the Prophet. In the end Cunnison 
suggested that all genealogies need to be dismissed as fake ideology.  Epistemological 
arguments aside, criticism of the focus on genealogy has been more generally 
associated with a scholarship that has problematized Arab identity in Sudan as part of 
an exploration of the causes of the prolonged internal conflicts which have affected 
Sudan since independence. A recent example is Mahmood Mamdani’s book on 
Darfur, which posed the question “who is an Arab”, and in answering this question 
has presented the ongoing debates.  Mamdani has asked the question ‘who is an Arab’ 
at a point in time when the word Arab is controversial and highly contested and 
inflammatory.     
 
Within this context Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim posed an interesting challenge to Mamdani 
by stating that genealogists’ claims should not be treated as wholly true but we should 
ask why they make such claims in the first place.  This issue was central to the debate 
in anthropology for a while in the early 1920s although it was addressed differently by 
                                                 
22 Hassan, ‘Main aspects of the Arab migration,’ p.31.  
23 Holt, ‘The study of modern Arab history,’ p. 6. 
24 Spaulding, ‘Chronology,’ p.328. 
25 Ibid., p.329. 
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scholars: “Are the recollections of the past – whether concerning myth (Branislaw 
Malinowski) 26  or lineage claims (Evans-Pritchard) 27  or other origin based claims 
(Paul Bohannan) 28 – confused memories or are they claims on the present?”29 Talal 
Asad made a different stand by stating that “The Kababish didn’t have genealogies 
going all the way back to Arabia. Could it be a case of who asks the question and 
how? The Kababish never said ‘we are Arabs and therefore from Arabia’. Who makes 
these claims and in what context? The Kababish actually never claimed to come from 
anywhere else.”30  However Ibrahim added to this by saying that “a people’s self –
concept” 31  should be taken into account for it elucidates aspects of “their 
understanding, organisation and mobilization”. However according to Mamdani this 
“still leaves us with the task of understanding the context in which this “self-  concept” 
originates and of which it makes sense”. 32 From what Mamadani puts forth, it can be 
assumed that this self concept is a device for measuring the dynamics of a society; 
however as regards the origin of this device, it is necessary to engage in a debate as to 
how this concept came into existence. It is no doubt true that Mamdani in order to 
create this idea of ‘self- concept’ was influenced to a great extent by the works of 
other scholars33 like Fadl; who argues that “Arab identity is neither ethnic nor racial 
but cultural”. He termed this process as “arabization”. It can be stated that this view of 
Fadl is contrary to that held by Sharif Harir who argues that “Arabisim” is “cultural 
acquisition”. This phenomenon is prevalent amongst many groups in Sudan that are 
not racially Arabic.34 
 
                                                 
26 Branislaw Malinowski, Myth in primitive society, quoted in Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and 
Survivors: Darfur, politics and the war on terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), p.106. 
27 Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: a description of the modes of livelihood and political 
institutions of a Nilotic people, quoted in Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, p.106. 
28 Paul Bohannan, Justice and judgement among the Tiv, quoted in Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 
p.106. 
29 Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, pp.105-106. 
30 Talal Asad, personal communication to Mamdani, June 2006, in Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 
p.106.  
31 Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, ‘Breaking the pen of Harold MacMichael: the Ja’aliyyin identity revisited,’ 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 21:2 (1988), pp. 217-231. 
32 Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, p.105. 
33 Fadl Hassan, Talal Asad, Sharif Harir, Jay Spaulding.  
34 Fadl Hassan, The Arabs and the Sudan , quoted in Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, p. 106; Sharif 
Harir, “Recycling the Past in the Sudan ; an Overview of Political Decay” in Short-Cut to Daecay: the 
case of Sudan, (ed.) Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt,10-68(Uppsala:Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies,1994), pp.21,18-19, quoted in Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, p.106-107. 
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Mamdani’s work in itself built on a prolonged scholarly and popular debate on the 
nature of Arab identity. This can be exemplified through the work of Gerasimos 
Makris, whose work is concerned with how people have come to identify themselves 
as Arabs, rather than with migration and genealogy. In this analysis, Islam and Arab-
ness in the Nile Valley were shaped by the prevailing socioeconomic and political 
conditions resulting in a process of a gradual adoption of Arabic as ‘lingua franca and 
as religious script’.35 Such adoption has brought together much of the population of 
northern Sudan under a common religion with a common sense of ‘history and 
historical destiny’ as Makris put it. This encourages them to adopt genealogies 
(nasab) which link them to the Prophet and to the Islamic Arabian lands. Within this 
context those who identified themselves as Arab also claimed a right over land. 
Makris asserted that claims to an Arab genealogy have more to do with political and 
economic circumstances, including clientage and slavery, than with migration. These 
above points explain the ‘Arab self- identity’ as the corollary of the attitudes built 
towards non-Arabs as explained by Makris,  
 
These finer points concerning the gradual but firm assumption of an Arab 
self-identity by those on the northern side of the nineteenth century frontier 
become clearer when one considers the second part of the oppositions - 
non-Islamic pedigree, non-Arab descent and black colour- that concerned 
those on the southern side.36  
 
Within a wider changing context of ecological and cultural framework in North Africa 
the Arab claimed an ‘imagined community’. This gave them permanence and a 
defined domain associated with ‘freedom, humanity, Islamic tradition and heroic 
history’ and asserted through a claim to patrilineal descent. All this existed in contrast 
with an untouched hostile image: the realm of the pagan African slaves (who were 
called ‘abd, riqiiq or khadam).37  For the Sudanese Arab, the term ‘slave, did not 
define 'a status’ but the ‘absence of a status’ where a lack of attachments of kinship or 
genealogy was central to the slaves’ society.  Identity served to mark the boundary 
between the free – the Arabs - and the enslaveable population. As the slave economy 
of Sudan developed, slaves included servants, agricultural workers, concubines, 
                                                 
35 G.P. Makris, Changing masters: spirit possession and identity construction among slave descendents 
and other subordinates in the Sudan (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2000), p.27. 
36 Ibid., p.26. 
37 Ibid., p.26. 
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boatmen, porters, mercenaries and guards in the service of the Muslim slave traders.38 
In the words of McHugh:  
 
Those said to lack the requisite (Arab) genealogy have been deemed 
barbarians, liable to subjugation and enslavement... The people without 
Islam and recognized Arab descent.. are the 'people without history,' .. 
Slaves were defined by their marginality, their 'outsider' status: they had 
no genealogy at all. With no religion, descent and history the slaves 
were 'mere commodities and cyphers (even those born in servitude _ 
muwalladin) ... classified in the legal sense with livestock,' 39 
 
As this shows, history and genealogy were crucial to political and social status. Amir 
Idris has similarly argued that 
 
The adoption of an Arab identity required the construction of certain 
perception and representations about others and Muslims in the North 
claimed for themselves patrilineal descent from distinguished Arab 
ancestors. This continued acceptance of the claim to be ‘Arab’ was of 
crucial importance. It demarcated and rationalised the people of the 
Sudan. 40 
 
Most of the Arab and particularly the Muslim slave traders and merchants had 
developed a self-ascribed Arab identity which affirmed the legitimacy of their 
dominance over even those slaves who became Muslim.  Being Muslim was of no 
help where claims to Arab descent were at the heart of status.  
 
In this analysis, the linkage between Arab identity and social status remained crucial 
even after Sudan became an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1898, and political 
control lay largely in British hands. The Condominium administration sought to 
suppress slavery, but – as was common in colonial Africa – they took a gradual 
approach, first making the slave trade illegal.  The changes were most rapid and 
evident much more in the urban areas in the north of the country for the first time after 
many years of ongoing raiding, trading and exchanging of slaves leaving behind an 
uneven social structure. The slave trade did diminish, but continued on a small scale  
until the 1940s. Meanwhile, the ownership of ‘domestic’ slaves was left untouched for 
fear of losing the loyalty of their masters and bringing about a downturn in the 
                                                 
38 Makris, Changing Masters, p .28. 
39 Neil McHugh, Holymen of the Blue Nile: religious leadership and the genesis of an Arab Islamic 
society in the Nilotic Sudan, 1500-1850 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), p.10, p.12.  
40 Amir H. Idris, Sudan's civil war: slavery, race, and formational identities (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2001), p. 36. 
12 
 
economy.41 As Warburg cited by Makris, the British had tried to suppress slavery yet 
they had institutionalised domestic slavery with an Islamic ideology among the 
dominant Arabs of the north. 42  The Condominium also entrenched a distinction in its 
policies and language between the freeborn Arabs and slaves. Slaves were identified 
by a series of names such as 'volunteer slaves,' 'servants,' 'unpaid workers' or – 
significantly - 'Sudanese'. This drew on former practice. During the period of Turco-
Egyptian rule in the nineteenth century, the term Sudani (black) was associated with 
slaves (though it was used as nisaba in nineteenth century Egypt).43 By the end of the 
nineteenth century the term was also used to connote the soldies – often run-away 
slave soldiers from Turco-Egyptian or Mahdist forces - who made up the bulk of the 
Black corps of the Anglo-Egyptian army. In an ironic twist – revealing how malleable 
ethnic labels and constructions can be - this term ‘Sudanese’ was taken up by 
educated northern Arabs from the 1930s, and they developed a vision of the 
‘Sudanese’ nation as pre-eminently Arab which was to shape post- independence 
policies in ways which provoked conflict. In this analysis, in which – as N’Mah Yilla 
puts it – being Arab is best understood as an ‘identity rather than an ethnic or genetic 
heritage’, Arabization has been a process which has been pushed by, and has marked, 
political and economic inequality, and claims to Arab genealogy are, ultimately, all 
about power and wealth: Sudanese Arabs are actually Arabic-speaking Muslims from 
a variety of ethnic heritages who have adopted Sudan's riverain valley language and 
culture as their own. Thus, it is also a collective self-definition that develops to 
highlight the contrasts between different groups and categories.44   
   
While they have been concerned to identify the ‘root causes’ of Sudan’s conflicts, 
these analyses of Arab identity have also drawn on a wider literature on identity in 
Africa. This topic has seen a large amount of scholarly work in recent years, much of 
which has argued that identity is constantly shaped and reshaped by socio-economic 
and political processes. It is also subject to construction and deconstruction of 
members within a group and outside the group as many scholars have argued.45 As a 
                                                 
41 Makris, Changing Masters, pp. 32-41. 
42 Ibid. , p.43.  
43 Ibid. , p.48. 
44  N'Mah Yilla, ‘History, Ethnicity and Religion and the Sudanese North-South Conflict,’ 
Reconstruction 8.4 (2008), p.3. 
45 Louis Brenner (ed. ), Muslim identity and social change in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, c1993), pp-59-78; Francesca Declich, ‘“Gendered narratives,” history and 
13 
 
process of “naming oneself, naming others and being named by others”,46 identity is 
constantly influx, forming and reforming as a function of different social, political and 
economic situations. It is constructed and deconstructed by both those within a group 
and those outside of it. In this way, identity reflects the collective self-perception of 
social, political and economic reality and not necessarily the true reality. 47  Miller 
added another aspect to the discussion of identity by pointing out that identity and 
cultural affiliation are understood in a ‘diversity of voices’.48 
 
A widespread feature of this scholarship has been a focus on colonial policy, and the 
ways in which colonial states exacerbated – or invented – ethnic differences. The set 
of practices which are roughly characterized as ‘indirect rule’ have often been 
identified as especially important in this process, for they encouraged colonial 
officials to see their subjects as members of discrete tribes, and they encouraged 
colonial subjects to present their claims for – or against – authority in terms of tribe.49 
 
Madan Sarup has asserted that ‘identities are not free-floating; they are limited by 
borders and boundaries’.50 However, as Southall and others continued the debate on 
tribalism, they argued that boundaries between tribes were often drawn quite 
arbitrarily by anthropologists or administrators. Occasionally this was done according 
to resemblances and dissimilarities between languages, and at different times variation 
in territory, religion, or dress code were all perceived pertinent by the Europeans. In 
most cases boundaries were constructed more out of convenience than for local tribes 
                                                                                                                                            
identity: two centuries along the Juba river among the Zigula and Shanbara,’ History in Africa 22 
(1995); see also Aidan W. Southall, ‘The illusion of Tribe’, in Grinker and Steiner (eds.), ‘Introduction,’ 
Perspectives on Africa;  Justin Willis, Mombasa, the Swahili, and the Making of the Mijienda (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1993), pp. 12, 201; Thomas Spear and Richard Waller (eds.),  Being 
Maasai: ethnicity & identity in East Africa (London: James Curry, 1993); Paul E. Lovejoy (ed.),  The 
Ideology of Slavery in Africa (London: Sage, c1981); Paul E. Lovejoy, Slavery on the frontiers of Islam 
(Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, c2004).  
46 Brenner, Muslim identity, p.59. 
47 Ibid. , p.59, p.2.  
48 Catherine Miller, ‘Language, Identities and Ideologies: a new era for Sudan,’ published in the 
Seventh International Sudan Studies Conference (Bergen: Norway, 2006), p.8.  
49 John Iliffe, A modern history of Tanganyika (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1979); Leroy 
Vail (ed.), The creation of tribalism in Southern Africa (Oxford: Currey; Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989). 
50 Nigel Rapport and Andrew Dawson (eds.), Migrants of Identity: perception of home in a world of 
movement (Oxford: Berg, 1998), pp.55-56.  See also Madan Sarup, ‘Home and Identity’, in George 
Robertson (ed.), Travellers’ Tales: narratives of home and displacement  (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1994), pp.93-104. 
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in Africa where many tribes found themselves divided into two halves.  The example 
of the Azande who live between Sudan and Zaire is a good illustration of this.51 
 
The case of the Lahawiyin supports many of the wider theories regarding ethnicity 
and identity formation. Government policies, including the imposition of boundaries 
and tribally-defined administration, contributed to the process whereby they defined 
themselves as Lahawiyin and as Arabs. The Mahdiya, for example, played a 
significant role in constructing certain identities among northern nomadic tribes.  This 
was maintained by differentiating between Darfurian and Kordofanian tribes, as well 
as between them and the riverain tribes who were perceived, to a large extent, by the 
Mahdiyia leaders, to be a clique identified with the Turkish government. 52  The 
Condominium administration then made a distinction between the ‘Arab and Black 
tribes’ adopting variant policies. This in turn strengthened the notion which already 
existed within the Arab tribes themselves. Interestingly enough even the Lahawiyin 
made a similar, rather stronger distinction between the Ahmada53 and Kababish.  
 
But the thesis will also show in detail how internal competition and politics fed into 
these processes; ethnic identity was not simply imposed on the Lahawiyin from 
outside, but developed because leading individuals and families saw the advantage of 
claiming to speak for a united ‘tribe’. And the processes of identity formation can also 
be located in changing livelihoods and relations with neighbouring and territory-
owning tribes over a long period of time. 
 
                                                 
51 Richard and Herskovits, ‘Introduction’, in Vail (ed.), Creation of tribalism, p.7. 
52 Muhammad Said Al-Qaddal, Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith [Modern History of Sudan] 1820-1955 
(Omdurman: Abdel Karim Merghani Centre, 2002), pp. 189-190, 252-253; Muhammad Said Al-
Qaddal, al-Mahdiyah wa-al-Habashah: dirasah fi al-siyasah al-dakhiliyah wa-al-kharijiyah li-
dawlat al-Mahdiyah, 1881-1898  (Khartoum: Jami‘at al-Khartum, Dar al-Ta'lif wa-al-Tarjamah wa -al-
Nashr, 1973); see also Peter M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan: from the Funj sultanate to the 
present day (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, c1961); Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, al-Ard fi al-
Mahdiyah  [Land in The Mahdiyya] (Khartoum:  Jami‘at al-Khartum Shu‘bat Abhath al-Sudan, 1970).  
53 The Ahamda were originally “Bedouin” as Barbara Casciarri presented them.  They came to Sudan 
as a result of the migration of many nomadic   groups from Arabia and Egypt.  They first crossed to 
Kordofan and later on settled in the White Nile area, west of the river establishing the first ‘Dar al- 
Ahamda’ which was recognized by other nomadic tribes and the authority early 17th century.  Over 
time and while making claim over the land they faced several intertribal conflict with the Hassaniya, 
Messalamiya, Dar Muharib, Seleim Gima’a. They failed to remain united and the tribe disintegrated 
and some left for Butana joining the Shukriyia Confederation.  For more details, see Barbara Casciarri, 
‘Tribal Recognition of the Ahamda’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy; 
MacMichael, 1922; Reid 1930; NRO Dakhlia 112/3/16; NRO CIVSEC 66/1/1. 
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One of the strategies which the Lahawiyin now claim to have pursued in order to 
maintain their identity was to avoid marrying non-Lahawiyin, including ruling 
families of other hosting tribes like the Shukriyia. But there were some cases, the 
most remembered of which was the intermarriage with the Shilluk in the nineteenth 
century. Interestingly this marriage was often referred to as the marriage of “the 
Lahawiyin of the White Nile Province”54 which indicates perceptions that within the 
Lahawiyin there were different degrees of Arab-ness. The Arab identity was a focus 
for competition between umudiyyas as much as it was a source of a unifying tribal 
identity.  
 
The story of Lahawiyin identity must be understood in this context of intense popular 
and scholarly debate over the nature of identity, and in particular Arab identity, in 
Sudan. But there was also a practical and economic context for claims to particular 
identities, in which rights and access to land and territory were most significant. 
  
                                                 
54 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director, Statistic Department, December 2007, Gedarif.  
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Land tenure System in Sudan (1405 - 1984) 
 
If wider debates over Arab identity form one crucial part of the context for the story 
of the Lahawiyin, changes in the nature of land tenure form the other. And these two 
issues overlap, for the question of how identity relates to access to land has been 
subject to particularly fierce debate, and significant change. 
 
There has been no single ‘system’ of land tenure in Sudan. Instead, there has been a 
chronic tension between multiple different systems, which have overlapped, coexisted 
and sometimes conflicted. As al Mahdi has pointed out, ‘traditional’ land tenure was 
diverse, undocumented and unclear. 55 A series of different government systems have 
been introduced over time, which have not entirely displaced these customary forms 
but have in some ways reshaped them, as well as sometimes conflicting with them.   
 
The literature on land tenure in Sudan, covering both colonial and postcolonial times, 
suggests that state attempts to introduce new land laws, policies and, therefore, rights 
always focused initially on riverain areas of central and northern Sudan. In particular, 
the systematic recognition of individual claims to land, whether as leasehold or 
freehold, was concentrated in those areas. 56  Elsewhere in Sudan, many rural 
communities remained outside this system of individualising land tenure for a long 
time: even after 1970, when changes in the law formally asserted government 
ownership of all land to which there was no other title. Instead, under various forms of 
customary land tenure, individuals had use-rights to land – a kind of usufruct.57 But 
these customary rights were not unchanging or unaffected by the state; a long pattern of 
state intervention, stretching back well before Turko-Egyptian colonialism created the 
Sudanese state, linked governmental authority, collective identity and land tenure. It also 
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progressively undermined the position of pastoralists – a process which accelerated 
rapidly in the latter part of the twentieth century.  
 
Land tenure from the Funj period (c. 1400- 1820)-to the Mahdist period (1885-98) 
 
The Funj sultanate covered a significant area of what is now central riverain Sudan; 
the exact extent and nature of its authority varied, but it existed in some form or 
another from around 1400 CE up the time of the Turko-Egyptian conquest in 1820/21, 
The Funj sultans used the system known as Wathiga: a charter through which they 
granted land rights to privileged local tribal rulers and holy men. 58  These charters, 
which gave authority over both nomadic pastoralist and sedentary cultivators, were 
mostly granted in the predominantly rain-fed lands to individuals who  showed loyalty 
and support to the sultanate; they expressed land rights in terms of a collective tribal 
identity, and gave power to the individuals recognised as intermediaries between tribe 
and sultan. 59 Thus the ‘power centre’ in each tribe was endowed by the monarch, who 
used allocation of land to win political alliances.  Shazali and Ahmed argue that the 
Funj period thus assisted the nomadic tribes to achieve a relative political stability, 
although the Funj monarchs did play different ‘power centres’ within a ‘tribe’ against 
each other to serve their purpose.60 These grants may be seen as the basis of the idea 
of the dar: a territory in which access to land was associated with membership of a 
particular ethnic group, and was associated also with acceptance of the authority of 
the recognized head of that group.  This was an idea which was to have profound and 
enduring importance in Sudan.  
 
After the defeat of the Funj sultanate in 1820/21, the new Turko-Egyptian 
administration established a system of administration that assumed direct control over 
the urban sedentary population.  Shazali and Ahmed suggest that, with the former 
‘power centres’ of the Funj left to administer tribes which came to be defined as 
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consisting largely of nomads only, this system began ‘a process of political 
marginalization of pastoralists’. 61  Through northern Sudan, the sovereignty of the 
tribes was maintained subject to payment of tributes by the dar holders to the Funj 
Sultans and later to their successors, the Turko-Egyptian rulers. 
 
Importantly, the Turko- Egyptian government recognised all the land rights, including 
dar rights, acquired from the Funj Sultans and regents, including their vassals. It has 
therefore been argued that the Turko-Egyptian regime (the Turkiya) did not affect 
fundamental changes in the structure of land ownership. Though all land was kharaji - 
the prize of victory – and as such was vested in the government, the only difference 
from the land policy pursued by the Funj Sultans was said to be that private ownership 
of irrigated land and rain-fed land under continuous cultivation was recognised.62  But 
there was uncertainty, even over this. Colonel Stewart, reporting on the Sudan in 
1883, wrote: ‘in the Sudan as elsewhere in the East it is admitted that the Government 
is the owner of the land, and that the peasant in order to cultivate it must pay a certain 
tithe calculated at one tenth the produce’.63 This suggests official uncertainty over 
freehold even in riverain areas: land that was cultivated intermittently was regarded 
formally as the property of the Government and the cultivators were seen as tenants.  
 
Uncertainties aside, however, it seems that under the  Turkiyya , the economy in the 
the lands surrounding and in between the Blue and White Niles – where the state was 
at its strongest – began a movement  from one based on communal land-sharing and 
ownership to one that was more capitalist, based on individual ownership of land. 
Addit ionally, the Turco-Egyptian government promoted individual land claims by 
instating law statutes that favoured private land ownership.64 This made it possible for 
individuals to privately own land that they could not have laid claim to under the pre-
colonia l system. In effect, as Spaulding concludes ‘the Turks, through their land-tax 
policy, encouraged institutions that facilitated the transfer of rights over the land out 
of the traditional system of tenure [where patterns of kinship dictated how land was 
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distributed] and into the bourgeoisie marketplace’.65 Spaulding further declares that 
under the Turko-Egyptians, ‘rights to the fruits of the land gave way to rights to the 
land itself’.66 These land policies affected the way that individual Sudanese viewed 
the concepts of landownership and communal responsibility. An example of this can 
be seen with the saqiya lands - those irrigated by a water wheel. Saqiya land was at 
one time public property but by end of the nineteenth century many of the Saqiya 
holdings were classified as maqsuma67  or divided into discrete plots of land with 
individual owners.68 
 
The accumulation of large plots of land by individual people became easier not only 
because the Turkiyya brought a legal system which – rather unevenly – recognized 
individual tenure in these riverain areas, but also because its occasionally arbitrary 
and extractive approach to taxation created new opportunities for some individuals. In 
this riverain heartland, land that had been recognized as individual property was 
vulnerable to seizure and sale when individuals failed to pay their tax; and others 
could buy the land, not at its market value but at the price of the debt owed to the 
state.69  
 
The Mahdist state of 1885 to 1898 - the Mahdiyya - made little formal attempt to 
change the land tenure system; but other policies of the time had a significant impact 
on land settlement.  The Khalifa Abdullahi, who ruled for almost the whole of the 
period, transferred vast territories to his loyal groups and followers, and disloyal 
groups were dispossessed of land rights. 70  Large areas were left empty, being 
depopulated for security reasons, or because the population had left following the 
Khalifa to Omdurman. According to Kibreab, the Mahdiya caused a ‘profound’ 
change in the system of land ownership in terms of individuals and groups while 
leaving the ‘dar right intact’.71  
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The Condominium (1899- 1956) 
 
Following the Anglo-Egyptian campaign of ‘reconquest’ in 1896-98, the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium agreement of January 1899 restored Egyptian rule in Sudan, 
but with joint authority exercised by Britain and Egypt. The agreement designated 
territory south of the twenty-second parallel as Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. 72  In the 
Condominium’s early years the Governor-General – the official in charge of the 
Condominium, nominally appointed by both powers but in practice always chosen by 
Britain – had a great deal of freedom in governing Sudan; this was only very slightly 
reduced after 1910 with the creation of an executive council whose approval was 
required for all legislation and for budgetary matters after 1910. This council was 
presided over by the Governor General and included the Inspector General, the Civil, 
Legal, and Financial Secretaries and two to four other British officials appointed by 
the Governor- General.73 The Executive Council retained legislative authority until 
1948.  
 
The Condominium saw an entirely new level of systematisation. Penal and criminal 
procedural codes were introduced; commissions established land tenure rules and 
adjusted claims in dispute; taxes on riverain land were calculated on a basis which 
took account of the type of irrigation, the number of date palms, and the size of herds. 
Government sought to undo what was seen as the disruption of the Mahdiya, and to 
restore an earlier tribal map of the country to reduce inter-tribal conflicts; on the other 
hand, land settlement and deeds registration legislation was introduced to solve 
disputes over land which was claimed by individuals, and despite its general 
conservatism, the Condominium’s concern to generate revenue to meet the costs of 
government led it, over time, into several innovations in land tenure in order to 
promote projects of  large-scale economic development. There was never any 
intention that Sudan should be a settler colony; from the outset, it was expected that 
Sudanese producers would be the basis of prosperity and government revenue.   In 
1912, Lord Edward Cecil wrote: ‘The Sudan is not and never will be, a country 
suitable for permanent European  habitation, and it is therefore the interest of the 
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Government to encourage as far as possible native land owners of a respectable and 
suitable type’.74 The Condominium formally separated civil law and sharia;   but it 
also created guidelines for the operation of sharia courts as an autonomous judicial 
division under a chief qadi.  
 
All this systematization was nonetheless associated with a continued reliance on 
customary law. The Condominium had limited resources, and its senior officials were 
British men, familiar with the imperial practice of relying on – and partially creating - 
subordinate forms of authority and justice which were not part of the formal structures 
of ‘modern’ government.75 Indirect rule of various kinds was widely used; in Sudan, 
this was formally adopted in the 1920s under the rubric of Native Administration or 
Idara Ahliyaa. But while the rhetorical emphasis on this approach was strongest and 
most consistent in the 1920s, the core of this system had been laid in the 
memorandum of Kitchener - the first Governor-General – who, immediately after the 
‘reconquest’, advised his subordinates to cooperate with indigenous leaders who had 
no direct commitment to the Mahdist state. The British officers from the very 
beginning sought to recognize and work with tribal leaders, and to give them a wide 
range of authority including the settlement of tribal conflict, maintenance of justice 
and collection of taxes.   
 
In terms of land tenure,  the Condominium government initially largely aimed to 
reinstate the pre-Mahdist system; but it legally enshrined and made systematic the 
distinction between rain land and riverain land. Some parts of the latter – especially in 
areas around Khartoum - came under the system of registration. Rain land, however, 
was excluded from individual ownership. The Government claimed some rights to 
control and regulate land recognized as dar, and its policies encouraged the perception 
that there were ‘homeland’ dars for different tribes, which conferred communal rights 
of control over areas usually used by them. Al Mahdi maintains that ‘because of the 
long enjoyment and use of large tracts of land, tribes became the reputed owners of 
their homelands (dar) with the effect that in some situations they were able to exclude 
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aliens’ and suggested a developing set of ideas about the nature of dar rights under 
which  ‘No other tribe can cultivate, graze or water themselves or their animals in a 
dar belonging to another tribe, except by permission of such tribe through tribal chiefs 
or the local authorities’. 76  Dar rights also involved the right to admit or refuse 
strangers to water and graze in the dar and the right to impose conditions on such 
entry; the right to build permanent buildings in the dar; the right to cultivate; the right 
to sink wells, or dig new ones. Closely connected to this issue were the questions of 
the nature and enforceability of routes (Masar) and camping sites on the migration 
cycle of the year, bearing in mind that the route is not simply a road or pass-through 
area, but is also grazing land. Dar rights were held to include the welcoming of 
friendly groups, hospitality being one of the outstanding features of nomadic life. 
‘The customary rules between nomads are based on the reciprocity of such guest-
rights in bad years: in fact, in times of need befriended groups have visiting right in 
the other dars - which means use rights as to water and range’.77  
 
These developing ideas of the dar gave individual rights, as well as collective ones; 
every member of the tribe was regarded as having the right to cultivate a plot for each 
member which is protected as an individual or family holding. This however was not 
generally understood as a permanent right, but depended on actual possession being 
continuous. It was economically most valuable because this potential use right could 
be actualised to claim unused land at anytime, anywhere within the dar.78   
 
During the Condominium, it was routine practice for nomadic tribes to hold annual 
meetings in which, among other things, they settled disputes concerning watering, 
grazing, animal theft, and blood money; settlements which themselves revolved 
around the idea of the dar. Access requests from neighbouring tribes were also 
considered during such conferences, which  devised grazing strategies, modified or 
amended terms of old agreements and defined the conditions under which temporary 
access could be granted, and other issues.79  
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Alongside this developing idea of dar rights, the Condominium developed the formal 
system of land ownership. It issued the first Land Title Ordinance in 1899; this 
allowed for the recognition of freehold in riverain areas, where a plot of land had been 
in continuous use for five years. It provided for the settlement of disputed titles to 
land and for the appointment of a commission consisting of three Egyptian Army 
officers and two notables.80 ‘The Ordinance however, excluded from land settlement 
and registration the rainlands of central, eastern and western Sudan as well as all lands 
in Southern Sudan’.81 Land commissions were appointed and toured many parts of 
Northern, Khartoum and Blue Nile provinces to settle titles to, and rights over, land.82 
Generally, the Condominium administration seemed to be more concerned with 
settlement of agricultural land as a basis of the economic future of Sudan while 
allocating specific grazing areas for nomads.  
 
The recognition of title to riverain land was an important element in the 
Condominium strategy of recovering from the Mahdiyya and ensuring social and 
political stability by encouraging agriculture.  Therefore cultivators were reassured 
that their rights over land would be secured and that no land would be recognized 
without a valid title”. 83  Therefore settlement of agricultural land was the prime 
concern of the Condominium and was seen as the basis of the economic future of 
Sudan. This was confirmed in May 1903 by the appointment of an inspector of 
agriculture and land. In 1903 the Condominium Government clearly defined as 
Government land property which included all karu [Land lying remote from river 
banks, slightly lower and are irrigated by river flood] and atmors [land possesses 
charatcteristics derived partly from sand and partly from clay]84  The Government 
claimed these lands because they were considered all waste and could be hardly 
treated.  85  
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The above two pieces of legislation, and further ones over the next few years - the 
Deeds Registration Ordinance of 1907, amended by the Deeds Registration Ordinance 
of 1908 and 1920 - were reinforced in 1925 by the comparative and consolidating 
Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance. 86  This absolutely fixed the legal 
dichotomy in land tenure that characterizes the agrarian structure of the present day 
Northern Sudan. This dual tenure has privileged certain groups. Under these laws, the 
cultivated rain lands of northern and central Sudan were considered “unsettled” areas 
and were classified as Government-owned and divided into two classes: Government 
land subject to no right, and Government land subject to various kind of usufruct, or 
use rights, which were vested in communities such as tribe, section, village (or, in the 
case of the Nuba Hills of Western Sudan, in individuals). This classification has 
remained intact up to the present time.87 
 
Mechanized farming experiments, and post-independence land policies 
 
The big step of land development during the Condominium was the Gezira scheme. 
Originally conceived before the First World War, this scheme aimed to create a vast 
new area of irrigated land, damming the Nile to make possible the creation of a 
network of irrigation canals in the triangle of land between the White and Blue Niles 
which is known as the Gezira.  Large areas of land were taken up for the scheme in 
192188 with an addition of a total of 134,414 feddan by 1927.89 This was, in effect, a 
transfer of land out of one category and into another; most of the land involved had 
been used for rain-based cultivation of for grazing, and so had been part of the 
category of collective rights. Under the scheme, it was taken by the government and  
leased to individuals.  
 
More generally, along the river, more and more land was being seized for pump 
irrigation, and let on annual basis : the increasing availability of petrol-driven water 
pumps made this an attractive new area for investment. Private cultivators were 
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encouraged to lease land particularly in Khartoum and Berber provinces to pursue 
pump irrigation; a development which inevitably created some tensions with previous 
systems of tenure.90   
 
It was not until the 1940s that the Condominium government attempted any 
involvement in rain-fed agriculture in Sudan. By 1944 the government had surveyed 
and demarcated 350,000 feddans of rain land at Gadambaliya near Gedarif for the 
mechanised production of dura (sorghum) for the Sudan Defence Force units 
stationed in North Africa. The Government attempted fully mechanised production in 
order to avoid dependence on wage labour and potential disturbance of the supply of 
labour to the Gezira scheme.  By the end of the 1946/47 season, in which 21,000 
feddans were cultivated, the available varieties of dura proved impossible to harvest 
effectively by mechanical means and the necessity for employing manual labour in 
the harvest was recognised. In the following year it was decided to introduce tenancy 
system on 3,000 feddans divided into plots of 28 feddans.91 These initial efforts at 
rain-fed mechanised agriculture were beset with difficulties.92 In addition, tenancies 
were allocated on the basis of family and relatives by the nazirs and sheikhs. In 1953 
the Ministry of Agriculture appointed a Working Party to review the situation at 
Gadambaliya. Among the many suggestions to improve the situation for the tenants 
and to minimise difficulties mentioned earlier, the working party proposed leasing 
larger plots to private investors and cooperatives.93  
 
This recommendation was implemented and many investors profited from mechanised 
farming; and so just as Sudan was coming to independence, at the beginning of 1956, 
the government’s earlier focus on irrigated riverain agriculture as the basis for 
development was now joined by a developing commitment to mechanized farming on 
rain fed land, which was to have particularly marked impact in the areas east of 
Khartoum. The crop areas in Kassala province under mechanised farming rose from 
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5,000 feddans in 1954/55 to 1.2 million feddans in 1959/60. This area was distributed 
to investors and co-operatives in blocks of 1,000 feddans. The consequence of such 
expansion was that the extension rapidly exceeded the planned surveyed areas. 
Legislation was developed to regulate such expansion. The Land Ordinance 1925 was 
effectively the base of regulating leasehold and production relations;    the Rain-fed 
Land Ordinance in 1959 required the Government to license all mechanised crop 
production. Leasehold moved from annual to a compulsory minimum of 25 years. 94 
By 1961, licensed mechanised crop production schemes had been extended to Dali 
and Mazmum areas in Blue Nile Province, and by the 1960s there were similar 
schemes in Kordufan and Upper Nile province and the White Nile area as well.  By 
1968 the Government had licensed 1.8 million feddans to private individuals in 
Sudan. 95 
 
As a consequence of this, while during the Condominium period the Government 
catered to a large extent for tribes and particularly nomadic pastoralists in term of 
dars, and grazing rights, the post- independence governments of Sudan dealt with 
pastoralist groups less carefully.  Pasture and grazing lands were transformed into 
mechanised schemes for privileged traders and business men more than nomads and 
livestock herders. 96 ‘Development’ was primarily sought through agricultural 
expansion.  Expansion either replicated the model of the Gezira Scheme (Managil 
Extension, New Halfa and Rahad), or promoted large-scale rain-fed farming in a 
search for enhanced national food security. 97 
 
This expansion had devastated most of the clay plains of eastern and central Sudan’s 
rain-fed areas since and turned them into rain-fed mechanized farming land, 
particularly after 1968. These were grazing lands for the Lahawiyin, Dabayna, 
Gawasma, Ahmada and Shukriyya.  They covered an estimated area of over twenty 
five million acres, most of which was not actually allocated by the Government but 
rather captured by big influential traders and politicians. Invariably this expansion 
was at the expense of pasture land and the environment.  The Lahawiyin and other 
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tribes stated that their fortunes during the Condominium time were far better than 
their lot under national governments. New legislation in 1970 accelerated this process. 
 
The Unregistered Land Act 1970 
 
The Unregistered Land Act (ULA) 1970 was based on the view that any common 
property was regarded as nobody’s property, where entry is unlimited and use 
unregulated.  The Government of Jaafar Nimeiri, committed to rapid economic 
development and motivated by a profound suspicion of the ‘reactionary’ nature of 
traditional authority, was determined to re-allocate land and other resources in the 
country to activities where it was believed that returns would be higher. By this Act 
the Government claimed ownership of all unregistered land in the country, and so the 
Government effectively vested in itself the power to limit nomads’ movement and 
their livelihoods. A further dramatic step was the dissolution of old tribal allocative 
power by the enactment of the Local Government Act, 1971 (LGA). 98 This meant, in 
essence, that continuance of land control by the old system was no longer enforceable 
in court. It opened the door to those investors who came to exploit uncertain situations 
of land tenure by establishing large, unauthorised tractor schemes. These merchants 
rejected any interference by traditional authorities and moreover claimed Government 
support; in fact usually they obtained some form of official authorisation. Then the 
situation allowed relatively easy access to land. Even legal access to, and allocation 
of, land by the Mechanised Farming Corporation,  the public venture created in 1968,  
turned out to be ‘soil-mining’, that is, destructive and exploitative farming which 
degraded the land because the soil conservation conditions in the lease were not 
complied with by the tenants.99 
 
By the early 1980s, as Sudan lurched from one economic crisis to another in the final 
years of Nimeriri’s rule – and as Nimeiri himself looked to Islam as a new basis for 
his authority - the consequences of these changes had become dangerously apparent. 
There was further legislation on land under the Civil Transaction Act, 1984, which 
abolished a number of land laws such as 1928 Ordinance. The Act stipulates that 
‘registered usufruct rights are equal to registered ownership’. The Act also authorizes 
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some parts of shari’a law by legally emphasising the role of the state as a landowner 
and a land manager. By repealing the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, the new 1984 Act 
provided comprehensive guidelines and details to assist in its implementation. I would 
argue that the coinciding of the introduction of this Act with the drought of 1984 
reveals that the Government had realised that the displacement of much of the 
population that took place as a result of the drought from their original rain-fed lands 
might cause some disruption in usufruct rights and therefore it was obligatory for the 
Government to regulate and keep order. The 1984 Act appeared to issue a number of 
rights regarding land and property and these rights included “land held in undivided 
shares, family ownership, and possession of unclaimed property, ownership of 
usufruct rights over land and property, grants of usufruct rights, easement rights, and 
acquisition of ownership by accession, possession and succession”. 100 The essence of 
this Act were issues related to acts instigated more or less by the government such as: 
‘transfer and inheritance of rights; compensation requirements for land appropriated 
by the state; granting of land leases to cooperative bodies; conditions for obtaining 
usufruct rights; possibility of registering easement rights (rights of way)’. The Act 
also fell short of being able to define wasteland as it tried to draw various Islamic 
laws from different countries that proved to be unsuitable to the Sudanese context.101  
Throughout this developing process of pastoral marginalization, the Lahawiyin were 
in a particularly vulnerable position, for they never had a recognized dar. The 
consequences of not having their own territory led the Lahawiyin to multiple 
movements, creating a succession of tribal conflicts as they joined different 
confederations, under each of which they were kept on the margins of power. The 
chapters below set out these conflicts chronologically, and analyse the persistence and 
development of Lahawiyin identity as they do so. 
 
The history of changing land policies and systems outlined above has been largely 
analysed in terms of its negative effects, particularly upon pastoralists. But while the 
Lahawiyin have certainly experienced a shrinking space in which to access land for 
their traditional livelihoods, their story shows the more complex effects of land 
policy. Among the tribe there were both winners and losers, as some individuals or 
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sections began to pursue alternative livelihoods, including sedentary cultivation and 
labour migration. The resulting differentiation and competition then fed into internal 
politics and external alliances, demonstrating once again the interconnections between 
land and livelihoods, tribal identity and administration, and wider politics. 
 
Chapter One  entitled ‘An emerging identity: political relations and migrations, 1881-
1910, presents some of the different accounts of the origin and migration of the 
Lahawiyin from Arabia to Northern Sudan. It then examines the internal structures of 
the tribe, and its various movements. It also covers the Lahawiyin involvement with 
the regime of the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa, under which the Lahawiyin 
were entitled to certain rights as a result of their early alliance with the Mahdi. The 
main argument in the chapter is that the power exercised by al-Tom of the Kababish 
led the Lahawiyin to emphasise a distinctive, ‘Arab’ identity.   
 
Chapter Two deals with ‘The Lahawiyin under the Condominium 1910-1928: 
external boundaries and internal divisions ’.  The chapter focuses on a period in which 
the Lahwahiyin struggled to resist the new boundaries imposed by the Condominium 
government, and shows how this was linked to a process of administrative unification 
of the tribal structure. This chapter argues that the British administrative policies 
towards the Lahawiyin centred upon controlling movement boundaries, grazing and 
land. 
 
Chapter Three is called ‘Slavery and Lahawiyin Identity and Economy. ’  This 
chapter explains the process of Arab identity formation in relation to slavery and the 
slave trade in the case of the Lahawiyin, who were simultaneously Lahawiyin, Ansar 
and/or Khatmiyya and ‘slave masters’. The chapter argues that the self-constructed 
identity of the Lahawiyin also rested on their no tions of wealth and status, which 
came to define membership of the tribe. Wealth and status were in turn based during 
the colonial period on ownership of camels and slaves. 
 
Chapter Four discusses ‘The desire for a dar: changing livelihoods and relations to 
the land in the later Condominium period’. This chapter explores the impact of 
continuing Condominium Government efforts to create and enforce such boundaries, 
and of the development of new agricultural land-use. The main argument of this 
30 
 
chapter is that there were contradictory processes of increasing tribal unity around the 
demand for a dar, and increasing variation between different livelihoods within the 
tribe 
 
Chapter Five,  ‘The shift to sedentarisation, 1956-1986’,  explores the social and 
economic changes of the period up to the 1980s, and uses them to set the context for 
the events of 1983-84, when drought brought these changes into dramatic focus, 
revealing the vulnerability of the Lahawiyin and pushing new developments in 
identity politics. The chapter argues that much of the agricultural mechanisation that 
took place did not always impact negatively on the Lahawiyin. Indeed it increased 
individual land rights among the well-off Lahawiyin, which would later support their 
political representation and claim for a nazirate.  
 
Chapter Six is entitled ‘New Claims for a Nazirate: the Politics of Native 
Administration in the 1990’s.  This chapter discusses three main events in the 
development of the Lahawiyin quest for nazirate in the 1990s. These were the 1994 
Decree, the Lahawiyin Conference of 1996 and the election of the Showak Rural 
Council in 1996. It argues changes in Native Administration offered opportunities to 
the men who competed for leadership of the Lahawiyin, and to their followers, to try 
and improve their political and economic positions. 
 
Chapter Seven deals with  ‘Lahawiyin Contemporary Politics’, looking at the 
contemporary politics of the Lahawiyin drawing on a specific period of time when 
Lahawiyin identity was re-shaped as a result of the expansion of mechanisation, 1980s 
drought and the abolition and reinstatement of Native Administration. It will discuss 
how they co-opted the local politics in their favour by collecting the tribe from all 
over Sudan and established new tribal and political institutions which perpetuated a 
process thriving on the contemporary politics of the region. This chapter argues that 
with the margin of political authority granted through the new institutions which had 
emerged, there was an underlying dynamic which would cause the tribal political 
power to attach more forcefully to the traditional Lahawiyin Arab identity in order to 
negotiate the nazirate and that identity would increasingly be confined to a new face 
of political identity which emerged within the tribe’s new political institutions.
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Chapter One 
An emerging identity: political relations and migrations,  
1881-1910 
 
As the Introduction showed, the history of ‘Arab’ identities in Sudan is much debated, with 
increasing divergence between scholarly views and the internal versions of their history 
presented by particular tribes. The Lahawiyin claim a more recent arrival in Sudan than many 
other groups, which they use both to explain their client status in relation to other tribes, and 
to claim a more pure Arab identity than these politically-dominant tribes.1 They also claim to 
be a part of the ‘Juhayna’ Arabs – descendant s of ‘Abdullah al-Juhani, like the Rufa’a, 
Kababish, and other Arab tribes of western Sudan.  2 McHugh has suggested that the division 
between those claiming Juhayna descent and those claiming Ja’ali (Abbasi) descent in Sudan 
tends to correspond to the division between nomadic peoples of the ‘hinterland’ and 
‘sedentary riverain peoples’. This, he argues, ‘had much less to do with literal migration than 
with political and economic associations, possibly including clientage and slavery’.3 As this 
suggests, the genealogical identity developed by the Lahawiyin is bound up with a complex 
set of factors: nomadism and pastoralism, political and territorial clientage, slave-owning, and 
changing access to land.  
 
Much discussion of Arab identity in Sudan has highlighted the twentieth century as the period 
in which it became most intensely politicised, through colonial policies favouring Arab tribes, 
the writing down of oral histories, and postcolonial programmes of Arabisation. But as 
historians have also noted, it was the long nineteenth century that saw the widespread 
development of Arab genealogies.4 This chapter shows that Lahawiyin identity emerged from 
the political context of the nineteenth century, so that even in the twenty-first century it 
                                                 
1 With exception of the Rashayda who arrived in Sudan by 1860s.  William C. Young, The Rashaayda Bedouin: 
Arab pastoralists Of eastern Sudan (Texas: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), pp.105; Eman Bushra, 
‘Local level political dynamics in Kassala State: the Rashayda’, in Catherine Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and 
Political Legitimacy, pp.277-308. 
2 MacMichael,  A history of the Arabs, pp.237-244.  See al-Tayyib Muhammad Tayyib,  al-Indayah / taqdim 
‘Awn al-Sharif (Khartoum: Dar ‘Azzah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi‘, 2004); see also al Tahir b. Abd Allah, ‘Kitab 
marif turu’ usul al- arab wa’l- hasab wa’l-nasab’ (Manuscript lithograph collected by R .Hill June 1966, 
Durham archives Box 97/5/76-83).  In this manuscript, the Lahawiyin genealogy goes back to ‘Rekab’  b. 
‘Sultan’  b. ‘ Shutair’  b. ‘Zebian’ of Juhayn, which would make the Lahawiyin blood relations with the ruling 
family of the Kababish, the Nurab who originally descended from Rekabiyya. 
3 McHugh, Holy men of the Blue Nile, pp.9-10. 
4 Spaulding, ‘Chronology,’ pp. 325-337.  
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continues to emphasise a contrast with their hosts a century earlier, the ‘Kababish’.5  The 
chapter also traces an emerging tribal unity through the migrations and disputes through 
which the Lahawiyin reached their present location in the Butana. By forming their own 
political relations with three successive regimes, they resisted absorption or intermarriage 
into host tribes and sought out the best situation in which to practise their livelihoods. 
 
This chapter presents some of the different accounts of the origin and migration of the 
Lahawiyin from Arabia to Northern Sudan. It then examines the internal structures of the 
tribe, and its various movements.  In crossing borders, the Lahawiyin further developed an 
Arab identity that was maintained through social and customary constructed norms, and 
which differentiated them in their own view from other ethnic groups.  They had no  
recognized tribal homeland – no dar - and any land rights were exclusively held by the 
hosting tribe. The primary hosting tribe in the nineteenth century were the Kababish of 
Kordofan, whose position was strengthened by their close relationship to the Turco-Egyptian 
government. 6  The chapter also covers the Lahawiyin involvement with the regime of the 
Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa, under which the Lahawiyin were entitled to certain 
rights as a result of their early alliance with the Mahdi. 7 This strengthened their position in 
relation to the Kababish authority; indeed it is argued that Lahawiyin support for the Mahdi 
was partly motivated by their ambition to improve their own political position. Their 
continuing search for stronger rights to territory, together with their resentment at the harsh 
system of tribute and taxes under Ali al-Tom, nazir 8  of the Kababish, would lead to the 
splitting and migration of the Lahawiyin from ‘dar Kababish’ to ‘dar Shukriyia’ in the 
Butana, where they became the guests of the Shukriyya nazir, whose family had gained in 
wealth and status through their association with the Turco-Egyptian regime, had succeeded in 
                                                 
5 Talal Asad,  The Kababish Arabs: power, authority and consent in a Nomadic tribe (London: Hurst, 1970);  
Talal Asad, ‘Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe,’ in Ian G. Cunnison and Wendy James (eds.), Essays in 
Sudan Ethnography, presented to Sir Edward Evans-Prichard  (London: Hurst, c1972), p.128.  See also Justin 
Willis, ‘Hukm: The Creolization of Authority in Condominium Sudan’, Journal of African History 46 (2005), 
pp.29-50. 
6 Asad, ‘Political Inequality,’ p.128. 
7 A.B. Theobald, ‘The Khalifa Abdallah’, Sudan Notes and Records, Volume 31:2 (1950), pp. 254-273.  See 
Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan ; Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, al-Ard fi al-Mahdiyah  [Land in The 
Mahdiyya] (Khartoum: Jami‘at al-Khartum Shu‘bat Abhath al-Sudan, 1970);  Muhammad Said Al-Qaddal, 
Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith [Modern History of Sudan] 1820-1955  (Omdurman: Abdel Karim Merghani Centre, 
2002); M.W. Daly, Empire on the Nile: the Anglo-Egyptian-Sudan, 1898-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986);  Abdalla Ali Ibrahim, ‘The  Mahadiyya  and the Kababish: towards legitimacy  and 
resistance’ (unpublished manuscript, University of Khartoum, 1976). 
8 In 1886 during the Turco-Egyptian rule and Musa Bash Hamdi   created new administrative divisions, aqsam, 
out of some districts and appointed local nazirs as their administrators.  Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan under 
Wingate; administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1916, (London: Cass, 1971), p.144. 
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maintaining much of their privilege under the Mahdiyya, and who continued to prosper  
under the Condominium. 9  That the Lahawiyin move occurred largely in the early 
Condominium period probably reflects the effects of the Anglo-Egyptian victory over the 
Mahdists, and the boost this gave to the position of the al-Tom family, now favoured by the 
British authorities, which was able to make new and unwelcome demands of their Lahawiyin 
guests.  
 
The main argument in the chapter is that the power exercised by al-Tom of the Kababish led 
the Lahawiyin to emphasise a distinctive, ‘Arab’ identity.  The distancing of the Lahawiyin 
from the power centre in dar Kababish by the Kababish ruling family, the ‘Nurab’was an 
important factor that perpetuated the preservation of the so called Arab identity and which led 
to the development of a search for a dar. 10  The Lahawiyin hoped to gain more control of 
their own affairs in Butana under the Shukriyia. Although British policies would perpetuate 
the privileging of dar rights, of claims to Arab identity, and hierarchical divisions among 
Arab tribes, this chapter will nevertheless show that these processes had their roots firmly in 
the nineteenth century. Finally, the chapter will discuss the role of the key leaders of the 
Lahawiyin, who emerged during the Mahdiyya. 
  
                                                 
9 Muhammad Said Al-Qaddal, al-Mahdiyah wa-al-Habashah: dirasah fi al-siyasah al-dakhiliyah wa-al-
kharijiyah li-dawlat al-Mahdiyah, 1881-1898 (Khartoum: Jami‘at al-Khartum, Dar al-Ta'lif wa-al-Tarjamah 
wa-al-Nashr, 1973), p.24-25. 
10Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim has defined the ‘Nurab’ as a section of Rekabiyya tribe lived east of al- Afadd on the 
Nile. A sub section resented living on the Nile and headed to Kordofan and mixed with other tribes where as   
the Kababish was one of them. Their intermarriage with the Kababish had helped them take over the tribe 
headship. They competed and defeated   the former traditional ruling family, ‘awlad Ugba’. Nurab  consisted of 
a  number of groups of a blood relations: of awlad Fadlalah wad Salim ( al-Tom, Balul, Karadem, Salih), awlad 
Gurish, awlad  Fahal, awlad Awad al-Seid, awlad al-Keir, dar Kabeer, dar um al-Bakhiet, dar Saeid and abu  
Shaiyya. The Nurab was – according to Abdullah Ali Ibrhaim - part of the ‘al-Baij’, a confederation that 
includes al- Rebeigat, al-Hawarab, and al-Kebishat. The ‘al-Baij’ was the symbol that this confederation put on 
their camels .The Nurab created an administrative unit governed by customary laws and  thus became to some 
small tribes or sub sections of tribes a resort for those who might had  blood feud or tribute debts to others.  
Abdallahi Ali Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1977), pp.32-38.  See also 
Asad, The Kababish Arabs, p.121; al Tahir b. Abd Allah, ‘Kitab marif turu’ usul al- arab wa’l- hasab wa’l-
nasab,’ pp.6-8; Awad abdel Hadi, The Political History of Kordofan during the Mahdiyyia 1881-1899 
(Khartoum,  1973). 
34 
 
 1. Stories of Lahawiyin Migration ‘from Arabia’ 
 
The Lahawiyin base their claim to a more ‘pure’ Arab identity on having arrived in Sudan 
from Arabia more recently than other Arab tribes in Sudan, and having ‘resisted 
intermarriage’ with other tribes.11 They also present their migration to Sudan as a search for 
pasture, implicitly emphasising that their pastoralist livelihood has been key to their sense of 
history and identity.  
 
Many Lahawiyin have presented themselves as part of the Juhayna, and this is generally 
accepted in the accounts of MacMichael and Fadl Hassan12 . The latter cites Burton, who 
reported that the Juhayna were a large tribe from the Hejaz Mountains who could be found 
from the plains north of Yanbu (which were granted to them by the Prophet in 624 A.D.) into 
the Semitic peninsula.13  MacMichael goes on to suggest that the Juhayna were among the 
tribes which ‘flocked’14 into Egypt in about 630 A.D, and notes that Makrizi mentioned them 
“among the six largest and most powerful tribes of Upper Egypt established at Manfalut and 
Elsiuf at that time”. 15 Furthermore, he writes that “some of them took part, with the Fezara 
and others, in the expedition of 647 A.D settling in great numbers between Sayene (Aswan) 
and Abyssinia”. 16  Again it was the Juhayna and the Rabia who in 869 A.D. contributed 
largely to the composition of the Arab groups that ‘invaded Beja country and settled there 
and intermarried with the people ’. 17  The scale of these movements is probably much 
exaggerated by Fadl Hassan and MacMichael, but they do suggest that any Juhayna migration 
into Sudan took place very early, between the seventh and ninth centuries, whereas Dirar 
suggests that the Juhayna came to Sudan as late as the 13th century. 18  But they all 
[MacMichael, Fadl Hassan and Dirar] suggest that the Lahawiyin migrated much later, in the 
late nineteenth century. These accounts may have influenced the Lahawiyin’s own 
construction of history.  
                                                 
11 Interviews with late sheikh Ahmed al-Zein, June 1997, al-Mugataa wad al-Zein, interview with Ali Sueleiman, 
Gedarif, December 2007, al-Zein Ahmed al-Zein, and others.  Collection of poems and songs, see Tamador A. 
Khalid, ‘Changing dynamics of gender relations of the Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.,) Land, ethnicity and political 
legitimacy, p.464. 
12 Mac Michael,  A history of the Arabs in the Sudan, p.237.   
13 Ibid., pp. 138-139.  See also Yusuf Fadl, The Arabs and The Sudan, pp. 154-177. 
14 MacMichael, A history of the Arabs, pp.138-139. 
15 Ibid., pp.138-139. 
16 Ibid., pp.138-139. 
17 Ibid., pp.154-176. 
18 Dirar Salih Dirar, The Migration of the Arab tribes to Nile Valley Egypt and Sudan [AR] (Al-Reyad, al-
Tawba Bookshop, 2001), pp. 446-447. 
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According to MacMichael (and Fadl Hassan) until the nineteenth century the Juhayna 
(including the Lahawiyin) formed no part of the Kababish and they were never more than 
temporary members. Since MacMichael’s account was very much based on the information 
he gathered as an administrator, this suggests that the Lahawiyin had emphasised to the 
Condominium Government their lack of connection to the Kababish. In the beginning – 
according to MacMichael - they were said to have settled in Western Sudan and moved as 
pastoralists between the White Nile and Kordofan and later on they moved to Eastern 
Sudan.19  
 
The Lahawiyin have relied on oral history to explain much of their origin, their genealogy 
and the routes they had taken to reach Sudan, as much of their history is undocumented. 
However, Awad al-Karim Babikir, a local historian, claims that they were descended from 
the Juhayna and that they linked their ancestors to the ‘Ashraf’ – that is, people who claimed 
nobility on the basis of their alleged descent from the Prophet - of Al Sayed Rafei wad Al 
Sayed Amir.20 He was the great grandfather of the Shukriyia and  – according to this account 
-  came to teach the Quran, crossing the Red Sea at the Bab el-Mandab strait, but then 
returned back to his home land in Arabia’. 21  This is interesting in that it provides an 
alternative geneaological linkage, tying the Lahawiyin genealogically to the Shukriyia. A 
Shukri interviewee similarly stated that a Lahawiyin great-grandmother was the daughter of 
Abdalla Al Juhani, and excluded any possibility of any blood relation between the Lahawiyin 
and the Kababish: ‘We have no relation with Kababish - Kababish are viewed as non-Arab’.22  
Thus the Shukriyia promote a similar notion to the Lahawiyin about who could be a pure 
Arab and who could not. As we shall see, Lahawiyin identity has been partly constructed by 
comparison with their former rulers, the Kababish, who are seen as less pure ‘Arabs’, and  
with whom the Lahawiyin claim not to have intermarried. 
 
The complexity – and the contradictory nature – of Lahawiyin stories of their geneoalogy is 
further suggested by another account, told by some Lahawiyin, which suggests that the 
                                                 
19 MacMichael, A history of the Arabs, p.180. 
20 The term ‘Ashraf’ was widely used as reference to all descendents of the Prophet, of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib’, and 
those of his brother ‘Ja’far al-Tayyar’. Though most descendents relied on oral history and local tradition they 
hardly obtain any evidence with exception to Sharif Zayed b. Abi Numayyb. Ajlan, sharif of Sawakin.  Hassan, 
The Arabs And The Sudan, p.171. 
21 Interview with Babikir Awad al-Karim Babikir, Historian, Showak Rural Council, December 2007. 
22 Interview with Babikir al-Daw Shola (Shukri), President Pastoralist Union, Gedarif, December 2007. 
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Lahawiyin are not Juhayna but are from the Rufaa group. They say that it is only because 
their great-grandmother was a daughter of Abdalla al-Juhani that some historians and some 
Lahawiyin think they are Juhayna. 23  Although MacMichael suggests that the Rufaa and 
Juhayna were closely connected in some way, this is hard to reconcile with his account, and 
these variations in the Lahawiyin history suggest that, in the absence of written histories, 
Lahawiyin have developed multiple  accounts of their migrations and geneaology, reflecting 
the shifting demands of alliance and affiliation. 24 
 
A further account provided by  Lahawiyin was that they were part of different Juhayna 
groups, who came from Egypt, Libya and Morocco through the Sahara to north Kordofan and 
had lived with the Kababish and then moved to White Nile Province and to the East after the 
Mahdiyya. According to a Lahawi Sheikh, “our grandmothers used to say belad Fas al 
Mawraha Nas” where ‘Fas’ literally refers to Fez in Morocco as the furthest land beyond 
which no one lived. 25 Whether this is any more ‘true’ in an absolute sense, it may convey 
some sense of the more gradual and extensive migrations that might have occurred in reality 
across the northern part of Africa. In this regard Fadl Hassan had also mentioned that the 
Arabs had entered Sudan from different routes, not only Egypt. Some Arabs had entered from 
the Red Sea from the early time of Islam as well.26 While Fadl Hassan stated that the Juhayna 
were found in Darfur and Bornu he was not specific in explaining whether these groups of 
Juhayna arrived from north Africa or through the Red Sea and had followed their  nomadic 
instinct to  search for grazing and pasture in  places further from their first identified 
settlement  in  Kordofan.  
 
Great numbers of them [Juhayna] still live to the east of the Nile, and some of these 
have immigrated within the last few years. Others are to be found in Bornu and 
Darfur.27  
 
One further account was presented by the Shukriyya Sheikh Omara Abu Sin to the Collinson 
Pasha, then governor of Kassala, in 1901. He declared that the Lahawiyin had migrated to 
Sudan from Arabia during the Mahdiyya and were living in many places in the Sudan, 
including Kassala and Kordofan, “having no ‘belad’ [land/country] of their own and that he 
                                                 
23 Interview with a Group of Lahawiyin sheikhs, market in Showak, December 2007. 
24 Sir Harold MacMichael, The tribes of Northern and Central Kordofán (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1912), p.187. 
25 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
26 Yusuf Fadl Hassan, ‘Main aspects of the Arab Migration to the Sudan’, Arabica T.14, Fasc.1 (February 1967), 
p. 31. 
27 MacMichael, A history of the Arabs, p.181. 
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was trying to collect them”. 28  However this same account was later contested by the 
Governor of Kordofan in 1910: 
 
I distinctively remember hearing him [Abu Sin] telling Collinson Pasha that story 
early in 1901. Neither Collinson Pasha nor I had any idea at the time, as I know 
now, that this was a [t]issue of falsehoods from beginning to end; so Omara was 
encouraged in every way to collect this tribe which though very rich in camels was 
without any habitation.29 
 
Clearly Abu Sin’s account was unfounded, since the Lahawiyin were documented to be part 
of Juhayna under the Kababish since the 1880s, although he might have meant to refer to 
their arrival in Butana in 1901. This also shows that the Shukriyia could construct history in 
order to justify ‘collecting’ the scattered Lahawiyin together under their rule. They may have 
contributed to the idea that the Kababish were less pure and that the Lahawiyin had more 
genealogical relation to the Shukriyya, as part of attracting the ‘camel-rich’ tribe to move to 
Butana, as will be discussed later in the chapter.  
 
Overall, then, little can be said for certain about the processes of migration and Arab 
influence on Sudan, but what is clear is that the Lahawiyin were involved in the same process 
of genealogical construction as other tribes claiming ‘Arab’ status. This was probably also 
part of a process of unification of disparate groups into the Lahawiyin ‘tribe’. Most 
importantly, Lahawiyin versions of history reflect their relations with the two competing host 
tribes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Lahawiyin identity is contrasted with 
the less ‘pure’ Kababish, whereas the Shukriyya are said to be distantly related to the 
Lahawiyin.  
 
 
  
                                                 
28 Letter, Governor of Kordofan to the Assistant Director of Intelligence Khartoum.  (31 May 1910)  NRO 
CIVSEC 66/3/29.  See also Hassan, The Arabs and the Sudan. 
29 Letter, Governor of Kordofan to the Assistant Director of Intelligence Khartoum.  (31 May 1910)  NRO 
CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
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2. The Lahawiyyin in the Nineteenth Century  
 
During the Turko-Egyptian rule (1821-1881) the social structure of the Lahawiyin tribe was 
based on the following sections,  each named as ‘the people’ of a particular leader; these 
would later become sections under headmen, or umudiyya: Nas Wad al-Faki,  Nas Wad Isa, 
Nas Magait, Nas Sowar, Nas Wad Hassan, Gawamis, Awlad Hardan, Awlad Gubarab, Wad 
Mohammed al-Zein.30 Each section centred on the leading family from which it took its name. 
These families claim distant common ancestry, so the Lahawiyin saw (and still see) their 
internal structure in terms of related lineages. Each section had its own hierarchy and 
structure, and they did not by any means exist in complete harmony and unity. Some old 
conflicts and blood feuds were inherited by them and were maintained for a long time, 
sustained by historical retelling. Some sections were interested in developing their own 
interests, rather than seeing their interests as defined by their membership of the Lahawiyin 
as a whole, and these ambitions contributed to the internal division of the tribe. 
 
It is interesting to note that the term nas among the Lahawiyin implied that the eponymous 
leader of the section possessed a distinctive level of wealth and power. The term awlad, 
according to many Lahawiyin, by contrast implied much less wealth: the Awlad Hardan (‘the 
sons of Hardan’) had few camels compared to the Nas Wad el Faki, ‘the people of the son of 
El Faki’, or the Nas Isa whose leaders held power and authority. Willis, writing of the 
Kababish,  uses the term ‘nas’ to mean those without authority of any sort – ‘the “subject”, in 
the full sense which Mahmood Mamdani used the word’.31 I would argue that on the contrary, 
in this context, ‘nas’ socially implies recognition and prestige and Nas Wad al Faki were a 
family of authority and power within the Lahawiyin. The role of Nas wad El Faki in shaping 
the internal structure of the Lahawiyin was significant in determining later political alliances 
(to strive for dar and nizarete) with traditional political parties during the Condominium 
administration and in the recent government of Sudan.  
 
 
                                                 
30 T. Khalid, I. Dalamu and C. Miller, ‘Lahawiyin in Showak Rural Council: Imposed Boundaries and the Quest 
for Political Recognition,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.313-314.  See also 
‘Lahawiin tribe’ in the Tribal Anthropological Survey, NRO Dakhlia [1] 112/5/27. 
31 Willis,‘Hukm,’ pp.29-50.  See also Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the 
legacy of late colonialism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1996).  
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3. Turco-Egyptian rule and the Kababish: the Lahawiyin as client tribe  
 
The Turco-Egyptian administration in 1821 established a new system of administration that 
assumed direct control over the urban sedentary population along the line of the river Nile in 
northern Sudan. This meant an administrative separation between these groups and the 
nomads and farmers in rain- land Sudan, amongst whom administration continued to be 
indirect and where people maintained their access to a collective claim, which relied on the   
payment of tribute to the Turko-Egyptian state, through tribal leaders who were recognized as 
dar holders. The Turco- Egyptian government recognised all the titles acquired from the Funj 
Sultans and regents, including their vassals. 32  Most importantly for the pastoralists, dar 
rights, including those emanating from the charters granted by the Funj Sultans, were 
recognised by the Turkiya. This benefitted both the Kababish and the Shukriyia; on the other 
hand, it meant that the Lahawiyin, who had held no dar under the Funj sultanate – quite 
possibly because they had no very long history in Sudan as a distinct group – had no 
collective right of their own,   and so had to rely on cliental relationships with these larger 
tribes. 
 
By the time of the Turkiyya, four sections of the Lahawiyin were hosted within the tribal 
boundaries of “Dar Kababish” under al-Tom Wad Salim.33 The Lahawiyin were considered 
as a client tribe, and as such had the right to graze and water in the dar of the hosting tribe 
with an annual payment of a goat by each member of the client tribe known as the yard goat 
for watering all their animals. Again the client tribe was eligible to cultivate in the hosting 
dar for a shiraya paid to the sheikh of the hosting tribe. The shiraya was a tax in kind valued 
as three amdad [510 Grams] for each raika (the raika is thirty mid i.e. four and half kaila).34 
A client tribe was not allowed to dig a deep well, or put signs on trees or mountains or hit the 
drum within the hosting dar. Like other small tribes, the Lahawiyin faced a difficult choice, 
imposed on them by the governmental recognition of larger tribes; they had to pay tax 
through the larger tribe or face punishment, and to make claims to land outside this system 
would be a risky option  
 
                                                 
32 O’Fahy and Spaulding, Kingdom of the Sudan, and Spaulding, ‘Herders and the State,’ pp. 329-48.  Also see 
Spaulding, ‘Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class,’ pp.1-20. 
33 ‘Lahawiin tribe’ in the Tribal Anthropological Survey, NRO Dakhlia [1] 112/5/27. 
34 Ibrahim, Fursan Kunjarat, p. 14. 
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The Kababish of northern Kordofan had a long history in Kordofan and they were considered 
by the Turkish administration to be an important tribe; Fadl Wad Salim, who was recognized 
as the leader of the Kabablish by the Turco-Egyptians, in 1833-1875, was a reliable supporter 
of the government.  In 1850, Mansfield Parkyns account, based on an extended period of 
residence with the tribe in 1846-47, differentiated between the Kababish and their client 
tribes: his list includes a number of names which are usually used of independent tribes living 
elsewhere, which suggests that the Kababish may at this stage have been acting as hosts to a 
number of sections which had separated off from these larger tribes and sought grazing, 
protection or other opportunities with the Kababish. 35  The key differences between the 
Kababish and the client tribes lay in the government recognition of the Kababish claim to a 
dar; under Turko-Egyptian rule the newly- imported term nazir was applied to the recognized 
leader of the Kababish. In terms of local symbolic items of power, the nazir also had a nahas, 
a copper tribal drum.36 Kababish sheikhs, subordinate to the nazir, were given responsibilities 
to claim and collect taxes and ushur according to the tribal customary laws. Client tribes, 
without their own nahas or dar, were directly subject to any appointed sheikh of a Kababish 
section. There seems little doubt that the Kababish as a whole and the Nurab in particular, 
absorbed many of these clients over time into Kababish identity – the advantages of 
becoming Kababish, rather than continued existence as clients, were considerable. 
 
The Kababish ability to attract clients and ultimately to absorb some of them, was a result of 
their relationship with government. Al-Gadal has argued that both the Kababish and the 
Shukriyia had built strong economic relations with the Turco-Egyptian government during 
their rule in Sudan; aware of the importance of camel transport to the government, they 
always supplied the required number of livestock, whenever these were demanded by the 
government 37. Such relations had strengthened the position of the Kababish and the Shukriyia 
among other tribes, particularly in relation to client tribes such as the Lahawiyin which 
explains the privileged relation both tribes, the Kababish and the Shukriyia, would also obtain 
and maintain throughout the Condominium.  
 
 
                                                 
35 MacMichael, ‘Notes on the history of Kordofan before the Egyptian conquest,’ SAD.281/3/1-30. 
36 Asad, The Kababish Arabs, and Asad, ‘Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe.’  
37 Al-Qaddal, Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith [Modern History of Sudan], pp.99-291.  See Daly, Empire on the Nile. 
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4. History of an ‘Arab’ Identity 
 
In their subsequent accounts of this period of clientship in Kordofan, Lahawiyin claim to 
have maintained a distinct identity while living in Kababish territory. One oral history told 
was that they had to flee when a Kababish sheikh wanted to marry a Lahawi woman. The 
family and the umudiyya as a whole refused to allow this, although the suitor was a sheikh, 
and so they decided to leave by night - with their camels, of course. The late Sheikh Ahmed 
al-Zein, telling this story in the 1990s, explained that it would have been impossible to 
approve such a marriage, because “we have an opinion about their [Kababish] Arab-ness”.38 
Whether or not this was actually the cause of the migration, the story is very revealing of the 
way in which the Lahawiyin have expressed their resentment of Kababish rule by questioning 
their degree of ‘Arabness’. Thus political grievances were channelled into the formation of a 
Lahawiyin identity which emphasised ‘pure’ Arabness. 
 
This assertion that Lahawiyin are more Arab than the Kababish is constantly encountered. In 
the early twenty-first century, one Lahawiyin explained how the position of women was a 
means of comparability of values as to whether they were genuine Arabs or otherwise.  
 
We are different from them (Kababish) in that our woman is always in the shade:  
that means, she does not go out – that means the uncle can’t joke with his niece, 
part of the discipline. The Kababish community is an open community; they flirt 
with women and their women dance openly. We say that the woman who is flirted 
with is (gazyyia) loose.39 
 
Such a statement made a clear distinction between the Arab tribes. Throughout the years 
spent with the Kababish and before, the Lahawiyin could – by their own account - trace their 
genealogical purity. This is contrasted repeatedly with the position of the Kababish: 
according to an account reported by Abdallahi Ali Ibrahim,  the Kababish great grand sheikh, 
Rabeh Baouda al Ugabbi, married a woman who, it was claimed was Shukriyia or a slave 
from Dar Hamid40. This was the reason why the Lahawiyin often publicly questioned the 
‘Arabness’ of the Kababish. The Lahawiyin in general had identified a way of social 
exclusion, consistently refusing to allow women to marry outside the tribe. It was 
                                                 
38 Interview with the late sheikh Ahmed Adam al-Zein, Mugataa wad al-Zein, June 1997. 
39 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
40 Ibrahim, Fursan Kunjarat, p.39. 
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unacceptable to marry a Lahawi woman to a stranger ‘Women who will be taken away and 
travel, we don’t support’.41 
 
The Lahawiyin, even as clients of the Kababish, claim to have maintained some sort of social 
structure by customary laws. This was, presumably, not easy and entailed intrigue and 
survival strategies in order to keep the tribe intact and insulated, as the Lahawiyin claim. This 
however was reflected in property ownership (camels) and marriage which was exclusively 
an internal matter for the Lahawiyin umudiyyas. Although some oral history shows that the 
Kababish tried hard to infiltrate the Lahawiyin by marrying their women, Lahawiyin insist 
that this did not happen on a significant scale, and attributed the occasional exceptional case 
of intermarriage with the Kababish as a consequence of the disruption during the Mahdiyya.42  
 
Our Kababish grandmother is probably the only offspring of the chaos that took 
place during the Mahdiyya or the possibility that our great grandfather worked with 
Kababish and he may be the only individual who married with them. Not many 
Lahawiyin did that.43  
 
Even this Kababish great-grandmother was not seen collectively by all Lahawiyin as their 
great grandmother; for other Lahawiyin, this is a peculiarity of the wad Hardan section. This 
shows how each omudia worked independently regardless of the fact that all belonged to one 
tribe.  
 
Simultaneously the ‘ruling group’, the Nurab, controlled political and economic power 
among the Kababish. 44 However, Ali Abdullah Ibrahim argues that the Lahawiyin, as a client 
tribe, insisted on preserving certain customs and rights of the tribe, and by doing so their 
‘nobles also exercised some sort of power and authority’ 45 at a different level which was not 
apparent to others. Although the Lahawiyin were always seen as the vulnerable clients who 
only provided labour and paid tributes, they handled their affairs subtly and carefully.46 The 
Lahawiyin knew any confrontation with the Nurab would cause them great loss of property, 
men, women and camels that could be avoided if the tribe co-operated and searched for 
                                                 
41 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
42 Interview with Siddig Yousef, Trader, Showak, December 2007. 
43 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
44 Asad, The Kababish Arabs, and Asad, ‘A note on the history of the Kababish tribe,’ Sudan Notes and Records 
xlvii (1966) and Asad, ‘Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe,’ pp.126-148. 
45 Interview with Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, Assistant Professor of History, University of Missouri-Columbia, 
Durham, September 2008. 
46 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
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alternative pasture. The Arab identity carried by the Lahawiyin was a protective element in 
the way that the Lahawiyin had dealt with the Kababish, and their women were central to 
their movement. 
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5. The Mahdiyia, 1881-1898  
 
Not all the Lahawiyin sections were living in Kababish territory in the nineteenth century. 
One section, Bulolab, was already in the Butana, and four others were in the White Nile 
Province. Local historian El Obeid has been told that before the Mahdiyya, the Lahawiyin 
were at Gadir, in the southern Nuba mountains,and Marabeei wad al Ebieh (a village to the 
west of the Nile) and also on Aba Island on the White Nile.47 In one written account, they 
constituted the first supporters of the Mahdi, who established his initial headquarters on Aba 
Island.48 Interestingly enough the oral history of the Lahawiyin also claims that the tribe had 
lived in Aba Island, with the Shilluk tribe.49  Later in 1921, a British Inspector in Butana who 
was presumably informed by the Lahawiyin themselves also reported the story of their 
presence on Aba Island before the Mahdiyya : 
 
During the Turkish Government the only Lahowin who were in Butana were the 
subsection BELULAB who were under AWLAD EL-KERIM AHMED BEY ABU 
Sin……..The other sub-sections, Nas WAD ISA, NAS SOWAR, AWLAD 
HARDAN, NAS WAD HASSAN Lived  about ABBA ISLAND under Sheikh 
WAD EL LEBEIH. 50 
 
In the 1860s a European explorer had recorded that 
 
The infamous Mohamed Khayr, sheikh of Hilat Kaka, had founded his first 
settlement here in around 1857 for the purpose of large–scale slave raiding. 
However, compelled by the Shilluk, he had to give up this location, and nowadays 
no trace of this settlement is found.51 
 
                                                 
47 Interview with Babikir Awad al-Karim Babikir, Historian, Showak, December 2007.  Gadir, near Tegali, 
owed its importance of  being  the  second big victory against the Turco - Egyptian army and  it was also the 
place where the Mahdi compiled  what was known as the ‘Imam al-Mahdi’s  Ratitb’, a collection of Quran’s  
verses and Hadith.  See Al-Qaddal, Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith [Modern History of Sudan], pp.180-185. 
48 Hill, Egypt in the Sudan; Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan; Hadi, Tarikh Kordofan al-Siyasi [Politicl 
History of Kordofan]. 
49 Interview with a group of Lahawi sheikhs, Showak, December 2007. 
50 P. Ball, Inspector Butana, 'The Lahowin Tribes' (1921), pp.1-14, NRO CIVSEC 66/11/102. 
51 Theodor von Heuglin, Die Tinne'sche Expedition im westlichen Nil-Quellgebiet 1863 und 1864 [Journey in 
the area of the White Nile: Eng. Trans] (Gotha: J. Perthes, 1865), p.81; Ferdinand Werne, Expedition zur 
Entdeckung der Quellen des Weissen Nil [Expedition to discover the sources of the White Nile] 1840 – 1841 
(Berlin: G. Reimer, 1848).  A detailed map with this book shows very clearly some distance south of Dueim, at 
appr. 13o 10’ North: ‘Die Inseln und die Stromufer von hierab von SCHILLUK bewohnt,’ which is to say, 
‘from here [i.e. further upstream] the islands and river banks are inhabited by Shilluk.’  This is well north of 
Jazira Abba! 
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 Some Lahawiyin claim that one of their great grandfathers was named ‘Khair Allah’, but 
there is no further evidence of the Lahawiyin’s involvement in slavery during that period of 
time or that ‘Mohamed Khayr’ was connected to ‘Khayr Alla’. 
 
According to the Lahawiyin oral history, the Mahdi turned to them for military support in 
order to evacuate the Shilluk from Aba Island and give their land to his own followers. The 
story told by the Lahawiyin has an interesting twist, however: 
 
Our great grandfather, wad Barajub, a Mahdi leader, was called by the Mahdi to 
talk to the Mak [‘king’ or ‘chief’] of the Shilluk who lived on the Island, urging 
him to leave the Island. The Island was not named Aba then. The Shiluk Mak 
received the Lahawi representative of wad Barajub and told him to tell wad 
Barajub that the Mak ‘Aba’ [Aba means ‘refuse’ in Arabic] and since then the 
Island was called Aba. Wad Barajub decided to fight the Mak and when he got 
there he gave him the choice; either to fight or to marry his two daughters to wad 
Barajub and his brother and that was the case. This why the Lahawiyin of wad el 
Lebiyeh (White Nile province) are different, their great grandmother was a Shilluk. 
 
This story was told by a Lahawi sheikh in Showak and was retold by another interviewee in 
Gedarif. 52   There was also a suggestion that these Lahawi leaders, wad Barajub and his 
brother, might not have married the two daughters of the Shilluk Mak as presented above but 
might have enslaved them instead. Such a marriage with a non-Arab would appear to go 
against all the Lahawiyin principles of refusing intermarriage with the Kababish because they 
were less pure Arabs. If taken literally, this intermarriage with Shilluk women might have 
happened because wad Barajub wanted to please the Mahdi.  
 
Whether or not the Lahawiyin were actually present on Abba Island in the 1880s, they did 
become supporters of the Mahdist rising and the Mahdist state established under the Mahdi’s 
successor, the Khalifa, from 1885. It is debatable whether they were strong believers in the 
Mahdi’s religious message;   the Lahawiyin have been generally reputed to be a nomadic 
tribe with little interest in religious teaching, as Fadl Hassan notes: 53  
 
                                                 
52 Interview with Sheikh Yousif Hassab al-Gawi, Showak. December 2007; interview with Ali Suleiman, 
Director  General of Statistics Department, Gedarif, December 2007. 
53 Interviews with late sheikh Ahmed Adam al-Zein, 1996, al-Mugataa wad al-Zein, Ali Suleiman, Gedarif, 
December 2007, Babikir Awad al karim, Showak,  December 2007, and Abdalla Amir, Gedarif, December 2007.  
Some informants had indicated that the Lahawiyin because of their continuous movement and nomadic life 
could easily  affiliate themselves with any religious Fiki.  For instance, the Lahawiyin umudiyyas followed both 
Kahtmyyia and Samania; they used to visit al-Sherif Hindi who was leading another different Tariqua, which 
means they were mixing up all sort of religious principles. 
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The nomads were neither well versed in Islamic dogma nor literate; but to 
disseminate the simple the teachings and practices of Islam do not require a high 
measure of literacy. To declare the Shihada or act of faith is all that is required..54 
 
Their support for the Mahdi might rather be the earliest indication that some of the leaders of 
Lahawiyin sections were seeking to gain their own territory, particularly as the leaders of the 
Kababish and Shukriyya, as close allies of the Turco-Egyptian government, did not have 
good relations with the Mahdist movement. While the Lahawiyin were roaming between 
Kordofan and White Nile province, they had lost any grazing rights they had previously had 
in Kababish territory. The Lahawiyin’s close affiliation to the Mahdi contributed to building 
mutual trust between the two parties. Thus the Lahawiyin who were rich in camels were 
entrusted to carry confidential messages to various parts of Sudan calling upon tribal leaders 
and sheikhs to join the revolution, as part of a camel post system. The time shared in Aba 
Island between the Mahdi and the Lahawiyin may have created a bond which caused them to 
support his religious teaching, if only in pursuit of political ends.  
 
The Mahdi’s unexpected death in 1885, shortly after he had achieved his final victory with 
the capture of Khartoum, may have deprived the Lahawiyin of some of the fruits of this early 
alliance. If he had had lived longer the Lahawiyin would probably have had more say in 
terms of dar and land. The Mahdi’s successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi transferred vast 
territories to those he as his loyal groups and followers – his fellow Ta’isha and other cattle-
keeping Arabs from the far west of Sudan, while groups he suspected were dispossessed of 
land rights.55 Large areas were left empty, being depopulated for security reasons, or because 
the population had left following the Khalifa to Omudurman. According to Kibreab, the 
Mahdiyyia caused a ‘profound’ change in the system of the land ownership in term of 
individuals’ and groups’ positions while leaving the ‘dar right intact’;56 For the Lahawiyin, 
this period was one of movement, but it did not result in the creation of a new dar for them. 
 
During the Mahdiyya, important political changes took place among the Lahawiyin sections. 
The privileged position of the sections referred to as nas did not change much. Some 
Lahawiyin moved to live near the Khalifa’s capital in Omdurman, while others remained in 
the White Nile and Butana areas.  Two sections (Wad Isa and the Wad Sowar) moved from 
                                                 
54 Hassan, The Arabs and the Sudan , p.177. 
55 Awad, ‘The evolution of land ownership in Sudan,’ pp.212-28.  
56 Kibreab, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, pp. 21-30. 
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the White Nile to Omdurman, while the remaining sections (Wad Hardan and the Wad 
Hassan) left for Gazira and lived opposite Abba Island.  Both these sections were known to 
own few camels making them appear poor compared to the rest of the Lahawiyin, who were 
considered highly rich. “They used to have no camels”. 57 The Mahdiyia offered titles to the 
some Lahawiyin section leaders, who were recognized under the Mahdist system of emirs. 
The appointed Lahawiyin figures were Mohammed al-Zein (al-Faki) and Mohammed al-Easir 
(Isa). These two emirs were subordinate to Ahmed wad Barajob who remained responsible 
for the Lahawiyin even after his retirement. They provided a good deal of transport for the 
Khalifa's armies but were not involved in fighting.58 However the structure of the Lahawiyin 
tribe had been profoundly changed and competition between al-Zein’s family and the Isa 
would continue through the twentieth century.  
 
The Khalifa used emirs and amils’ as tax collectors and they were given the responsibility of 
dealing with any significant problems which arose among tribes or internally within the tribes, 
particularly when it came to authority and headship of the umudiyya. However minor internal 
affairs were left to the tribal leaders, sheikhs and umdas who retained ‘certain local and tribal 
power.’59 It is possible that this system had created the opportunity for some tribal leaders to 
establish an administrative and legislative structure, perhaps assisted by a council of elders or 
majlis that might have to interfere to exercise power and settle internal tribal disputes where 
necessary. 60  All these changes represented a decline in the authority of the Kababish and 
their leader, al-Tom wad Fadlalla. . 
 
There were still several sub sections (al-Faki, Magit and Gawamis) of the Lahawiyin in 
Kordofan, and migration to Butana was a piecemeal process, suggesting a distinct lack of 
tribal cohesion at this time, with different sections moving at different times. All, however, 
seized the opportunity to manipulate political legitimacy and space. Their aim was to some 
extent achieved and maintained. The ir closeness to the Mahdi was manifested in protection 
and entitlements, and the tribe as a whole  did not suffer ill treatment during the Khalifa’s rule. 
Some umudiyyas of the Lahawiyin proved to be loyal Ansar or followers of the Mahdiyya; 
and during the Reconquest campaign of 1896-98 some Lahawiyin were among the many 
                                                 
57 All information in this paragraph is drawn from Anthropological and Historical Records, ‘Tribal Arabs, the 
Lahawin,’ NRO Dakhlia [1] 112/5/27. 
58 Anthropological and Historical Records, ‘Tribal Arabs, the Lahawin,’ NRO Dakhlia [1] 112/5/27. 
59 Hadi, Tarikh Kordofan  al-Siyasi [The Political History of Kordofan], p.103. 
60 Mohamed Ibrahim al-Nur,  ‘The  role of the Native Court’, in Lavin (ed.), The making of the Sudanese 
State ,Volume 1, p.78. 
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Ansar who suffered at the hands of Kitchener’s army.61 According to some interviewees, the 
section with the strongest affiliation to the Ansar was Wad Hardan. They claim to have 
provided the largest number of soldiers for the Mahdi’s army:62  
 
Our grandfather was the Mahdi’s Swordsman Mohamed El Shaeir. When the 
Mahdi came, Wad Hardan were the ones whom he befriended. The majority of the 
Mahdi army were from Hardan - even those who used to own livestock died for 
him. The rest of the Lahawiyin with livestock tried not to engage with the 
Mahdiyya and were distant from the fighting areas… This may explain why Wad 
Ez- Zein and Magait were always rich.63 
 
This statement may also reveal that a motive for other Lahawiyin sections to affiliate 
themselves to the Mahdiyya was for fear of losing their camels to the Mahdi if they did not 
join him. In the wake of their close attachment to the Ansar, the leaders of Wad Hardan tried 
to retain independent authority and resist the hegemony of the wad al-Zein umudia, mapping 
out a separate political path for their section.  
 
By the end of the Mahdiyya in 1898 a partial settlement had taken place by the Lahawiyin in 
the Butana except for Wad Mohammed al-Zein, who settled in White Nile province, and 
Awlad Ghraloga who relocated to Blue Nile province. A few also settled in the Mahdist 
capital of Omdurman, across the river from Khartoum, in the area known as Hay al-Arab, 
‘the village of the Arabs’. 
 
It is evident that the Mahdiyya was not as harsh on the Lahawiyin as on many other tribes. 
On the contrary there was mutual benefit and exchange of services on both sides. That the  
Lahawiyin camels were not touched helped them to have an interesting role later on in terms 
of herd tax during the Condominium. Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim has interpreted the support of 
tribes like the Lahawiyin for the Mahdiyya in terms of their client status: “the client tribes 
tended to support Mahdi as a revolt to their masters”. 64 However, I would suggest that this 
argument ignores the time factor which indicated that most of the client tribes showed their 
discontent with the Kababish effectively during the Condominium period. Some Lahawiyin 
after all initially returned to the Kababish territory after the Mahdiyya.   
                                                 
61 Interview with Babikir al-Daw Shola, President Pastoralis t Union, Gedarif, December 2007. 
62 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
63 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
64 Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat, p.78; NRO CIVSEC 1/38/101; see also Hadi, Tarikh Kordofan  al-Siyasi [The 
Political History of Kordofan]. 
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6. The Mahdiyya and the Kababish 
 
Whether the Lahawiyin were increasingly at odds with the Kababish because they were loyal 
supporters of the Mahdi; or whether they were supporters of the Mahdi because they were at 
odds with the Mahdi, it is clear that the leaders of the Kababish were generally hostile to the 
Mahdi and to his successor. The Kababish disliked the Mahdiyya because it threatened their 
strategic location on the trade route between Egypt and Kordofan. By 1887 the Khalifa 
Abdullah was convinced that Sheikh Fadlallah was allied with Egypt, which may well have 
been the case, given how the Kababish had benefitted from that relationship. 65  Another 
reason for Kababish disaffection was that the ruling Nurab had largely lost their control of the  
lucrative trade transporting gum arabic from al-Obeid to Dongola because of the war between 
the Mahdiyya and the Turkiyyia.  
 
Furthermore the Mahdiyya began to threaten the Nurab by sending them and other tribes 
north to Kordofan, an official directive urging them that ‘no two people have to fight over the 
way of cultivation and no one can claim the inheritance of land from his fathers or 
grandfathers to get from it a tribute or tax or value anyone living on it for that reason’.66  This 
posed a direct threat and challenge to an important economic aspect of the power of the 
Nurab and contradicted what they had taken for granted - their ownership of the dar and their 
absolute right to dispossess any other client tribes by arms. This was known as barad al dar 
that is, the doctrine that the dar would be the right for the invader.67From an economic 
context this directive had deprived the Nurab of the revenue from tributes on water and 
cultivation, which had come to them as the ultimate owners of the dar. Such a directive had a 
political implication for the Nurab as the Mahdi had requested Ali al Tom wad Salim to 
return all that had been confiscated forcibly from Dafallah wad Mohamed Juhayni.68  
 
Another political implication was that the Mahdiyya had also threatened the political 
hegemony of the Kababish in the eyes of the client tribes such as Kawahla, Beni Garar, 
Shanabla and Juhiyina.  This led to the disbanding of two sections that split from the 
Kababish. The two were al-Atawiyia, who joined the Kawahla and al-Aawida and later 
                                                 
65 Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat, p.74; see Al-Qaddal, Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith [Modern History of Sudan]. 
66 Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat, p.76. 
67 Ibid., p.76. 
68 A well-off sheikh of Juhayna who lived in the vicinity of Kababish had some of his property  confiscated by 
Kababish  leaders. For more information see Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat. 
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moved to Butana.  Furthermore the Mahdiyya made the Kababish look small in the eyes of 
the neighbouring tribes such as Dar Hamid and Hamr who were traditional rivals of the 
Kababish.  
 
Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim suggested that ‘by establishing its own institution, the Mahdiyya had 
replaced the Bado [Bedouin] aristocracy with its new institutions’69 which in fact justified the 
split of the Lahawiyin and others as client tribes. Many client tribes decided to disentangle 
themselves from the rule of the Nurab and moved away to Omdurman or to other parts of the 
Sudan. This helped many client tribes to act independently and to take control of their affairs, 
leaving the Kababish unable to control their client tribes politically at a time when most of 
the neighbouring tribes were their enemies.  
 
This move of the client tribes was to a large extent encouraged by the fact that most client 
tribes were also afraid of the Mahdiyya and thus resorted to allying themselves with large 
tribes who had already sided with the Mahdi.  In doing so they had to disregard their 
Kababish identity to avoid becoming the ‘Ghanima’ (literally, ‘the booty’ of the Mahdi.70 For 
instance, the al Barar section joined the Jaaliyin, al Atawiyia and al Awaiyida joined the 
Kawahla and Sarajab joined the Kenana while some sub sections of Awlad Ugba moved to 
Dongola.71  
 
The Khalifa made use of the existing tribal conflict in the Kordofan in his confrontation with 
the Kababish. He used the  client tribes and the neighbouring tribes from Beni Garar, Dar 
Hamid and Kawahla, and in doing so he opened the door for the suppressed sections within 
the Kababish, client and neighbouring tribes to enjoy some space and autonomy, overturning 
the existing unbalanced relationships of power. 
 
Another aspect was that the Khalifa had included in his directive his wish to send religious 
teachers to introduce Islamic teaching and to renovate mosques and staff them with Imams. 
This was not welcomed by the Kababish as they tended to invite religious sheikhs according 
                                                 
69 Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat, pp.76-77.  See also Hadi, Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith [The Political History of 
Kordofan]. 
70Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat, p.77.  ‘Ganima’ is a free hold of property, lands and money of a victory. It was a 
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to their own criteria, approval and supervision. This was a real threat to the Nurab as the 
imams were meant to advise that all confiscated animals to be returned to their owners – 
which would seriously affect their wealth.  It was also felt by the Kababish to be a threat to 
the tribe’s customs and traditions. The Mahdi had also advised that women and girls should 
be segregated from the men and should cover their bodies and hair and anyone who refused 
should be lashed.72 However this was contrary to practice among the Kababish, where men 
were allowed to visit women and talk to them freely.  
 
But the Mahdiyya did not result in a complete break between Kababish and Lahawiyin. A 
large section of the Nas al-Faki remained in the Butana for two years after the Battle of 
Omdurman and then went back to Kordofan, not returning to Butana for ten years. The cause 
of their return to Kordofan was – according to a note made in 1939 - a blood feud.73 The 
details of this are unclear: many years later, the only blood feud which the leading Lahawiyi 
sheikh could recall was caused by cattle belonging to members of the Hadendawa tribee 
grazing on a sorghum field  cultivated by some Lahawiyin from al-Faki umudiyya. 74 This, 
incidentslly, suggests that when the Lahawiyin first arrived in Butana the land was occupied 
by the Hadendawa and was not as empty as they later claimed. The last of the Lahawiyin 
would not finally leave Kordofan until 1909-10, when they were angered by the policies of 
the new Nazir, Ali al-Tom. Ali al-Tom’s reputation for aggression towards other 
neighbouring tribes perhaps had a positive influence on the Lahawiyin, causing them to face 
tribal discontent against the Kababish with caution and leading them to abandon Dar 
Kababish for a new home land. 75  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
72 ‘Manshur al-Hidud min Sayedna al-Imam al- Mahdi’ (proclamation of the Mahdi), compiled by Richard Hill, 
‘Hand-list of Arabic manuscripts and lithographs’, (1966), SAD 97/5/129-130. 
73 P.B. Acland, District Commissioner, ‘Copy of handing over notes on Butana District,’ (1939), SAD.777/14/7. 
74 Interview with Sheikh al-Zein Ahmed al-Zein, by phone, May 2009. 
75 “Ali al-Tom led the Kababish against the Berti in northern Darfur, defeating them and seizing their herds on 
the pretext that they were 'enemies of the government'. From there they turned to raiding Dar Zaghawa (a 
territory straddling the Chad/Darfur border). At the same time the Bani Halba of southern Darfur were looting 
herds from other neighbouring tribes without any concern for whether their owners were pro or anti 
government”.  Andrew McGregor, ‘Subverting the Sultan: British Arms Shipments to the Arabs of Darfur 1915-
1916,’ accessed on 25 November 2010, 
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/subvertingthesultan.aspx.  
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7. The Final Migration to the Butana 
 
In 1898 the British army defeated the Mahdiyya; one consequence of the bloody battle at 
Omdurman was a structural tribal demographic change, particularly in Gedarif area, the home 
of tribes such as the Dabayna and Hamaran which were decimated. This left behind an 
unpopulated area which had lately became the concern of the Condominium Administration 
which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
The movement of most Lahawiyyin sections from Kordofan to the Butana after the first 
decade of Condominium rule resulted from the taxation and administrative policies of the 
new government and its appointed leaders, and from the interaction of key personalities: Ali 
al-Tom, nazir of the Kababish; Omara Abu Sin, nazir of the Shukriyia, and Mohamed al-Zein, 
a leading Lahawiyin sheikh. Also significant in the migration was another Lahawiyin sheikh, 
Hamed Abdel Kader. But it was during this period that Mohamed al-Zein or ‘Mohamed 
walad Ezzein’ of the al-Faki section really consolidated his leadership and helped to unify the 
Lahawiyin in their final migration to the east of the Sudan, though it was challenging for any 
client tribe to stand in the face of the power and authority of Ali al-Tom.  The al-Faki section 
would continue to play a leading role, as was shown later on by his son Sheikh Adam al-Zein 
and his role during the Condominium regarding the structuring of the tribe.  
 
Sheikh Mohamed al-Zein, known in the Condominium records as ‘walad Ezzein’,76  was born 
in Kordofan in the middle of the nineteenth century. He belonged to al-Faki section, and had 
succeeded sheikh wad Barajub, the swordsman entrusted by the Mahdi with the leadership of 
the Lahawiyin, who was one of the appointed amirs during the Mahdiyya.77 Being appointed 
as amir had enabled Mohamed al-Zein to act as a representative of the Lahawiyin and talk on 
their behalf to the nazir of the Kababish. He identified himself as a new leader of the 
Lahawiyin by trying to keep them united and also by maintaining the privileged position of 
the al-Faki section.  
 
Following the Battle of Omdurman and defeat of the Mahdiyya, some sections of the 
Lahawiyin already began to move to Butana, but others were still in Kordofan. The role of 
                                                 
76The Condominium records identified Sheikh Mohamed al-Zein as ‘walad Ezzein.’  P. Ball, Inspector Butana, 
'The Lahowin Tribes' (1921), pp.1-.2.  NRO CIVSEC 66/11/102. 
77 Ibid., p.2. 
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the Shukriyya nazir in encouraging this migration was already significant, according to a later 
report by a British official:  
 
On the reconquest of the Sudan, the late sheikh Omara Abu Sin, nazir of the 
Shukriyyia on the Atbara in Kassala Province, induced certain of them to join him 
on the Atbara and as long as he lived intrigued to get more of them to follow.78 
 
In 1898 the British Administration appointed Ali al-Tom, the son of Fadullah as the nazir of 
the Kababish. At the time of his appointment Ali al-Tom was described by Asad as having 
been “a young man of very modest wealth”. 79 Asad described him further by stating that in 
1899 he was reported by some British officials to be ‘resident in a small village of scattered 
grass huts about 40 miles west of Omdurman’, and had been sent as Head Sheikh of the 
Kababish to bring some Kababish raiders to justice, being warned ‘that any slackness on his 
part might cause his dismissal’. 80 
 
Ali el Tom must have been successful in dealing with these offenders, because far from being 
dismissed; he quickly became the favourite of the new British officers of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium government.81 He was much less popular with the Lahawiyin, however. This 
unpopularity stemmed from the fact that he began to overuse the authority he had been 
granted, though he was supposed to be, as Willis put it, the “epitome of the ‘uneducated but 
loyal and influential  nomad she ikhs’ who were to be the basis of authority”.82 As Willis has 
put it: 
 
The handful of European administrators with intimate knowledge of Dar Kababish 
all knew that its people paid an additional tax, of grain from cultivators and 
livestock from pastoralists and which was used by Ali el Tom to build up his own 
wealth. 83 
 
The Lahawiyin complained about their share of the tax, as it was considered high, and about 
the irregularity in terms of time of payment. Their large number of camels was the reason 
                                                 
78Anthropological and Historical Records, ‘Tribal Arabs, the Lahawin’, NRO Dakhlia [1] 112/5/27.  
79 Asad, The Kababish Arabs, p.161. See also Willis, ‘Hukm.’ 
80 Asad, The Kababish Arabs, p.161. 
81 R. Davies, ‘Official Papers: Policy in Dar Kababish, a memorandum written by R. Davies when Inspector of 
the Kababish, 9 June 1915, with explanatory note written by him in 1966,’ SAD.627/1/1-21; Daly, Empire on 
the Nile; Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate.  See also A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, ‘The Sudan Political 
Service: A Profile in the Sociology of Imperialism,’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 
15:1 (1982), pp.21-48. 
82 Willis, ‘Hukm,’ p.37. 
83 Ibid., p.32. 
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behind the high payments. As a client tribe the Lahawiyin suffered most because of their 
wealth in camels compared to other clients such as the Awaida and Bisharab who had fewer 
camels. I would argue then that the willingness of the Condominium authorities to turn a 
blind eye to the additional tax extorted by Ali al-Tom was a legitimisation of that power over 
client tribes which gave him the absolute right to determine the amount of arrears per section 
and when it was due; in effect the Lahawiyin and Awaida had to pay a disproportionate share 
of the overall tribute which Ali el Tom collected, partly for the Government and partly to 
enrich himself. This contributed to the decision by both tribes to decamp from the Kababish 
dar.  
 
The Lahawiyin seemed not to have been regular in paying tribute and tax to Ali al-Tom until 
around 1909, which seems to have been a turning point in the relationship between al-Tom 
and Mohamed El Zein. MacMichael mentioned that: 
 
They were for several generations attached to the Kababish and lived in northern 
Kordofan and were known as Guhayena section; but they quarrelled with the 
“nazir” of the Kababish in 1901and moved eastwards over the Nile.84  
 
Even earlier the fleeing of some sections of the Lahawiyin had not affected nor disturbed Ali 
Al-Tom’s status regarding the collection of tributes and taxes from client tribes. This shows 
that the biggest exodus of Lahawiyin to Butana had taken place during this year and 
afterwards. The departure of the Lahawiyin for Kassala Province was also accompanied by 
Awaida and Bisharab and this reduced even further the tributes and taxes received by the 
Kababish.   
 
The Lahawiyin claimed that they had been satisfied with their treatment by al-Tom’s 
predecessors, suggesting that it was personal dislike of al-Tom’s rule that had prompted the 
migration. Mistrust developed between the two sheikhs, Ali al-Tom and Mohamed al-Zein 
over time. As Mohamed al-Zein wrote directly to al-Tom: 
 
After greetings, I beg to inform you that your grandfather Fadl al-Tom walad Salim 
has not done any harm to the Lahaween, and the Lahaween are not content in the 
land because of you and of what you do to the Lahaween. We are not pleased of 
what you do. If you would like to do us a favour then send the camels to us and at 
                                                 
84 MacMichael, A history of the Arabs, p.244. 
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the same time think of the good connection your father has done. We thought that 
you will be of good.  Salams to all in your own quarters.85 
 
MacMichael, Inspector of Bara at the time, presented this case to the Governor of Kassala 
informing him about the correspondence of Ali al-Tom and Mohamed al-Zein. It seemed that 
the relation between MacMichael and Ali al-Tom was good enough not to be disturbed by 
Mohamed al-Zein’s letter. This might be attributed to the fact that MacMichael had left the 
matter to be handled by the Governor of Kassala rather than to be dealt with in Bara 
jurisdiction. The confidence built between Ali al-Tom and MacMichael was not going to be 
dismantled by a client tribe that was regarded as unimportant by the British authority then. 
MacMichael wrote  
 
Enclosed here a letter from Mohamed al-Zein, sheikh, of the Lahawiyin, I believe, 
in Kassala. Will you please note that he, Mohamed says, that the Lahawiyin were 
satisfied with the treatment they got from Tom’s ancestors, so much for the plea 
that they were only a temporary adjunct of the Kababish in recent days. Secondly 
Ali al-Tom with reason brought by experience fears that the remainder Guhiyyna 
still in Kordofan with the Kababish (and they have been one of the biggest sections 
of the tribe for at least 60 years, if not more) may follow the example of their 
relatives and with impunity change their Mudiria.  He wishes a wire to Governor 
Dueim in order to forestall them should they attempt it. I pass the matter to you as I 
have no idea whether it is desired that these persons should remain here to be left to 
their own desires.86 
 
The 1909 migration to Butana was started in part by another Lahawiyin sheikh, Hamad Abdel 
Kader and his brother Idris, who had already fled there once before in late 1898, but then 
returned to Kordofan. 87 In 1909 they moved again to Butana with their and other umudiyyas’ 
herds, Hamad abdel Kader and his brother thought that fleeing dar Kababish would have 
minimized the ushur and taxes due and the fact that the Awaida had preceded them in a 
similar act to Butana had encouraged them to a large extent to follow their example.    
 
Perhaps it is true Hamad Abdel Kader was some far years ago with the Giheina in 
Kassala, but previously had been with the Kababish i.e. this is the second time he 
has “decamped” from Kordofan.88 
 
                                                 
85 Translation of copy of the note sent from Sheikh Mohamed wad al-Zein, sheikh of the Lahawiyin to Sheikh 
Ali al-Tom, by MacMichael, Inspector Bara, 19 May 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
86 Letter from H.A. MacMichael, Inspector Bara, to Assistant Director General, 22 May 1910, NRO CIVSEC 
66/3/29. 
87 There is no evidence to why they returned to Kordofan, however this might be explained by either of the 
following reasons: the shortage of pasture following the Khalifa Abdallahi’s plan to resettle tribes from Western 
Sudan which might have resulted in less grazing.  See Al-Qaddal, al-Mahdiyah wa-al-Habashah, and 
Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, Tarikh al-Khartum (Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1979). 
88 Letter from Mac Michael to Inspector General, Kassala, 16 July 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
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At the height of the tension between al-Tom and wad al-Zein, al-Tom received a statement 
from Mohamed wad al-Zein at Kassala in which the latter requested that al-Tom should “let 
off the men and women who sent their camels to Kassala with Hamad Adel Kadir and Idris al 
Kadar (by way of flight)”. 89 Mohamed al-Zein went further by asking al-Tom not to prevent 
the Lahawiyin whose animals were already in Kassala from following their animals so that 
they could be with them. The nazir of the Kababish was apparently concerned that the rest of 
the tribe might leave; he was concerned both for his ability to collect tribute and for his 
reputation, both of which would suffer if his subjects were allowed to flee. Ali al-Tom’s fear 
was that all those who ran away with their camels would not come back and he was sure that 
al-Zein would “secretly communicate with the rest of the tribe living with me (which he has 
ready done) to cross the river and follow those who went ahead”. This disturbed Ali al-Tom 
greatly and he wrote to the Governor of White Nile Province advising him to ascertain 
crossing points along the White Nile River whereby the Lahawiyin could be traced and 
forbidden from crossing. In his correspondence Ali al-Tom requested the Governor to bring 
back those who had fled to Kassala with their camels and also those animals sent earlier with 
Hamid Adel Kadir and Idris al-Kadar, “so that their owners should not follow them and so 
that the tribe should be in peace”90 
 
Ali al-Tom claimed that the migration of the Lahawiyin had bewildered him to a large extent 
and had undermined his image as the principal figure of local authority in northern Kordofan. 
For a long time he continued to petition the Condominium government urging them to return 
the Lahawiyin to his authority.   
 
Re the Lahawiyin about whom I have already petitioned with Hamed Abdel Kader 
Idris al Faki and their people, I beg to state that they have been living with the 
Kababish for a period of seven fat body [sic] …… they are of Kababish tribe; but 
owing to their intrigues and unitary [sic] nazirs of Shukriyia, they eventually deny 
that they belong to and make false statements to your Excellency. You are 
however, quite aware of the real situation of the Kababish and its celebrity in the 
old days of the former government, also misshapes and ruin that the befallen it 
through the cruelty of the Khalifa. The Kababish have only recovered their name as 
a tribe through just government; but if ever now and then a section of this itself on 
the plea that its people are not Kababish, they evidently be the complete ruin of the 
whole tribe disappear.91 
 
                                                 
89 Letter from Sheikh Ali al-Tom to Inspector Bara district, 19 May 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Letter from Sheikh Ali al-Tom, nazir of Kababish, to Inspector General, March 1910, ‘Lahawiyin, Halwiyien, 
Shukriyia disputes,’ NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
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In response to this letter the Inspector General replied “They all united by intrigues.”92 In this 
regard the Governor was referring to both the Shukriyya and the Kababish, and the 
personalities of the two nazirs, Ali al-Tom and Abu Sin.  Ali al-Tom had great confidence 
that the Condominium Government would bring back the Lahawiyin who had left for Butana 
(Kassala Province) as he believed that Kordofan was their homeland and that they should be 
living within his locality with the rest of the Kababish.  Al-Tom’s key concern was that he 
should be able to collect arrears of tributes and also to avoid any future trouble that other 
groups might cause to the Kababish. However, at the same time Ali al-Tom also accused the 
Shukriyya nazir and felt that the Lahawiyin had left his district because they were encouraged 
and supported by the Shukriyya which implied that the Lahawiyin would not have the 
courage to think of leaving Kordofan had they not been united with the Shukriyya. 
 
The Lahawiyin migration should also be understood in terms of competition between the 
Shukriyya and the Kababish for clients to contribute to taxation, and for control of the camel 
trade. Al-Tom might not have cared as much to have the Lahawiyin under his “hukm”93 if he 
had not been aware of their wealth.  The commercial aspects of his hukm relying on client 
tribes led to the expansion of the camel trade with Egypt. The fact that the Lahawiyin decided 
to leave dar Kababish for dar Shukriyya added another dimension in terms of the subtle 
competition between the two tribal leaders that arose from them being treated differently by 
the Condominium.  The only competitor to the Kababish in terms of the camel trade with 
Egypt turned out to be the Shukriyya. Having said this, the departure of the Lahawiyin was 
interpreted by the Kababish as a commercial and economic blow to their economy. Not only 
had they lost tribute and tax but also the contribution the camel trade would have made to the 
tribe’s prosperity and welfare.     
 
I would argue that in addition to the above reasons, which were obvious to many Sudanese 
historians, the Lahawiyin had always felt above the Kababish in terms of being pure Arabas 
which was a legitimation to their departure. They left to seek refuge among other Arab tribes 
so as to satisfy an internal search for a homeland that would be more or less acceptable and 
accommodative to them as Arabs. The drive behind their Arab identity was strong enough for 
them to move away for the hidden reason which the nazir of Kababish and the Shukryya alike 
both confirmed was a blood feud. There was no evidence to present regarding the cause of 
                                                 
92Letter from Inspector General to District Commissioner, Bara, March 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
93 Willis, ‘Hukm,’ pp.29-50.   
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the blood feud – which might be seen as an assertion of distinct identity - but reference was 
made to this alleged feud in a letter sent by the nazir of Shukriyya in 1909 to the Governor 
General where he mentioned that:  
 
the Lahawiyin who arrived in ‘Halfayat al Muluk’94 with their camels had lived in 
the east in 1904: ‘They then joined the Kababish, until… an incident… cropped up 
between them and the Kababish; the result was a blood feud and the loss of 
everything they held and they were forced to come to the east without knowing the 
Government’s orders not to move without permission..95  
 
The letter of the nazir of Shukriyya suggested that the Lahawiyin were moving reluctantly, 
and may have been intended to win the sympathy of the Governor General to the Lahawiyin.  
The feud could have been a reason for a section of a tribe to leave, but would  probably not in 
itself be a strong enough reason to cause the entire tribe to follow. The willingness of the 
Shukriyya nazir to provide a refuge was crucial, for the only ‘Juhayna’  tribe to leave 
Kordofan was the Lahawiyin; the rest had accepted the rule of Ali al-Tom. Some wanted to 
be independent of the Kababish, but on the whole they were happy to remain part of the 
Kababish because of the grazing rights it provided them with. 96  
 
In 1910 the nazir of Shukriyia wrote to Sudan’s Inspector General informing him that the 
Lahawiyin had arrived in Halfayya with their camels. 97  This shows that the nazir of 
Shukriyya was well- informed about the Lahawiyin movement, and anxious to communicate 
the matter to the higher level of authority.  According to the provincial boundary map, 
Halfayya was not part of his territorial jurisdiction nor was it within the boundary of 
Shukriyia. It was located within Khartoum province. This might explain why al-Tom planned 
to travel to Khartoum to discuss the Lahawiyin migration with the British officials.98  For al-
Tom it became no longer a matter of a client tribe but a matter that involved tribal leaders:   
 
I beg to report that Lahawiyin who cros sed the W.N.P this year are surely found in 
the Gezira vis Awlad al-Faki, under sheikh Abdalla wad Ahmed living at Maatook 
of Kawa Merkaz, and awlad Mohamed al-Zein under sheikh Gaber Khairallah 
living at Shabasha, all of them under White Nile Province. They didn’t proceed to 
Kassala. I received today the attached letter from the Lahawiyin awlad Mohamed al 
Zein in which they report of abandoning their native land (al dar wal watan) 
                                                 
94 ‘Halfyat al-Muluk’ is located in Khartoum north, and a section of the Lahawiyin arrived there in 1909.  
95 A telegraph sent by the nazir of Shukriyia to the Governor General (in Arabic), 3 March 1909, NRO   
CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
96 Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat, p.77. 
97 Letter from Nazir of Shukriyia to Inspector General, 3 March 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
98 Letter from Governor Kordofan to the Assistant Director of Intelligence, ‘Awaida Lahawiyin in Kassala,’ 23 
June 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
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without any cause of harm to themselves, they changed their mind and expressed 
their repentance. Orders have already been issued regarding this. 99 
 
His letter showed that some sections of the Lahawiyin did not go directly to Butana but had 
to stay in White Nile province. However this might not have been so for long because awlad 
Mohamed al-Zein later ended up in Butana. If grazing was available and good it would be the 
reason why their movement was interrupted before a final settlement was agreed upon in 
addition to the fact that traditional and customary rule prevailed; the hosting local sheikhs had 
to approve and welcome their presence before giving a final settlement. Ali al-Tom felt that 
by sending that information it might be easier for the Government to send them back as they 
were close to Kordofan.  The surprising thing was that the correspondence continued between 
the Kababish sheikh and the Shukriyya sheikh more than between the former and the 
Lahawiyin. It was as if the Lahawiyin were not as concerned about the consequences of their 
migration as the Shukriyia nazir was about their attachment to his tribe.   
 
On several occasions Ali al-Tom complained to the Government regarding the return of the 
Lahawiyin to join the rest of the tribe, hoping to recover from them the amounts which he had 
paid to the Government on their behalf which were tribute arrears for forty people from 
Lahawiyin; from Hamed wad Abdel Kader and his brothers and Idris al Kadad. These 
amounts were “£78 for 1909 and £78 for 1910, a total of 156.”100  
 
At the same time Ali al Tom was claiming tribute arreas from the Awaida Bisharab, in 
Kassala – another client group over whom he was trying to maintain his authority, with 
Government help.  
 
As regard the sum claimed by Ali El Tom from the Awaida Bisharab in Kassala, 
who have been told to return and from whom I told Ali El Tom he could collect his 
tribute   from 1909 and 1910 on their arrival, the amount of tribute owned has, I 
believe, not been exaggerated as happened in the case of the Lahawiyin but 
correctly stated as £19.200.101  
 
Ali Al-Tom did not give up – even if he could not get the Lahawiyin and the Awaida 
Bisharab back to his dar, he insisted on being paid his arrears. On the grounds of the above 
                                                 
99 Letter from Ali al-Tom, nazir of Kababish, to Inspector of Bara, 31 December 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
100 Letter from Ali Tom, nazir of Kababish, 19 May 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
101 Letter from H.A. Mac Michael, Inspector Bara, 22 May 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
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complaint made by Ali al-Tom to the Governor of Kassala, the Lahawi sheikh, Al Abdel 
Kader was a prisoner in Khartoum accused of unpaid tributes arrears   
 
Subject: Sheikh Abdel Kader El Lahawi: Kindly arrange to release sheikh Abdel 
Kader El Lahawi now in the Khartoum Mudiria Prison, and instructed him to report 
himself to this office. Tributes arrears due from El Kader and brothers and Idris £ 
78 for 1910] people (Lahawiyin)102 
 
Ali al-Tom continued corresponding with the British Government to return the Lahawiyin 
which seemed to have caused him great embarrassment in front of his tribe and neighbouring 
tribes. 
Several times I complaint to you requesting that the Government may kindly  
arrange to them returned here to join the whole tribe so I may be able to recover 
from them the amount which I paid on the behalf , but up to day no result having 
been arrived at. 
 
Being still compliant with the Government order in all events Ali Al-Tom begged that the 
Government may put an end to this question so that he should not be troubled again. I would 
argue that Ali al-Tom’s tribal image mattered much more than his duty to paying the British 
administration and whether that unpaid amount would be retrieved or not from the concerned 
tribes. He had only used this argument of ‘paying back’ to the Government in order to urge 
the Government to send the Lahawiyin back.  
 
I had complained several times in regard to the above sub sections who failed to 
pay me back. I consider this is my duty for the government and the government has 
to fulfil its part.103  
 
In response to the above complaint the Assistant Director of Intelligence took no action 
regarding the Lahawiyin tribute arrears. On the other hand he suggested the punishment of 
Awaida Bisharab. It is hardly surprising that the Assistant Director referred to the Awaida 
and not the Lahawiyin because if the latter had been subject to any punishment which in their 
case implied financial payment, the nazir of the Shukriyia would not have been happy about  
being deprived of any arrears that were to be paid by the Lahawiyin104. He asked “Do you 
                                                 
102 Letter from Assistant Intelligence to Governor of Khartoum Province, Khartoum, 14 May 1910, NRO 
CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
103 Letter from Ali al-Tom to Inspector Bara, ‘Rifat Effendi,’ May 1910, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
104 Letter from Savile, Governor Kordofan to the Assistant Director of Intelligence, Khartoum, May, 1910, NRO 
CIVSEC 66/3/29 
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wish me to take any steps to punish the Awaida?”105  A month later in July 1910  the 
Governor of White Nile Province passed  an order to stop the Lahawiyin  from crossing the 
east bank of the White Nile to the Gezira yet it was not an effective order because most of the 
Lahawiyin by then had already crossed.   
 
By the end of 1909/10 the split by the Lahawiyin from Ali al-Tom of the Kababish and their 
movement to Butana had several implications. First, the Condominium consented to the 
Lahawiyin movement without objection. As the Governor Kordofan wrote 
 
every year a section of the Kababish emigrate to the Atbara. Every year they are 
ordered to return. They do not return and after two or three years they are taken on 
to the Kassala lists. Every year recently we have been told that no others will be 
allowed to go & that those who have most recently gone will be sent back. I have 
never yet come across a case in which any were actually sent back.106 
 
In 1910 the Lahawiyin petitioned the Governor Kassala to allow them to remain in the 
Province until the rains as there was no grazing for their animals on the road back to 
Kordofan. They were permitted to stay. Reading from the earlier correspondences of sheikh 
Mohamed al Zein it seems evident that the Governor had no intention of making the 
Lahawiyin and their animals return to Kordofan.  
 
Secondly, Ali al-Tom’s wealth was definitely affected by the departure of the Lahawiyin and 
Awaida Bisharab. Tax and tribute that used to be collected by his tribesmen would be 
decreased and would be transferred to the Shukriyya.  This was pointed by the Governor 
Kordofan in the letter cited above, in which he  asserted that some Lahawiyin had already 
settled in Butana and had paid less tribute compared to those sections who remained in 
Kordofan, but noted also that the Government was not willing to assign police patrol to 
prevent the Lahawiyin from further movement.107 There was an understanding that most of 
the officials during the Condominium who were dealing with the Lahawiyin had not shown 
commitment to put ting pressure to stop them from migration. There was a great deal of 
correspondence and letters yet there was little to implement : 
 
                                                 
105 Letter by Assistant Director to Governor of Kassala Intelligence, Khartoum, 23 June 1910, NRO CIVSEC 
66/3/29. 
106 Letter From Governor of Kordofan to Assistant Director of Intelligence, Khartoum, 31 May 1910, NRO 
CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
107 Ibid. 
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the following “most likely the whole of the Giheina, one of the largest & wealthiest 
sections of the Kababish, of which the Lahawiin is a sub-section, will follow 
suit.108 
 
Critically most correspondence exchanged portrayed a concern from the side of the 
Government on the issue of the loss to the Kababish of the wealth of the Lahawiyin. But Abu 
Sin had been chosen by the Condominium Government as an important new ally in eastern 
Sudan and this will be documented in the following chapter.  This might explain why the 
Condominium Administration did not stop the Lahawiyin from moving to Butana despite 
Government orders; the Shukriyya were growing in power and the camel trade was high 
among the Government’s exports to Egypt. Sheikh Abu Sin might have convinced the British 
Government with good pasture in Butana for the Lahawiyin and their camels and this was 
strong reason for the Condominium approving Lahawiyin movement. 
 
The Condominium tried to dismantle the institutions that Mahdiyya had established and the 
administration tried to restructure nomadic tribes to and remap their dar(s) and to set grazing 
agreements in action. Thus by doing so, people leaving Kordofan were relocated in Butana. 
Indeed the departure of the Lahawiyin had created a vacuum for Ali al-Tom particularly at a 
time when another tribe who had been subordinate to them, the Kawahla had also moved 
away. 109 The relationship between the Nurab and the Kawahla had been tense for a long time, 
dating back to before the Mahdiyya.  This could be attributed to the close affiliation of the 
Kawahla with the Mahdiyya, which was the opposite of the Kababish’s bad relationship with 
the Mahdiyya. Because of this connection with the Mahdiyya, the British Administration later 
treated the Kawahla with caution. Willis has also argued that the Kawahla had “in those 
turbulent years [of the Mahdiyya] established separate identity and authority”110 The fact that 
the Kawahla had tried to split from the Kababish and claimed their nazirate made the 
Condominium aware of the consequences of the new territorial boundary that the Kawahala 
might have aspired to and which might have some consequences to other client tribes.   
 
                                                 
108 Letter from Governor of Kordofan to the Assistant Director of Intelligence, Khartoum, 31 May 1910, NRO 
CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
109 Kawahla were re-attached to Ali al Tom in 1935.  For more details see Willis, ‘Hukm’; Ibrahim, Fursan 
Kunjarat, and ‘Migration of Lahawiyin,’ CIVSEC 66/3/29, CIVSEC 66/11/99.  
110 Willis has also stated that “the Kawahla as a group remained independent, to Ali el Tom’s annoyance”; see 
Willis, ‘Hukm: The Creolization of Authority’, pp.39-40. 
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Simultaneously the Government had a job ahead of it to deal carefully with Lahawiyin 
arrivals in Butana where other tribes such as Hadendawa, Bani Amer and Fellata were 
already there and tribes from Western Sudan had arrived at the same time. 
 
In conclusion, during their stay in Kordofan, the Lahawiyin suffered the control of the ‘Nurab’ 
over the tribe and the heavy tax and tribute Ali al-Tom imposed on them, while the lower tax 
and tribute in Butana had encouraged the Lahawiyin to migrate. The Lahawiyin had left 
Kordofan because of the factors discussed earlier but the most pressing factor was that they 
did not accept the rule of a tribe whose ‘Arab-ness’ they doubted. The Lahawiyin also felt 
that remaining in dar Kababish might jeopardise the tribe’s integrity and their Arab identity 
would be dismantled in an authoritative environment run by Ali al-Tom. In light of all these 
issues Mohamed wad al-Zein, having been an amir during the Mahdiyya, overcame his fear 
and led the Lahawiyin to a new destiny in their history in Butana, a phase that witnessed 
internal restructuring of the tribe and more power struggles between its sheikhs. Grazing and 
administrative boundaries were instituted and limited political authority and recognition was 
achieved by the Lahawiyin. 
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Chapter Two 
The Lahawiyin under the Condominium 1910-1928: external 
boundaries and internal divisions  
  
To the Lahawiyin, boundaries never resemble the true nomadic life: we are free 
Arabs. To be an Arab is to be a nomad. 1 
 
 
As the previous chapter showed, in the course of their struggles against the Kababish ruling 
family the Lahawiyin had already begun to assert a distinctive Arab-ness. Under the 
Condominium, British administrative policy and changing land use would push the  
Lahawiyin into a rather contradictory position. For much of the period they resisted or 
resented the imposition of boundaries limiting their movement, in line with a vision of 
unfettered movement as the basis of true ‘Arab-ness’. Yet as pressures increased on available 
grazing, and as political and administrative authority became more closely tied to territory, 
the Lahawiyin would ultimately come to demand a defined territory of their own. And this 
quest for a dar led them to strengthen the tribal unity between the various sections, and to 
further emphasise their Arab-ness. Questioning Arab-ness would become a way for the 
leaders of a small dar- less tribe to assert themselves in relation to larger, more powerful 
tribes. 
 
This chapter focuses on a period in which the Lahwahiyin struggled to resist the new 
boundaries imposed by the Condominium government, and shows how this was linked to a 
process of administrative unification of the tribal structure, imposed by an administration 
which sought – sometimes obsessively, and often unsuccessfully -  to use tribal identity and 
authority as the basis of government, and to create clear geographical limits to tribal land use 
which would coincide with administrative boundaries. For the Lahawiyin, the term nazir – 
first introduced by the Turco-Egyptians, and reintroduced by the Condominium to denote a 
‘paramount’ sheikh – acquired new importance; so too did umda, a title introduced in 
nineteenth-century Egypt for a village headman, which spread steadily in Sudan, along with a 
new sense of the territorial nature of administrative control. 2   By the 1920s, Lahawiyin 
sections which had been conceived as kinship groups had also become umudiyyas – the 
                                                 
1 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General of Statistics Department, Gedarif, November 2007. 
2 Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p.144. 
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administrative units under individual umdas.   Throughout the period from 1898 to 1918 the 
creation of provinces and districts was partly related to grazing boundaries.3  These districts 
were quite important to the Lahawiyin in terms of authority and administration and 
constituted different layers of confinement. These districts were Butana, Gedarif, Khashm al-
Girba and Abu Deleig which were all administered from Kassala province. In this context, 
Lahawiyin unification paradoxically came about through internal divisions and rivalry and 
individual ambition, but it was perhaps enabled by the wider context of a shrinking space for 
the Lahawiyin. As access to grazing and to administrative influence increasingly became 
defined by ‘tribe’ so perhaps the Lahawiyin ‘created’ a tribe to belong to, in Iliffe’s famous 
phrase.4  
 
1. 1910-18 
1.1. Becoming confined to the Butana, c. 1910-18 
 
As the previous chapter showed, the Condominium government to some extent reproduced a 
tribal structure inherited from the Turco-Egyptian government in the nineteenth century, as it 
sought to undermine former Mahdist supporters. The Kababish and the Shukriyya had been 
privileged by the Turco-Egyptian authorities and were now similarly favoured by the 
Condominium, which was “keen to re- instate” the leading families of the Turkiyya.5 The 
power of these families was greatly expanded under the Condominium, as other sections and 
tribes were placed under their administration. Small tribes were overseen by eminent tribes 
such as the Rizeigat, the Kababish, the Shukriyya  and the Beja. This would lead to growing 
rivalry between groups, as ethnicity became the defining factor in administration. At the same 
time, the rather romantic vision of Arab tribes held by leading British members of the 
government led to increasing emphasis on claims to Arab genealogies, and attempts to record 
their history in writing. 6 
 
                                                 
3 Kassala, Dongola, Berber, Fashoda, Kordofan and Khartoum provinces were created in 1898  In 1934,  
Kassala was enlarged to include Red Sea Province after the creation of the Beja ‘Confederation’ for the purpose of 
strengthening the tribal system.  See Mudaththir Abd al-Rahim Tayyib, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: a study 
in constitutional and political development, 1898-1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 49. See M.W. Daly, Imperial 
Sudan ; The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1934-1956  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), also Peter 
Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the unstable state (Boulder: Rienner, 1990).  
4 Iliffe, Modern History of Tanganyika, pp.318-341. 
5 Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p.12. 
6 Asad, The Kababish Arabs; Asad, ‘Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe.’ 
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Rulers of groups such as the Kababish and Shukriyya, as part of their self- recognized Arab 
identity and their power to rule, accommodated non-tribal members, creating a power relation 
through expanded relations by marriage, or incorporation into a fictive geneaology,  with 
other smaller client tribes.  This was to safeguard their hegemony over others and to increase 
their  economic, social and political authority. As the previous chapter showed, however, 
despite disregarding territorial boundaries, the leaders of the Lahawiyin, and those who 
identified themselves as Lahawiyin, rejected these strategies of incorporation. Though they 
were a client tribe they nevertheless claim to have maintained rigid social boundaries, 
preserving their identity by refusing intermarriage even with their host tribes.  Elsewhere in 
Sudan movement across ethnic boundaries might be easy, as Johnson has argued of Dinka 
‘becoming’ Nuer7; but the Lahawiyin insisted on maintaining their identity, and their claim to 
greater tribal ‘purity’ shows the way in which they created their identity in opposition to 
these larger, powerful tribes.  
 
The Lahawiyin population increased in Butana between 1910 and 1914 compared to the 
Shukriyya or other tribes.8  The increase in their numbers would mean an increase in their 
contribution towards the tribute and ushur, making them more valuable to their hosts. The 
population continued to increase, making the Lahawiyin the second largest group in Butana, 
with an estimated 14,000, compared to 20,000 Shukriyya in 1931.9  In terms of camel wealth, 
the herd tax records list an increase from nearly 30,000 camels in 1917 to 46,000 just three 
years later; it is not clear if this reflected a real increase, or simply more effective taxation 
listing. In 1931 the Lahawiyin were said to own 50,000 camels out of a total of 90,000 in the 
Butana. 10  The Lahawiyin’s wealth had increased considerably since the beginning of the 
Mahdiyya, partly because they had not suffered as heavily as other tribes under Mahdist 
rule 11 . Also, since their first move to Butana, they had not faced drought or any 
environmental degradation that would have hampered the growth of their livestock. Their 
                                                 
7 Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Tribal Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer-Dinka Relations in the Sobat and Zaraf 
Valleys, 1860-1976,’ The Journal of African History 23:2 (1982), pp.183-203. 
8 Sudan Government Intelligence Department, Khartoum, 20 March 1916, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
9 P.B. Acland, District Commissioner , ‘Copy of handing over  notes on Butana District’ (1931), SAD 777/14/7. 
[‘The population of the Butana is purely conjectural. Attempts have been made to arrive at a figure by 
multiplying the numbers of the names on the herd tax lists by seven and by asking sheikhs for information as to 
the number of houses in their sheikh -ship.’] 
10 Ball, Inspector Butana, 'The Lahowin Tribes' (1921), pp.1-14, NRO CIVSEC 66/11/102; Acland, District 
Commissioner , ‘Copy of handing over  notes on Butana District,’ (1939), SAD.777/14/7; NRO Dakhlia 
112/5/27 
11 Ball, Inspector Butana, 'The Lahowin Tribes' (1921), pp.1-14, NRO CIVSEC 66/11/102; Acland, District 
Commissioner , ‘Copy of handing over  notes on Butana District,’ (1939), SAD.777/14/7; NRO Dakhlia 
112/5/27 
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wealth in livestock gave them a degree of power to negotiate clientage. As a result of the 
increasing population and herds, in 1916 the Civil Secretary wrote to the Kasssala Governor 
to inform him that the Government had decided that the ‘Lahawin [sic] should remain with 
the Shukria,’ 12  and by 1920 the government itself admitted its inability to control this 
movement or redress the fait accompli, despite its close friendship with Ali el-Tom: 
 
No other action would appear necessary at present. The Governor of Kassala is 
correct in saying the Lahawiin crossed from Kordofan about 1908. They had been 
a section of Kababish, under the name Guhyna, and showed the same spirit of 
insubordination at that time as now. They left Kordofan en masse without 
permission and against orders, but protracted efforts to send them back proved 
fruitless and were finally discontinued by the Inspector–General’s instructions.13 
 
 
Some Lahawiyin appear to have remained in White Nile Province, as this report from 1916 
suggests: 
 
From enquiries made among the Sennar Arabs I find that the Kawahla reported as 
having ascended from Kordofan with their camels, and who were constantly said 
to be coming into Sennar province en route from the Eastern Sudan, have never 
left White Nile Province. They are said to be now partly at Gefrat and partly south 
of Jebal Doham. I am told that they consist partly of Kawahla and partly of 
Lahawiyin, but none of my informants have actually met them, as they have never 
come within the boundaries of the province.14  
 
 
The Condominium government did not acknowledge the separation that its own policies were 
creating amongst the Lahawiyin, who were divided by administrative and provincial borders 
between White Nile, Blue Nile, and Kassala provinces. This division, interestingly, had not 
brought about any competition along the tribal leadership lines, but it had created tension 
with government authorities and hosted tribes.  These tensions revolved around grazing and 
tax, for a major aspect of Condominium administration was the attempt to control and 
regulate nomadic movements. Some British officials admitted the difficulties in imposing 
territorial limits: ‘It was a mistake to fix a rigid boundary because of the acknowledged 
nature of nomads”.15 However, in general, British administrative policy did seek to impose 
such boundaries.  
 
                                                 
12 Civil Secretary to Governor of Kassala, N.D. April 1916, CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
13 Civil Secretary to Private Secretary, 13 March 1920.  See also Civil Secretary to Governor, Kassala Province, 
12 April 1916, NRO CIVSEC 66/11/102. 
14 Angus Cameron Lewa , Governor of Sennar Province, ‘Migration of the Kawahla,’ 16 July 1916, NRO 
CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
15 District Commissioner, Khashm al -Girba, 25 October 1925, NRO CIVSEC 66/11/102. 
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In 1904 the Condominium administration, concerned to limit potential conflicts, assigned a 
boundary commission to demarcate areas and routes for nomads.  This demarcation resulted 
in the Butana grazing agreement which divided the Butana into general and specific grazing 
areas.  The general grazing area was left open to all southern nomadic tribes16 that were 
outsiders to the Butana, while the special grazing area was kept mainly for the Shukriyya and 
a few client tribes including the Lahawiyin from the Butana.17  The shared grazing area had 
no permanent water resources, only some seasonal water reservoirs (hafirs) and wells, which 
compelled roaming tribes to leave the Butana after the rainy season The Commission’s task 
was extended to set the boundaries dividing Butana from the west with the Blue Nile 
Province and from the north with Berber Province. By doing so the Condominium 
administration would increase control over nomads by controlling water points and migratory 
routes by issuing local orders to regulate the times and direction of the nomads  movement.18  
The 1904 boundary was of great consequence for the Lahawiyin, because it placed them 
under one Shukriyya khut, the Atbara khut which lies within the boundary of Gedarif district 
and later Khasm al Girba. The Lahawiyin were always the weaker party in land matters, 
reliant on grazing agreements and vulnerable to punishment when they broke them. The 
Butana area was expanded in 1916 and its boundaries were subsequently modified several 
times. However, owing to movement of the Butana nomads across the Atbara, these remained 
‘somewhat vague’ 19 until the 1930s.  Though also inhabited or used by a great number of 
other tribes, the Butana was considered Shukriyya tribal land (dar); the Lahawiyin were there 
as subordinate guests.20   
 
The Lahawiyin did not however remain within the imposed boundaries on their grazing, as 
for example in 1916 when a report suggested problems with the boundary, and a sense of 
official frustration with the uncertainties over the relationship between identity and place – 
and in particular with the challenges posed by Lahawiyin identity:  
                                                 
16 These tribes were Fadanyya, Batahin, Messelmiyya, Rufa’aa, al-Sharg, Kenana and Rekabiyya.  See C. 
Delmet, ‘The Native Administration System in Eastern Sudan’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political  
Legitimacy, p.153. 
17 Delmet, ‘The Native Administration,’ p.153. 
18 Kibreab, State Intervention , p.110. 
19 Acland, District Commissioner, ‘Copy of handing over notes on Butana District’ (1939), SAD 777/14/ 1 - 23; 
cf. also Anthropological and Historical Records, ‘Tribal Arabs, the Lahawin,’ NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35; Kibreab, 
State Intervention, pp.110-119.  Extract from the Report of the Butana Commission, 1904 (Appendix ‘A’, 
Monthly Intelligence Report, No 115, February 1904 in Appendix ‘B’ Sudan Intelligence Report 323, 
WO33/997). The southern tribes who migrated to southern Butana during rains were from the provinces of 
Berber, Sennar, Khartoum, Gezira and Blue Nile. 
20 Acland, District Commissioner, ‘Copy of handing over notes on Butana District,’ (1939), SAD 777/14, 18/1 – 
23. 
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I received information four days ago that the ‘so-called’ Lahawiyin had appeared 
close to Jebel Moya and sent them  orders to return within their own boundary 
which is in that latitude quite known.21  
 
A dispute of uncertain origin occurred at this time between the Lahawiyin and the Halawiyin, 
which resulted in a decision to impose a temporary prohibiting of the Halawiyin from the 
eastern boundary of Butana 22 where the Lahawiyin used to graze and which in turn confined 
the Lahawiyin to the boundaries of Kassala Province.23 The two tribes established peace in 
1917 and the Halwaiyin were then allowed to return to graze on the eastern boundary.  24  
Even within the Butana, internal movement continued between the different parts of the 
Butana and Atbara River.  
 
The Government’s desire to  limit tribal movement in order to avoid any tension or conflict 
between nomads could only be realized by redefining and revising provincial boundaries of 
Sennar, White Nile and Upper Nile, which the Lahawiyin and other tribes used and abused.25 
New measures were set to regulate tribal movement and demarcated areas were identified. 
The new 1916 boundary was south of Kalakis which is approximately 15.2° north by 33.6° 
east. 26  This area had been used considerably by the Lahawiyin and others to bring slaves 
from Abyssinia into central Sudan, as we shall see later in the chapter. 
 
1.2. Land policy in the early Condominium 
 
As was discussed in the introduction, the Condominium land policy recognized individual 
claims to land in some areas, but more widely sought to re- instate collective dar rights, and to 
use this to favour large confederations. The Condominium administration perceived that dar 
right was the core of the overall strategy that it pursued in terms of resettling the nomads and 
the other tribes that were displaced as a result of the Mahdiyya state. During the first two 
                                                 
21 From Civil Secretary to Assistant Civil Secretary, N.D. September 1916 (in response to a correspondence 
dated May 1916), NRO CIVSEC 66/3/39. 
22 The mentioned area was between Umrueshid, Bera and El Deid. 
23 ‘Report on Lahawiyin – Halawiin disputes,’ 14th August 1916, pp. 153-154, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
24 Kibreab, State Intervention, p.116.  See Governor of Kassala Province to Inspector Butana, 11 April 1921, 
NRO CIVSEC 66/11/101. 
25Assistant Civil Secretary to Governor of Sennar, 3 August 1916, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
26 Governor of Sennar to Civil Secretary, 24th August 1916, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29.     
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decades of Condominium rule, tribal boundaries in northern Sudan were assumed to coincide 
with geographically-defined customary dar rights.27  
 
’Guest’ tribes in the dar might be allowed to cultivate in limited areas; such use was not 
restricted by time but gave no ownership; long-term ‘guests’ could develop   a usufruct right, 
as Runger explained: 
 
however this is not a permanent right, but depends on actual possession being 
continuous. It is economically most valuable because this potential use right can 
become actualised at any time and place.28   
 
As was discussed in detail in the introduction regarding land tenure in Sudan, the 
Condominium administration was principally concerned with settlement of agricultural land 
as a basis of the economic future of Sudan. The 1903 legislation which did not recognize 
nomads’ rights to karu or atmors had a significant effect on the Lahawiyin, many of whom 
now now lived between the Atbara and Setit rivers. Further legislation in 1905 ruled first, that 
 
all waste, forest, and unoccupied land shall be deemed to be the property of   
Government until the contrary is proved; 29  
 
 
By this Ordinance more land was named agricultural land and became the property of the 
government, as explained by Shazali:  
 
The class of government land subject to customary land usufruct rights mainly 
comprised the abundant rainland where usufruct rights of nomadic pastoralists and 
sedentary cultivators were recognized; it also included the whole of southern Sudan.30  
 
 
But this formal ownership was combined with a policy which engaged the ‘traditional 
authorities’ in issues related to land and especially customary land which it recognized.   
 
For the Lahawiyin, this meant that their claims to land were mediated through others. They 
had been assigned areas to cultivate and areas to graze within the Shukriyya dar; however 
                                                 
27 Awad, ‘The evolution of land ownership in Sudan’, pp.212-28; Spaulding, ‘Slavery, Land Tenure and Social 
Class,’ pp.1-20.  See also Saeed .M. al-Mahdi, ‘Some general principles of acquisition of ownership and of 
rights over land by customary prescription in the Sudan’, Journal of African Law 20:2 (1976), pp. 79–99. 
28 Runger, Land Law and Land Use Control in Western Sudan, p.40. 
29 Al-Mahdi, Guide to land settlement, pp.86-96. 
            30 Shazali and Ahmed, ‘Pastoral land tenure and agricultural expansion,’ p.5. 
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these areas were not recognised outside the customary rights of the Shukriyya. Yet the 
Lahawiyin took it for granted that it was their land as long as they used and took care of it. In 
interview, some Lahawiyi sheikhs argued that 
 
As long these areas were not inhabited and grazed by others, we were the ones to 
claim them. Not only that, but we are the ones who used to protect them 
[Shukriyya] from Abyssinians and the shifta.31 
 
But although nomadic tribes were granted rights to land and watering, these rights had to be 
approved by district commissioners and tribal leaders. For the Lahawiyin, every right was 
negotiated either by the DC or nazir of the Shukriyya. Even the digging of a well or hafir had 
to be approved by the DC.32 
 
 1.3 Administrative restructuring, c. 1910-1927 
 
During this time the Condominium began to lay the basis for an administrative structure. The 
British DCs were supported by Assistant District Commissionerss (ADCs), who until the last 
years of the Condominium were always British, mamurs (a rank roughly similar to that 
of`ADC, but held by an Egyptian, and in later years by Sudanese), accountants, sirrafs 
(cashiers), katibs idaras (clerks), transla tors and police. This developing administrative 
hierarchy supervised- but also relied on - the recognised (and sometimes newly created) 
‘tribal’ leaders. In Butana, the Lahawiyin relied on the long-recognized possessors of the dar, 
the Shukriyya, and their rulers, the Abu Sin family. The Shukriyya hosted the Lahawiyin with 
the intention of adding to their judicial, administrative and financial authority. They provided 
the Lahawiyin with land, water and political representation to the Condominium government 
but this did not satisfy the Lahawiyin. In a letter to the Civil Secretary as early as 1910/11, 
the Governor of Kassala – Baily - revealed his apprehension as to whether the Lahawiyin 
would accept the leadership of the Shukriyya nazir, Awad al-Karim Abu Sin. Responding to 
the suggestion that that other tribes, such as the Ja’alin, Kawahla and Batahin, should be 
considered to be under the auspices of the nazir, Baily thought that this idea was slightly 
premature. His prime concern was that the nazir should exercise better authority over the 
Shukriyya and the Lahawiyin.33 In pursuit of this goal, the nazir and the Deputy Governor of 
                                                 
31 Interview with Lahawi sheikhs in al Shuwak Rural Council, November 2008. 
32 Lea,  Butana notebook No. 1, SAD 645/3/1-90. 
33 Baily, Governor of Kassala Province to Civil Secretary, 27 January 1927, NRO CIVSEC 1/28/78.   
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Kassala Province went on a tour to mobilize the Lahawiyin’s support for the Shukriyya 
nazirate.34 
 
On the whole, Condominium officials were reluctant to address Lahawiyin grievances, 
though they were aware of them: 
 
They would like to be independent of the Shukria and yet be allowed to graze in dar 
Shukria at their own sweet will. their umdas are nearly all self-made men and 
intriguers, who care little for anything except their own advancement. Their people 
enjoy having a grouse; and the umdas are apt to stir the mud up in order to fish in 
the troubled waters; [but] it must not be imagined that the Lahawin complaints are 
always groundless.35 
 
The Lahawiyin suffered a lot from the restriction of grazing areas which resulted in an 
increased loss of animals from disease. Theft of livestock was also a major problem for the 
Lahawiyin, as they were usually the victims rather than perpetrators: it was mentioned by P. 
Ball that during his three years of service in Butana District, he never had a case of theft 
raised against a Lahawi.36  For Lahawiyin, such problems could be readily blamed on their 
Shukriyya hosts; although the hardship was not openly voiced it was probably the basis for 
the Lahawiyin discontent – expressed again through plans for migration - at that time.37  
 
The migration of the Lahawiyin had led to a disturbance in the social structure of the tribe 
itself. Some sections – now formally umudiyyas, each with its own umda - became close to 
the Shukriyya and others kept their distance. This resulted in the division of the tribe with 
some wanting to go back to Kordofan. Awlad Hardan wished to go back to Kordofan and had 
petitioned the Government to let them leave while others preferred to remain in the Butana. 
The Governor of Kassala noted in 1916 that 
The reasons alleged for Lahawin dissatisfaction with Kassala Province were as 
follows: Restriction of grazing areas, resulting increase of loss of animals from 
disease, Loss of animals by theft, over oppression by the Shukria. The third 
reason was not openly voiced but it is probably the foundation of Lahawin 
discontent at that line. Enquiries showed that in the original quote a feeling of 
discontent with their lot was prevalent throughout the tribe. The desire to move 
to Kordofan and the White Nile Province was not shared by the whole tribe.38 
 
                                                 
34 T.Khalid et al, ‘The Lahawiyyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.318. 
35 Acland, District Commissioner, ‘Copy of handing over notes on Butana District,’ (1939) SAD 777/14/21. 
36 Ball, Inspector Butana, 'The Lahowin Tribes' (1921), pp. 1-14, NRO CIVSEC 66/11/102. 
37 ‘Note on Lahawiyin petition for transfer from B.N.P to Kordofan,’ 1925, NRO Kassala 1/78/350. 
38 ‘Note on Lahawiyin: petition for transfer from B.N.P to Kordofan,’ 1925, NRO Kassala 1/78/350. 
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The British administrators therefore refused to allow any return migration by the Lahawiyin, 
which left authority over the Lahawiyin in the hands of the Shukriyya39. The Lahawiyin were 
still divided into their sections, but Sheikh al Igba Abdalla continued to have some wider 
influence. 
  
Condominium policy towards the Lahawiyin must been seen in the context of ‘native 
administration’ more widely. In 1917, the Sudan Government’s Legal Secretary, Bonham-
Carter, proposed a committee to study and report on what steps should be taken to involve the 
‘native Sudanese closely in the work of the Government Departments’. 40  In 1920, the 
Condominium administration accepted the recommendation of the Milner Commission which 
emphasised that the native Sudanese should handle the administration of their country. Up to 
1924, the ‘dual policy’ promoted such Sudanese involvement both in terms of bureaucratic 
structures and ‘customary authority’; but after the events of 1924, which were seen by the 
British as evidence of the unreliability of educated Sudanese, the emphasis was entirely on 
customary authority, and ‘Native Administration, as it was called, became  ‘almost a 
doctrine’.41. As the Power of Nomadic Sheikhs Ordinance, 1922, stated: 
 
It has from time immemorial been customary for sheikhs of nomadic tribes to 
exercise powers of punishment upon their tribesmen and to decide disputes among 
them and whereas it is expedient that the exercise of these powers should be 
regularised.42  
 
 
In 1923 the Power of Nomadic Sheikhs Ordinance was applied to Butana district. Gradually, 
in its application, the 1922 Ordinance also included umdas besides which sheikhs of big 
confederations were given some limited authority. Few of the umdas were able to fully 
practise and use the authority they had been granted. 43 Limited power was granted to the 
Lahawiyin sheikhs, Sheikh al Igba Abdalla and Sheikh Adam al Zein.  Native administration 
created a tribal ‘hierarchy’: the nazir of the Shukriyya, for example,   became close to the 
                                                 
39 R.E.H. Baily, ‘Outline of Shukria history,’ in ‘notes on the history of the Shukriyyah, Balahin and Ashraf 
tribes,’ SAD.533/4/44.  See also Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmad, Shaykhs and Followers: Political struggle in the 
Rufa'a al-Hoi Nazirate in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1974). 
40 E. Bonham-Carter, Legal Secretary, ‘Note on the Administrative Policy’, 10th May 1917, NRO B.N.P 
1/17/102. 
41 L.M. Buchanan, ‘Memoirs,’ SAD 797/8/41. 
42 Ahmed I. Aboushouk and Anders Bjorkelo, The Principles of Native Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, 1898-1956 (Omdurman; Bergen: Abdel Karim Mirghani Cultural Centre; Centre for Middle Eastern and 
Islamic Studies, 2004), p.88. 
43 Some mdas of the Shukriyia were granted powers under the Ordinance.  See Acland, ‘A note on the history of 
the Shukriyiah’, November 1931, SAD 777/14/33-53. 
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British administration to the extent that his advice was often taken whereby the client tribes 
maintained a lower position in the hierarchy away from any direct privileged authority.  
 
In 1924 the Condominium administration granted some budgetary powers to nazirs including 
Abu Sin of the Shukriyia and Ali al Tom of the Kababish. By 1925 the Village Court 
Ordinance was in place to extend some authority to cliental tribes, whose sheikhs could deal 
with minor offences. The jurisdiction of 1925 was limited to some provinces but the 1928 
Village Court Ordinance covered all northern Sudan provinces and was effective within 
districts and villages. This legislation covered the sheikhs of smaller tribes, and under it 
Sheikh Adam al Zein became the first to preside over the Lahawiyin Village Court.44 His 
achievement of this position reflected a restructuring consequent upon a rivalry between the 
leaders of two umudiyyas, wad al Faki and Magit, over the headship of the tribe. 
 
This rivalry became entangled with northern Sudan’s sectarian politics, and the competition 
between Sufi orders which, in the early twentieth century, tended to simplify into an overall 
competition between two major groups.  The Khatmiyya and Sammaniya, as two Sufi 
tariqas45 had influenced the socio political role of tribal structure in Kassala province. The 
relation between the two tariqas had always been competitive.  In the nineteenth century, the 
Khatmiyyaa was allied to the Turco-Egyptian Government and it later proved a stronger ally 
to the Condominium while the Sammaniya took a different path, being identified with the 
Ansar, the supporters of the Mahdi. 46  
During the early times of the Condominium, the Lahawiyin had been followers of the 
‘Sammaniya tariqa’ which explained their proximity and affiliation to the Mahdiyya whilst in 
Kordofan. Lahawiyin sub sections which were clients of Tom wad Salim of the Kababish had 
been considered Sammaniya, but had gone over to the Khatmiyya when they moved to 
Butana in 1910.  Since then most of them followed that tariqa, though some of them used to 
visit Sharif Yusif al-Hindi who was seen as an offshoot from the mainstream of the 
                                                 
44 Acland, ‘A note on the history of the Shukriyiah’, November 1931, SAD 777/14/33-53. 
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Khatmiya. The Lahawiyin showed no consistency in their attachment to tariqa. Some years 
later, when Sheikh Adam al Zein was reinstated as umda of wad al Faki, he fully positioned 
himself with the Khatmiya. One informant argued that the inclination to the Khatmiya was a 
political manoeuvre that al Faki and Magit sections had used in the early years of its arrival in 
Butana to be accepted by Hadendawa   whom they had encountered in Atbara River areas, 
and by a locally respected faki, a Muslim healer and diviner. 47 
 
On the other hand the sub sections that were in the White Nile Province48 - Nas wad Hardan, 
Nas wad Isa and Nas wad Sowar - for the most part followed the Sammaniya though some of 
them also went over to the Khatmiyya and developed a similar pattern of visiting Sharif Yusif 
al-Hindi. The other sections, under sheikh al Igba Abdalla, including the Magit and the rest of 
the tribe was divided between Khatmiya and Sammaniya. The sheikhs of the Magit 
umudiyya, for instance, were all Khatmiyya. The division between sections along the two 
tariqas, to a large extent was based on the political affiliations of each sheikh. This might 
have served the interest of each sheikh but it did not serve the tribal interest. It also served the 
two traditional parties in term of political support and many followers that were added to 
them. In Kordofan and White Nile the Lahawiyin had been classified as followers of the 
Ansar; that some sub sections changed their beliefs with the movement from Kordofan to 
Butana revealed their new affiliation to the Shukriyya, who followed the  Khatmiyya. The 
Lahawiyin affiliation to Sherif al Hindi could be useful to them in terms of positioning with 
the rest of the Khatmiyya,  as will be seen in the case of al Igba Abdalla and his claim against 
the Shukriyya. This relationship of al-Hindi to the Lahawiyin could also be explained by a 
quarrel between the Sharif and the nazir of the Shukriyya, which took place in  March 1920 
when the two were travelling back to Sudan after their involvement in the ‘loyalty delegation’ 
of sectarian leaders and ‘traditional authoritie s’ which visited King George V. The quarrel 
was described by an official as an ‘extensive affair’.49 Soon after this two Lahawi sheikhs 
went to Khartoum to complain about the nazir of the Shukriyya, one intending to visit the 
leader of the Khatmiyya, Sayed Ali al-Mirhgani and the other to see Sherif Yusef al-Hindi. 
The two sheikhs were informed that ‘they should apply to the authorities if they had any 
complaint’; and they were also put in detention for few days, to discourage this sort in order 
to make them learnt not every complaint should they travel for to Khartoum.   One official’s 
                                                 
47 Interview with Dr. Abdullah al-Bashir Musa, Director Ministry of Health, Gedarif, January 2008. 
48Those sections in White Nile province were under sheikh wad al-Lebeih. 
49 ??? to Lyall, 28th March 1920,  NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
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comment on this hinted at the abuses which might underly such complaints, and the way that 
encouraging complaints could be a tactic in rivalries. 
 
I gather from native sources that the tax returns are not made out with complete 
fidelity to the facts, and the Shukria make the difference and the figure is 
sufficiently large to arouse their keen objection to any system that may endanger 
their profits. As far as the recent events are concerned, I attributed the remarks of 
the Lahawiin to a desire to annoy Awad El Karim and the Shukria, and to the best 
of my knowledge sheriff Yusef  has maintained a correct attitude over Lahawiin  
coming here to complaint, merely  directing them  to the Government…….I have 
mentioned privetaly to Yusef El Hindi that he should  avoid semblance  of 
interference  in Shukria affairs, but I think it only fair to him to give some account 
of what I believe to be the facts to indicate that whatever may have been  the case 
some years ago , he has  ..erly[sic] adopted a correct attitude. I further understand 
that owing to the failure of the Lahawiin to provide the customary “awaid” 
[payments] they are not likely to receivee Sherif Yusef’s assistance.50 
 
Yusef al-Hindi tried to use the Lahawiyin for his own sake by corrupting  the image of sheikh 
Awad al-Karim Abu Sin; but this was hard to do when some of the British officials thought 
high of the latter as a man who ‘does not take money from the Arabs.’51 
 
The Shukriyia remained Khatmiyya52 and the Lahawiyin majority also became Khatmiyya. 
Apparently, becoming Khatmiyya or Sammaniya to the Lahawiyin was not an ideological 
issue; it was a way to manoeuvre between powerful patrons.  In terms of daily life and 
cultural practice, in births, weddings and death, Sherif al-Hindi was probably the most 
influential,53 but combining more than one loyalty seemed to be the trend for the Lahawiyin. 
Hardan was the only umudiyya which remained independent of wad al Faki and Magit that 
adhered strongly to the Ansar sect forming a new line in the tribe leadership.  
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2. Rivalry between al Igba and al- Zein 
 
1918-20 was a turning point for the Lahawiyin regarding internal tribe restructuring. The 
establishment of a new administrative district in the Butana and the division of the Shukriyya 
between Butana and Atbara resulted in  only one section, Hardan,  remaining with Omara 
Abu Sin in Atbara District, while the rest of the Lahawiyin were connected to Ali Wad al-
Had, Butana District. 54  
 
Al Igba Abdalla was appointed umda of the Magit and Gawamis in 1919, when the 
Lahawiyin were for the first time granted the title umda, a total of six Lahawiyin umdas being 
created. 55  By this time, the Condominium Government had become concerned about the 
presence of the Lahawiyin in Butana, and how it might complicate tribal relations regarding 
grazing and rights over land : a sheikh khut position was created to manage the Lahawiyin and 
ensure that they paid tax.  
 
In 1920 the six umudiyyas were rearranged, divided up into two khuts headed by Adam al 
Zein and al Igba Abdalla respectively, under the two Shukriyya nazirs, Ahmed Hamed Abu 
Sin and Awad al-Karim Abu Sin. The creation of these khuts gave a kind of recognition to the 
Lahawiyin, but at the same time created a new dividing line, between the two sheikhs: Sheikh 
Adam al Zein, who was then quite young at eighteen years old compared to Sheikh al Igba 
Abdalla who was fifty-three years old. The new sheikh khut, Adam al Zein had little support 
from his people but the full support of the Shukriyya  nazir and the Government whose 
requirement  was, as stated by Baily, ‘government support’; if that was obtained, authority 
would be granted.  
 
The sheikhs khut had to ensure that certain public works were undertaken, including the 
digging of the wells, and the building and maintenance of roads and rest houses. They also 
had minor administrative tasks such as reporting death. But they were also, most importantly, 
supposed to assist in the administration of justice and were responsible for the collection of 
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taxes. The Magit, Geborab, and Hilalab and Belulab sections were placed under Al Igba 
Abdalla. The Gawamis, formerly part of al Igba’s umudiyya, were transferred to Adam al 
Zein’s khut. Within his area, al Zein was responsible for the three tribal leaders of Gawamis, 
Sowar, Wad Isa and Wad al Faki who were known by the military ranking of magadem (a 
title that was given to prominent and active tribesmen who had participated in the battle of 
Omdurman.).56  
 
The following diagram explains the political structure and hierarchy of the tribe under the 
Shukriyya ‘Confederation’ which was approved by the Butana district officer in 1925. The 
reporting mechanism that was established between the two Lahawiyin sheikhs indicated the 
British mistrust of Sheikh al Igba Abdalla as well as the preparation for the amalgamation of 
the different sections under one sheikh.57 
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The new sheikh khut, Adam al Zein, was appointed sheikh of nas wad al Faki in 1918 on the 
death of his father, Sheikh Mohamed al Zein. Sheikh Adam was then nominated as sheikh 
khut by a few of his people from al Faki section and supported and approved by the 
Shukriyya nazir. In the same year he was given a 3rd class Robe of Honour when he was only 
twenty-three years old. Like the Kababish nazir, Ali el-Tom, Sheikh Adam had in fact 
‘adroitly turned the British concerns to his advantage’; 58 he was described positively by a 
British official as ‘honest, and energetic and not afraid of enforcing Government orders at the 
risk of making himself unpopular with his own people’.59 
 
Al Igba, by contrast, was said to have ‘endeavoured several times to assume the leadership of 
all the Lahawiyin though [he] has no family claims to this position and has done so with a 
view of obtaining a Nazirship over the whole Lahawiyin.” 60  Al Igba was described by DC 
Butana in 1921 as “dishonest and untruthful and a born intriguer”. 61   All these personal 
qualities of al Igba had to do with the fact that he was a man in his fifties who never abided 
by the laws of the Condominium and was always rebelling against orders.  
 
The rivalry between the two sheikhs khut was already emerging in 1921, when some of Adam 
al Zein’s sheikhs reported to the D.C. that the Lahawiyin of Sheikh al Igba had deserted to the 
Italian border. He sent a force to bring them back to a place called al Shagarab, south of 
Khashm al-Girba, eight days journey from the Butana and they were then instructed not to 
leave.62 Al Zein may have deliberately tried to discredit al Igba in British eyes.  
 
He is young and inclined to be much like a government protégée, but he has had 
rather a difficult and responsible task and he promises with courage on his part to 
visit, unaccompanied by Government officials, the hostile parts of his tribe, and 
with attention to the wise council of the nazir to be satisfactory.63  
 
 
Due to historic hostility between Magit and al Faki and between the latter and the Geburab, 
Adam al Zein was not widely welcomed by those two umudiyyas. The Magit were not happy 
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to have the al Faki on an equal standing with them. Up to now this feeling of enmity with the 
people of al Faki has grown throughout the years. An informant from the al Faki put it 
interestingly as “Al-Yad AlMa Btalaha Khut Magit Telaha”.64 Symbolically this means that 
‘the enemy which you cannot face put the Magit in front to protect you’ explaining how the 
Magit were known as fierce and cruel characters. It also implies that the Magit are people 
who initiate trouble. The two sheikhs had different ways of coping with the Condominium 
authority and a different approach to holding power. Al Igba seemed to be confrontational 
and uncompromising while Adam al Zein sought to advance himself – and the status of the 
Lahawiyin – by cooperation with the Condominium. Each tried to rule the tribe by giving 
privileges such as land, headship of umudiyyas and positions in tribal courts to close and 
direct blood relations.  
  
The rivalry between al Igba and al Zein was also entangled in the relations between the 
Lahawiyin and the Shukriyya. When a general meeting was held in the presence of certain 
government officials to discuss the subordination of the Lahawiyin to the Shukriyya nazir, al 
Igba called upon Sheikh Awad al-Karim Abu Sin, Nazir of Shukriyia and Lahawiyin, to take 
an oath before the assembly that he would not treat any Shukriyya better than any Lahawi, 
and would look upon them with an eye of equality.65 Abu Sin refused to take the oath. Sheikh 
Abu Sin paid no attention to the presence of the government officials or to the Lahawiyin’s 
sheikhs and umdas. Such a reaction led to a stressful situation for the Lahawiyin that caused 
them to suspect that their new nazir would not treat them fairly. On the other hand, the gap 
between the two sheikhs, Awad al-Karim and al Igba, had widened as Awad al-Karim was 
offended by al Igba’s request. This particular request of al Igba caused more enmity between 
the Shukriyya and the Lahawiyin which became obvious to everybody. In addition, Sheikh 
Adam al Zein seemed to be siding with the nazir, Awad al-Karim. Al Igba’s supporters 
regarded Adam al Zein as a plotter, interpreting his stand as a jeopardising the Lahawiyin’s 
position as a tribe and reinforcing the hold of the Shukriyya on the Lahawiyin. 66  
 
Some Lahawi sheikhs were reportedly ‘looking upon him, (Adam al Zein)  as a sheikh and not 
as a Lahawi’.67 This reveals how a ‘Lahawi’ identity was further emerging through political 
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and administrative relations with the Shukriyya. A real Lahawi, as interpreted by some 
Lahawiyin, would not compromise the wishes of his people to serve his own interest or 
become allied with a stranger. Their identity as Lahawiyin seemed to proceed from their 
political aspiration and this is why some Lahawiyin sheikhs thought that Adam al Zein should 
be asserting Lahawiyin rights in the face of Shukriyya dominance.    
 
I would say that all the recent troubles in the Lahawiyin are traceable to these first 
and important differences. The nazir and Wad al Zein try to control the affairs of 
the whole tribe; the nazir’s word is that listened to by the Government officials; 
and therefore the position of sheikh al Igba, in the eyes of the Government 
officials is precarious. Al Igba is a not a match for the nazir and Wad al Zein 
combined, especially as these two are supported by Government.68  
 
Interestingly enough, Baily took a different stand from the rest of the British officials who 
dealt with the Lahawiyin. He was once described as having the “greatest fondness for the 
Shukriyya and the nazir”.69  
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3. Grazing boundaries and inter-tribal relations 
 
Within a few years of the creation of the two khut for the Lahawiyin, Sheikh Khut al Igba was 
put on trial and dismissed, resulting in the unification of the tribe under one Sheikh Khut. We 
have seen already that the British administrators were predisposed to favour the young and 
pliable Adam al Zein over the older and more resistant al Igba Abdalla. But in order to 
understand the particular reasons for the dismissal of the latter, it is necessary to return to the 
wider context of government policy towards the Lahawiyin, in terms of their grazing 
migrations and land rights. In this context another tribe, the Hadendawa, were also 
significant, as well as the continuing fluctuating relations between the Lahawiyin and their 
‘hosts’, the Shukriyya.  
 
A grazing agreement had been signed in 1913 between the Shukriyia and the Hadendawa. 
This agreement was one of the customary unwritten agreements signed in a tribal meeting 
(majlis) between the nazir of the Shukriyia and the nazir of the Hadendawa. It compelled 
each umda or sheikh of the Shukriyia to satisfy the nazir of the Hadendawa in terms of 
grazing protection (confined grazing in Hadendawa land) and if they failed to do so, the nazir 
of Hadendawa had to appeal to the British Government. The Government then had the right 
to fix fines and the time in which they had to be paid.70 
 
Hassan has argued that the land policies and grazing agreements issued during the 
Condominium benefitted some nomadic tribes more than others.71 Some agreements caused 
tension between tribes, such as that tension between the Shukriyya and the Hadendawa over 
territorial rights to land east of the Atbara River, which was known as “no man’s land”. This 
had on the one hand developed into tension over administrative and district boundaries along 
the Gedarif and Kassala Provinces, while on the other hand, the Lahawiyin feared the loss of 
‘the no man’s land’, over which they believed they had rights because they had cleared it 
when “it was forest inhabited by wildlife”.72  
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The issue of grazing created a bond between the Lahawiyin and the Shukriyya against the 
Hadendawa   for the first and only time. From 1918 into the 1920s these two tribes repeatedly 
violated the agreement with the Hadendawa.73 The Lahawiyin, as a non-signatory party in the 
agreement, took this opportunity to refuse to abide by the agreement and particularly to 
refuse to pay any tributes or fines to the Hadendawa, claiming that they were guarded by the 
Shukriyia who in this situation were obliged to pay tribute to the Hadendawa. For the first 
time the Lahawiyin seemed to value their cliental relationship with the Shukriyia. As a 
further consequence the tribal assembly called upon the Shukriyia and the Lahawiyin to agree 
not to violate the set boundaries of 1913 unless allowed by the nazir of the Hadendawa. 
However it was difficult to control nomads, especially the Lahawiyin.74 
 
By 1923 they had infringed further into the Hadendawa   homeland, which caused fighting 
between the two tribes in which many were injured. The tribal assembly was called to 
negotiate and reconsolidate between parties on the matter. The Shukriyya on the one hand 
were representing themselves and the Lahawiyin at the same time, and the Hadendawa   on 
the other hand had to abide by the customary laws of the tribe. The nazirs of both the 
Shukriyya and the Hadendawa wanted to keep this incident within the jurisdiction of the 
tribal assembly because otherwise their stature as tribal authorities would be compromised if 
they failed to solve ‘minor’ troubles over grazing and nomadism. It is worth mentioning here 
that this tribal assembly also included members of resident tribes like the Bani Amer and the 
Rashaida, and that membership was bound by any decisions the assembly might have taken. 
The Lahawiyin also admitted that they needed the Shukriyia’s support against attack and theft 
by the Hadendawa on their herds, as much as the pasture and water point which was located 
on the Hadendawa’s land.75 
 
The work of the tribal assembly did not make much difference to the movement of the 
nomadic tribes searching for pasture. In 1924 for instance, there was a sudden movement of 
tribes from within the Butana towards the Atbara River. These were specifically Shukriyya, 
Lahawiyin and the Rashaida. The cause of this movement was a shortage of rain inside the 
Butana, while there was more rainfall on the east bank of the Atbara which offered the 
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chance of better pasture. Many arrived with their families, and large herds were seen as far as 
Goz Rejab, close to Kassala province boundary. 76  This alarmed not only officials at the 
provincial headquarters but also the Hadendawa   tribe, who feared that these migrants might 
settle for a long period. The area between Goz Rejab and the Atbara River was considered 
Hadendawa   grazing, and was under the authority of the nazir of the Hadendawa. At the 
beginning, the nazir accepted the migrants’ presence given that the three visiting tribes 
acknowledged the Hadendawa’s land rights and would respect their customary laws that 
extended to the payment of the customary ‘awaid’, an amount paid on behalf of one tribe to 
another. However this did not last long as the visiting tribes began to abuse the customary 
agreement and conflict erupted with local Hadendawa. The nazir of Hadendawa   
immediately requested the DC to send them back to Butana in order to avoid further conflict 
and maintain good relations with the Shukriyya nazir.77 
 
J.A. de C. Hamilton, the DC to whom they took this request, wrote to the Governor of 
Kassala :    
 I shall be glad therefore if you would approach the District Commissioner Butana 
on this matter and ask him to arrange that no Shukria or Lahawiyin establish buyut  
[houses] or cultivate east of the River and that further if they wish to continue to 
graze on this side that they will arrange to pay the customary grazing dues to nazir 
Ibrahim Musa. Whilst the fixing of the latter might I suggest be settled at the time of 
the Shukria gathering next month, I would request that the necessary orders with 
regard to settlement east of the River be given at once as feeling is running very 
high at the moment.78  
 
 
It was not only the government rule that governed the nomads; there were also ‘customary 
rules’ that nomads accepted which compelled them to return all their herds to Butana from 
grazing to the east of Atbara River during the rainy season. 79  
 
In 1925, four Lahawiyin men went to Khartoum to reveal their grievances and complained to 
the Condominium authorities that the grazing was bad and that there was much sickness 
among their camels, 
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. …they therefore want to go to Kordofan or rather to the Northern end of the 
White Nile Province where they allege there is sufficient space for them. I pointed 
out to them that the Lahawiyin left Kordofan in flat disobedience of order and 
they had been repeatedly told to return and had never done so until efforts to make 
them return were finally discontinued by the order of the Inspector General.80 
 
 
These four men, who were from wad al Faki, wad Hardan and Gaborab, also complained, that 
their camels were subject to continuous theft by the Shukriyya. They believed that the nazir 
of the Shukriyia had not done what he should do to catch the thieves. More than that they 
reported that there was ‘bloodshed’ among the Lahawiyin and their sheikhs were not forceful 
in addressing the matter before the Government, ‘but glaze over them either from fear of 
discharge for negligence or from fear of the Shukria’.81 Mr. Ball, a British official at Khashm 
al-Girba, dismissed this complaint, claiming that the Lahawiyin umdas and sheikhs 
disassociated themselves from it and expressed their regret that it had been made. On the 
contrary it was agreed by the Shukriyya and the Lahawiyin in a meeting following the 
complaint that the two tribes should assist each other in handling any incidents.82  
 
A significant attempt to address the Lahawiyin complaint against the Shukriyya was also 
made on the orders of the newly-appointed Governor of Kassala, C. A. Willis, in 1925. The 
Lahawiyin being rich in camels, as many of the sources confirmed, had formerly been denied 
the right to sell their camels directly to the Government. 83 Willis suggested that ‘for camel 
purchases the government should deal directly with the Lahawiyin’. 84  The Condominium 
Government used to purchase Lahawiyin camels through Shukriyya sheikhs and through 
direct arrangement with the nazir of the Shukriyya. This had displeased the Lahawiyin for a 
long time. The Condominium administration had treated the nomadic tribes in an unequal 
manner.85  
 
The change in government policy over this in 1925 reveals two main points. First, the 
Condominium government had acknowledged the injustice shown to the Lahawiyin as main 
contributors to Butana tributes and taxes. Secondly, the government was aware of the tension 
                                                 
80 C.A. Willis, Director of Intelligence, to Civil Secretary, 16 May 1925, NRO CIVSEC 66/4/30.   
81 Willis, Director of Intelligence, to Civil Secretary, 16th May 1925, NRO CIVSEC66/4/30.   
82 P Ball, Khashm al Girba, to Governor of Kassala, 17th February 1920, NRO Kassala 1/78/350. 
83 See Acland, Ball, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29-31. 
84 ‘Notes on the Political organisation of the Lahawiyin’ (1925), pp.2-3, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
85 The Condominium had dealt with the Rashayda differently.  Isbelle Dalman argued that the Rashayda are the 
pioneer in the Easter Sudan of camel (meat) trade with Egypt, which has always been the main source of their 
monetary wealth. They convoy Lahawiyin and other’s camels as well as they taking their own to Egypt.’  
Isabelle Dalmu, ‘Camel Production and Trade’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p. 208. 
86 
 
and sensitivity between the Lahawiyin and the Shukriyya  over grazing land and thus  to apply 
the carrot and stick policy they were compromising the upper hand of the Shukriyya in camel 
purchases. They were also granted some limited autonomy in relation to their economy and 
tributes at the same time. By 1926 the Governmnet introduced certain measures which were 
of benefit to the Lahwiyin. It changed the system of tax collection from   herd tax to tribute 
and it had also simplified its method of collection of ushur. In addition to this it opened  a 
camel market in Gashm al Girba which had lessen the monopoly of the Egyptian and 
Rashaiyda camel traders  in the Ed dammar  market and many camel owners were able to 
deal with their camels.86  
 
In 1927, however, the Lahawiyin again failed to stick to the 1913 Shukriyya-Hadendawa   
grazing agreement. Because of the bad grazing that year they crossed the Setit River on 10 
June.  The Government sent a police patrol to drive them back to the boundary of Atbara 
River. 87 The incident revealed to officials that the Lahawiyin could not be handled efficiently 
by the Shukriyya local authorities. Butana was seen as a model to the Condominium which 
should set an example of smooth grazing, movement and peaceful coexistence between 
nomadic tribes; in the face of this new problem the Condominium administration tried to 
control the Lahawiyin, not through the Shukriyya but rather through the Hadendawa. Setting 
a boundary between the Shukriyya and the Hadendawa was supposed to limit future 
movement of the Lahawiyin. Instead of facing authorities from the Shukriyya  they would 
apparently have to handle other authorities with which they might not be familiar. There was 
therefore continual official pressure upon the Lahawiyin to recognise the Hadendawa and 
thus the Shukriyya sovereignty in the Butana and east of Atbara River.88  
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4. Al IgbaTrial 1926-27 
 
Despite the creation of the Lahawiyin khut and the concessions over the camel trade, the 
Lahawiyin continued to resent and resist subordination to the Shukriyya and the restrictions 
placed on their grazing: as one retrospective account oput it, these were an affront to their 
‘free Arab identity’.89 This dislike of boundaries, together with the internal tensions resulting 
from rivalry of the sheikh of khut, came to a head in 1927.  
 
During this time, and as result of the Hadendawa   agreement, the DC issued an order to 
confine the Lahawiyin to graze only on the west bank of the Atbara River and not to cross to 
the east during the rainy season. They were allowed to do so in the dry season, but even that 
was strictly demarcated, as they could not cross beyond al-Showak crossing point (meshraa) 
in the south east, and subject to other conditions, notably ‘Provided they do not trespass on 
other tribal boundaries’.90  
 
This order did not bring the Lahawiyin to one area. They were divided between the west and 
east banks. For instance two umdas and one sheikh of khut were on the west, and three umdas 
and one sheikh of khut on the east. In February 1927 Sheikh Adam al Zein with some of his 
people and muawin (local men employed as agents of the DC) met in Butana to discuss the 
movement of the tribe, routes it should take as well as permission to drink from government 
hafirs (the government had constructed its own hafirs which were regulated, and the use of 
which had to be approved).The DC also informed Sheikh Adam al Zein that some of the 
Gawamis umdas and twenty-six muawins were in the east and should be kept within the 
boundaries.91  
 
Nonetheless, Sheikh al Igba, accompanied by some of his people crossed the boundary and 
were found to the east of the Atbara River. They did not ‘trespass’ on any ‘tribal boundaries’ 
though they encroached on ‘the no-man’s- land’ south of Khashm al-Girba. Essentially even 
this area it seems was prohibited because of its proximity to the border, though that was not 
clearly stated by the Government. However no-one could confirm whether al Igba intended to 
go beyond crossing grazing boundaries. One umda, though, simply supported al Igba’s 
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action, claiming that “for any Arab when his sheikh moves, he moves with him”92; though in 
fact only one umda out of four had moved with al Igba, and two of his sheikhs were even 
grazing on the west bank of the Atbara River close to Sheikh Adam al Zein.  
 
Early in 1927 two border points, Suruf and Zahana had been identified and demarcated by 
officials from Gedarif, together with local sheikhs and the umda of Zahana, Yousuf Osman.  
The Lahawiyin and the umda of Zahana had a dispute over land that the Lahawiyin had 
cultivated before they were given permission. The umda had claimed this land and there was 
no other way but to resort to the nazir of the Shukriyya because the Lahawiyin refused to pay 
him the tribute. It was agreed that the Lahawiyin would make a payment of 560 piaster.93 
 
This incident shows that the Lahawiyin found it difficult, if not impossible, to stick to one 
area and to abide by rules. In July 1927 the DC, Acland, forbade grazing on the east bank of 
the Atbara River, but some Lahawiyin who were already living there decided to remain in the 
east during the rainy season because pasture there was plentiful. Sheikh al Igba was among 
those Lahawiyin and when he heard of the DC’s order he went to Khashm al-Girba to meet 
the DC and requested permission to be allowed to remain.  Acland refused and asked him to 
cross to the west with his people immediately. Sheikh al Igba had allegedly been told by his 
people to explain their complete lack of grazing and that ‘if they were faced with crossing 
over all their animals would perish’.94 The DC was not sure whether al Igba and his people 
intended to depart from the east bank. Meanwhile the Lahawiyin and their herds were 
scattered all over the place which made the DC’s mission difficult. Therefore the DC decided 
to send a muawin with thirty policemen to ensure their evacuation on time. When the muawin 
arrived, sheikh al Igba and his umda were no longer there. They had left to meet with the 
acting DC. However most of his people were found grazing on the east bank. 
 
Al Igba subsequently claimed that Acland had allowed him to graze in the east. 95 Whether 
this was true or not, al Igba was summoned to Khashm al-Girba and put on trial for defying 
orders. The trial was held by the Assistant DC, Lea,  and heard evidence from the umda 
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Yousif and also Sheikh Adam al Zein and a muawin. 96   The umda stated that el-Igba told his 
people that he had permission from Acland to graze on the east bank. Sheikh Adam el Zein 
then spoke and declared that ‘El Igba is the cause of it all… The common people are not to be 
blamed they have only been stupid’. He also revealed the complexities of internal politics, 
explaining that el-Igba was also trying to remove one of the Magit umdas, Abdullah Adam 
Ali Taam.  A muawin was questioned and declared that the Lahawiyin ‘are like their own 
camels: they can’t obey an order’. The muawin reported that all the Lahawiyin expressed 
their contempt for Adam al Zein and his umda Abdalla Ali Abd Taam to the extent that the 
umda couldn’t appear alone  in public, particularly without the muwain.  “They spit at his 
name and wad el Zein” said the muawin. 
 
Al Igba Abdalla explained that he crossed because he had left some of his herds with two 
groups of his people -  ‘nas Ballinga’ and ‘nas Abdalla Khiraallah’ – and because he had to 
find building material for his house, which came from al- Showak. In the end, al Igba lost his 
title of sheikh khut .  The case revealed Lahawiyin leadership was contested between the two 
umudiyyas, al Faki and Magit, and how much more successful Adam was at securing British 
support. None of the British officials who dealt with al Igba’s case believed his story and 
therefore the penalty was inevitable. 
 
The story of al Igba Abdalla did not end there. Some Lahawiyin sheikhs, mostly from Igba’s 
people, went to Acland, the DC Butana, after his return from leave. They appealed to him to 
reinstate Sheikh al Igba. Acland reinstated him; but only briefly, because of pressure from the 
Shukriyya nazir, Abu Sin, for whom Acland had a high regard.97  For Acland, as for many 
British officials, loyalty of tribal leaders was not enough for the Government trust if they 
show any sign of independence.98  
 
When Acland reinstated Sheikh al Igba Abdulla, Sheikh Awad al-Karim Abu Sin told him, 
 
I am drinking your tea, I am eating your food, I will tell you the truth. You were 
right to sack El Igba, you were wrong to return [sic] him. He is too old to learn, he 
will try it again. You will have to arrest him. There may be a riot. Innocent 
                                                 
96 Lea, ‘Daily record of work done at Butana, 1927-1928; carbon copies of official correspondence,’ Butana 
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Lahawin may be hurt. He will be banished instead of peacefully retiring to live 
with his own people. There is no blessing of God for a weak ruler.99  
 
Months later, after the dismissal of al Igba Abdalla, in a meeting held between the sheikhs of 
the Lahawiyin and the sheikhs of the Shukriyya, it was agreed that before the Lahawiyin 
could enter dar Shukriyya in the Gedarif district, the umdas of the Lahawiyin or their 
representatives had to seek permission from the sheikhs of khut and the umdas. The sheikhs 
and umdas of the Shukriyya could allow the Lahawiyin to enter their territory if there was 
adequate grazing for their own livestock. The Lahawiyin also had to remain strictly within 
the watering and grazing areas allocated to them by the Shukriyya sheikhs.  
 
Some of al Igba’s umdas received some punishment being seen as opponents of the new 
orders of the government. For instance umda Yousif Osman a sum of £E.100 while another 
two umdas were transferred to Adam al Zein’s sheikhship.100  Al Igba was not granted a right 
to appeal; such was the power of the Condominium. The case revealed the tensions inherent 
in the system of native administration: al Igba had tried to act as a representative of his 
people in defending their interests in grazing; but officials viewed his behaviour as 
disobedience. The dismissal of sheikhs, umdas and even nazirs was not uncommon in 
Sudan.101 But al Igba’s replacement did not come from the same family but rather from a 
different umudiyya which was not the norm for the Government who tended to keep it within 
the same family for the sake of stability and authority.  
 
Sherif Yousif al-Hindi, reported an account of the al Igba case which he heard subsequently, 
from a man of the Lahawiyin tribe, who was ill and was seeking treatment in Khartoum. The 
Lahawi man told Sherif al-Hindi: 
 
A party of the Lahawiyin grazed last year at Zahana near Setit. The days were 
very hard oweing to lack of grazing and Sheikh al Igba asked the D.C for 
permission to graze in Butana and permission to graze at the railway line was 
granted. When this DC went on leave and another came to replace him, some of 
umda Adam al Zein reported that al Igba had deserted to the Italian border. He 
sent a force to bring him back to a place called al Sharagab, south of Kashm al 
Girba, eight days journey time from the Butana and they were then instructed 
                                                 
99 Sheikh Abu Sin to Acland, cited in Kibreab, State Intervention, p.146. 
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not to leave.  It is a district full of insects and harmful birds and the Lahawiyin 
in consequence are losing their animals.102 
 
This shows the sense of injustice with which the Lahawiyin viewed the whole issue of the 
boundary and el-Igba’s trial. Their bitterness only increased with the subsequent appointment 
of Adam al Zein as the sole sheikh khut, without the unanimous approval of the Lahawiyin. 
Immediately after the dismissal of al Igba, DC Butana requested Sheikh Awad al-Karim Abu 
Sin to visit the Lahawiyin with him. He argued that ‘the wisdom of Abu Sin and their respect 
was needed at that moment especially as al Zein was disrespected by some of his own people 
because of the dismissal of al- Igba’ 103  The Lahawiyin sheikhs went further in trying to 
undermine Adam al Zein, justifying their transgression of the grazing boundary by 
complaining to the DC that Sheikh al Zein had not informed them on the subject and thus he 
was the one responsible.  
 
The events of 1927 thus led to the Lahawiyin being united administratively under one Sheikh 
Khut, Adam al Zein of the al Faki section. This occurred largely because al Zein convinced 
the British administrators of his loyalty and cooperation, in contrast with the resistance of al 
Igba to the (rather ambiguous) grazing boundaries imposed by the government. Al Zein had 
also forged good relations with the ruling family of the Shukriyya. None of this enhanced his 
legitimacy within the Lahawiyin tribe. But ironically, his appointment as the sole Sheikh Khut 
can be seen as a key moment in the unification of the tribe, and its quest for its own nazir and 
dar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
102 Note, 6 December 1927, NRO Dakhlia (1) 112/5/27. 
103 Ibid., NRO Dakhlia (1) 112/5/27. 
92 
 
5. Native Administration changes in 1928: Sheikh Khut and courts  
 
The reinstating of Sheikh Adam al Zein strengthened the position of the al–Faki umudiyya 
and brought the Lahawiyin under a new leadership with a new title mandated by judicial 
authority. It was formally announced that the Lahawiyin were to come under the nazir of the 
Shukriyya and for the first time since they moved to Butana they were collected under one 
khut. However, this was not accepted by some Lahawiyin, especially supporters of Sheikh al 
Igba Abdalla. The Lahawiyin were amalgamated into one administration unit, the khut, just 
before the introduction of new ‘Native Courts’ as part of the Condominium government’s 
policy of native administration.  Native Courts, one for each khut, were instituted in 1928 
following the Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance.  
 
Native Courts consisted of two levels, in a hierarchy. Some were considered major Native 
Courts and some were treated as minor Native Courts. There were five in the Gedarif and 
Butana districts. These included one in Gedarif, one in Mugataa, and others in Subag, Rufaa, 
Matarg, Kashm and al Girba for the Shukriyya.104 The local, minor court of al-Mugataa was 
exclusively for Lahawiyin and dealt mostly with cases of land disputes, which included 
grazing and cultivation (bildat rights), herd disputes and familial affairs - marriage and 
divorce. The court was granted limited authority to deal with these cases but not to overrule 
the authority and judicial power of the nazir of the Shukriyya. The Lahawiyin positively 
welcomed al-Mugataa court and interpreted its jurisdiction as part of the tribe’s self-
governing and autonomy from the Shukriyya. The Lahawiyin were then the only client tribe 
which had been granted a separate court in Butana while the rest of the smaller tribes’ affairs 
were being dealt with in courts dominated by the Shukriyya, or by the Gedarif court. Some 
Lahawiyin came to see this as the first step towards independence from the Shukriyya, which 
irritated   the leadership of the Shukriyia to a large extent.105  
 
The reason for this separate treatment is not clearly recorded, but it may have been either 
because of the Lahawiyin wealth in camels, which made them such important tax-payers, and 
because of the continuous discontent which Lahawiyin had shown over theirsubordination to 
the Shukriyya. The Shukriyya were under three Native Courts. Within their dar these courts 
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had power to judge on more serious cases and to impose much larger fines than the 
Lahawiyin under their Native Court. The referral system was indirect for the Lahawiyin court 
which meant going through the Shukriyya court and then to the DC. This meant that while on 
the one hand the new court system gave the Lahawiyin a measure of autonomy, it also 
institutionalised their subordination to the Shukriyya; the more serious cases, and appeals, 
had to go to Shukriyya courts. 
 
Newly-appointed as sheikh khut for all the Lahawiyin Sheikh Adam al Zein, had to deal with 
cases within the jurisdiction of the Lahawiyin Native Court, and so had to work with the 
umdas to identify recognized sheikhs of lineages who would sit on the court when 
nedecessary. About ten sheikhs representing lineages, or khashm beit, to the east of the 
Atbara River and between the border and the Merkaz in Gedarif were selected to deal with 
conflict arising from grazing and cultivation. Interestingly, there were a small number of 
cases of divorce and runaway brides which were also dealt with by the court as well as minor 
injuries and theft. 106 
 
In regard to the selection of sheikhs, the umdas tended to select ‘loyal sheikhs’ from within 
their families to keep their customary rights close to their blood relatives. This brought about 
difficulties when it came to the bildat and juruf customary rights as will be discussed in the 
chapter on post independence. It was reported that Sheikh Adam al Zein relied more on his 
family members, and particularly his sons and nephews.107 This may or may not have been 
true as there were many unauthenticated stories about Adam al Zein because of the rivalries 
between the different umudiyyas.  However time proved one thing, that after his death one 
son became his successor and the other became wakil to his brother.  
 
In 1932, further reform divided the Native Courts  into four types; Sheikhs’ Courts with 
sheikhs as presidents, Members Courts with a sheikh sitting with elders in majlis, Village 
Courts with a sheikh sitting alone and Special Courts established by warrants. 108  Native 
Courts were then granted some power to try cases relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance 
and related matters according to the shari’a (rather than the combination of local custom and 
Condominium law which usually governed native administration courts). This introduced a 
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new element into the hierarchical ranking of courts, as those with an’Alim (a scholar with 
training in the shari’a) acquired a new status. The relevance of this to the Lahawiyin ‘Native 
Court’ was that their court did not have an alim; it continued to be presided over by the 
sheikh al-Khut.109  
 
The implication of the Native Court for the Lahawiyin was that it gave them a degree of 
independence from the Shukriyya. It also enco`uraged a sense of a social superiority based on 
‘Arab-ness’, because cases involving ex-slaves of the Lahawiyin were brought to the court, 
an issue which will be discussed in the next chapter. Disputes between the Lahawiyin and 
people of western Sudanese origin (known collectively, and derogatively, as Fellatta) over 
juruf land were also brought to the court of the Lahawiyin, and fell under the jurisdiction of 
Sheikh Adam al Zein.110   
  
Sheikh Adam al Zein’s appointment as sheikh khut created the Lahawiyin as a single 
administrative unit in its own right. Now Adam al Zein stood between the nazir and his 
people, and while the government’s trust in Adam el Zein may have made him unpopular 
among his own people by creating this new administrative unity it had encouraged a feeling 
of distinctiveness among the Lahawiyin. This newly-constructed political power by the 
Condominium Administration created a type of enduring demand among the Lahawiyin who 
believed that these new structures of administration could provide means to negotiate further 
powers and rights. 
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Chapter Three 
Slavery and Lahawiyin Identity and Economy 
 
‘if a non-Arab became a Moslem, and acquired a Moslem name and culture, he 
became an Arab.’1  
 
Nyombe’s argument echoes a widespread notion of the ability of Islam to transform status 
and identity. Islam, during the early days of the Prophet, called for the integration of slaves 
into the kinship structure of ancient Arabia, encouraging the coexistence of ‘people who have 
no previous identity’.2 This integration, when accompanied by a conversion to Islam by a 
slave, meant the ‘difference between the servile and the free’ would be removed.3 But as John  
Ralph Willis noted, in practice slaves in Muslim societies did not always enjoy such 
straightforward possibilities of social advancement, with their exclusion in itself affirming the 
genealogy and behaviour which underpinned the identity of their masters: ‘Slaves were seen 
to lack those attachments of lineage or genealogy which, . . ., an Arab–dominated society 
held in highest esteem: they were without honour and identity - moved by savage and 
irrational instincts; swayed by animal propensities;’ 4  Among the Lahiwiyin, too, ‘inclusive 
idealism’, as Heather Sharkey calls it, has historically  often been eclipsed by an exclusive 
sense of enduring racial hierarchy5. If it were the case that conversion to Islam was enough to 
transform someone into an Arab, the estimated 10,000 slaves held by Lahawiyin in the early 
twentieth century would have become Arabs.6  This chapter explains the process of Arab 
identity formation in relation to slavery and the slave trade in the case of the Lahawiyin, who 
were simultaneously Lahawiyin, Ansar and/or Khatmiyya and ‘slave masters’ 7 . The 
Lahawiyin identity as an ‘Arab tribe’ developed partly through their experience as ‘clients’ of 
the more powerful dar-owning groups, the Kababish and the Shukriyia, as the previous 
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chapters demonstrated. It would also develop and harden as a result of administrative policies 
in the colonial period and subsequently. But the self-constructed identity of the Lahawiyin 
also rested on their notions of wealth and status, which came to define membership of the 
tribe. Wealth and status were in turn based during the colonial period on ownership of camels 
and slaves; and geographical circumstances – notably their proximity to the porous borders 
with the Italian colony of Eritrea and with Ethiopia – gave Lahawiyin particular opportunities 
to both acquire slaves and to trade in them. Trading in slaves was illegal under the 
Condominium, but here – as elsewhere in Africa – the cautious policy of the colonial state 
effectively allowed continued slave ownership well into the 1930s, providing a degree of 
cover for a continuing clandestine trade.8 
 
 The Lahawiyin consistently resisted the idea of being looked at as “subjects”, whether under 
the Kababish or the Shukriyia, and promulgated and were nourished by the notion of being 
the ‘masters’ And with such a notion, resistance to being assimilated with their host tribes 
was internalised and thus  they preserved an “Arab” identity in many ways. 9  One way to feel 
like ‘masters’ was to distinguish themselves from slaves. 
 
1. The Camel and Slave Trades and the Eastern Frontier  
 
During the Condominium period, the camel trade became an important activity. This was 
partly driven by tax: camels were either paid directly as tax, or sold to raise money to pay tax. 
Dalmau added that such exchange led to a “monetarization of pastoral economy.” 10 Some of 
this trade was cross-border, perhaps linked to the movement of camels either in search of 
grazing or to evade taxes. In 1920, for example, a Lahawi sheikh whose camels were said to 
be grazing near the ‘Italian’ frontier (that is, the Eritrean border) was reported to have crossed 
it in order to evade Sheikh Adam al Zein who had been sent to investigate by the British 
officials in Kassala. 11  The Government was concerned that camels were smuggled to the 
Italian territory.  The sheikh explained that some herds were in Italian territory and some 
were watering in Sudan. Following this incident Adam al Zein was called and had to inform 
                                                 
8 Lovejoy, The Ideology of slavery in Africa; Lovejoy, Slavery on the frontiers of Islam.  
9 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director Genneral, Statistic Department, Gedarif, December 2007. 
10 Dalmau, ‘Camel Production and Trade,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.208.  See 
‘General Report: Rashayda, Notes on all tribes of Kassala,’ NRO CIVSEC 66/A.1.8 (190-35). 
11 Lea, Butana notebook No.3, SAD 645/4/37. 
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the DC in charge concerning another two sheikhs that “Their camels were found to be there 
[near the frontier]”; when Sheikh Adam pursued them they removed everything to ‘Italy’: 
‘The official declared that all camels were safely arrived in Italy and that the sheikhs would 
disappear’.12 
 
In the early years of the Condominium, the trade in camels within Sudan was not entirely 
straightforward for Lahawiyin, who found that in their dealings with the government – a 
major buyer of camels – they were forced to deal through the Shukriyya nazir and his 
sheikhs; as a result, the camel prices received by the Lahawiyin were not satisfactory to them 
which frustrated them to a large extent. 13 As the previous chapter showed, the Condominium 
government eventually agreed in 1925 to deal directly with the Lahawiyin in the purchase of 
camels, rather than going through the Shukriyya. The purchase of camels increased 
dramatically during the Abyssinian campaign of the Second World War: 
 
The year ended for me in order to take change of the buying, branding   and 
grazing of 3,000 baggage camels for the Ethiopian transport Camel Corps to be 
used in the intervention of Abyssinia to carry supplies, weapons and 
ammunition as far as the Abyssinian Escarpment. The total number purchased 
for this exercise from Kordofan, Kassala and Blue Nile Provinces was 18,000… 
The price was agreed according to the merits of each camel and ranged between 
£8 and £10. The seller seemed well satisfied.14 
 
In March 1941 alone, one offical reported buying 600 camels from the Lahawiyin.15 It was 
obvious that the camel trade was crucial to the Lahawiyin economy and this was why they 
had to fight for transactions which did not go throught the Shukriyya. Not only that but it also 
showed that the Government had to rely on the Lahawiyin camels to a large extent.  
However, since camels were so important to the wealth and status of the Lahawiyin, many 
preferred to find the cash to pay taxes from elsewhere. Some sheikhs were ready to pay their 
tribute in gold rather than compromise a camel. On one occasion Sheikh Adam al Zein had to 
plead with the DC to leave the sheikhs’ camels and to let them pay the tribute in gold.16   
 
  
                                                 
12 Lea, Butana notebook No.3, SAD 645/4/37. 
13 ‘Notes on the political organisation of the Lahawiyin,’ 1925, pp.2-3, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
14 K.D.D. Henderson, Set Under Authority: being a portrait of the life of the British District Officer in the Sudan 
under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1898-1955 (Castle Cary Press, 1987), p.163.  
15 Ibid., p.163. 
16All information in this paragraph is drawn from Lea, SAD 645/3/1-149. 
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 In 1917 it was reported that  
 
It is well known fact that the Lahawin run both rifle and slaves out of 
Abyssinia, though my efforts to catch anybody red-handed have so far had no 
success. It is however, I think, advisable to keep them away from the 
Abyssinian frontier as much as possible. I have at present no arrangement 
whatever for looking after any of the other Arabs more whose feriks 
[residences] are on the Atbara from Mogatta to Khor Showak17 
 
Observations by Condominium officials in the 1920s and 1930s suggest that for Lahawiyin, 
the slave trade continued to be one way of generating extra revenue.18 For a long time the 
eastern region of the Sudan had been an important sources of slaves, drawn from the 
uncertain borderlands between a succession of states; and many nomadic tribes had been 
engaged in this trade. These included Shukriyya, Batahin, Hadendawa, Rashaiyyda, Bani 
Amer and the Lahawiyin.19 Slaves were an important economic commodity to the Lahawiyin 
for maintaining a viable nomadic mode of production that relied on camels and seasonal 
cultivation; therefore a close relation between the two activities, slavery and fulfilment of 
tribute and ushur to the Condominium, developed comfortably.20  On the other hand, to the 
nomads the value of slaves, compared to camels, was not high; a slave boy or girl had less 
value than a good camel. Therefore the Lahawiyin’s strategy for trading slaves in order to pay 
their taxes was partially to avoid losing their camel herds; and both camel and slave trades 
allowed the Lahawiyin to exploit the opportunities provided by the Abyssinian (Ethiopian) 
and Italian (Eritrean) frontiers.21 Not far from this frontier were the areas of Bela–Shangul 
and Gubba, where Khojeli Hassan and his family members and others had established 
                                                 
17 ‘Administration- Nomads Arabs Atbara Grazing Grounds,’ letter signed by Inspector Ground Gedarif dated 6 
March 1917, Kassala, Gedarif, in notes on Gedarif District, NRO Kassala 3 139/615. 
18 ‘Notes on the Political organisation of the Lahawiyin,’ 1925, NRO CIVSEC 66/3/29. 
19 Hargey, ‘The Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan 1898-1939,’ p.139.  Hargey also mentioned that during the 
Mahdiyya and while the country was considered unstable, some of the above nomadic tribes had been engaged 
in trafficking in slaves by sending them to Arabia and beyond.  See also Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, p. 43; 
Willis report, NRO CIVSEC 66/2/1-78. 
20 Isabelle Dalmau, ‘Camel Production and Trade’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity  and Political Legitimacy, 
p.208. 
21 Early in 1899 a tentative agreement on the Frontier was agreed upon between the British Government headed 
by Harrington and Menelik, the ruler of Abyssinia.  This agreement was drawn on a map and had no 
topographical or ethnographic meaning.  It also acknowledged that the District south of Blue Nile, Beni Shangul, 
was not part of this agreement though it was under the rule of the Egyptians until 1898 when it was taken over 
by Menelik. Meanwhile the Frontier northwards at the Setit River was recognised as the Italian frontier.  The 
final stage of demarcating the Sudan-Abyssinia frontier was undertaken in the winter of 1902-3.  Major General 
Sir Charles Gwynn, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., ‘The Frontiers of Abyssinia: a retrospect,’ Journal of the Royal 
African Society 36:143 (April 1937), pp.150-161. 
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chiefdoms, and begun to pay tribute in slaves, ivory and gold to the Ethiopian government., 
Many Arabs from Sudan were acquainted with the area.22  
 
The umudiyya Magit were particularly active in a pattern of grazing and trade which spanned 
the border. They crossed the international borders whenever there was insufficient pasture in 
Butana and along the  permitted grazing zone  of the Atbara River. The Magit are said to have 
organized this on a collective basis, arranging with Ethiopian tribal sheikhs that they should 
be allowed to remain for four to six months with a kind of awaid paid to the local Ethiopian 
leaders for grazing, on the condition that the Magit should not take or steal any unattended 
animal or cut trees. The Magit gave the Ethiopian sheikhs a guarantee, the ‘al Raee paper’ 
(the shepherd document), which covered a permitted grazing area and was intended to 
promote good relations between them. 23 In 2007, one interviewee, a sheikh from umudiyya 
wad Hardan, implied that the Magit had identified themselves more with the tribes across the 
border and went so far as to say that that a blood relationship existed, saying that ‘Magit is 
not an Arabic name’.24 Although the Lahawiyin engaged in cross-border grazing, trading and 
raiding, the border nevertheless contributed to defining their identity as ‘Arab’ as opposed to 
the people on the other side, which were not Arab. The section which interacted most across 
the border, Magit, were therefore also seen to be possibly less purely ‘Arab’ than the rest of 
the Lahawiyin. This tells much of how the history of the Lahawiyin has been told by certain 
families of certain umudiyyas as a reflection of a shaped identity at a certain period of time 
and according to a specific interest.   
 
Crossing the frontier was considered to be a serious matter by the Condominium. Sometimes 
the police had to arrest umdas and sheikhs in Kassala to force the Lahawiyin to return the 
camels from the frontiers. At one point the Governor drove to Gereda (near the border) and 
then went down the Italian frontier looking for camels. He ordered that all people and animals 
were not to be left until they were south of Gereda.25 
 
Both border control and slavery posed challenges to the Condominium government. Slave 
trafficking was said to be easy for the Lahawiyin (Magit and Gawamis), who obtained slaves  
                                                 
22 Wendy James, ‘Life lines: exchange marriage among the Gumuz,’ in Donald Denham and Wendy James (eds.) 
The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: essays in history and social anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), p.122. 
23 Interview with late sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, Mugataa wad al Zein, June 1996. 
24 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director Generala of  Statistic Department, Gedarif, December 2007. 
25 Lea, Butana notebook No.3, p.37, SAD 645/4/84. 
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either by raiding or purchase, crossing the border to do so  on the pretext that they were 
looking for  grazing.26 Some other Lahawiyin such as Hamid Gadallah and Hamid al Igba 
were also reported to be slave traders.27 Raiding for slaves increased during the early period 
of the Condominium (1900-1918), attributed by Hargey to the intention of slave traders to 
keep the ‘social fabric’ as it was, and to meet the emerging need for an agricultural labour 
force while the eastern frontiers question was still under discussion.28 These factors had led to 
the increase of slaves trade in the eastern frontier Moreover, the Lahawiyin were thus among 
the leading raiders, beside the ‘Jallaba’ traders, ‘individual kidnappers’ and ‘enterprising 
dealers’ in Abyssinia.29 Even in the early 1920s it was estimated that there were about 15,000 
persons in Sudan engaged in the slave trade which indicated that the average number of 
slaves handled each year might have been far beyond this figure.30 
 
These merchants established commercial networks across the border and their slave-trading 
activities evaded suppression. 31  This was attributed to several reasons. First the enslaved 
tribes here belonged to ethnic serf groups in the frontier district of Abyssinia; second, their 
new Arab masters appeared to a certain degree to be “respected religious notables”32 who 
instilled in the slaves “a considerable fear of what the white man will do to them”33 and third, 
the Abyssinian administration was openly engaged in slave trafficking and derived indirect 
profit by taxing it. But this was also a result of the wider policy of caution with regard to 
slave ownership. Colonial governments – in both Sudan and Eritrea – were short of resources, 
and feared the economic and political disruption which might be provoked by robust 
measures to end slavery. Thus district commissioners and the governor of Kassala, while 
laying down their authority, barely attempted to take a firm stand or even to look critically 
upon slavery; and the widespread presence of slaves made detection and suppression of 
slave-trading problematic. 
 
                                                 
26 C. Willis, Chapter 1- ‘Control of Routes with Special reference to Slave Traffic,’ SAD 212/1/11. 
27 A. J. Arkell, ‘Official papers’, WP/SD/MC NO 41-D-54/8, 09/06/1928, SAD 783/2/39. 
28 Hargey, ‘The Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan,’ p.105; Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, p.37; letter, Slatin 
to Wingate, Cairo, 27 January 1900, SAD 270/1/1.  
29 Hargey, ‘The Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan,’ p.105; Sikainga, Slaves into Workers. 
30 Hargey, ‘The Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan,’ p.105, citing P.F. Martin, The Sudan in Evolution, 
(London, 1921), p.216. 
31 Abbas Ahmed Mohamed, White Nile Arabs (London, 1980), quoted in Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, p.43. 
32 National Archive London, F/141/571/8. 
33 National Archive London, F/141/571/8. 
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The Lahawiyin had taken a central position in the Abyssinian slave-trade compared to other 
nomadic tribes (Seleim, Rufaa, Zeidat, Nebeha Ahamda); and the Gawamis and Magit were 
allegedly heavily engaged in raiding and abduction along the border.34 In a case from 1916 
reported by Arkell, Arabs from Seleim (Nas Attia and Nas Abdall) went via Gelhak to 
Belwara brought three boys, two women and six girls. On their return through Rufaa Agab al 
Mahdi, one of the Arabs changed one boy   for a girl who had just been imported from 
Abyssinia by Ali Abdalla, a Lahawi. 35 In 1917, for instance it was reported again that ‘Arabs’ 
from Seleim went to Abyssinia to ‘Belawar’ through ‘Gelhak’ to get slaves and they came 
back with one man, two women - one with her son, five girls, and two boys. On their return 
through Rufaa they exchanged some of them with a Lahawi man called Ali Abdalla.36 The 
deal was accomplished in local currency and a boy was sold for £E 10, a girl for £E 10, and a 
man for £E 3. It was obvious that age was a determining factor in buying and selling; a young 
boy was worth much more than a mature man. 37 In addition to the age factor Hargey added 
that the ‘ethno-tribal origins continued to dictate the value of the merchandise.’ 38  Young 
female slaves were highly valued in the market.  
 
The slave trade was a well-organised and defined business with distinctive roles being played 
by different Arab groups. In most cases the Lahawiyin were primarily raiders and buyers 
while the Ahamda and Seleim were mostly dealers. The Ahamda lived in White Nile 
bordering Kordofan. The Condominium records confirm the  Ahamda’s involvement in the 
abduction of Nuba women, girls and also boys; the Lahawiyin, by contrast, were more 
involved with the trade in Abyssinian slaves.39 The Lahawiyin and the Ahamda were also 
engaged in pre-financing which was an important aspect of the slave trade.  Pre-financing 
required cash, and dealers were expected to pay before the trip to Abyssinia took place; 
although enquiries have shown that the Lahawiyin could cross the Abyssinian border and buy 
slaves themselves. Another case from the 1920s reveals some of the details of this pre-
financing. In January 1927 Hamid Bashir Abu Gifin and Bilal Beshir bought the 12 year old 
Fargalla (a Berta boy of serf parents), 11 year old Sabah al Khair (a Berta boy of slave 
                                                 
34 A. J. Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, ‘Summary of the evidence presented at minor courts 
during 1928 and 1929, into cases involving smuggling and purchase of slaves’, SAD 783/3/14. 
35 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court  No. 76/1928, SAD 783/3/16; see also Arkell, 
Official Papers, White Nile Province, SAD 783/3/1-28. 
36 Ibid., SAD 783/3/16. 
37 Ibid., SAD 783/3/16. 
38 Hargey, ‘The Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan,’ p. 62. 
39 Arkell, Official Papers, ‘White Nile Province, summary of the evidence presented at minor courts during 1928 
and 1929, into cases involving smuggling and purchase of slaves’, SAD 783/3/16. 
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parents) and 12 year old Aruin (a Berta boy of slave parents) and three rifles, including a 
Remington. Two Ahamda pre-financed Hamid Bashir Abu Gifin and Billal Beshir. They paid 
them £40 which they presumably made from selling grain from the excellent Agarib’s Hareeg 
crops in the previous year.   Hamid Bashir Abu Gifin and Billal Beshir acted as agents and 
when they returned from their journey they handed over two slaves and the three rifles to the 
Ahamda men. The third slave was sold to Ibrahim Ismail of Seleim, Nas Ibrahim. 40 Arkell 
reported other cases of pre-financing by Ahamda:  
 
  Safi was pre-financed by an Ahamda called Sheikh Ali who gave him £24 
before his start and to whose son he delivered Madina + rifle + a Remington 
with Egyptian Army Mark in Oct 1927. The girl and the rifle being together 
valued at £36 on his return, he was given a further £5 for his trouble. More 
than 20 boys and girls had been collected. Most of them were sent back to 
Showa in Abyssinia but she and two others were sent to the house of Mehdi 
Khojali Hassan at Megali and remained for two years before being sold to 
Safi.41  
 
Within these tribes religious sheikhs and tribal leaders were the main buyers or middle men. 
Other local sheikhs employed a large number of slaves for domestic work. As well as buying 
slaves, groups such as the Lahawiyin raided the Berta and Gumus on the upper Blue Nile. 
The consequence of this was that, somewhat surprisingly, slave owning amongst the 
Lahawiyin actually increased in the first years of Condominium, despite the nominal 
commitment of the government to end slave-trading. It was reported that the Lahawiyin had a 
small number of slaves at the beginning of the century, but within a decade or so their slaves 
numbered about 10,000 – a remarkable figure, given that the Lahawiyin themselves were a 
relatively small group. 42  Such a figure was high compared to other tribes such as the 
Shukriyya, but this may be because the latter had less need to trade in slaves since it paid its 
tribute from its client tribes, Bawadra and Lahawiyin. Rufaa Ewida, a nomad’s farik was the 
congregation entry point of slaves after arriving in Sudan. 43 Throughout their raids on non-
Arabs in Abyssinia, the Lahawiyin dealt with Arab slave traders (of both genders): the 
dividing line between slave traders and raiders on the one hand and slaves or potential slaves 
on the other was defined by Arab identity, which may have contributed to their developing 
                                                 
40 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No. 62/1928, SAD 783/2/26. 
41 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No. 76/1928, SAD 783/2/40. 
42 Willis, Report, NRO CIVSEC 60/2/7 and 78.  See also Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, p. 43. 
43 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.76/28, SAD 783/2/34-38. 
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pride in this Arab-ness. Most of those with whom they dealt were known as Watawit who 
were descendants of Sudanese Arabs who came to Bela-Shangul as traders and Islamic 
preachers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; some were brought in 1897 by 
Ras Makonnen, governor of Hararge in southern Ethiopia, when he led an expedition into 
Bela-Shangul. The fact that they intermarried with the local Bertha people caused them to be 
identified as Black Arabs. In time the Watawit became the sole slave traders in the area, with 
some of them engaged in transporting the slaves to Sudan. More often the Watawit sold 
slaves to Sudanese merchants who used to come to the market of Bela-Shangul. As they were 
mixed with Bertha people they had fewer slaves from the area but regularly raided the Mao 
and Khoma people to the south of Bela–Shangul.44 
 
  
                                                 
44 Information from Abdussamad H. Ahmad, ‘Trading in Slaves in Bela -Shangul and Gumuz, Ethiopia: Border 
Enclaves in History, 1897-1938,’ The Journal of African History 40:3 (1999), pp.433-336, and Arkell, Official 
Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.72, SAD 783/2/34.  For more information see Margery Perham, 
The government of Ethiopia  (London: Faber and Faber, 1969); ‘Blue Nile Province’, NRO 1/27/202;  ‘The 
Dinder Reserve’, FB/31/A16;  Arkell, District Commissioner, Southern District, Upper Nile Province, ‘Subject: 
Slave Trade Between Abyssinia and the Sudan,’ April 1928, NRO 1/12/104.  Another market was the Gallabat 
Market which catered for the supply of slaves from Ethiopia, and had been established as a market in the 
nineteenth century.  It was considered a transit market and its catchments for slaves of this transit market 
extended southwards to the Beni Shangul area and south and south-east to the Oromo lands. Gallabat was 
central to Sinnar and Shendi markets and far up to Sawakin on the Red Sea. Quoting Burckhardt, Bjorkelo 
(1989) gives a detailed description of the market and the flow of commodities in Shendi. He illustrates, with a 
diagram, the connections that Shendi had with the rest of the country and abroad.  See Anders Bjørkelo, From 
King to Kashif: Shendi in the Nineteenth Century (Bergen, 1983), p.24.  
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2. Slavery, Gender and Lahawiyin Identity 
 
I was surprised to know that many of the more important Sheikhs owned one or 
more slave girls. They and their parents had often been with the sheikh’s family 
for generations. They usually seem well content, but if they wanted their 
freedom they could go to the District Commissioner and demand it and they 
were often freed. The difficulty was what they would do thereafter? Prostitution 
was the obvious line but sometimes it was arranged for them to marry into the 
police force which worked extremely well.45   
 
Slave-raiding and trading led to the formation of internal power centres of traders, dealers 
and buyers. Each group strove for authority, for the number of slaves they acquired 
determined wealth and power and men were not bound to one particular leader. Slavery was 
as prestigious to the Lahawiyin as keeping camels.46 Slaves were often shown off, and and 
exchanged between the different umudiyyas and with other tribes. The importance of the 
slaves was not simply economic; one could argue that while the Lahawiyin were rich in 
camels, there was no need for slaves, as camels could have substituted for tribute and ushur, 
but the possession of slaves affirmed the Lahawiyin identity as Arab nomads, and asserted 
both their economic independence and their defiance. For the Lahwiyin, just like the Baggra 
cattle-keeping Arabs described by Ian Cunnison, the ideal was ‘to hold no man his master’.47  
 
Nor was this just a matter of owning slaves; the direct contact with Arab traders in Abyssinia, 
and their own part in slave-trading, led the Lahawiyin to identify themselves as masters and 
that their feeling of Arab-ness grew further. These groups of raiders and traders identified 
themselves as masters and perceived themselves as an authority away from the government ’s 
reach, even as the government was busy establishing rules to ban slavery, and DCs were 
increasingly concerned with the number of slaves who had either been forced into slavery or 
were still under their masters.48 
 
However, the Lahawiyin did not abide by the rules; for them raiding and/or trading for slaves 
was less preferable to having to sell camels to pay tribute and taxes.  But a further motive for 
involvement in the slave trade was a sense of pride in being Arab - to rule but not to be ruled.   
 
                                                 
45 Mrs. Bridget Acland, ‘Memoir’, SAD 777/15/1-13. 
46 Interview with late sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996. 
47 Ian Cunnison, Baggara Arabs; power and the lineage in a Sudanese nomad tribe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1966), p.114.  
48 Lea, Butana notebook No.3, p.37, SAD 645/4/84. 
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As already noted, the Lahawiyin were not known to be religiously orthodox. The consistent 
movement the Lahawiyin had experienced and the lack of their own religious sheikhs had led 
to somewhat unorthodox practices of Islam and deprived them of a systematic kind of 
religious education. Hence, it may be not surprising that they were not concerned with the 
Islamization of slaves, nor were they generally likely to view this as a route to incorporating 
slaves. Usually, they gave the slaves names which, interestingly enough, were solely confined 
to slaves. This was another dimension of the Arab Lahawiyin identity construction process 
whereby slaves were distinguished from the Arabs by exclusively reducing their names to 
days of the week and/or relating them to their masters such as ‘Khamis’ [Thursday], ‘Khair 
Eseid’ [Master’s welfare or well being]  or ‘Khadim Aboha’ [the slave of the father]. These 
were all names which implied belonging to others.  
 
The diary of a DC’s wife, Mrs Acland, gives us a window on events of the time in Butana. It 
portrays a relative tolerance to slavery by  the Condominium administration represented by a 
high official, the Governor General, to the presence of slaves as part of the social lives of 
nomadic tribes and as an important element in entertaining officials. 
 
It was the slave girls who danced “Dellukas” on festive occasions. As the 
tempo increased their top clothing was slipped off. When the Governor General 
came to the big Tribal Gathering at Khashm el Girba it was considered 
unsuitable for the dancing girls to expose so much of themselves and they were 
issued with little ‘B.B’s 49 - this was not a government instruction and it 
produced roars of laughter from the assembled natives.50  
 
 
This reveals an interesting and overlapping set of ideas about what should and should not be 
revealed; the nazirs and sheikhs instructed slave women to dance, but feared that their breasts 
(though not their status) would cause embarrassment; the Sudanese audience laughed that 
ideas about female modesty should be applied to slave women.  Lahawiyin Arab women, on 
the other hand, would never be allowed to dance and expose themselves in this way, so this 
also reinforced the interplay of gender and the Arab identity, based on Lahawiyin women 
being seen as more morally pure than other women.  
 
This reminds us of the profound importance of slavery in allowing a particular, gendered 
vision of the relationship between moral behaviour and identity. Many activities were 
                                                 
49 ‘B.B’ means brassieres. 
50 Mrs. Acland, ‘Memoir’, SAD 777/15/2. 
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considered absolutely inappropriate for Lahawiyin Arab women. In the large households to 
which they were attached, women slaves presided over the cultivation and preparation of 
food, the making of clothing and the looking after and upbringing of children; but they also 
had multiple duties in the public domain, such as the market place, which women of higher 
status avoided. 
 
It seems likely that the leaders of the Lahawiyin were well aware of this trade, and may have 
been actively involved. In 1918 Beshir wad Tayib (Lahawi), Sheikh Tayeb el Hajja (Rufaa), 
and one ‘Nazir Ahmed el Ugba,’51 (Lahawi) who was accompanied by others, and Ahmed 
Abu Shotal (Kenani) went to Belawara and Dorolawi after Wad Mahmud attacked Beshir 
village. They seemed to be less successful in obtaining as many slaves as had hoped. They 
purchased only two slaves, Gabir, a boy and Shamma, a girl from Koma. The boy was sold 
for £11 and the girl for £20 by Amin wad al Sheikh Gellab aki Guma.52 When this incident 
was investigated it was reported that the so-called ‘nazir el Ugba’ was active in buying 
slaves; presumably this was al Igba Abdalla it confirms the argument presented earlier that 
Magit was a leading umudiyya in slavery.  
 
In his capacity as a DC in White Nile province in the late 1920s and early 1930s, A J Arkell 
presented a great deal of information on the slaves from Abyssinia, categorising them 
according to tribe and age.53  The majority of the slaves of the Lahawiyin were women and 
girls, according to Arkell’s accounts of minor court cases in White Nile Province. These 
cases often concerned girls and women who had recently been freed from their masters. 
Those female slaves were highly valued by the Lahawiyin for public work as well as for the 
image of the tribe, a concern which has continued until recently, as will be discussed in the 
post independence section.  Female slaves unveiled their faces and  were open to public view. 
They could conduct affairs in a manner denied to their masters’ women.  
 
                                                 
51 The only sheikh of the Lahawiyin in 1918 was Sheikh al Igba Abdalla; however J.A. Arkell reported that it 
was Nazir and Ugba which might have been wrongly spelled or another sheikh of the Lahawiyin section in Blue 
Nile.  
52 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.55, 1928, SAD 783/2/17. 
53 Unspecified report, presumably concerning the slave trade from Abyssinia to White Nile Province.  Each 
appendix consists of a summary of the evidence presented at minor courts during 1928 and 1929, into cases 
involving smuggling and purchase of slaves. Courts files of slaves in White Nile Province were registered by 
place of origin, tribe, gender and age, See Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, SAD.783/1/1-53 and  
SAD 783/2/1-103;  statistical summary of information contained in appendices above, showing numbers and 
origins of slaves imported, SAD.783/3/1-28. 
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Alongside this public role there was a sexual one. Female slaves were treated as concubines 
to their masters.  Hence the master’s sexual exploitation was, in Walz’s words, ‘a right which 
brought no blame’.54 This sense of a right to sexually exploit slaves seems to have extended 
beyond their own masters: 
 
In the village at Khashm el Girba lived a few slave girls whose behaviour was not 
always immaculate. One evening I decided to inspect the police guard on the prison 
and government stores. The guard turned out smartly, but with no sergeant. I found 
him in the guardroom on the bed with one of these young ladies who had been 
arrested for affray.55  
 
As a result of the above case the district mamur, Daud Khalifa Effendi was summoned to build 
an extra room in which he had to lock up females. The Governor of Kassala visited Butana 
district while Acland, the DC of Butana was on trek, at this time. Daud Eff. wanted to show 
some respect and to impress the guests by showing them around the prison and especially the 
newly-built women’s prison.  When he carefully opened the room door there was a girl 
hiding in a corner under the heat.  She instantly objected to the Governor about being 
mistakenly arrested and imprisoned on false grounds and it was reported that she ‘begged for 
mercy’.56 When Acland returned he was asked by the Governor for an explanation regarding 
the imprisoned girl of whom he had no knowledge and had to find out about from Daud Eff.  
Acland was told that: 
 
There was no woman in the prison and no record of any arrest. Daud Eff.’s 
explanation was simple - he regarded the building of our special prison as 
something modern  to be proud of and when showing it to a distinguished visitor, 
he thought  it would  be more realistic if it had an inmate; so he had paid the girl 
10 piasters to sit there for the morning. I was told to write and offer this 
explanation to Johnson-Hicks and received back a charming letter thanking me 
for an excellent story on which he could dine out.57 
 
While freed slaves thus found themselves subject to the  legal whims of the state, cases 
involving slave girls who still lived under the Lahawiyin authority would not have reached 
the merkaz, as reported retrospectively by a Lahawi sheikh: ‘we Lahawiyin would handle our 
problems internally, we were responsible for them, and they are ours’.58 Such cases were 
were considered a matter of honour and should not be made public.  
                                                 
54 ‘O’Fahey, ‘Preface,’ in Willis (ed.), Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa, p.viii.  
55 Acland, ‘Memoirs,’ SAD 707/15/6-7. 
56 Acland, ‘Memoirs,’ SAD 707/15/7. 
57 Ibid., SAD 707/15/6-7. 
58 Interview with El Igba Ahmed Adam al Zein, a driver and jurif owner, Gedarif, December 2007. 
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While female slaves were treated differently from Lahawiyin women, the slave trade also 
offered opportunities to some other ‘Arab’ women to gain status outside their normal 
gendered roles. The famous woman slave-trader, Asit Amna, had a principal role in 
providing, safeguarding, selling, purchasing and exchanging slaves, particularly female 
slaves, with whoever was interested. She was married to Sheikh Khojali Hassan, who had 
army of his own which he used to raid another slave-owner, Wad Mahmoud, in 1922.59 This 
army was made up of slaves who were brought up in his own compound - that is slaves born 
of slave parents.  Many ex-slaves of Wad Mahmoud were captured as a result of the raid and 
came into the possession of Khojali Hassan. Khojali Hassan was also reported to have gold 
mines in Bani60 (Bela) Shangul where in 1923 the government in Addis Ababa consulted him 
about concessions on the gold mines regarding the behaviour of some Italian businesses61. 
For more than two decades after 1905, Asit Amna - the wife of the slave-trader, Sheikh 
Khojali Hassan - traded in slaves from Bela Shangul to Sudan. According to British records 
she was a Jaaliyin, from northern Sudan62 , but Abdussamad Ahmad has given a slightly 
different account of her origin and movements 
 
She emigrated from Bela-Shangul to the Sudan and settled at Jebel Ora, then 
at Khor Yabus and finally at Mortosoro, an established slave depot. Khojele, 
[Khojali] himself, established another slave entrepot in the Sudan through 
which some 600 slave children passed.63 
 
Asit Amna would conceal all the Berta and Koma slave girls in her household, before they 
were dispersed through the trade.64 This took place not within the house itself, but in an 
attached building, as a hiding place away from the eyes of intruders: ‘The slaves were kept in 
the “barn” behind the household where she used to keep her horses’.65 While the slaves were 
                                                 
59 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, ‘A note on the history of the country of the Berta lying east of 
Kurmuk within the Abyssinian frontier, with special reference to the recent discovery of a considerable import 
of Berta slaves into the Sudan’, 1928, SAD.783/3/40-53. 
60 Arabic name for Bela.  
61 A. R. C. Bolton, Official papers, Situation reports on northern sector, Upper Nile area, January –April 1941, 
SAD 624/3/17. 
62 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.58, 1928, SAD 783/2/19. 
63 Ahmad, ‘Trading in Slaves in Bela –Shangul and Gumuz,’ p.438; Atieb Ahmed Dafallah, ‘Sheikh Khojele al-
Hassan and Bela-Shangul (I825-I938)’ (BA thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1973), p.16-17; Hargey, ‘The 
Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan,’ p.149. 
64 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.133, 1928, SAD 783/2/90. 
65 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.157, 1928, SAD 783/2/19. 
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hidden, Asit Amna settled deals with any potential buyer/s.  Some claimed that Arabs, 
including the Lahawiyin, went to Mortsoro to buy slaves from Asit Amna. 66 
There was direct communications between the Lahawiyin and Asit Amna. Clearly 
Lahawiyin, whatever their feelings about their own women,  felt no restriction on dealing 
with female traders; on the contrary most deals were done by her as she appeared to be the 
ultimate authority in her family and the main source for female slaves.  67 Asit Amna was one 
of the main providers of Lahawiyin slaves after Kojali Hassan, Mahdi Khojali Hassan, Faki 
Ishag. 68  
 
The export of slaves from Bani Shangul and its neighbouring lands seems to have been  at its 
highest from 1923 to 1925, due to the state of instability of Abyssinia and the activities of 
Wad Mahmud’s former slaves,69  
 
At this time Wad Mahmud having been removed to Showa (where he still is) 
his Berta soldiers were quite out of hand, robbing right and left, and stealing 
slaves in large numbers and selling them. These slaves they obtained from 
Asosa, Gotta, Dul, and ORA, selling them all in Bani Shangul.70 
 
These raiders were led by Ibrahim Abdel Rahman (a Bertawi slave and a wakil of Mohamed 
Abdel Rahman, chief of Bani Shangul). The latter was detained in Addis Ababa by 1923 and 
many Berta were exiled in Kurmuk district; they were estimated at 5,000 by Bimbashi Ruth 
[sic].71 Some sense of the personal insecurity of the time cn be gathered from individual 
stories: in 1923, 13 year old Idris and seven year old Al Ajabo, two sons of Himidi Idris, 
Magdam of Hageral Abelad, were abducted from their home in Hagar al Abelad in Agadi.  
This was south east of Jerok between Jebels Belagu and Jebel Midok, in the country of Wad 
Mahmoud, who had just been defeated by Khojali Hassan and an Abyssinian force. The 
kidnapper was a Watawiti man who lived in Mahadi wad Kojali’s village. They were sold to 
                                                 
66 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.157, 1928, SAD 783/2/19,47,90,94; SAD 
783/3/16. 
67 Arkell, Officia l Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No 75/28, SAD 783/2/39. 
68 Concluded from Arkell papers, SAD 783/2/1-103. 
69 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, SAD 783/3/53. 
70 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, ‘Note on the history of the country of the Berta,’ 1922-1923, 
SAD 783/3/50. 
71 Report on Bani Shangul-Asosa 1923, NRO Dakhlia (1) 112/16/101. 
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Habib Ahmed, a sheikh from Seleim, but after two years he found that they were not 
sufficiently servile so he sold them to an Ahamdi, Nas Dehaiba.72  
 
By 1926, the border slave trade had declined. One source suggested that the reduction in the 
number of in Arabs visiting the frontier to buy slaves was financial ‘since 1925 there has 
been a great diminution of Arabs visiting the frontier in order to buy slaves, apparently due to 
their shortness of ready cash’.73  This was also a period in which the administrative apparatus 
of the Condominium was developing, in the aftermath of the introduction of the Power of 
Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance and the Village Courts Ordinance to regulate and incorporate the 
powers and authorities of traditional leaders, increasingly strict monitoring by British patrols 
along the borders may have been another reason. This, however, had little immediate effect in 
some border areas, where bordering tribal sheikhs were traditionally involved in slavery, and 
some were far more closely involved with Abyssinian authorities than with those of the 
Condominium. Nor, however, were they always attentive to Abyssinian officials: Khojali 
Hassan (I897-1938)74 received an order from Showa forbidding the buying and selling of 
slaves and warning that ‘anyone guilty of selling a slave would be fined 10 wogias of gold 
and the purchaser 25 wogias’.75  Many took no notice of this order, including Khojali’s own 
family members and their clients, the Arab nomads of eastern and central Sudan.  
 
Mahdi Khojali’s son lived in Megali.76 With his relative Fiki Ishag of Sergoli, he continued to 
openly sell slaves, and to round up slaves stating that they were demanded by the 
Abyssinians, and to send them in batches to Khojali Hassan at Showa. From there they were 
presumably kept by Khojali as ‘concubines or servants, not slaves’or distributed to those with 
whom he wished to curry favour. 77 Interestingly enough Mahdi Khojali Hassan’s concubines 
were themselves given slaves. For instance Mahdi’s concubine Mahdia was given Khamisa 
who was later transferred to another concubine called Magia.78 Children born of slaves and 
children born of serfs [Mahdia and Magia parents were bound to the land simply to labor; 
they could not travel freely without the consent of Mahdi Khogali the ir master; they had no 
                                                 
72 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No.72, 81, 1928, SAD 783/2/34, 41. 
73 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, 'Subject: Slave Trade between Abyssinia and the Sudan', 29 
April 1928, SAD 783/3/53. 
74 Ahmad, ‘Trading in Slaves in Bela –Shangul and Gumuz,’ p.435.  For the life of Sheikh Khojele, see Dafallah, 
‘Sheikh Khojele al-Hassan.’ 
75 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, July 1928, SAD 783/2/32-35. 
76 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No 89/1928, SAD 783/2/32. 
77 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, SAD 783/2/32. 
78 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No 12/1928, SAD 783/1/14. 
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legal rights but were relatively free to work as they wish in their daily action while Khamisa 
for example was a property of Mahdi and could sell her anytime he wants] were treated 
differently. The latter mostly became the selected concubines. Most of the serfs were owned 
by slave traders in Abyssinia such as Abu Rabha (uncle of Khojali Hassan). ‘Mahdi supplies 
Fiki Ishag with slaves on payment and he also sends them to his mother Asit Amna at 
Morbosor, who sells them for him’.79 It is apparent that the slaves of the family of Khojali 
Hassan learnt Arabic from birth. Not only that but according to one record a medical 
inspector reported that three slaves girls of Kojali were circumcised and had been long time 
before his examination. 80 
 
The demand for slaves in Abyssinia was encouraged by coffee plantations which required 
large number of workers; the provision of slaves met that demand. An owner of a coffee 
plantation called Beshir, in Mega, used to employ slaves in coffee picking, though he was not 
equal to Asit Amna and her family in terms of the number of slaves owned and authority 
exerted.81 Beshir village on the border was named after him and was recognised as a meeting 
point where most dealers and buyers met and spent time before accessing slaves. The two 
traders had worked closely and provided support to each other at times of official raids and 
when slaves were in short supply. 82 However the link with Asit Amna was stronger among 
the Lahawiyin and many of the suppliers who dealt with the Lahawiyin were ex-slaves of her 
sons Mahdi and Ismaail.  
 
In 1917, Safi Mohamed, Lahawi came to  the Abyssinian frontier brought Bahr 
Elniel Fadlalah ‘ alias fadl Wasi, a Berta girl now aged  about 22 from Ismaail 
son of Bimbashi, Khojali Hassan’s trusted slave at Kirin. 83   
 
While trading in Abyssinian slaves, and using Arab identity as a way of distinguishing 
between those who could and could not be enslaved, the Lahawiyin were unconsciously 
exercising their power in differentiating between those born of slaves and those born of serfs
[they were differentiated as being the child of a serf of one of the slave traders]., with the 
assistance of the slave traders who set different prices for them.  Price also depended on 
gender. For instance in 1924 a Koma girl a child of a serf of Mahdi Khojali, Mogdam Sebit, 
                                                 
79 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, July 1928, SAD 783/2/32. 
80 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No 12/1928, SAD 783/1/15. 
81 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No. 77, 1928, SAD 783/2/38. 
82 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No. 97/1928, SAD 783/2/61. 
83 Arkell, Official Papers, White Nile Province, Minor Court No. 75/1928, SAD 783/2/39. 
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was taken to Mahdi’s house and had the cheek marks known as ‘shillukh’ ‘cut on her cheeks 
and was sold by Mahadi for £10. Together with another two girls she was sold to Hassan 
Omer, Seleimi, who was pre-financed by Hamid Mareig another Seleimi.84  
It was common to sell and resell slave girls more than once and a slave girl might have been 
roaming from one sheikh to another or from one village to an Arab ferik. After the 1922 raid 
against Wad Mahmound, where many female slaves were captured by Khojali Hassan, some 
were resold a few months later by relatives of Asit Amna to Arab nomads.85 Others were kept 
until 1925 when prices rose to £35 for girls of 10-13 years old. 86  
 
But Condominium authority was slowly extended over this area through the 1920s’ Khojali 
died in the mid-1920s, and when a Condominium patrol set out for Kurmuk and Bani 
Shangul about 1928/29 it was reported that ‘Asit Amna, the widow of Khojali Hassan, has 
sent a letter of welcome’.87 In Asit Amna’s letter of support she welcomed the arrival of the 
patrol in that part of Ethiopia; she had evidently opted to make an ally of the Condominium 
authorities in an area that lay in the uncertain borderland between the Condominium and 
Ethiopia, and hoped to have a cordial relationship with British officials  so her business would 
survive.  
 
Condominium officialsalso received a letter of welcome from her son Mahdi wad Hassan.88 
The three family members had spread their residence across the trade routes: Asit Amna lived 
in Mortosoro, Khojali Hassan in Beika and Mahdi wad Hassan in ‘Megali’ near Wad 
Mahmoud’.89 “Mahdi supplies Fiki Ishag with slaves on payment and he also sends them to 
his mother Asit Amna at Morbosor, who sells them for him”.90 
 
The Sudanese slave trade made Khojali and Amna rich and provided them with great returns. 
Despite her letter of welcome, in 1928 the Condominium arrested Asit Amna for slave 
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trading and she was put in prison in Wadi Halfa until 1935 when she was released and 
returned to Wad Medani.91  
 
For, though enforcement was slow and patchy, in the end Condominium policy was driven 
along by Britain’s international commitments to end both the slave trade and – ultimately – 
slavery itself.  The Inter-Departmental Committee on Slavery and the Slave Trade, in 
London, had made it clear to that’ it shall be deemed to be a panel offence for any subject of 
signatory power wherever resident to engage in the slave trade.”’ 92 Condominium policy had 
first been aimed to eliminate the ‘capture of human beings, their sale and purchase and their 
ill- treatment at their masters‘will and which involved non-recognition of all personal rights’. 
On the other hand, there had existed, what was commonly referred to as 'domestic slavery’,93 
which was more gradually dealt with. 94 In May 1925, however, the Sudan Government issued 
a decree which asserted the absolute right to freedom of all Sudanese despite the strong 
objections of the powerful religious leaders including the Grand Qadi ‘that wholesale 
manumission was a contravention of Islamic law.’95 
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3. Slaves and sedentarisation 
 
While slave-trading continued, the campaign against slavery and the slave trade was gaining 
momentum. As early as 1910-1913 about 200 slaves, men and women had reported their 
demand to emancipation to the merkaz Al Dweim.96 The campaign required inquiry into and 
the listing and registration of the slaves’ conditions.  Exhaustive inquiries had to be made by 
the Condominium administration relating to the place of capture, method of capture, dates, 
route taken and persons concerned, as often the slave was either a child or an old woman 
incapable of answering coherently.  In many cases the accused, their masters, would be sent 
away to minimize their influence over the slaves. 97  The Condominium authorities 
consistently sought to downplay grievances: in 1929, one official reported that there were 
‘very few cases of ill treatment and dissatisfaction and many of them are almost 
independent’.98 Yet, by the late 1920s, courts set up by the Condominium government were 
active in hearing ex-slaves’ cases, of whom some had been abandoned by their masters. 
Revealingly, in this district [Butana], most of the slaves belonged to Lahawiyin and were 
found in the area of what would become the headquarters of the sheikh khut, Mugataa Wad al 
Zein, along the River Atbara. 99  Remarkably the majority of descendants of those 10,000 
slaves of the Lahawiyin chose to remain by the River Atbara, and formed what is now known 
as Mugataa al-Suq. This was a town of slaves and non-Lahawiyin migrants.100 
 
Settlement following both the campaign and the steps of their masters perpetuated a self-
recognition of a new identity.  Land began to become a concern in an area where herd 
ownership was also classified as that of Arabs.  Therefore the only option open to those ex-
slaves was to seek smallholdings of land to exercise a form of ownership.  Mostly, these 
smallholdings were the rain-fed land, bildat, in the environs of Mugataa Asuq and the juruf 
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close to this village.101  The Lahawiyin’s acceptance of the establishment and expansion of 
Mugataa Asuq did not happen arbitrarily; rather it was intentional as it served many purposes 
that suited the Lahawiyin, as later accounts suggest. Ex-slaves had always constituted part of 
the tribe and were counted within the constituency of the sheikh khut. Moreover, the labour of 
ex-slaves was crucial to the maintenance of the tribe, a reciprocal relationship. Former slaves 
provided agricultural and herding work that was in high demand with the expansion of small 
mechanised schemes.102    
 
Across central and eastern Sudan, livelihoods were changing at this time. In the White Nile 
Province, a mixed economy of herding and rain land cultivation developed. In the Gezira 
Province the introduction of cash crops generated a great demand for labour. Also, with the 
existence of market towns such as Kosti, Sinnar, Kurmuk, and Jabelein, nomadic tribes had 
accumulated wealth in livestock which contributed to successful farming and in turn allowed 
individuals to build up herds. The combination of these activities created a greater demand 
for labour, particularly family labour.103  
 
Most of the ex-slaves were engaged in agricultural and herding activities, petty trading, 
butchering, mechanics and carpentry, the trade in vegetables and so on. Some may have 
owned bildat, through continuous cultivation over the years which were customarily known 
as ‘free hand’ while some bought agricultural schemes from other land owners within the 
tribe.104 A number of ex-slaves obtained a right over juruf but these were limited in number.  
During the 1940s most of the slaves were freed. The desire for education encouraged some 
slaves to leave their masters105 and compete with them in local politics, creating a somewhat 
problematic relationship.106  As we shall learn later on that the Lahawiyin were not very 
much into education some former slaves also joined the police and the army, prominent 
services for the people who in these years of the Condominium were the only ones called 
‘Sudani’.107  
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Prior to the settlement and the development of Mugataa Asuq, the interaction of the slaves 
with their sheikhs and their families was very close and unavoidable; however the new set-up 
separated the slaves and their masters further. 108   The freedom obtained by the slaves 
distanced them and allowed some to engage in certain social practices of which some 
Lahawiyin might have not approved.  The development of the Mugataa contributed to 
widening the gap between the Arabs and non-Arabs, particularly the slaves.  The nominal 
freeing of the slaves by manumission led to a kind of confinement of the slaves by the 
Lahawiyin; just as the Lahawiyin found themselves confined by grazing boundaries, former 
Lahawiyin slaves found themselves confined by restriction to a particular area: the  Lahawiyin 
perhaps lost direct control over the slaves; but they had succeeded in confining the slaves in 
one place. Al-Mugataa Asuq, as a case in history, played a part in a relationship of self 
recognition and construction of two opposite identities of nomads and slaves. As one 
informant put it “Al-Mugataa is a place that brings strangers, sons and ancestors of slaved 
women Alsarari. Al-Mugataa Asuq is ‘Abeed’ [slaves]; some of the social behaviours suit 
them- and 90% of them were owned by Magait.”109  
 
Yet most interesting of all is that – as the next chapter will show – when the Lahawiyin 
themselves also began to form permanent settlements, the leading al-Faki section would 
choose to establish its village of Mugataa Wad al Zein right next to the ‘slave’ settlement of 
Mugataa Asuq. 
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4. Identity and slavery  
 
In 2007, a Lahawi woman proudly stated that: ‘Our grandfather, Wad Al Yagoub, and his 
camel named Kbasour used to enter Ingesana areas. He was trading in slaves.’110  During the 
Condominium period the Lahawiyin acquired a degree of wealth, sustained a nomadic 
economy and asserted their own status by enslaving others.  Even though the Lahawiyin 
sheikhs respected the slaves as living beings – for example, they acknowledged the slaves’ 
desires – they still treated them with less respect than a Lahawi because slaves were used as a 
means to their own ends. Descendants of ex-slaves still maintained relations with their ex-
masters; a feeling of belonging to the tribe was quite prevalent and this maintained an 
inherent identity of their past experiences as ex-slaves, which in turn confirmed their  self 
perception and recognition of the Lahawiyin as masters. The master/slave relationship still 
exists long after formal emancipation, as was reflected in many interviews. This was clearly 
depicted in the private discussions of the Lahawiyin:  
 
Some slaves freed themselves – the market has brought people from all walks of 
life and they married and mixed with them. Some even married with Lahawiyin. 
But the fear is that the grandsons will not be able to marry from Lahawiyin. They 
continue to feel that they belong to the Lahawiyin and they are affiliated to the 
tribe. Some of them educated themselves and now represent their constituency in 
the State Assembly.111 
 
Nyombe expressed the sense that Sudanese social borders might be negotiable and  that 
Arabism was not genealogically exclusive.  The Lahawiyin suggest a very different dynamic 
to Arab identity.  They claim that throughout their history they were cautious of intermarriage 
even with non-Lahawiyin Arabs, as illustrated by the statement made by an interviewee ‘A 
Lahawi daughter was married to a Shukri sheikh; the Lahawiyin were angry although this 
marriage would have solved a lot of land problems.’112  
 
Slaves’ circumstances did improve in the aftermath of manumission even though in some 
cases they had the experience of their offspring being identified as ‘awlad al seriyya’113 and 
treated differently. In the view of a Lahawi sheikh, recorded in 2007 , people from former 
slave families have a ‘blood relation’ and need to be ‘protected’; interestingly he explained 
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this in terms of a division within the tribe, between Arab and the no-Arab former slaves, 
whom he called al-Hakamat, as well as seriyya: 
 
They are members of the Tribe with two different colours - we feel it is a blood 
relation. The tribe supports and protects them when they need it. In celebration al 
Hakamat are not Arab – they are the ex slaves up to now they play the drum 
(Daluka [nugara]), but an Arab will get her hand chopped off if she dares to do 
that - only among the women alone. In most Lahawiyin areas the drum or the Tar 
calls in evils like the slaves. Al Hakamat organise parties and bring joy to people. 
Any Lahawi whose grandmother is Seriyya even if this Lahawi is your cousin 
you will not give him your daughter.114 
 
As this shows, the role of female slaves was also defined. They made their living and 
obtained rewards by entertaining and praising their masters and related family members. 
Competition between female slaves over an intimate relationship with their masters was 
common.  Hargey argued that ‘the nugara [dancing drum] . . . became the focal point’ for 
former slaves.115  Mugataa Asuq became a refuge, a residence and a ‘nugara place’ for the 
slaves and ex slaves. Haja Bakhita stated that slave women were ‘good at dancing and made 
the nugara hot [appealing].’116   
 
A contemporary illustration reveals the endurance of the ‘ex-slave’ category within the 
Lahawiyin tribe. One morning in 2007, two ex-slave women came from al Mugatta al-Suq on 
a visit to Sheikh Ahmed al Zein and his wife Haja Bakita.  From a distance they could be 
seen and when they were close to the vicinity of the house of Sheikh Ahmed and his wife 
Bakhita, they both suddenly took off their slippers and carried them in their hands and took 
their traditional Sudanese cloths from their heads and sat down. They greeted the hosts not by 
shaking hands but by starting to chat casually. When Bakhita was asked why these two 
women acted strangely she replied “they are khadam (slaves) nas amik (your uncle) 
Ahmed.”117 This story reveals two things; the slave self- image and the Lahawiyin expectation 
of their slaves which has become a norm. These were ex-slaves; however they continued to 
be identified as slaves. To have head and shoulders uncovered is, for a woman, a sign of low 
status. Away from the family that had owned their family, these women covered themselves, 
and wore shoes; but when they saw that family, they uncovered themselves in a way that 
marked their lower status. This persistent slave identity was tied to the economic and social 
                                                 
114 Interview with a Lahawi sheikh in Showak, Gedarif, November 2007. 
115 Hargey, ‘The suppression of slavery in the Sudan,’ p.140. 
116 Interview with Haja Bakhita al Igba, Mugatta a wad al Zein, December 2007. 
117 Ibid. 
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protection that the tribe could offer to those women.  However, negotiating another identity, a 
non-slave identity, is out of the question and unobtainable to elderly slaves. They identify 
themselves with the Lahawiyin. As long as they live in the boundary of the Wad al Zein, they 
belong to them.  
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Chapter Four 
 The desire for a dar: changing livelihoods and relations to the 
land in the later Condominium period 
 
As the previous chapter showed, the main forms of wealth and sources of status among the 
Lahawiyin were firstly camels and secondly slaves. Maintaining these resources, particularly 
camels, required the crossing of administrative, grazing and national boundaries. This chapter 
will explore the impact of continuing Condominium Government efforts to create and enforce 
such boundaries, and of the development of new patterns of agricultural land-use. As the 
Lahawiyin experienced increasing restrictions on their grazing and access to land, they 
responded in two ways. Firstly, they began to demand their own territorial homeland or dar 
to try to protect the communal grazing rights of the emerging ‘tribe’ as a whole. Secondly, 
individuals and groups within the tribe began to take the decision to engage in non-pastoralist 
economic activities and to purchase cultivable land. For those who had always been poor in 
camels, the new opportunities for agriculture and labour migration offered the chance to gain 
different kinds of wealth, and to renegotiate their status within their section or tribe. The later 
part of the Condominium period therefore saw the contradictory processes of increasing tribal 
unity around the demand for a dar, and increasing variation between different  livelihoods 
within the tribe. 
 
1. ‘The Lahawiyin must be ruled’: enforcement of grazing and district 
boundaries 
 
 We saw in Chapter two that violations of grazing boundaries led directly to internal 
restructuring of the Lahawiyin, because Sheikh el-Igba was removed as a result of illegally 
grazing camels across a boundary. This left Sheikh Adam al Zein of the Wad el-Faki section 
as the overall administrative head of the Lahawiyin, holding the title of sheikh khut.  The 
issue of boundaries placed him and his section in a difficult position, because they were one 
of the richest sections in camels, and therefore needed access to grazing. Yet al Zein needed 
to appear loyal to government and obedient to its boundaries in order to avoid the same fate 
as al-Igba. This may explain why he began to demand the creation of the position of nazir for 
the Lahawiyin, a demand first articulated at the time of the establishment of the Lahawiyin 
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Native Court in 1928; this was part of a strategy to secure land rights which would allow him 
(and other Lahawiyin) to maintain their camel herds. According to the archives, both in 
Sudan and in Durham, the Lahawiyin had demanded their independence from the Shukriyia 
several times.1 The archive sources suggest that this was expressed in administrative terms – 
the demand was explicitly for a nazirate. But it seems clear from interview evidence that for 
the Lahawiyin, the claim for a nazirate was inseparable from the claim for a dar. Dar and 
nazirate were used almost interchangeably, to define tribal territory, authority, and political 
legitimacy. The linkage was one which was not – and is not - necessarily accepted by others. 
As Babikir al-Daw Shola, a prominent Shukri leader, argued in 2007 ‘a nazirate is not a dar.’2 
His argument – and, no doubt, the argument of other Shukri since the 1930s - was that the 
existence of a land wathiga (a land document issued by the Funj Sultanate) which recognized 
the claim of the Shukriyia to the Butana as far as the Blue Nile was in itself a guarantee not to 
grant any dar rights to other tribes in the same area. . Yet, revealingly, he himself went on to 
conflate land claims and administrative titles:   
 
Shukriyya are always welcoming others and sharing grazing lands. Every nazirate is 
based on dar – The basis is the dar - Emarat [nazirate] Wad Zaied, Wad Bakur 
Ashukria, these are traditional holders of the land.3 
 
The Government, meanwhile, saw al Zein’s role as that of an agent who would enforce limits 
on Lahawiyin movement. al Zein’s title as sheikh khut  may have given him additional status – 
and power – as an individual, but the recognition on which the title depended was dependent 
on governmental approval, and this – of course – left al Zein trying to balance the conflicting 
demands of accumulating wealth for himself and his section, trying to maintain a degree of 
legitimacy among the Lahawiyin as a whole, and meeting the expectations of the 
government. In the 1930s this balancing act was made steadily harder, as the government 
greatly increased the restrictions on the movement of the Lahawiyin, especially crossing the 
Atbara River.  
 
These restrictions were associated with the elaboration of a hierarchy of people and 
institutions with titles and positions  which were ultimately derived from a relationship with 
government. The hamla – ‘patrol’ - was in general introduced to impose boundaries by 
                                                 
1 Lea, Butana notebooks, 1927-1928, SAD.645/2-645/4; G.M. Hancock , Governor Kassala, Kassala Province 
Annual Paper for 1948, NRO Kassala 3/138/610. 
2 Interview with Babikir al- Daw Shola, President Pastoralist Union, Gedarif, December 2007. 
3 Ibid. 
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keeping the nomads in assigned grazing areas as well as to show that the Government 
authority’s had not been affected. In 1923 the government sent a hamla of the Eastern Arab 
Corps to Abu Deleig to warn the Batahin not to mess with the Government after the transfer 
of part of Abu Deleig to Butana District.4  For the Lahawiyin, regular hamla imposed the 
boundary that kept them south of Khor Gergaf and north of Atbara River and ran from 
Kassala merkaz. 5  For example, ten camels were hired between July-August 1927 for the 
hamla.6  The muhafiz - ‘retainer’ - was a post established after the placement of two police 
officers on the east bank; his authority bolstered by the police, this man would give written 
permission to the Lahawiyin who wanted to go north of Khor Gergraf. 7  Otherwise the 
Lahawiyin would be liable to questioning and their camels would be confiscated. This post 
was authorised by the merkaz in Kassala 8  and Lea made a request which suggested the 
potentially coercive nature of the role: ‘Could handcuffs be supplied to sheiks of khuts for use by 
muhafizia?’ 9 .   
 
The supervisory structure of official support, which both, supported and scrutinized men like 
Adam el Zein, was however always subject to financial constraints. In 1931 it was proposed 
to abolish the mamur and katib Idara [‘administrative secretary’] posts at Khashm al Girba 
and to reduce the number of police. This was intended to result in greater efficiency – that is, 
lower costs - and was accompanied by an increase in the number of muhafizin.10 On the other 
hand the muawin,11 was an official, appointed by the government, and working for the DC – 
not part of the ‘native administration’ was established to keep guard over grazing camels, 
report to the DC and communicate orders to sheikhs and the Lahawiyin people. 12  The 
muawins were attached by DC to sheikhs according to the size of the herds and locations 
identified and the number of muawins was 37 in total.13 The wakil, or ‘representative’ was 
                                                 
4 The Batahin had an internal quarrel and were in conflict with the Shukriya because of land being confiscated 
by the latter and also for camel-thieving.  For more details on the transfer of Abu Deleig, see Acland, Official 
Papers, ‘Handing over notes on Butana District,’ SAD.777/14/1-32. 
5 Lea , Butana notebook No.2, SAD.645/3/90 . 
6 Ibid., SAD.645/3/50. 
7 Muhafiz (pl. muhafizin); Acland, Official Papers, ‘reorganisation and expansion,’ SAD.777/14/6. 
8 Lea , Butana notebook No.2, SAD.645/3/90 . 
9 Lea , Butana notebook No.3, SAD.645/4/26. 
10 Acland, Official papers, SAD.777/14/9. 
11 Daly says that the term was used of ‘Sudanese sub-mamurs’, who were being introduced to replace Egyptian 
mamurs from the mid-1920s.  M. Daly, British Administration and the Northern Sudan, 1917-24: the governor-
generalship of Sir Lee Stack in the Sudan (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut, 1980), pp. 
45-46.  Sub-mamurs in other provinces, though, for instance in Dongla and Merwai, were assigned different 
tasks such as administration and accountancy. 
12 Lea , Butana notebook No.2, SAD.645/3/87. 
13 Ibid., SAD.645/3/ 95-97. 
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appointed to deal with   land disputes, rather than herds; the archive record is not clear, but   
Abu Shouk and Bjorkelo suggested that these were all assigned by the DC.14 
 
Like the sheikh khut  himself, the muhafizin and wakil occupied an uncertain position; 
nominally part of the ‘native administration’, yet dependent on the approval and support of 
the government, which would be lost if they were not able to meet at least some of the 
demands of government policy. The hamla was placed to follow the Lahawiyin wherever 
they crossed the Atbara, and in particular to report unpermitted crossing from west to east. In 
1932 a muhafiz was assigned to look after the Lahawiyin away from the east bank and thus 
facilitated proper crossing of the river when it was low. 15 The Lahawiyin were difficult to 
control, even in the presence of the muhafiz.  In areas of cultivation (bildat), a ‘wakil’ was 
appointed to watch over cultivated areas as much as he could to minimize disputes between 
different land users in 1932.  Conflicts which could not be solved by the wakil would go to 
Sheikh al Zein.16  
  
                                                 
14 Aboushouk and Bjorkelo, The Principles of Native Administration, p.100. 
15 Lea, Butana notebook No.2, SAD.645/3/ 54. 
16 C. D. Denver, Assistant District Commissioner Gedarif, ‘General Report of Trek’, 30 August -12 September 
1945, p.88, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
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2. Agricultural schemes and further grazing restrictions 
 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, a series of developments underlined the increasing 
challenges faced by Lahawiyin – and others around them – in securing access to the range of 
grazing land which was necessary to sustain a life reliant on camel herds. In 1924, an 
agricultural scheme had been established in the Gash delta. Its aim was to encourage cotton 
cultivation, and to draw Beja tribes, particularly the Hadendawa, into a new kind of seasonal 
cultivation, and its effect was to gradually transform nomadic livelihoods - mostly those of 
camel herders – to agriculture.17 Though the scheme was much smaller than the enormous 
project at Gezira, it grew steadily: from 9,100 feddans in 1924, to 29,400 feddans in 1927 and 
68,600 feddans by 1956; and as it expanded, the ‘tenancies’ which were given to those who 
wished to farm as part of the scheme were given not only to Hadendawa, but also to some 
farmers from western Sudan. In 1939, following encouragement from the government, the 
nazir of the Shukriyya gave up valuable grazing land on the karab. This was ‘an area of bad-
lands topography between the river valley; and the steppe, an open clay savanna stretching 
eastwards to the Gash River some 50km away.’ 18  This was to be included in this Gash 
scheme. The nazir was advised – perhaps pushed - by the Government to do so because of the 
‘economic importance’ of the Gash agricultural scheme.  
 
The nazir’s decision included land which the Lahawiyin claimed for their own use. Since 
entry to the land  east of the Atbara had been restricted because of the uncertain conditions on 
the frontier, the Lahawiyin had come to assume that they had acquired grazing rights there. 
The Beja, by contrast, had not had access to the area, and so in Lahawiyin eyes had no right 
to infringe on the rights which others had already established there. The issue sparked fresh 
dispute over the demarcation of boundaries, and whether the area which the Lahawiyin were 
accustomed to use was, or was not, a part of the dar of the Shukriyya: 
 
 He [the nazir] did not admit the claim that the grazing agreement in which the 
grazing rights east of the Atbara were based did not mention the Karab and that 
therefore it was excluded……. it is unfair to term the area east of the Atbara a 
general grazing area; it has been part of the Dar Shukriyia since the ‘reconquest of 
the Sudan’.19 
                                                 
17 Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan, pp.17-18.  The scheme was run by a board of the Kassala Cotton 
Company, the government and the tenants. 
18 Karim Sadr, ‘Interim Report On Late Pre -Historic Settlement Pattern  Of The Khashm El Girba Area, East 
AST Central Sudan,’ Nyame Akuma 22 (1983), p.28. 
19 DC Southern Gedarif, 25 September 1941, NRO Kassala 3/ 139/ 615. 
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The arguments turned on the need for a range of grazing which would provide for bad years, 
as well as good; there was not enough pasture for the nomads in order to give up access to 
such land, even if they did not need it every year.  The DC Gedarif agreed; as he pointed out, 
there were dangers in asking the Shukriyya to give up their grazing land, because in bad years 
it was Shukriyya pastoralists were sorely tempted to try and graze their animals in the 
agricultural part of Dar Shukriyya, which caused damage and disputes; just as pastoralist the 
Beja were liable to damage the cotton in the Gash when grazing was short. The DC, however, 
seems not to have seen this as part of the Shukriyya dar, but as an area which needed much 
closer administration 
 
In this connection you will recall that the area between Kassala and the 
Atbara and Setit contains a “Higgies”20 [mix] of tribes (to quote from one of 
my predecessors) of this area.  The Hadendawa are responsible for…their 
strip. The rest is ‘nominally’ administered from Kassala or Khashm al Girba.  
I have recently discussed in Kassala the urgent need for forming a body 
representing this ‘higgies’, and I will urge the Hadendawa authorities in that 
body and the tribe to combine to improve good order in this no-man’s land.21  
 
“Higgies” was metaphorically used by the DC in Gedarif to refer to the mix nature of the 
tribes in this area, and that mix formed a concern to the government in terms of 
administration and control, The Hadendawa, Shukriyya, Lahawiyin, Bani Amer and others 
were claimants to the no-man’s land.  The proposed ‘body’ meant to oversee all these tribes.  
But this body disregard the Shukriyya claim to the  area to the east of the Atbara River, and 
overlooked the Lahawiyin claim, that this was a part of their grazing land. Instead, the ‘the 
no-man’s land’ was rather annexed to demarcated areas and the Lahawiyin‘s chances to land 
right decreased.  
 
At the same time, increasing demand on grazing land, and government attempts to manage 
conflict arising from these, was leading to other kinds of demarcation which explicitly relied 
on ethnic categorization. In 1940 a grazing line (now remembered locally as the ‘Fasher 
Ford’ line, apparently from the name of a British official) was established to   set southern 
boundaries to the Shukriyya and Bawadra movement into this area; and, conversely, to 
demarcate a grazing area for the Lahawiyin.22  This may, on one level, have been welcome 
for the Lahawiyin, since it gave them an exclusive area; on the other hand, it was part of 
                                                 
20 This is used in the Scottish sense, i.e. a ‘mix’. 
21 DC Gedarif, Sinkat, January 1940, p.159, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
22 ‘Interview with Amna Mahmoud, Deputy Manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
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wider changes which increasingly restricted grazing, and made their lack of a recognized dar 
ever more of an issue.  
 
The Government went further in its confinement of the nomads. In 1940 a boundary 
commission was assigned to fix boundaries with the Blue Nile province in the west and the 
Berber province in the north. 23 The same commission also redefined the boundaries of the 
Butana. As the use of land was becoming more closely restricted and proscribed, the size of 
the herds of the Lahawiyin and the sedentary tribes was increasing; by the early 1950s it was 
reported that the Lahawiyin owned more animals than the eastern Shukriyya of theButana 
and Atbara khut.24  
 
The ever-closer fixing of boundaries showed the fundamental nature of the differences in 
interests and approach between the Condominium and the nomads. Condominium officials 
saw the fixing of the boundaries of the provinces as a process of administrative 
regularisation, simplifying the task of government. British administrators were guided 
primarily by administrative concerns –‘It would be good to have the boundary at Adrama’, as 
Lea wrote. But in doing so they set a northern boundary for the Lahawiyin.25 The southern 
boundary was set at ‘Hager al-Abiad’ or ‘Mereibiaa’, the point at which the Lahawiyin 
usually watered their camels in large numbers, and where they had once objected to the 
presence of the Rashaida.26 But for the Lahawiyin such regularisation inevitably meant the 
restriction of movement in a way which directly threatened their livelihood; four Lahawiyin 
men went to Khartoum to complain, but the DC commented ‘in this the Lahawiyin must be 
ruled’.27  
 
The impact of the flurry of boundary setting around 1940 was in some ways contradictory.  
The fixing of boundaries was followed by the introduction of penalties, including fines, for 
those who crossed the boundaries without permission, and in effect the boundaries both 
                                                 
23 Governor of Kassala Province to District Commissioner Southern District, Sinkat, 29 September 1941, 
Kassala 3/139/615. 
24 ‘General Grazing Question,’ NRO Kassala 1/78/348; M.M. Harrison, ‘Report on a grazing survey of the 
Sudan, 1956,’ quoted in Khalid et al, ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, 
p.323. 
25 Lea, Butana notebook  No.3 , SAD.645/4/84. 
26 District Commissioner Southern/ District, Agriculture/Eastern Grazing, Ninth Rashaida Meeting, Goz Rajeb 
15-20 February 1940, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
27 DC Southern/ District, Agriculture/Eastern Grazing, Ninth Rashaida Meeting, Goz Rajeb 15-20 February 
1940, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
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restricted access to watering points and grazing and divided the Lahawiyin – with some on 
one side of the new boundaries and some on the other. For instance the Bulolab umudiyya 
became part of Khashm al Girba district whereas the rest of the umudiyyas remained within 
Gedarif district.28 However they all remained under the sheikh khut of the Lahawiyin. 29    But 
the division, and the sense that livelihoods were threatened, actually encouraged a sense of 
unity among the Lahawiyin and changed the dynamics of the constant negotiations over 
access to grazing and water in which ideas about identity and the nature of claims to land 
were constantly rehearsed. 
 
In July 1941 the Rashaida and the Hadendawa presented several complaints regarding 
boundary violations by the Lahawiyin.30  The nazir of the Hadendawa, Ibrahim Musa, and 
presented a request for the enforcement of certain rights vis à vis the Shukriyya and the 
Lahawiyin. But these were not expressed in terms of the recent redefinitions of boundaries; 
the rights involved, he insisted, had been granted to him in an agreement made between the 
tribes by an earlier Condominium official, Townsend Bey, decades earlier.31 In his request 
the nazir acknowledged implicitly acknowledged equivalence between the rights of the 
Shukriyya and the Lahawiyin in the area, by accepting that the Lahawiyin had possessed 
grazing rights in the area prior to the mentioned agreement. The response of officials was to 
try and impose a separation of the Lahawiyin from the Hadendawa and Bani Amer, which 
resulted in restricting social and economic relations for a long time.32  It was also supposed to 
prevent the Bani Amer crossing the frontiers to Sudan. 33  
 
This was enforced by the establishment of a camel police patrol in Zahana south of the Setit 
River. This was intended to stop the Lahawiyin from crossing the boundary into the grazing 
area; through this police presence administrators were able both to bolster Adam al Zein’s 
authority and to put pressure on him to exert that authority more thoroughly, as a telegram 
from 1941 shows: 
 
                                                 
28 Interview with Abdalla Suleiman Amir, former deputy Governor of Gezira State and a District Administrator 
for Lahawiyin (1964), Gedarif, January 2008. 
29 Khalid et.al, ‘The Lahawiyin,’ p.319. 
30 Kassala 23 July 1941, District Commissioner Gedarif, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
31 District Commissioner Gedarif, Kassala 23 July 1941, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
32 Ibid. 
33 D. F. Hawley, Official papers relating to Gedarif, Kassala Province, 1946-1948, SAD.1/3/1-79. 
128 
 
The police have found some Lahawiyin and are now sent to you. Please do 
what is necessary and inform all your Muhafizeen to send away all the 
Lahawiyin from the restricted grazing area.34 
 
 
However the  1927 incident, which had led to the removal of sheikh al Igba Abdallah from th 
tribal leadership had not taught the Lahawiyin much as they continued to ignore government 
rules and graze in restricted areas.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
34 A telegraph from the Inspector to Sheikh Adam al Zein on 23 October 1941, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
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3. Changes in livelihoods, internal differentiation and inter-tribal 
competition 
 
The Fasher Ford (also known as the Sindi Ford) line proved difficult to police effectively, but 
certainly did not work in favour of the Lahawiyin. This was partly because of pressures on 
grazing which resulted from wider changes - notably the expansion of mechanised 
agriculture, which had a growing effect on the Butana from the mid-1940s.  Therefore 
nomads from outside the area were not stopped by this line. Kibreab argued,  
 
that ‘the strangers [Kawahla and Rufa’a el Sharig]  followed no rules and did 
whatever they liked with the resources…. but they also tended to overstay, 
encroaching  upon  the dry season grazing and watering areas in central Butana 
on which the livelihood of central Butana tribes depended.35   
 
The establishment of the mechanised schemes had an effect on the local economy and 
grazing in Butana and led to competition between tribes and internal change in economic 
practices within the Lahawiyin. Three sections or umudiyyas were particularly affected in 
different ways by the wider economic and administrative changes. The Magit were the most 
prominent in trading across the colonial borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea, as we saw in the 
previous chapter. Wad Hardan had always been poor in camels and so became among the 
first to turn to sedentary agriculture and labour migration. Wad el-Faki, the section of the 
sheikh khut, al Zein, retained their wealth in camels, but also took advantage of their 
prominent position to invest in purchasing land. In terms of inter-tribal relations and 
competition, the Fellatta, and the Bawadra also became significant, as well as the dominant 
dar-owning Shukriyya and Hadendawa.36 
 
Up to the 1940s, there had been no official encouragement for the development of rain-fed 
grain agriculture in Sudan – schemes in the Gezira and Gash had been based on irrigation, 
and the production of cotton for export. But the demand for food grains created by the 
Second World War drove a newly interventionist approach, and by 1944 the government had 
surveyed and demarcated 350,000 feddans of rain land at Gadambaliya near Gedarif for the 
mechanised production of dura (sorghum) for the Sudan Defence Force units stationed in 
North Africa. By the end of 1946 into 1947 about 21,000 feddans of dura were cultivated. 
                                                 
35 Kibreab, State intervention, p.109. 
36  Most of information in this page is extracted from O’Brien, ‘Agricultural Labor,’ pp.89-92.  See also Arthur 
Staniforth, Imperial Echoes: the Sudan: people, history and agriculture (Oxford: World View Publications. 
2000) and M.M.M. Ahmed, Development of Agriculture in the Sudan: an Annotated Bibliography with an 
Introductory Essay (Khartoum: Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, c1994). 
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This proved impossible to harvest effectively by mechanical means and the necessity of 
employing manual labour for the harvest was recognised; the government consequently 
experimented with the introduction of tenanted leasehold farming, already established in the 
irrigation schemes, and in 1948 a tenancy system was established on 3,000 feddans divided 
into plots of 28 feddans. Nazirs and sheikhs played an important role in the allocation of 
tenancies where distribution was based on family relations and loyalty. This came at a time 
when many Lahawiyin were still seeking to maintain their status as pastoralists and in 
consequence few were allotted tenancies. The only Lahawiyin who were granted tenancies at 
that time were the family of Adam al Zein. 37  The administrative subordination of the 
Lahawiyinto the Shukriyya also ensured that they lost out in the process. In 1953 the Ministry 
of Agriculture assigned a committee to review the situation at Gadambaliya. The committee 
presented a list of suggestions among which they proposed the leasing of larger plots to 
private investors and cooperatives.38 The Ministry adopted many of the suggestions and land 
was leased to a number of investors who sought to benefit from this opportunity, the 
consequence was a more effective return to the mechanised farming which had been 
envisaged ten years earlier. 
 
The consequence was a change in land use, and a diminution of grazing areas.  The land 
which was given out as leaseholds was partly taken from former free grazing areas; among 
the new leaseholders were many non-pastoralists. These included members of some riverain 
Arab tribes - Ja’aliyin, Shaigiya - and a sprinkling of exotic investors - Copts, Kurds Indian 
and Yemenis. The Ja’aliyin and Shaigiya were the majority. 39  This official encouragement of 
rain-fed agriculture had further effects. Though nominally ‘mechanized’, this agriculture 
remained highly reliant on labour, and this led to a new influx of migrants from elsewhere in 
Sudan (Fellata, Nuba, and Darfuris) and even Ethiopians seeking new opportunities in waged 
labour. Not all Lahawiyin lost out in this process, the family of Sheikh Adam al Zein, for 
example, were allotted some land, though this was small in size compared to those of the 
Shukriyya leadership. 
 
The presence of non-pastoralist migrants in the area was not new. Certain tribes like the 
Fellatta had been officially encouraged by the Government in 1906 to contribute to the 
                                                 
37 Interview (online) with Babikir Awad al Karim, historian, May 2010. 
38 O’Brien, ‘Agricultural Labor’; Ahmed, Development of Agriculture in the Sudan. 
39 M. Assal, ‘Economy and Politics in Gedarif,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.193. 
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population growth in an area that had allegedly been depopulated in the Mahdiyya, and what 
the government called ‘Fellata colonies’ drew on a longer tradition of movement and 
settlement connected with the pilgrimage.  40   But the development of new agricultural 
schemes encouraged further migration. This increasing Fellata presence had an effect both on 
the local politics of identity and on the local economy. As a non-Arab community of growing 
size and importance, the Fellata may have encouraged a reactive assertion of ideas of rights 
and status based on Arabness; and as they became increasingly active in the local economy as 
agricultural labour and so they began to acquire land rights and compete with the Lahawiyin 
over the juruf along the Atbara and Setit Rivers.41 Yet, challenging though the Fellata were, 
the growing involvement of the Bawadra to the local economy was more challenging for the 
Lahawiyin. The Bawadra were among the early investors in Butana who opted to transform 
their livelihood from purely herding to being agricultural scheme owners. This investment by 
the Bawadra was attributed to the fact that they had relied on their blood relation with the 
Shukriyya. Being close to the  Shukriyia and always having lived around the area between 
Butana and Gezira had granted them usufruct rights over land prior to the Lahawiyin, which 
explained how their presence in Butana exceeded that of the Lahawiyin. However their land 
boundaries were more to the west of Butana and far from the traditional areas of the 
Lahawiyin which were bounded by the Atbara River. The Bawadra were considered to be 
Arab, and an exclusionary language which linked Arabness with rights to land could not be 
used so effectively against them. This conflict with Bawadra became particularly intense after 
as increasing numbers of Lahawiyin settled began in the 1950s.   
 
Alongside this encroachment of the mechanized schemes on grazing land, the Lahawiyin 
began to diversify their involvement in commerce. Lea’s description of the Lahawiyin when 
crossing border with Ethiopia as still ‘untamed’ and ‘independent’ at the end of the 1930s is a 
                                                 
40 C. Bawa Yamba, Permanent Pilgrims; The Role of Pilgrimage in the Lives of West African Muslims in Sudan 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), p.137; Alamin Abu Manga and Catherine Miller, ‘The West 
African (Fellata) Communities in Gedaref State: Process of Settlement and Local Integration’, pp. 375-423, and 
Rupert Hasterok, ‘Sultan Muhammed Bello Mai Wurno, Native Administration and the Fellata of Kassala 
Province’, pp.424-448, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy.  Also see J. S. Birks, Across 
the Savannas to Mecca: the overland pilgrimage route from West Africa (London: C. Hurst, 1978), p.20; ‘Tribal 
–Sudan Moh. Bello Mayurno of the Fellata,’ NRO CivSEC 66/8/57; Mark R. Duffield, Maiurno: capitalism & 
rural life in Sudan  (London: Ithaca Press, 1981); A.A. al-R. Nasr and M.R. Duffield, A bibliography of West 
African settlement and development in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan (Khartoum: Development Studies 
and Research Centre, Faculty of Economic & Social Studies, University of Khartoum, 1980).  
41 Fellatta were reported to have sett led in these areas since 1925: see Abu Manga and Miller, ‘The West 
African (Fellatta) Communities,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.385. 
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good one. 42  The rapid political changes of the 1940s – war, the brief period of British 
administration in Ethiopia, and then the reestablishment of an independent government that 
was suspicious of British intentions – did little to tame the area. 43  In the late 1940s, the 
Condominium had resorted to routine use of the Sudan Defence Force to patrol the frontier in 
the Basunda area of Gedarif: two regular patrols were maintained from January to May every 
year, at the peak of seasonal movements, and were occupied mainly with the prevention of 
crossing. 44  Despite this increased policing, the population on either side of the nominal 
border continued to live in ways which straddled it. In 1940, it had been reported that the 
Lahawiyin felt that there were no inhabitants to the east of the Atbara and this was ‘no man’s 
land’45.  
 
By the 1940s, both slavery and the slave trade had declined substantially – partly because of 
the steadily tightening enforcement of the law, but more generally (in Sudan, as elsewhere on 
the continent) because economic opportunity and social change had pushed emancipation.46  
But the border continued to be a resource, for people who sought to avoid colonial demands, 
improve their livelihoods or benefit from border trade, and the Lahawiyin continued to cross 
the border not simply in search of grazing but rather to avoid paying tax, to trade in camels, 
and for other kinds of trade. 47   Movements by the Magit section of the Lahawiyin, for 
example, tended to take them east across the international border more than west. The Magit 
were reported to be good at arms smuggling and many local agreements were signed by their 
sheikhs and sheikhs in Ethiopia and Eritrea. 48  Of course it was not only the Magit but other 
umudiyyas, such as the Gawamis, who were engaged and active. Their proximity to Ethiopia 
played a role in establishing business relations.  The relevance of this to the rest of the 
Lahawiyin case stems from the fact that the Magit was a leading umudiyya, rich in camels 
who sought to graze without restriction whether in Sudan or Ethiopia.  Their wealth in 
livestock enabled and encouraged the umudiyya to develop a special relationship and a small 
                                                 
42 Lea, Personal Papers, letters to his parents, 1926-1927, SAD.645/7/1-62; Lea, Butana notebooks No.1-3, 
SAD.645/2-4. 
43 Bahru Zewde, A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991(Oxford: James Curry, 2001), pp.178-79; also 
Denham and James, The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia. 
44SAD, ‘Report on Finance, administration and condition of the Sudan, SudA PK1561 GRE: 1939-41 
(inclusive)’, pp.11-12.  As mentioned by Birik, the West African pilgrims transiting through Sudan increased by 
1940. They predominantly used the Ethiopian routes and this might also explain why there was a routine patrol 
at the border.  See Birks, Across the Savannas to Mecca, p.25. 
45 DC Gedarif, Sinkat, January 1940, p.159, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
46 Sikainga, Slaves into workers; Hargey, ‘The suppression of slavery in the Sudan.’ 
47 Kassala Province Annual Paper (1948), pp.1-2, NRO Kassala 3/138/610. 
48 Informed by a Lahawi sheikh in Mugtaa wad al Zein, 1997. 
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scale border trade with tribes on the Ethiopian border that were mutually beneficial to them, 
with traders in Gedarif district and with Ethiopians.  
 
The significance of cross-border trade – almost all of which was ‘smuggling’ in government 
eyes, since it involved either trade in banned goods, or the avoidance of tax – is suggested by 
the continued official efforts to suppress it. In 1940 it was reported that there was ‘already a 
mounted patrol based at Showak engaged in stopping the export of grain and it can be 
temporarily diverted to other duties if circumstances require’.49  Camels, grains (sesame and 
sorghum) were all smuggled by the Lahawiyin out of Sudan across Ethiopian frontiers.50 
These deals were organised and maintained by tribal leaders along the borders. As the 
demand for slaves declined, the main items imported came to be gold, arms, coffee beans and 
honey. The rainy season was the peak smuggling period as it was difficult to follow animals’ 
footprints.   
 
The smugglers were mostly Lahawiyin and Bani Amer. Camel men were among the many 
regularly caught by the police, but many others must have got through undetected and hardly 
any of the principals in this trade, who were believed to be Sudanese merchants, were 
caught.51  Neither the  Lahawiyin nor the Bani Amer had much cultivable land that would 
produce grain for export, only khors and bildat for domestic subsistence. They were 
particularly interested in camel smuggling rather than grain smuggling which was arranged 
by merchants (grain was in high demand during the period following the Second World War). 
But they became involved in grain smuggling as providers of transport to carry the grain for 
traders.   The smuggling of grain and sesame from the Gedarif district into Eritrea via the 
Ethiopian frontier post of Homera also occurred on a large scale.52 
 
In 1951, it was reported that the local authorities in Ethiopia were ‘under the impression the 
Atbara River was the frontier’.53 While there were reports of border violations by Hadendawa   
and Bani Amer, most reported crossings were by Lahiwiyin and by Ethiopians.54  For both 
                                                 
49  DC Southern District, ‘Agriculture: Eastern Grazing, Ninth Rashaida Meeting Goz Rajeb’, 15-20 February 
1940, NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
50 Kassala Province Annual Report (1948), pp. 1-2, NRO Kassala 3/138/610. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Kassala Province Annual Report (1948),  NRO Kassala 3/138/610.   
53 For P.B. Brockbent, Governor General Kassala Province, Kassala Province Annual Report (1950/51), NRO 
Kassala 3/138/610.  
54 Kassala Province Annual Report (1950/51), NRO Kassala 3/138/610.; SAD, ‘Report on Finance, 
administration and condition of the Sudan, SudA PK1561 GRE: 1950/51. 
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Lahawiyin and the Ethiopians, the border could mean free pasture and free border trade in an 
uncultivated land where the political concept of boundaries was purely nominal.  
It is possible that by the mid-1950s, border patrols had reduced some of the cross-border 
movement; one report claimed that:  
 
‘Our Lahawiyin tribe kept away from attempts at encroachment on the rich 
pasture on the other side of the border’. 55  
 
At the same time however, arms smuggling may if anything have been increasing, The 
‘Shifta’ – a term which was used rather loosely of  armed bandits generally – were said to be 
active along the Gedarif–Ethiopia frontier in 1955/56, when it was reported that three 
Lahawiyi were kidnapped and held for a ransom of E£250, which was paid. 56.  
 
The first Lahawiyin settlement – in the sense of a long-term living place, with cultivation and 
long-term dwellings - was around 1940 and was by members of the al Faki umudiyya.  A few 
al Faki families started to settle at that time in al Mugataa al Suq57, a seasonal camp on the 
eastern bank of the Atbara River. This village was a multi-ethnic centre for both Arabs and 
non-Arabs and a marketing centre for many tribes in the area, and as noted earlier, the first 
settlers had been the ex-slaves of the Lahawiyin. . However, Mugataa al-Suq did not flour ish 
due to the growth of Showak as the local and intra- state market holder for the camel trade; in 
1946 the DC  Butana, Mr. Hawley, described Mugataa, (presumably he meant Mugataa al-
Suq) as ‘an unpleasant place’ of about 12,000 people. 58 His apparent distaste could perhaps 
be attributed to the fact that the place was known to be a village of former slaves where 
distilling illicit spirits - araki - was a normal, wide-spread activity.59  Meanwhile, another 
Mugataa was developing.  This, established by Sheikh Adam al Zein was the first exclusively 
Lahawiyin village, 'al-Mugataa Wad al Zein'.60 He was followed by other members of the 
tribe who settled with him, realising the importance of land acquisition. According to 
Hawley’s comments in 1946, Sheikh al Zein used to camp near Mugataa in winter; it was this 
seasonal camp which became the basis for a gradual settlement. Initially those who lived 
                                                 
55 Kassala Province Annual Report (1954/55), p. 4, NRO Kassala 3/138/610. 
56 Kassala Province Annual Report (1955/56), NRO Kassala 3/138/610. 
57 Al Mugatta al Suq was established in 1939 according to National Archives London, Boundary and Frontiers  , 
FO 141/463-574/7-4.nd The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, by the Conference coordination 
committee (this report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin 
Planned for April 1996),p, 3. 
58 Hawley, Official papers relating to Gedarif, Kassala Province, SAD 1/3/1-79. 
59 Ibid. 
60 ‘The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, by the Conference coordination committee (this report 
includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996), p.8. 
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there would still move to the Butana during the dry season period. However this settlement 
was perceived in retrospect by some members of the tribe as the beginning of the ‘taming’ 
process of the Lahawiyin and the end of the ‘independent’ nature for which the tribe was 
known. 61  A second settlement took place in 1953, led by members of the Wad Isa and 
Magit,62 though Al Mugataa wad al Zein continued to grow as the tribe’s main settlement, 
and the headquarters of its leaders. This change, roughly coincided, with the increased 
provision of education and other services, and with a new sense among the Lahawiyin 
themselves that these services were desirable. From then on, the Lahawiyin started to divide 
into small groups on the eastern and then western banks of the River Atbara. This grouping 
was based on previous dry-season camps that became villages on the banks of the river.63  
 
Most of the villages north of Showak, with the exception of those of the Gawamis umudiyya, 
developed in the late 1950s and 1960s, which will be expanded on in the next chapter. 
However, the establishment of villages brought with it a new concept of territorial village 
boundary and concern over rights in the land which was known as juruf. This had alarmed 
neighbouring tribes such the Shukriyya and the Bawadra, who saw the settlement as a sign of 
a long term political challenge to their authority.  Some Bawadra were themselves trying to 
pursue significant investment in the expansion of mechanized agriculture, on the basis of 
their position as one of the leading tribes. But it was not only Lahawiyin settlement which 
concerned them; all the meshras’ (fords/watering points) along the Atbara were used by the 
many Lahawiyin herds of camels  which also indicated a constant presence of livestock which 
might jeopardise other tribes in the area as a threat to crops. 
 
Meanwhile, Showak town grew in population. Numbers were swelled by the settlement of 
Arabs from a number of groups, from all over northern Sudan – Hamran, Ta’isha, Ja’aliyyn 
and others – and also non-Arab Fellata, Nuba and others. But the basis of the town was a 
number of predominantly Lahawiyin villages. Having moved into the area, some sections of 
the Lahawiyin began to value settlement as a way of possessing land. This was a profound 
                                                 
61 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General, Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2007. 
62 ‘The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, by the Conference coordination committee (this  report 
includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996),, pp. 
3-20. 
63 These were Remailer, Duwaih, Shagra, Wad Eirra, Eal Tartar, al Shagalaib, Magit, al Mugataa al Suq, al 
Mugataa Wad al Zein.  All these villages corresponded with others on the eastern bank of the River Atbara. 
Lahawiyin also established villages on the banks of the River Setit, for example Baslam Fashaga, west of 
Gedarif, al Donkey, Um-Khanjar, Qaryat Thuria, and Um-Shajarat. 
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change – a movement from an idea of rights to grazing and water which stretched over a wide 
area to an idea of the outright ownership of a defined piece of land.  From this modest 
beginning, Showak was to become, over the following decades, the focus of an ever-more 
settled Lahawiyin community.  
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4. Administrative changes: councils 
 
The changes in livelihoods and settlement patterns of the Lahawiyin would also lead to 
political rivalries within the tribe. These took place largely within the structures of the Native 
Administration which had developed since the 1920s, contributing to the pressure for the 
highest position in those structures, that of a nazir. But these structures were themselves 
changing in the later Condominium period, as the colonial government shifted its rhetoric 
from indirect rule to ‘local government’.  
 
The rhetorical shift was formally introduced in 1937, when the very name of new legislation 
– ‘Local Government’ ordinances - suggested a decisive break with the former ideology of 
traditional authority as the basis of ‘native administration’ The immediate significance of this 
can be overstated, however, and in rural areas in particular there continued to be a heavy 
reliance both on the tribe as a unit of administration and on ‘customary’ authorities as the link 
between government and people. There was, however, a new impetus towards forms of 
administration which were at least in part territorial, and were not restricted to a single tribe; 
and there was increasing overlap and confusion in following years, between judicial and 
administrative functions and between tribal and territorial structures. The Local Government 
Ordinances of 1937 for Rural Areas64 gave recognition to bodies such as the tribal majalis, - 
‘assemblies’, especially among nomadic tribes, though it revealed a conflicting jurisdiction 
between the majalis (singular majlis) and the native courts. This step was supported by the 
Local Government (Rural Areas) Ordinance 1937.65  The majalis, though presented in the 
language of custom, were not tribal bodies; the nazir was considered the head of any majlis, 
but the essence of any majlis was that it included representatives from more than one tribe 
and more than one nazir. The tribal majlis of the Hadendawa and the Shukriyya in the 1940s 
had three nazirs, including the Bani Amer.  
 
If the changes of 1937 had been less immediately significant than their language might 
suggest, the end of the 1940s saw a more profound ideological change. The Marshall Report, 
as it became known (after its author, Arthur Marshall, the Town Clerk of the British city of 
Coventry) proposed a major revision of local government structures. This was intended to 
                                                 
64 J. Howell (ed.), Local Government and Politics in the Sudan  (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1974), 
pp.30-31.  Majalis is plural; Majlis is singular.  
65Aboushouk and Bjorkelo, The Principle of Native Administration, p.247. 
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make them into much more effective local agents of a central government whose primary aim 
was development, and which was committed to the provision of multiple kinds of social 
service which were seen as necessary to development. Marshall recommended the complete 
end of the long-standing overlap between local administration and courts, and a move to an 
entirely territorial system of local government. 
 
Before explaining the tribal majlis in detail in relation to the Lahawiyin one has to make the 
distinction between the tribal majlis and ‘majlis ahli. The latter, literally the ‘popular 
assembly’, was the term used for urban councils, and is not our focus here.  In this rural 
context, the leaders of tribal majlis as Woodward put it, “had become involved in the 
territorial politics. They were utilized not simply for administrative purposes but also for a 
political reason too,”66 The majlis was an inter-tribal, consultative body called upon to settle 
disputes, as opposed to a council which was formally still a tribal body. The nazir of the 
Shukriyia and three sheikh khut , including Adam al Zein of the Lahawiyin, were also invited 
to participate in the meeting. A number of umdas, and sheikhs with complaints were also 
welcomed.67 The implication for the Lahawiyin was that the tribe was represented on the 
majlis yet Sheikh Adam al Zein would not be able to attend without the authorization of the 
nazir of the Shukriyya; his presence was under the auspices of the Shukriyya.68 
 
The majalis were summoned to discuss issues related to the tribes’ affairs and relations 
including theft and killing. On occasion they could act as Native Courts and various cases 
were brought in for further discussion and investigation. In 1941 the relation between the 
Hadendawa and the Lahawiyin became tense over grazing. Confrontation between the two 
tribes was frequent, and the Shukriyya were unwilling to intervene or act as guardian to the 
Lahawiyin. When five Lahawiyin were shot by Hadendawa tribesmen a Majlis was 
immediately convened and tribal leaders were summoned. The Majlis members (Hadendawa, 
Shukriyya and Lahawiyin) and they were satisfied that the Lahawiyin agreed that this case 
should be dealt with on its own merit when the investigation was complete and need not hold 
up the discussion of other cases.69 
 
                                                 
66 Peter Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese nationalism (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1979), p.168. 
67 NRO Sudan, Kassala 1/78/348,  The Beja – Shukriyya Meeting, Kassala Dec (19-23) 1941; see also NRO 
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68 Ibid. 
69 District Commissioner, 1January 1942, NRO Kassala 3/139/617, p.309. 
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The aforementioned case and others suggest the duplication of authority between Majlis and 
Native Courts, where powers overlapped but the process involved was quite different. In a 
Majlis the decisions regarding sentences, apart from fines and compensation, had to be 
approved unanimously by all parties, rather than resulting from the decision of the judge or 
court president. For example, in December 1941 eight Lahawiyin killed and injured members 
of the Amrara tribe and were sentenced by the major court to three to five years’ 
imprisonment. They were fined £E150 to pay dia (blood money), and also had to pay 
compensation for injuries. A Majlis, by contrast, gave the opportunity to negotiate fines.   In 
1942 the same Majlis reached an agreement over the killing (or disappearance) of two men 
from Amrara and Lahawiyin in addition to a Lahawi woman. 70 There were only a few cases 
where tribal settlement was made possible by first reaching agreement.  
 
In the view of the paramount importance in the maintenance of public security of 
better tribal relation in the area, especially furthering the disturbances due to the 
war) I strongly recommend that the sentence of the Lahawiyin (none of whom are 
actively convicted of homicide) be now reduced and compensation hospital 
stoppage be actually paid up before release of any of them.71  
 
The aforementioned facts speak about the functioning of the Majlis from 1930s to the early 
1940s, however this change with coming into force of the Gedarif Rural Council; which this 
section shall engage in a discussion.  
 
Gedarif Rural Council came into being in 1945. By 1950 it had been granted the status of an 
urban council, with two new councils created for the northern Shukriyya area and the 
southern Dar Bakr area.72  In 1951/52 the cost of staff in what had by then become Gedarif 
Northern Rural Council rose and it was also faced with revenue difficulties which could only 
be overcome by the full efficient collection of direct tax, a long-standing problem in a  
predominantly nomad area. During that year the population of the settled part of the council 
area (Abu Sin Khut and Western Khut) were persuaded to accept the collection of a tax in 
grain. This was in line with the prevailing system in the southern rural council area. However, 
as a dual system for tax collection was not introduced in the northern council area, it was not 
possible for the nomad khut to comply with the sys tem.73 The rural councils had relied to a 
large extent on the tribal majlis and had resorted to sheikhs and umdas in the process of tax 
                                                 
70 Women’s cases used to be discussed in public in Majlis before sending them to major courts. 
71 District Commissioner, 1January 1942, NRO Kassala 3/139/617, p.309. 
72 Kassala Province Annual Report for (1953/54), NRO Kassala 3/138/610.  
73 Kassala Province Annual Report for (1951/52), NRO Kassala 3/138/610.   
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collection. For instance umdas and sheikhs failing to pay their herds tax were firstly dealt 
with at the majlis and each majlis would try its best to settle such an issue for the sake of 
complete tax collection to contribute to the council. The Lahawiyin were not represented in 
the Rural Council; however Sheikh Ahmed, the son of Adam al Zein, was appointed as tax 
collector for the Lahawiyin khut.74  
 
This had been a continuous but necessarily slow and gradual process since the middle of the 
1920s. The position of nazir and combined multiple types of power – judicial, administrative 
and executive - in one single person.  
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5. Internal politics and the claim for a nazir 
 
During the late Condominium, the Lahawiyin went through another restructuring and the 
tribe organisational setup was expanded to eight umudiyyas which will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter. The umudiyyas were Wad al Faki, Wad Isa, Hardan, Gaborab, Magit, 
Swar, Blulab and Gawamis. Towards the end of the Condominium the Lahawiyin leadership 
shifted, but remained within the al-Faki umudiyya. Wad Hardan umudiyya grew in economic 
terms and new rivalry between leaders came to the fore with al-Faki umudiyya, while Magit 
umudiyya had less of its previous intrigues.  
 
In  1946 D.F. Hawley, ADC of the Gedarif district, had considered promoting Sheikh Adam 
al Zein by formally appointing him as wakil (deputy) nazir to the nazir of the Shukriyya, 
Sheikh Mohamed Hamad Abu Sin. This position previously been held by Shukriyya sheikhs 
only. 75  Hawley was considering this because the Lahawiyin had already bypassed the latter’s 
authority and appealed to the DC:  
 
That there might be a case for appeal from Sheikh Adam’s court lying to the D.C. 
instead of to the Nazir of the Shukri76  
 
However, Hawley drew back from this idea because he realised that his suggestion would be 
controversial. When the Lahawiyin arrived they were hosted and accepted by the Shukriyya 
and they in turn accepted the Shukriyia’s hospitality; Hawley himself felt that this was the 
reason behind the Lahawiyin’s prosperity. Hawley described the Lahawiyin as ‘strong and 
the largest and most important of the “foreign” tribes within the Shukriyya nazirate.’77  
Hawley did not want to annoy Sheikh Mohamed Hamad Abu Sin by making the  suggestion 
for the Lahawiyin to have right of appeal direct to the DC; he hoped that it might be possible  
instead for Abu Sinn to be made to feel that it was his own idea, rather than directly telling 
him ‘hands off the Lahawiyin’.78   
 
Hawley’s sympathy towards Sheikh Adam al Zein did not last for long. Within a few months 
he had changed his mind, and described Sheikh Adam al Zein as follows:  
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Adam El Zein the Sheikh khut used to be the finest and best looking and most well-
mannered and strong young nomad sheikh that I have ever met.-That was 19 years ago 
and now he is in decline - teeth gone to [illegible’] diabetes and araki. Full of his own 
importance. Loathes the nazir of the Shukriyia to whom he has been grossly rude in 
majlis. Has turned against Sheikh Yusif Omara who always his friend was even 
backing him up against the late Nazir of Shukriyia Awadel Kerim Abdullah.79 
 
By 1947 Sheikh Adam al Zein was apparently regarded by officials as an increasingly 
disruptive element in the politics of the tribes.Apart from this statement of Hawley, there is 
no other evidence regarding the incident in majlis, and it is only possible to speculate on what 
may have lain behind this. Whatever the reason, the Lahawiyin faced the challenge of losing 
the old friendship of the Shukriyya for whatever reason, and Sheikh Adam al Zein was not 
promoted to wakil nazir. However, he was a man of long term vision and by having his sons 
sent to school ahead of other umudiyya children; he had paved the road to keeping the 
leadership of the tribe within his family. 
 
The al-Faki accumulated wealth in terms of land and herds and were the first to have 
educated members in addition to filling higher position in the native administration. Sheikh 
Adam presided as the sheikh of the Showak court as well as being sheikh khut.  This put him 
close to the nazir Omara Abu Sin of Shukriyya and to the British.  
 
The Governor, Peter, Yusef Omara, Adam El Zein, Hamid Abdel Gadir and 
myself went by car to Nawsil. We walked all over the mountain and I was made 
to sketch-map asite for an hafir.80 
 
Al-Faki umudiyya remained the leading umudiyya with growing authority and ambitions. A 
leading figure in this came to be Sheikh Abdalla Adam al Zein, the oldest son of Adam al 
Zein.  Sheikh Abdalla was not of the same mother as Adam’s other sons,   al Zein and 
Ahmed; He represented his father as the latter grew old and ill. Sheikh Abdalla took the 
formal position of wakil, ‘deputy’, from 1947 until the death of his father in 1963, though he 
was never given the title sheikh khut, and much of the actual power and decision-making 
remained in the hands of Adam al Zein until his death. 81 
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143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above diagram shows how authority of umudiyya wad al Faki descended and remained in 
one family during this period. Al Sara bet Yusef and Hawa bet al Daw, both slave wives from 
Mugatta al Suq, and Fatma bet Mahamed Ali, who was from Gabourab umudiyya, were all 
childless. This raised the question as to why only the non-Faki women had no children. All 
Adam’s children were from his marriages to cousins from within the section direct and 
distant cousins, so that power remained with the al Faki’s.  Particularly prominent were the 
sons of his wife Um Balila, who was a direct cousin from his father’s side, though he had 
other children from his other wives. Apart from the four children stated above, Adam al Zein 
had another thirteen children. 82 
 
Not long afterwards, the younger brother al Zein of the newly appointed wakil deputy 
Abdalla was also placed in the administrative hierarchy of the tribe as well as the Native 
Administration given the sheikh khut title. In 1956, Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein was 
appointed the katib khut  to the Lahawiyin; working with his brother al Zein but also in close 
contact with the DC of Butana. 83  This was a new post that could be related to the local 
                                                 
82 Interview with late sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former katib khut and president Pastoralist Union Showak, 
Mugatta’a wad al Zein, June 1996. 
83 Interview with Al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein in Mugatta wad al Zein, January 2008. 
Adam al Zein (wives)  
 
Zeinab bet 
Najaa 
Fatema bet 
al Abbas 
Hawa bet 
al Daw* 
al Sara bet 
Yusef* 
Fatma bet 
Mah Ali 
Niemaa bet 
Yusef 
Um Balila 
bet al Kadar 
Zeinab 
(daughter) 
  Idris  
(son)  
Ahmed 
(son)  
al Zein 
(son)  
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government changes with the establishment of new local government councils. The councils 
were required to form financial and personnel committees according to local needs and were 
also allowed to co-opt members from the council for services. 84 So it was that possible this 
post was needed at the local level for purely technical reason; though the appointment may 
also have been political, as a response to the dominance of the council by the Shukriyya. 
 
This post was more threatening to the nazir of the Shukriyya than the post of the sheikh khut. 
The power of the nazir of the Shukriyya over the Lahawiyin had however been reduced 
within the tribal territorial boundaries through being deprived of the right to collect tax from 
the Lahawiyin by the new authority given to the Lahawiyin in 1946.85  Sheikh Ahmed was 
responsible for tax collection so was in direct contact with all the umdas and sheikhs of his 
tribe, using his authority in tax collection the way he saw appropriate.  Some may argue that 
the appointment of Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein as katib khut  was another plot by Sheikh 
Adam, which no doubt had benefitted the Lahawiyin and his family most.86  According to 
one informant,  
 
Sheikh Adam al Zein had placed his sons with the children of the Shukriyya in the 
primary school in Kassala and they were privileged, being met by a car at the 
railway station in Kassala. 87 
 
The appointment was not entirely welcomed by the Shukriyya nazir because Sheikh Ahmed 
Adam al Zein showed some kind of a spirit that alarmed the Shukriyya, a spirit full of 
ambition and unbounded by rules or hierarchy. At government level his appointment seemed 
to be approved by the DC who had chosen him whereas the majority of umudiyyas showed a 
degree of satisfaction towards Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein who was reported to be ‘humble 
and wise’.88 This Ahmed, on the other hand, was felt to be full of intrigues and ambitions.89  
However the new post was seen as a direct threat to the nazir much more than to the sheikh 
khut because it deprived the nazir of direct contact with the Lahawiyin for collecting tax and 
therefore the nazir’s financial sources were reduced.    
 
                                                 
84 G. M. Salih, ‘Local Government after Independence’, in Howell (ed.), Local Government and Politics in the 
Sudan, pp.33-36. 
85 Extracted from an interview with Abdalla Amir, former deputy Governor of Gezira State and a Dis trict 
Administrator for Lahawiyin (1964), Gedarif, January 2008, and correspondence of District Commissioner 
Gedarif. NRO Kassala 3/139/617. 
86 Interview with al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein in Mugataa wad al Zein, January 2008. 
87 Interview with an informant in Gedarif from the Lahawiyin, January 2008. 
88 Interview with a Lahawi sheikh, Showak, December 2007. 
89 Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, Sheikh al-Bashir of the Hardan umudiyya began to seek ways and means of 
developing his own power and influence, based not on herd accumulation (as this umudiyya 
had always been poor in camels, and was not in a position to accumulate more) but through 
education and trade. After living for a while in White Nile Province, Sheikh al-Bashir 
returned to Butana and became umda of the Hardan at the end of the 1940s. He went into 
trade, in to a joint business with a Ja’ali man.  The account of his movement to White Nile 
Province and subsequent return, as told by his son, suggest a complex dynamics of sectarian 
and tribal politics.  
 
In the late 1930s my grandfather (Sheikh Musa, al Bashir’s father) said that he 
wanted to go back to White Nile Province because it was an Ansar domain and 
he also believed that the Butana was a Khatmiyya place which lacked religious 
spirit. He planned to take his young wife with him but he was stopped by the 
nazir, Abu Sin, and the nazir forced him to sign a   document in which he stated 
he would not go back to White Nile Province which was an abiding order. This 
document was initiated by Sheikh Adam al Zein. He did not want the 
Lahawiyin to go back. But it was not abiding for a long time to my grandfather. 
Following the rainy season and while the tribe went to graze in Butana Sheikh 
Musa had left for White Nile Province and did not come back until he died 
there. My father joined him later when he was 18 years old. He spent five years 
in White Nile Province and another five years in Blue Nile Province.90  
 
This account clarifies many issues.  First, as discussed earlier in chapter one, the historical 
rivalry between the two sections, which had now become umudiyyas was a rivalry based on 
wealth.  Hardan had not retained many camels  while al-Faki was recognised to be rich in 
camels. This had resulted in the pursuit of different livelihoods, allowing the al-Faki to invest 
in new kinds of activity.  For instance, Sheikh Adam al Zein had requested of DC Hawley a 
site for shops in a new mall, which the ADC had approved for Mugataa.91 Second, religious 
affiliations were stronger among the Hardan, which led their sheikh to seek out a much 
stronger Ansar environment in terms of practices.   On his return to Blue Nile, Bashir 
established al-Mansura village on Atbara River, which became the Hardan leading family’s 
residence.   
 
Despite the internal competition between umudiyyas, in 1948 the Lahawiyin leaders revived 
their demand to have their own nazirate. The Lahawiyin had persistently claimed a nazirate 
and their claim coincided with the growing encroachment of mechanisation and huge 
settlement of merchants and businessmen as well as a gradual process of settlement of the 
                                                 
90 Interview with Dr. Abdallah al Bashir Musa, Ministry of Health, Gedarif, December 2009. 
91 Hawley, Official papers relating to Gedarif, Kassala Province, 1946-1948, SAD.1/3/1-79. 
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tribe. The involvement of the Lahawiyin leaders with the Khatmiyya might explain why the 
Lahawiyin had to bring it to the attention of the government. This was a time of rapid 
national political developments, in which the two main sectarian leaders were heavily 
involved: in 1948, over Egyptian objections; Britain dissolved the advisory executive council 
and created a partially elected national Legislative Assembly to represent them. At the same 
time, elected local government bodies were taking over more responsibilities. In these 
circumstances, the sectarian leaders, all of whom held political ambitions, were active in 
seeking support and followers. 
. 
In 1948, the Governor of Kassala Province, G.M. Hancock reported that 
 
Tribal politics show ed no more than normal activity … the Lahawiyin of Gedarif 
district resuscitated their twenty year old intrigue against the Shukriyia nazir and 
pressing for the promotion of their sheikh to the status of nazir and local autonomy 
for the tribe.92 
 
For the first time the Government made a distinction between sections of the Lahawiyin as a 
tribe by referring to them as the ‘Lahawiyin of Gedarif district’. Hancock also described the 
Lahawiyin section in Gedarif as intriguers which presumably meant they had previously been 
involved in activities that were not appreciated by the Government.  
 
It was also in 1948 that the sedentarization of some umudiyya began to take place along the 
Atbara River and this might also explain the fact that the Lahawiyin felt the need to be 
recognized as the owners of Atbara river banks. In addition to this, as mechanisation was 
expanding and western tribes were encroaching, there was a real fear of depletion of 
resources. I would argue that the reason behind their claim at this point in time was that the 
Lahawiyin feared further loss of land rights, and saw also that this was the right time to gain 
land if they had a nazir who could negotiate authority away from the Shukriyya. However the 
Condominium Government did not take the Lahawiyin claim seriously as it was perceived as 
further intrigue against the Shukriyya nazir; which may have been particularly unwelcome at 
a time of wider political uncertainty.  
 
Nevertheless my argument is that the nazirate claim was not the product of a consensus 
among the different umudiyyas across gender, ethnic (slaves) and economic status. This was a 
                                                 
92 Kassala Province Annual Report for 1948, NRO Kassala 3/138/610. 
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claim directed by certain umudiyyas, or groups within umudiyyas who had particular power 
and authority. A more widespread dissatisfaction could easily have been articulated by those 
umudiyyas or sub sections that were not happy with the Shukriyya, who might have decided 
to voice their request to the Government and show their dislike for the Shukriyya. But this 
does not seem to have happened. Although there was no evidence whatsoever to distinguish 
which umudiyya was leading the claim but it is interesting that the government had made a 
distinction between Lahawiyin of Gedarif and others.  Within Gedarif, it seems likely that the 
call for a nazir came especially from al Faki; Hardan or Magit umudiyyas for the reasons 
discussed earlier, the historical intrigues and strive for power. 93 
 
In conclusion, while the imposition of boundaries on the Lahawiyin continued, with other 
large confederations like the Hadendawa setting tribal boundaries, restricting grazing and 
movement, and while this went hand in hand with increased enforcement of boundaries, this 
did not restrain the Lahawiyin from aspiring to more administrative reforms and an 
independent authority. The dominant families among the Lahawiyin used the new structures 
of government to augment their power within the tribe, and to assert claims for greater 
autonomy – and land access – for the tribe as a whole. This had revealed the growing 
ambitions and aspirations of the tribe’s leadership from sheikh khut  to Native Court to 
representation in the Majlis and later on a katib khut.   
 
This period had also witnessed a growing economic power of Hardan umudiyya that became 
the bases for a competitive leadership along different religious affiliation. The leadership  
differences of the Hardan and al-Faki umudiyyas had much to do with ways of gaining 
authority and power. Both were striving for headship of the Lahawiyin. But Sheikh al-Bashir, 
lacking wealth in herds, turned to entrepreneurship in trade and acquisition of land, and also 
began to invest in education. On the other hand, while the leaders of al-Faki educated their 
own children and made some investment in land, their focus remained on the accumulation of 
camels, and trade in these.   
 
The Local Government Ordinance 1951 was based on these recommendations; over the next 
few years, the number of local councils grew significantly. This new 1951 Ordinance threw 
into question the nature of tribal cohesion and power relations between the old and young 
                                                 
93 G.M. Hancock, Governor General in Kassala Province Annual Paper for 1948, NRO Kassala 3/138/610. 
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sheikhs. In the Butana it particularly affected the relationships within the Shukriyya and also 
their relation to the Lahawiyin.  
 
This also showed a process of centralization of authority upon local councils and courts, 
running against the previous intention were to establish decentralised power through the tribal 
sheikhs.  However this centralizing put the government in a position to control events more 
closely at provincial and local levels.  It is significant to note that these institutions became 
dependent on the centre with less and less uniformity and a latent weakness in the executive 
authority.  Such a situation had made the local government bodies, finances, powers and 
personnel more or less dependent on the central government.94 The 1951 Ordinance stressed 
the executive nature of the activities of the local government but was silent on any type of 
political activity performed by local government officials, perhaps as a result of its 
resemblance to the British model.95  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 G.M.A. Bakheit, ‘The Condominium and Indirect Rule,’ in Howell (ed.), Local Government and Politics in 
the Sudan, pp.30-32. 
95 M. el Basir, ‘The Political Role of the Local Government Officer,’ in Howell (ed.), Local Government and 
Politics in the Sudan, p.78. 
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Chapter Five 
The shift to sedentarisation, 1956-1986 
 
The thirty years after Sudan’s independence in 1956 saw the continuation and intensification 
of processes that had begun during the Condominium, in terms of alienation of land for 
agriculture and resulting changes in livelihoods and internal relations for the Lahawiyin. By 
the mid-1980s increasing numbers of Lahawiyin were no longer camel-owners, but had 
become waged labourers, farmers or traders. This led to questions about an ‘Arab’ identity 
that had been built upon nomadic camel-herding (and slave-owning). But the self-constructed 
Arab identity of the Lahawiyin had also been in part their reaction to their inferior political 
and legal status as a client tribe under other nazirs, as well as a strategy by leading families to 
maintain their privileged position within the tribe. By the 1990s, such strategies would be 
revived in a new environment of political opportunity, as the next chapter will show. But the 
‘tribe’ that would demand its own nazirate in 1996 looked rather different from the tribe that 
made the same demand in 1948, or 1928. This chapter explores the social and economic 
changes of the period from the 1950s up to the 1980s, and uses them to set the context for the 
events of 1983-84, when drought brought these changes into dramatic focus, revealing the 
vulnerability of the Lahawiyin and pushing new developments in identity politics. 
 
The changes of this period have been widely discussed in the literature on Sudan, and it has 
generally been argued that pastoralist livelihoods were increasingly under threat from a 
combination of factors; largely related to the developmentalist ambitions of the post-colonial 
state. These ambitions affected the structures of government: the creation of a more 
interventionist state which sought to dispense with the mediation of tribal structures, initially 
envisioned by late-colonial British planners, was pursued with increasing vigour by a 
succession of Sudanese independent regimes up to the 1970s. But it was also apparent in 
economic terms. The post- independence governments dealt less with issues of dars and 
grazing rights.  Pasture and grazing lands were transformed into mechanised schemes that 
benefited traders and businessmen more than nomads and livestock herders. The crucial 
development here came in the 1960s. Up to that time, development policy continued to 
foreground irrigation schemes; in Butana, the New Halfa scheme, linked to a new dam at 
Khashm el Girba, had a significant impact. But the scope of this was relatively modest 
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compared with the consequences of the decision in the 1960s to pursue with much greater 
energy the experiments with rain- land grain agriculture that had begun in the late 1940s. 
Across Sudan, the area of rain-fed mechanized schemes grew from less than one million 
feddans in the mid-1960s to more than three million in the mid-1970s and more than six 
million by 1981-82; by one estimate, as many as 12 million feddans may have been under 
mechanized cultivation by around 1990.1 The growth of these schemes was accelerated by the 
1970 Unregistered Land Act, which gave the state complete control over unregistered land – 
which included almost all land used customarily by pastoralists – and in effect threatened the 
complete dismantling of the dar system.  
 
In developmental terms, neither the new structures of government nor the new emphasis on 
rain- land agriculture were a success.  The progressive changes in local government – the 
abolition of district commissioners in 1960, the elections of 1964 – generated new 
institutions, but the state lacked the resources to transform local authority, and the local 
councils continued to be heavily influenced by the ‘native administration’, since government 
still relied on this. Nimeiri’s dramatic abolition of ‘native administration’ in 1971 reflected 
the frustration of radical intellectuals who hoped thus to overthrow, once and for all, what 
they saw as a reactionary force which held rural Sudan back from progress. Arguably, this 
was a decision which profoundly weakened the Sudanese state at a local level since, despite 
the ambitious plans for a pyramidal structure of authority based around the Sudan Socialist 
Union, there was no effective replacement for the system which had been abolished; the 
consequence was uncertainty, rather than the new, clear, progressive system which Nimeiri 
had hoped to create.  
 
Rain-fed agriculture, while rewarding for some of the well-connected individuals who 
acquired tenancies, has been widely identified as ecologically destructive, with brief short-
term benefits leading to long-term decline: it has been variously characterized as ‘agricultural 
strip-mining’ or as ‘briefcase farming’ by well-connected investors who extract wealth from 
                                                 
1 Mechanized farming was based on short pay-off period and high profitability besides very low land rents, ‘on a 
kind of cultivation which can be depicted as "agricultural mining."’ as Oesterdiekhoff put it. For full 
information see Peter Oesterdiekhoff and Karl Wohlmuth, ‘The "Breadbasket" is Empty: The Options of 
Sudanese Development Policy,’ Canadian Journal of African Studies 17:1 (1983), p.46.  Johnathan B. Bascom, 
‘Food, wages, and profits: mechanized schemes and the Sudanese state,’ Economic Geography 66:2 (1990), 
pp.140-55; Jay O’Brien, ‘Sudan: an Arab breadbasket?’ MERIP reports 99, Land and Labor (1981), pp.20-26. 
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the land in order to invest in other sectors.2 And in both short and long-term, the negative 
impact of the rain-fed agriculture on pastoralism in several parts of northern Sudan has been 
widely noted, as pastoralists themselves are forced into increasingly unsustainable practices: 
as Jay O’Brien notes: ‘pastoralists tend to be the most vulnerable and the first blamed’.3 The 
schemes were, essentially, large-scale diversions of to intensive partly-mechanized 
agriculture; they meant that pastoralists lost access to grazing, to water and to the migration 
routes on which pastoralist livelihoods relied.4 
 
Morton’s work has located changes in Lahawiyin society very much in the context of these 
economic and political changes, and emphasised their destructive impact on Lahawiyin 
livelihoods. The main consequence of these changes was a forced kind of settlement in areas 
where resources for subsistence agriculture were meagre. This left some Lahawiyin on an 
impoverished rural wage as labourers. 5  Additionally, settlement accelerated when the 
administrative law that regulated the distribution of juruf was enacted in the 1950s. The 
distribution of juruf was brought under the jurisdiction of the Gedarif Rural Council where 
the allotments of areas within the juruf to families were the responsibility of the Lahawiyin 
umdas and sheikhs. This was done according to the seasonality and area left by the flood 
which determined the size of the juruf.6 This chapter will largely follow Morton’s analysis, 
but will move beyond it to explore the consequences of this for Lahawiyin identity and the 
internal politics of authority.  
 
It argues that the agricultural mechanisation that took place did not impact negatively on all 
Lahawiyin. Indeed it increased individual land rights among the well-off Lahawiyin, which 
                                                 
2 Bascom, ‘Food, wages and profits,’ p.145; O’Brien, ‘Sudan: an Arab breadbasket,’ pp.24-25; Oesterdiekhoff 
and Wohlmuth, ‘The “breadbasket” is empty.’  
3 Jay O’Brien, ‘Sowing the seeds of famine: the political economy of food deficits in Sudan,’ Review of African 
Political Economy  33, War and Famine (1985), p. 28; also O’Brien, ‘Sudan: an Arab breadbasket,’ p.26. 
4 Abu Sin argued that ‘the amount of water consumed is directly related to the density of animal population as 
water is mainly used’ and that about 1 million to 1.3 million m3/year of water (excluding Kharif months) for 
1967 and 1977 was consumed by the total estimates of animals. However this amount of water might not be 
available every season, so the herders were forced to migrate to other places (usually in March to June or July) 
with their animals to places such as the Blue Nile (Gezira Scheme) and Atbara River (Khashm eI-Girba 
Scheme); see Farouk D. Ahmed and Mohamend D. Abu Sin, ‘Water supply problems in the Butana region-
central Sudan with special emphasis on Jebel Oeili Area,’ GeoJournal 6:1 (1982), p.17. 
5 John Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawin pastoralism (Kassala Province Eastern Sudan),’ Overseas 
Development Institute (1988), pp.13-14; Mohamed Hashim Awad, Sedentarisation of nomads in the Butana 
region of northern Sudan (Cairo: Institut français d'Archéologie orientale, 1964), pp.1-33. 
6 The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 
1996), p.12; There were three types of juruf; the early juruf from September to November, the intermediate 
juruf from December to March and the late juruf from March to May. 
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would later support their campaign for improved political representation and claim for a 
nazirate. Murdock describes a transformation in the local economic relations in the Butana 
from simple livelihood of nomadic groups into a much more complicated entrepreneurial 
economy.7 But in the process, differentiation and variation continued to increase within and 
between the Lahawiyin sections, as did competition with neighbouring ethnic groups – 
notably the Bawadra, with whom Lahawiyin relationships became increasingly complex and 
fraught. These processes were then greatly accelerated by the devastating effects of drought 
in the mid-1980s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
7 Muneera Salem-Murdock, Arabs and Nubians in New Halfa: a study of settlement and irrigation. (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 1989), p.4; see also Tony Barnett, The Gezira Scheme: an illusion of 
development (London: Cass, 1977).  
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1. Local government and authority  
 
Despite the introduction of new legislation in 1951, Local government in the late 1950s still 
relied heavily on the native administration, with local councils heavily dominated by tribal 
leaders and sheikhs who retained both executive and legislative powers. The military coup of 
1958 brought limited change to this. The military government lacked the experience to run 
the country’s civil service and relied on bureaucrats at national and local levels, following an 
increasingly interventionist policy, as el-Bashir has noted 
 
Consequently the military rulers in the provinces and various districts began to 
interfere constantly with normal work of the local government institutions. 8 
 
Such interference not only resulted in nepotism and corruption in the service but rather led to 
politicization of local services at local level.  
 
To further its control, the government introduced the Provincial Administration Act 1960 
which was designed as part of the policy to accomplish a fully-fledged political hegemony 
over the jurisdiction and views of the civil servants at local levels. This was the primary 
feature of the local government structure of this period. The Act however led to the 
establishment of a “statutory council”, called the Provincial Council, in each of the nine 
provinces with executive, legislative and advisory powers. The chair of each provincial 
council was appointed by the supreme military council, and members were carefully selected 
for loyalty. Those who showed disagreement with the government were excluded and 
disqualified from the Provincial Council. And the most significant action that the government 
implemented in this regard was the Compulsory Pension Act of 1962 which was enforced 
against officers who were considered politically opposed to the government. Hence the 
executive provincial authority tended to be directed by the provincial council in each of the 
nine provinces as an assisting political body. 9 At the district level, the district administrative 
body continued. So, for example, the Rural Council of Northern Gedarif was dominated by 
the Shukriya as stated by Awad 
 
                                                 
8 Mutasim el Bashir, ‘The political role of the Local Government Officer,’ in Howell (ed.), Local Government 
and Politics in the Sudan, p.81. 
9 Ibid., p.82. 
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its chief is the Nazir of the Shukria, who does not concern himself only with his own 
tribe but also with the Lahawiyin and others whose territories extend over the 
greater part of the Butana,….. [he] occupied a permanent post, presided over the 
meetings of the council and exercise considerable power and was paid by the central 
government and assisted by officers from the ministry of local government.10 
 
The nazir, sheikh Mohamed Hamad Abu Sin, was the ‘chief’ of the council with 
responsibility towards the other tribes in Butana. The main duties of his council members, 
leaders of other tribes including the Lahawiyin, were to collect the taxes which were assessed 
according to the size of herds. Awad reported that the size of the Lahawiyin’s herds was 
estimated at 114,000, camels compared to 92,000 for the Shukriya; he believed this was an 
underestimate. The Lahawiyin used to pay £S 30,000 annual tax. 11 This suggests the very 
great responsibility placed on the sheikh of the Lahawiyin, and the huge taxes he had in hand. 
It also constituted a peak in the authority given to the Lahawiyin by the local government 
system.  
 
By the end of the Condominium,  Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein had become sheikh khut , and 
the tribe grew from six (wad Isa/Sowar, wad al Faki, al Gaborab, Magait, al Gawamis, 
Blulab/ Helalb) to seven umudiyyas, with Sowar becoming a separate umudiyya. The Hardan 
remained a section until in late 1970s they became an umudiyya.12  The al Faki umudiyya 
continued to rule the Lahawiyin, and this umudiyya had remained in the hands of the family 
of Adam el Zein. This leading position enabled them to acquire land in the traditional farming 
system and to diversify their economic activities (breeding and sorghum cultivation).13 
 
Ahmed Adam al Zein, the brother of the sheikh khut, al Zein Adam al Zein, was growing in 
importance as the katib khut. In September 1958 the nazir of the Shukriyia wrote a complaint 
against Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein claiming that the latter had overstepped his assigned 
responsibilities and tasks. Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein was responsible for tax collection, 
tribute, and looking after unattended herds, but he had begun to take over the authority of the 
nazir by signing on his behalf without the latter’s knowledge.  He received a memo from the 
local government officer, Taha Osman warning him to abide by his designated tasks and to 
                                                 
10 Awad, Sedentarisation of nomads in the Butana region, p.12.  
11 Ibid., p.13. 
12 Interview with Abdalla Suleiman, former Governor of Gezira, Gedarif, January 2008. 
13 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawin Pastoralist,’ pp.4-5. 
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stop signing for the nazir because that was the responsibility of the deputy nazir or someone 
assigned by the nazir. 14  
 
This suggests that the power of Ahmed Adam al Zein had grown beyond that of his brother, 
the sheikh khut, and his ambition was threatening the authority and jurisdiction of the nazir. It 
also revealed that Ahmed Adam al Zein was willing to challenge the nazir. Ahmed took 
charge the collection of taxes from the Lahawiyin tribe; this was an opportunity that the 
Lahawiyin, and particularly the wad al Faki, had been waiting to benefit from as they were no 
longer directly linked to the Shukriyya tax system. Ahmed Adam al Zein and Sheikh Al Zein 
Adam al Zein as representative of the Lahawiyin expected that the government would 
similarly be rewarding the Lahawiyin in their settlement with basic social services.  They felt 
that the Lahawiyin villages received inadequate water, health and education facilities in 
comparison to the herd tax they paid and in comparison to what the Shukriyya received in 
relation to the tax they paid. Sheikh Ahmed wanted to please the government by collecting 
tax from his own people, among whom he was seen as unfair to. Ever shrewd, he saw tax 
collecting not as a job but rather as a favour to the government which he could manipulate.15 
 
At a national level, during the period running up to independence the Lahawiyin were more 
concerned with seizing land, settlement, pasture and grazing boundaries than with any claim 
to a nazirate. Wad al Faki were lobbying the National Unionist Party (closely linked to the 
Khatmiyya) at party level, to acknowledge their right to the area east to Atbara River and up 
to the Ethiopian border.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Memo from Taha Osman, Local Government Officer, Kassala, to Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein September 
1958. Kept with al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein as part of the archives of Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein in his 
house in Mugtta wad al Zein.  
15 Extracted from interviews with al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein. 
16 Interview with Abdulah Suleiman, former Governor of Gezira, Gedarif, January 2008. 
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2. Intensifying pressure on land: 1960s 
 
In the mid-1960s, a threat to Lahawiyin land-use became – briefly – a matter of national 
concern in Sudan. In May 1966 the Deputy Minister of Interior wrote a letter to the Minister 
of Defence informing him that there had been a large-scale encroachment by Ethiopian 
farmers into Sudanese territory, and that this was part of an Ethiopian government settlement 
scheme. 
 
Sudanese area located east of the Atbara River, between the Setit River and the 
Ba-Salam River is outlined by the Border Agreement between the two 
Governments of Britain and Ethiopia in 1902 and 1903 and was not recognized by 
the Ethiopian Government until after the visit paid by the Sudanese–Ethiopian 
friendship delegation last July (1965). In addition the area which is the subject of 
this letter is located within our boundary according to the Agreement and the 
Protocol mentioned…… 
They destroyed the basic signs of the border and confiscated some of the local 
population’s land, appropriated and killed Lahawiyin herders assuming that this 
area east of the Atbara River was Ethiopian land and were supported by Ethiopian 
authorities. This belief was encouraged by the presence of a delegate of the 
Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture in 1964 to allocate an agricultural scheme in 
this area for Ethiopians. It has been found that an Ethiopian force entered the 
border up to 30 km towards Gedarif and harassed farmers and forced them to pay 
taxes and tribute to the Ethiopian Government and in case of failing to pay they 
were threatened with confiscation of their lands. 17  
 
Previously, border crossing by Ethiopians in the past had not gone beyond scattered attacks 
by bandits – Shifta, as they were called locally - and the crossing of some individual 
Ethiopians into the area that lies east of the Atbara River, who cultivated small areas. But 
now Ethiopians had advanced tens of miles over the borders in organized movements and in 
great numbers and started to cultivate large areas, estimated at approximately 1,776 square 
kilometers, accompanied by plant, and large heavy machinery. The Ethiopians were 
encouraged to cross the borders into Sudan by the rich soils of the area east of the Atbara 
River and the ready availability of water compared to that in the poor land in Ethiopia. The 
territory involved was not permanently occupied by Lahawiyin, but this was a threat to 
                                                 
17 Letter from the Deputy Minister of Interior, Mr. Amir Al- Sawi, Khartoum, May 1966, NRO Dakhlia 
2/16/200 (translation by the author). 
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grazing lands.  This raised the concerns of many Sudanese particularly the national assembly 
authorities and officials in 1966.  A brisk correspondence was exchanged between officials in 
Kassala and Gedarif provinces. The officials who discussed the incident were the Governor 
of Kassala Province, the eastern army commander, the Gedarif resident army officer, the 
police commander, a local government representative and the resident Judge in Gedarif. 
However it seems that a previous meeting in late 1965 between the Army, the police and the 
security in Kassala preceded this discussion.  
 
The discussion continued in Gedarif province, between the Governor, the resident Judge and 
police commander who gave the conclusion of their discussion in a report dated February 
1966 to the deputy minister of Interior in Khartoum. The matter was handled and discussed 
within the Ministry of Interior until May 1966 when Mr Amir al Sawi, wrote a confidential 
letter to the Minister of Defense enclosing the report of the governor of Gedarif.  In this letter 
al Sawi presented the security measures that the army and the security committee in Kassala 
province had decided upon in late 1965 and which were set out in the governor of Kassala 
letter. He also referred to the police commander of Kassala province’s visit to the eastern 
frontier and the latter’s report on the Ethiopian violation of the border agreement.18 
 
Surprisingly the police commander’s report mentioned that the invaders were not only 
Ethiopians but included large numbers of people from the Hadhramaut and elsewhere in 
Yemen,  and Sudanese living in Al Hamra and Um Haja districts in Ethiopia who entered this 
area every rainy season and, when the rivers became full, remained and expanded the 
cultivated areas using modern tractors. The crops cultivated would be smuggled or taken to 
Ethiopia.  The report also mentioned that this area had been neglected for a long time and it 
required the government to take some urgent measures. These measures were suggested in 
the report as the reinforcement of the existing police stations and establishment of new ones 
at Hamadbeit, Jebel Alkuddi and Baslam River. It also mentioned the need to establish an 
army border checkpoint without specifying a location, leaving that for the army to decide. In 
addition it suggested that the army should patrol the border. Also, it suggested that roads, 
                                                 
18 Letter from the Deputy Minister of Interior Mr. Amir Al- Sawi to the Minister of Defense, Khartoum, May 
1966, NRO Dakhlia 2/ 16/200 (translation by the author). 
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bridges, water and health facilities should be provided to help the nomads on the Sudanese 
side to settle in an area considered empty. 19 
 
Despite this drama, the real threat to Lahawiyin livelihoods in this period came from the 
Sudanese state, not from invading Ethiopians. The first post-colonial government from 1956 
to the 1960s pursued a range of policies that encouraged the expansion of the mechanised 
farming system and alienation of land through schemes that deprived many of pastoralist 
grazing land. A systematic attempt to settle some Lahawiyin began with the New Halfa 
(Khashm al-Girba) Agricultural Scheme, which was initiated in 1965.20 The initial purpose of 
the scheme was – as its name suggested – providing resettlement for farmers (about 50,000)21 
who had been displaced from Halfa by the creation of Lake Nasser, as part of the Aswan 
High Dam project; the Atbara was dammed at Khashm el Girba to allow the creation of a 
new irrigated settlement scheme for these farmers. But the ambitions of the scheme went well 
beyond this; 24,000 feddans were assigned in small freehold plots to the Halfawis, but 
330,000 feddans were included in the scheme 22 , with the stated aim of settling 20,000 
nomadic families on fifteen feddan tenancies.23 The scheme ran into significant problems; the 
supply of water proved inadequate, many Halfawis left the scheme in disappointment, and by 
the 1980s only around 150,000 feddans were actually being irrigated.24 But it had substantial 
effects, nonetheless. The settlement and its related benefit of the tenancy system perpetuated 
a process of differentiating between the Lahawiyin umudiyyas and also between them and 
other groups within the scheme: the Shukriyya and the people from Halfa themselves, who 
were mostly Nubians, members of communities which had long been settled along the Nile 
and which, while they identified had come to identify themselves as Arabs, lived very 
different lives to those of the Lahawiyin. The Lahawiyin sense of their distinctive Arabness 
was further stimulated by the scheme’s policy of distinguishing in terms of areas and villages 
based on ethnicity, which arguably nourished their Arab identity. The New Halfa Scheme 
                                                 
19 Letter from the Deputy Minister of Interior Mr. Amir Al- Sawi to the Minister of Defense, Khartoum, May 
1966, NRO Dakhlia 2/ 16/200 (translation by the author). 
20 Gunnar M. Sorbo, Tenants and nomads in Eastern Sudan: a study of economic adaptations in the New Halfa 
scheme (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985), p.6; Gunnar M. Sorbo, How to survive 
development: the story of New Halfa  (Khartoum: Development Studies and Research Centre, Faculty of 
Economic & Social Studies, University of Khartoum, 1977).  
21 Awad, Sedentarisation of nomads, p.8. 
22 At the first stage 150,000 feddans were included, to be expanded to 500,000 feddans in later stages. 
23 Bret Wallach, ‘Irrigation in Sudan since independence,’ Geographical Review 78:4 (1988), pp.417-34; 
Mustafa Mohamed Khogali , ‘Nomads and their sedentarization in the Sudan’ (Department of Geography, 
University of Khartoum, 1979). 
24 Khogali , ‘Nomads and their sedentarization in the Sudan,’ p.424. 
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issued tenancies to residents of the area, which included the Shukriyya, and also aimed to 
resettle the Nubians who had been displaced in the 1960s. However, there was a clear basis 
on which tenancies were allotted - Arab and non-Arab. The villages were set up according to 
ethnic backgrounds. The Nubians were allotted villages separate from the Arabs or nomads 
(Lahawiyin and the Shukriyya).25  The Shukriyya households were allowed to remain and 
their subsistence livelihood was kept on. The Nubian and the Lahwiyin villages were 
numbered and each group was given a set of numbers;  the southern part of the scheme was 
dominated by the fourteen Lahawiyin villages, , which were named ‘Arab One’, ‘Arab Two’, 
and ‘Arab Three to ‘Arab Fourteen’ all of which were found north of al Eizzba village.26 
Salem-Murdock carefully documented the process of ethnic grouping in the case of New 
Halfa scheme. She was quoted by Miller as saying: 
 
Ethnic identity plays a prominent role in differentiating groups on the New 
Halfa Scheme. The border line was between the Halfawi (i.e. the resettled 
Nubians), the Arabs (all the former Butana pastoral groups including the 
Arab-speaking groups and the Beja-speaking groups who were allowed to get 
tenancies ) and the Sudanese (i.e. people mainly from Western Sudan, West 
Africa or Southern Sudan who did not have tenancies and work as share-
croppers or wage-labourers).27 
 
The New Halfa Scheme allocated about 2,358 tenancies allocated at New Halfa for the 
Lahawiyin, most went to a section called wad Hussein, mainly from Blulalb umudiyya. 28  
The closeness of this umudiyya to the area of the scheme made settlement painless for them 
and made it easy for the scheme management to accommodate them. 29  In some cases tribal 
leaders were involved in the distribution of the tenancies and some were given a quota of 
tenancies for their people, but this may not have been the case for the Blulab as much as for 
the Shukriyya, as the Blulab were just an umudiyya under the Sheikh khut of the Lahawiyin, 
who were themselves still under the nazir of the Shukriyya. 30  Also no other recognized 
Lahawiyin umudiyya was involved in the scheme apart from Blulab. 
 
                                                 
25 M. Pearson, ‘Settlement of pastoral nomads: a case study of the New Halfa irrigation scheme in Eastern 
Sudan’ (School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, 1980).  
26 Awad, ‘Sedentarisation of nomads,’ p.17; Salem-Murdock, Arabs and Nubians in New Halfa, p.27; interview 
with Ali Suleiman, Director, Statistics Department, Gedarif, January 2008.   
27 Salem-Murdock, Arabs and Nubians in New Halfa, in Miller, ‘Introduction,’ in Miller, Land, Ethnicity and 
Political Legitimacy, p.20. 
28 A population of 22,990 Lahawi; see Sorbo, Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan, p.154. 
29 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director, Statistics Department, Gedarif, January 2008.  
30 Sorbo, Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan, p.105. 
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According to Sorbo the standard of settlement and location of houses, materials for building 
and location of tenancy differed between those provided for the people from Halfa and the 
nomads (Shukriyya and Lahawiyin). The original plan of the scheme was explained by 
Sorbo: 
It was intended to accommodate the nomads into 22 villages at cited location; 
however they proceeded to make their settlement in haphazard way all over the 
scheme area. As a result, 57 new communities emerged in addition to the 15 
villages which were founded before the establishment of the scheme. 31 
 
Settlement in villages did not stop seasonal migration with the herds or the nomadic 
livelihood. The Lahawiyin in the scheme tended not to abide by the scheme’s agricultural 
rules and regulations in terms of schedule, agricultural practices etc. Rather they caused 
damage to the crops by allowing their herds into tenancies of other tenants which resulted in 
conflicts between them and other tenants and between them and the scheme’s management.32 
The scheme management often resorted to bringing in police and army personnel during the 
cotton picking season in order to prevent animal trespass.33 Because the Lahawiyin lacked 
interest in becoming fully settled, were not used to proper cultivation and lacked agricultural 
skills, their tenancies were left unattended or in some case were shared with other settlers.34 
The tenancy system appeared to them as another form of ‘confinement’ which they had often 
resisted.  
 
The scheme also made internal distinctions among the Lahawiyin more apparent, as those 
who took up the tenancies were seen as less ‘Arab’ than their camel-herding neighbours. As 
one Lahawi put it, characteristically combining ideas of wealth in livestock, Arabness and 
independence: ‘those of the Lahawiyin who settled in New Halfa didn’t care much, they 
didn’t have many camels, and had a less strong Arab identity, enabling them to endure the 
authority of others.’35 On the other hand, accepting the terms of settlement in New Halfa was 
an opportunity for some Lahawiyin to secure land even though it was perceived differently by 
some of them as degradation to their Arab identity. 36 Though the Lahawiyin tenants kept their 
distance from other settlers in terms of any social interaction, particularly marriage, this did 
not explain the non-tenant Lahawiyin’s contempt for those Lahawiyin who were identified as 
                                                 
31 Sorbo, Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan. p.104. 
32 Interview with Amna Mahmoud, Deputy Manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
33 Sorbo, Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan. p.118. 
34 Ibid., p.154. 
35 Interview with Sheikh Siddig Yousif, Showak, December 2008.  
36 Ibid. 
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tenants. The latter were seen to have been forced to settle by their poverty. Though it was a 
planned settlement, it caused the rest of the Lahawiyin who lived in villages outside the area 
of the scheme to pigeonhole those within the scheme as being too submissive.37 Despite the 
fact that those who opposed the settlement in the scheme were a number of umudiyya who 
also experienced some sort of submission to the ruling umudiyya, wad al Faki, to them the 
exercise of authority and power when applied by the Lahawiyin was allowed and accepted.  
 
In fact not all Lahawiyin submitted to their tribal leadership. Wad al Faki’s leadership was 
challenged by wad Hardan.  Up to the 1960s wad Hardan was not a separate umudiyya as a 
former administrator stated: “wad Hardan was not an umudiyya of its own but rather part of 
an umudiyya under their sheikh”. 38  In the late 1960s and probably during the second 
parliamentary government, the most prominent figure in wad Harden, Sheikh al Bashir, 
contacted some figures from the Umma party for an upgrade to his section to an umudiyya. 39 
This would have appeared as a cha llenge to the leaders of al Faki umudiyya, who felt 
bypassed as Hardan was Ansar; followers of Umma, and al Faki were religiously and 
politically aligned with the Khatmiyya. Although many had expected a challenge to come 
from the Magit, who had long competed for leadership of the tribe, the main threat came from 
a newly growing umudiyya.  
 
The challenge suggests that circumstances had helped wad Hardan to grow, and given its 
leaders new ambitions: to becomea viable umudiyya, and ultimately to aspire to the 
leadership of the tribe, to increase their individual rights over land and to expand and upgrade 
their authority in the Showak area.  The early involvement of members of wad Hardan’s in 
agriculture had worked to their advantage and had allowed them to diversify their economic 
resources by realising the importance of juruf land. Consequently the number of Lahawiyin 
umudiyyas increased to eight.  
 
The juruf was of increasing importance from 1950, and its economic importance of juruf 
grew in 1970 after the 1971 Act.40 The land laws which existed in the Sudan declared all 
                                                 
37 Interview with four members of staff, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
38 Interview with Abdalla Amer, former Deputy Governor of Gezira State and District Administrator for the 
Lahawiyin. Gedarif, December 2007. 
39 There was no evidence regarding the exact year Sheikh al Bashir made his demand, but most of the 
interviewees mentioned the late 1960s. 
40 The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes 8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996)  
162 
 
native land to be under the ownership of the government, but local authorities had, in 
practice, control over all land. The land laws did not grant any proprietary title to cultivators 
of the land, only a right of occupation. Usufruct grazing land rights were not formally 
recognized by Sudanese law, though some nomads, particularly settled ones, had registered 
their arable lands. A few families of al Faki, Hardan and Gaborab had registered some of the 
land as agricultural schemes in 1966.41 At this juncture, 1969, registration guaranteed some 
security of tenure for rain-fed land in the sense that the government or the mechanised 
schemes owner were unable to confiscate, a rule that did not apply to grazing lands. These 
were assumed to be ‘empty’ and, as Morton stated, pastoralists did not make the political 
connection to block its expropriation.  42 He suggested further that, although the Lahawiyin 
generally had access to juruf, recently-settled groups did not have sufficient rain land (held 
by customary tenure) to guarantee prosperity.  43  This suggested that land for agricultural 
purposes was increasing at the expense of the security of herds.  Up to 1960, however, the 
expansion of mechanised farming did not infringe on grazing, and it may actually have 
increased the availability of ‘residue’ land during the dry season. The type of land the 
Lahawiyin on the east bank possessed was rain land under “customary” land tenure. The 
average cultivator might have farmed between twenty to twenty-five feddans by tractor but 
this might have been on behalf of an extended, rather than a nuclear, family.44 Not many 
Lahawiyin had tractors to tackle large rain-fed areas. Overall, then, the increasing importance 
of cultivation of juruf, as other kinds of land and land-use became difficult, pushed many 
Lahawi families to farming on the juruf. 
 
Shazali has suggested that a major difference between the Condominium policy towards land 
and that of post- independence governments has been the consistent tendency of the latter to 
withdraw recognition from usufruct rights; as private landownership was accepted in areas 
where it had previously been unrecognized; people like the Lahawiyin were deprived of 
access to land.45 Despite the fact that, as Shazali posited, some forms of relative ‘communal 
landownership’ were allowed in some cases ‘there was apparently no justification not to 
                                                 
41 Interview with late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former Katib Khut and president of the Pastoralists Union, 
Showak, Mugattaw al Zein, June 1997; The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the 
Conference coordination committee (this report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference 
on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996), p.4. 
42 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawiyin pastoralism,’ pp.6-7. 
43 Ibid., p.7. 
44 Ibid., p.10. 
45 Shazali et al., ‘Share The Land Or Part The Nation,’ p.19.  
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settle and register land that belongs to sedentary villages.’ 46  This trend encouraged many 
sedentarised Fellatta, Ja’alin and Taisha to use a usufruct argument to justify ownership of 
land that was formerly cultivated by customary right by nomads, which was the beginning of 
mechanization.  
 
  
                                                 
46 Ibid.,  p.19.  
. 
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3. Competition over land in the 1960s: acquisition of ‘juruf ‘land  
 
The expansion of mechanisation together with shrinking grazing land led the Lahawiyin to 
seek new land. The land became a prime source of competition between the Lahawiyin and 
others such as the Fellatta tribes on the banks of the Atbara and Setit Rivers.  The juruf 
covered an estimated area of 20 kilometres along the River Atbara from al Shareif Hassaballa 
village to al Tirtir village north. Though claims to juruf were limited to the southern part of 
the river in the early years of the establishment of Khashm al Girba Dam, they were later 
extended to cover larger areas to the north. It was also mentioned that the first juruf were 
found in Shareif Hassaballa village, one area of Hardan umudiyya in the mid the sixties.47  
 John Morton outlined that  
       
       a Lahawi ‘mesheikha’[umudiyya] has, in most areas, a customary right to its riverside 
juruf (a dry season site) and collectively to the grazing and tree-browse areas around 
it (although there are no strict boundaries)48 
 
The 1970s were a crucial time for the Lahawiyin as much land was seized by the newcomers.  
The majority of these were actually Hausa and Fellatta Sokoto, Katsina and Melle Fulani.  
These were tribes from Nigeria and West Africa and other non-Lahawiyin from Sudan who 
occupied the riversides of some villages along the Atbara and Setit Rivers and restricted 
pastoral access to the rivers.49 Awad Al Karim suggested that there might have been a tribal 
and ethnic intermingling between the original residents of the Butana tribes and particularly 
with the newly-arrived migrants.50 But I would suggest that this was limited to members of 
tribes who lived in towns, especially in Showak, where livelihood changed and market and 
trade relations affected tribal affiliation, so that tribal relations became less and less strong.  
But elsewhere, villages remained separate. The Lahawiyin had remained in their exclusive 
summer villages, initially trying to maintain a predominantly nomadic livelihood. As they 
always wanted to remain ‘Arab’ they remained separate, and the exclusivity of their villages 
presented less chance of intermingling.  
 
                                                 
47 Interview with Awad al Karim Ahmed Adam al Zein, Ministry of Agiculture, Showak, December 2007. 
48 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawiyin pastoralism,’ p.6.  
49 Ibid., pp.8-9. 
50 Interview with Babikir Awad al-Karim Babikir, historian, Showak, December 2007. 
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The expansion of mechanised farming by other tribes in the area resulted in the restricting of 
grazing land. However, it was evident that the upper land of the Atbara River banks was in 
great demand as it was considered rich. These were previously known as the Lahawiyin dry 
season sites where they seasonally migrated. However recently most of this land had been 
taken over by Taisha, Fellatta and Dabayna, who claimed it on the basis of customary rights 
and in doing so denied previous customary grazing as well as tree browsing rights along the 
riverside; by doing so pastoral access to the river became impossible.51  
 
Settlement accelerated when the administrative law regulating the distribution of juruf was 
enacted in the late 1960s. The distribution of juruf was under the jurisdiction of the north 
Gedarif Rural Council where the allotments of areas within the juruf to families were the 
responsibility of the Lahawiyin umdas and sheikhs according to the size of the juruf and 
seasonality. 52 The semi-settled Lahawiyin were therefore still mainly herders and continued 
to send the ir herds into the Butana during the rainy season. They mainly relied on extensive 
herding and their migration pattern came to be increasingly long,   due as both pastures and 
the routes between them were taken by mechanized farming. 53 
 
Most of the Lahawiyin communities along the east bank claimed ownership of juruf land by 
the mid 1970s. 54 About 37 Lahawiyin villages had a total of 7,130 feddans of juruf land; 
giving people in these villages cultivated an average of 2.3 feddans for each family. 
However, not all Lahawiyin had a right over the juruf because the juruf lands were owned by 
                                                 
51 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawin pastoralism,’ pp.4-8. 
52 The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 
1996), p.12; there were three types of juruf; the early juruf from September to November, the intermediate juruf 
from December to March and the late juruf from March to May.  
53 During the rainy season (from June to September), they set up temporary headquarters at Jebel Mukheiriq. 
They could move north as far at Jabal Urn Batikh or Jabal Mayemba and west as far as Khor Atshan. From 
September to December most of the camels could drink from the Atbara River and continued to graze in the 
Butana. They could go as far as the Shukriyia Butana khut territory (Jabal Nawasil) and they could graze as far 
as Jabal Kasamor and Jabal Maganis in the southern part of the Butana.  Grazing borders were not easily crossed 
as many farmers and scheme owners began to set grazing rules for nomads. The following grazing routes were 
used during the rainy season and were considered by the Lahawiyin as part of their traditional pasture land. Four 
routes were located west of the Atbara River and two in the east. They could go from south to north, parallel to 
the railway line passing Showak- al Mugataa - Shagarab –Remeila and west to Nigarat, Jabal Nawasil to the 
Butana in order to claim land that was regularly grazed by them.  Khalid et al., ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), 
Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.330-331.  See also Victoria Bernal, Cultivating workers: peasants 
and capitalism in a Sudanese village (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Leif O. Manger, Survival 
on meagre resources: Hadendowa pastoralism in the Red Sea hills (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996). 
54 Over thirty-five villages developed as sedentarization continued between the 1950s and 1960s.  The latest 
established villages were al-Madina Arab and Mabruka in 1991-92.  These two villages were mainly inhabited 
by the Gawamis, the last umudiyya to partially settle; al-Hadi, Katuta, al-Mabruka, Shangaraira, al- Muharagat, 
Hajer al-abyeed etc. (see map of Lahawiyin settlements).  
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a small group of well-to-do Lahawiyin. The division of land between villages was apparently 
done equally by the North Gedarif Council, according to each village’s residents; but division 
within the area allotted to each village was not equal.55 The type and size of the juruf varied 
according to the rains in Ethiopia’s highlands and the flooding season and, to a large extent, 
to the volume of silt that the Atbara River brought with it. Since the Lahawiyin began 
cultivating juruf which was in late 1970s they tended to cultivate three times a year: 
(September to July) which are early juruf, intermediate and late ones. The Lahawiyin mainly 
cultivated watermelons, okra and tomatoes during the dry season and sometimes, pumpkins. 
On the west bank of the Atbara, upstream at the junction with Setit, the Lahawiyin were 
being pushed out of the area by increased mechanized farming and also pressurized by  the 
expansion on the juruf lands by villagers. In addition, land available for dry-season grazing 
was retreating and, due to increased activity from shifta, the area around Safawa on both the 
east upstream side of the confluence and the west upstream were unsafe. The Lahawiyin were 
unable to enjoy the customary land they had previously used during the dry season because 
most of this land was taken by villagers (non-Lahawiyin) in 1979/1980.56  
 
As dry-season cultivation on the juruf became ever more important, conflict became more 
common. By 1980 a problem over juruf arose between some Lahawiyin and some Fellatta 
near Showak town. The Atbara in this area was not rich in juruf and the villagers had already 
claimed what little there was.57 Both sides claimed rights over these juruf. The Showak rural 
council formed a committee to solve this problem in which representatives from both parties 
were included. At the same time a sub-committee in the village was also established to ensure 
that the juruf were distributed according to the outlined areas set by the council committee, 
and the disputed juruf were divided according to the family members of both sides. 
Accordingly each family on the basis of size, was given 12 habil [habil = 60 meters] for a 
large family, average sized families were given eight habil and a single man was given six 
habil.58 
 
                                                 
55 Interview with Yusif Hasb al-Gawi, Deputy President, Legislative Council, Showak, January 2008; interview 
with Mohamed Hassan, Sudanese Red Crescent, Showak, June 1996. 
56 Khalid et al, ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.331. 
57 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawin  pastoralism,’ pp.9-13; see also The Lahawiyin Development 
Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this report includes  8 working papers 
Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996) .  
58 Interview with Mohamed Hassan, Sudanese Red Crescent, Showak, June 1996. 
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The Lahawiyin faced another challenge.  Not only were they competing over juruf ownership 
but also over labour; both because Lahawiyin themselves sought to avoid cultivation work as 
far as possible, and because the juruf were seasonal and required intensive labour within a 
limited period of time before the next season’s river flood.59    
 
This raised new issues in gender relations. Women were also drawn into the discussion of the  
juruf because this was the only area where Lahawi women were allowed to work outside their 
homes. About five Lahawi women owned juruf by 1970 which were reported to be in al 
Sharif Hassaballa and Mereibiaa villages.  It was also mentioned that there were women 
owning juruf among the Fellata and Taisha. The number of Lahawiyi women involved 
increased in the following years.60 However, this was restricted and had to be authorised by 
their male counterparts or guardians. Women and girls were engaged to pick tomatoes and 
okra, mainly for the household only, because in most cases the juruf owner would hire a non-
Lahawi (mostly Fellatta) to work on the juruf. This shows that juruf cultivation set a different 
boundary for Lahawi women.  It provided women with a space but that space was bounded 
and authorised. It is quite interesting to note the contradiction here that though the Lahawiyin 
often saw boundaries as imaginary and hardly respected them, when they touched on tribal 
values, as well as on gender relations, there they would be strictly imposed.  Even where 
women were permitted to work, they were within the vicinity of their villages.61  
 
On the upper Atbara, north of Showak there was a small amount of arable land. Here water 
points, both meshraa – fords on the river and hafirs, were subjected to customary rights. Such 
restrictions presumably intensified during the dry season when water became scarce and less 
during the rainy season when hafirs would be filled and the river would be flooded.  By the 
late 1970s, the  drying-up of, and damage to, water points had changed the movement of the 
nomads to the northern parts of the Butana by shortening the period of their stay to less than 
five  months, before they wouldhead south searching for water. This increasingly early 
caused trespassing over cultivation and forests. Although many hafirs had not been 
rehabilitated since the independence, they were reserved especially for the Lahawiyin and the 
eastern Shukriyia in eastern Butana.62 In this area, customary rights to rain-fed land (bildat) 
                                                 
59 Interview with Awad al-Karim Ahmed Adam al Zein, Agricultural and Forest Department, Showak, 
December 2007. 
60 Telephone interview with Babikir Awad al-Karim Babikir, historian, August 2010. 
61 Khalid, ‘Dynamics of changing gender relations,’ pp.455-456. 
62 Sorbo, Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan, p.154. 
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were also held on a loose family basis of 23 feddans per each after 1974.63 These rain-fed 
areas, however, remained under the mechanised farming cooperation [MFC] and were 
cultivated by tractors that owned by few families and were sold by Agricultural Bank on 
instalment which was facilitated by MFC. However, they were regulated by the Showak 
Rural Council Agricultural Department. 64  As many Lahawiyin families were still on the 
move most of them were deprived of that right and thus their customary rights were more or 
less arbitrated by their sheikh or umuda.65 
 
Up to 1971, while the expansion of mechanisation continued, the Shukriyya Confederation 
continued to hold its traditional authority over the Bawadra, Kawahla, Magarba, 
Messlemiyya, Ahamda, Bataheen and Lahawiyin. All of these tribes lived in vicinities that 
recognised, approved and were protected by the customary laws of the hosting tribe, the 
Shukriyya. 66  But the abolition of native administration ended the formal existence of the 
Confederation, and some of those tribes had expanded their tribal territories beyond the 
original boundaries set and approved by the Condominium by purchasing agricultural 
schemes, and so tribal territorial boundaries were changed as new mechanisation farming 
schemes were added. Therefore the relationship between tribes in Butana was put at stake. 
The Shukriyya generally suffered at the hands of the non-Butana tribes (those from Sinnar, 
Gezira, Khartoum, the Nile, Kassala, Gadarif and Blue Nile), and the Lahawiyin suffered at 
the hands of the Bawadra who closely bounded them. 67 This grazing land of the Shukriyya 
was greatly reduced (the grazing area used to encompass an area roughly from 79 km north of 
west Atbara to 250 km east of Atbara by 70 km south to the railway line) to a third of its 
original size.68  
 
Thus, from the above discussion, competition for land was not limited to the rain-fed land but 
went beyond that and extended to the river banks, the juruf land where the Fellatta presented 
a new force challenging the Lahawiyin. Within the tribe itself a different change took place 
                                                 
63 That was after the establishment of the Showak rural council in 1974.  Khalid et al, ‘The Lahwiyin,’ in Miller 
(ed.), Land Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.324. 
64 Al-Tayeb Omer al-Tayeb et al. ‘The present and the Future’, in The Lahawiyin Development Conference 
Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this report includes  8 working papers Presented at 
the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996), p.4. 
65 Interview with Awad al-Karim Ahmed Adam al Zein, Forest and Agriculture Department, Showak, December 
2007. 
66 Interview with Babikir al-Daw Shula (Shukri), President Pastoralist Union, Gedarif, December 2007. 
67 Khalid et al., ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.330-331. 
68 Interview with Amna Mahmoud, deputy manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gadarif, January 2008. 
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with women becoming relatively ‘public’, playing a role yet remaining within the territorial 
vicinity of the Lahawiyin villages.  During this period of the 1970s the Lahawiyin of Atbara 
lived within one administrative unit; the Rural Council of the Showak which was created in 
the early 1974. 69  Most of the settled Lahawiyin were within the council’s area, with the 
exception of those in the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme who were part of the rural council 
of Gash al-Girba.  
 
While these administrative changes may have diminished tensions with the Shukriyya, the 
Lahawiyin relationship with another neighbouring tribe, the Bawadra, was increasingly 
problematic.70 The   Bawadra were already living on the edge of the Butana on the border 
with the Lahawiyin rural council.  They were enjoying a degree of relative cohesion and 
prosperity which instigated envy and jealousy from the Lahawiyin.71 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
69The Jurisdiction of the Showak Rural Council includes areas between 35-43 and 53-55 longitude and 14-16 
and 14-61 latitude.  The Council was bounded to the north by Dwaideg village, to the south by Almurabaa 
village, to the west by al-Feil forest and Kasamor Hill, and to the east by the Atbara River.  
70 Extracted from various sources: Sorbo, Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan, p.154; Khalid et al., ‘The 
Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.326-27; Salem-Murdock, Arabs and 
Nubians in New Halfa, p.27. 
71 Dalmau, ‘Camel Production and trade in Showak,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, 
pp.215-17. 
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4.  Emerging Competition with the Bawadra   
 
A number of Bawadra, members of a formerly a nomadic tribe, had begun to invest in 
mechanized agriculture. As they did so they crossed former boundaries, including the former 
pasture line ‘Sindy Four ’.72 This line was recognized by the Lahawiyin as a major Lahawiyin 
migration route. The mechanized farming owners converted the former customary pastoral 
land into private ownership and charged the Lahawiyin for passing through. As the Bawadra 
developed property ownership of most of the water points and agricultural schemes, they also 
began to set grazing rules for nomads.73  
 
It has been argued that the relationship between the two tribes reflects the intense competition 
over land at the peak of expansion of mechanised farming in Butana from the mid 1960s.74 
By 1967 the total area under mechanised agriculture increased from less than one million to 
more than three million feddans. 75   This coincided with the period in which the local 
government structure was being developed, first with the abolition of the post of district 
commissioners, and then, from 1971, with the formal abolition of native administration. 76 The 
effects of this were felt not only among the traditional confederations but also within small 
tribes.  With the absence of DCs, who had been in close contact with tribal affairs a kind of 
administrative vacuum had been created. More political and economic dynamics emerged.  
Party politics became more important as local communities tried to open up new means of 
communication with the state, and the Lahawiyin were trapped between the Ansar and the 
Khatmiyya. Within these growing dynamics the Lahawiyin were faced with rivalries from 
within and with others. Externally it was the Bawadra who represented a new rivalry. The 
Bawadra’s political affiliation to the Ansar brought them closer to wad Hardan umudiyya 
which constituted internal rivalry. Moreover, the leaders of these two groups shared a 
common ground, an interest in education, settlement and expansion in agricultural 
mechanised schemes.77  
                                                 
72 A pasture line set by the British Administration in 1940. 
73 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawin pastoralism,’ pp.8-12.; The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, 
compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this report includes  8 working papers Presented at the 
Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996) 
74 Staniforth, Imperial echoes; Ahmed, Development of agriculture in the Sudan . 
75 Bascom, ‘Food, wages and profits,’ p.143.  1 feddan equals 1 acre.  
76 Howell (ed.), Local Government and Politics, p.43. 
77 Interview with late Sheikh Ahmed al Zein, former khut katib, member of Pastoralist Union, Mugataa wad al 
Zein, June 1997; see also I. Dalamu, ‘Camel Production and Trade in Eastern Sudan: A Case Study of  Showak 
Market’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy in Eastern Sudan, pp.215-217. 
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The Bawadra political affiliation to the Ansar was made clear by events when the Unionist 
leader al Azhari visited Um-Shajara. According to a non- Lahawi informant Al Azhari was 
touring the east as part of a political campaign; the Bawadra slaughtered a dog in front of 
their village Um-Shajara, on the road he took, was an open insult. This informant believed 
that this was the reason al Azhari subsequently promised the Lahawiyin ‘the no-man land’ 
east of Atbara River as their dar. Another, Lahawi, man stated:  
 
The late president of the NUP Ismail al-Azhari (also a president of Sudan) was 
on a tour for a political campaign in Eastern Sudan. While he was on his way 
from Kassala he passed by Um-Shajara, the headquarters of the Bawadra, the 
Bawadra, instead of welcoming him by slaughtering camels or sheep (as 
customary for many Arab tribes), they slaughtered a dog instead on the road he 
passed by.78   
 
The Lahawi man thought that this had happened because of Bawadra loyalty to the Ansar and 
because al Azhari was aligned with the Unionists and the Khatmiyya. Al Azhari must have 
been disappointed and perhaps offended by the Bawadra attitude. As for the Bawadra, they 
probably wanted to show their true loyalty as Ansar.  It was an act of intense disrespect to al 
Azhari’s position and title as a political activist and political party leader. It also did not 
reflect the generosity of the Arab tribes.  Its relevance here is the political feeling that was 
growing among the people at that time.79 The Lahawi man while telling this story showed 
pride in distinguishing the Bawadra behaviour from the Lahawiyin’s. In other words no 
Lahawi would do what the Bawadra did. Although he could not question the Bawadra’s 
Arabness he related the incident to their political affiliation without any details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 Interview with a Lahawi sheikh, Showak, January 2008. 
79 Interview with Babikir Awad al-Karim, historian, Showak, January 2008; interview with Abdalla Suleiman, 
former governor, Gedarif, January 2008. 
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5.  New legislation in the 1970s  
 
The 1970 Unregistered Land Act (ULA) and the 1971 People’s Local Government Act 
(PLGA)80 impacted on the Lahawiyin grazing land while granting them much more political 
influence to negotiate land. The ULA on one hand introduced the Government as the main 
owner of all land in Sudan and the PLGA showed the Government to be a partner in the 
political arena. The development of the 1970 Act was effectively synchronized with the 
abolition of native administration and gave the Government more authority to dispossess the 
dar rights of some tribes and repossess land rights to new groups. The PLGA established 
‘People’s Councils’ from which former members of the Native Administration and traditional 
political leaders were excluded.81 It also established new administrative boundaries for rural 
villages and nomad councils, though these more or less coincided with the former dar 
boundaries. It created parallel lines of authority: formal authority led by educated groups and 
informal led by traditional and tribal leaders. This Act posed challenges in terms of the 
authority and the jurisdictions of the rural councils as well as national government in 
Khartoum. In line with the rapid agricultural expansion as well as the local orders to 
regularize, grazing activities were completely stopped.82  This was because the May 1969 
Government had acknowledged that the new system of local government, had limited 
resources and staff and was incapable of delivering the administrative responsibilities that the 
abolished Native Administration in the rural areas used to deliver. It was difficult to fill the 
administrative gap   and therefore some Shukriyya continued to enjoy considerable power, 
both within their tribal structures and in the newly- instituted local government of 1971.83   
 
Article 4 (1) of the ULA stated that:  
 
 all land of any kind whether waste, forest, occupied or unoccupied, which is not 
registered before the commencement of this Act shall, on such commencement, be 
the property of the   Government and shall be deemed to have been registered as 
                                                 
80 Howell (ed.), Local Government and Politics, pp.117-123; see also Delmet, ‘The Native Administration’, in 
Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.151-52. 
81 Aboushouk and Bjorkelo, The Principles of Native Administration, p.151. 
82 An interview with Abdalla Amir, former deputy Governor of Gezira State and a District Administrator for 
Lahawiyin; see also Salah Shazali and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, ‘Pastoral land tenure and agricultural 
expansion: Sudan and the   Horn of Africa’, a paper presented at the DFID workshop on Land Rights and 
Sustainable Development in sub-Saharan Africa at Sunningdale Park Conference Centre, Berkshire, UK on 
16th–19th February 1999, p.11. 
83 Howell (ed.), Local Government and Politics, pp.93-94. 
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such, as if the provisions of the  Land Settlement and Registration Act, 1925, have 
been duly complied with84  
 
The enactment of this law sharpened the tension between the dar owners and those without a 
dar and also between different ethnic groups. 85  But more basically it called the whole idea 
of dar into question. It became a source of discontent in rural areas, though Nimeiri’s radical 
government viewed it as a positive step on the way to liberation from colonial heritage:  the 
government was determined to reallocate land and other resources in the country for activities 
which it believed would give higher returns. By this Act the government claimed ownership 
of all unregistered land in the country, and so the government vested in itself the power to 
limit nomads’ movement and their livelihoods.  
 
The enactment of the ULA disposed of the 1904 Grazing Agreement and thus the special 
grazing areas in central Butana were no longer exclusively available to the Shukriyya alone, 
creating opportunities for other tribes such as the Rashaida, Beja, Kawahla  and others 
including the Fulani groups from Southern Blue Nile State who gradually moved to central 
Butana. 86  That is, there was reason to exclude them as the Fulani were known to be cattle 
herders which would affect the safety of the camels. This of course implicated more on the 
Lahawiyin pasture and grazing rights. The Sindy Four pasture line was then completely 
dismantled.  
  
Despite the fact that the Bawadra had already trespassed over this line, the encroachment this 
time was much heavier and more damaging. It brought both heavy grazing from the herds of 
newcomers, alongside the expansion of mechanised farming by both Butana tribes (Bawadra) 
and non-Butana residents.  
developed 
At this point in time the grazing land came under the Department of Pasture, Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture, which was a department with no power or decision in terms of protecting 
pasture and ensuring routes or preserving water points.   Land lease and selling were under 
the authority of the Minister of Agriculture who distributed land to those politically 
supporting the government. The Mechanised Farming Corporation gave much power to lease 
                                                 
84 Kibreab, State Intervention, p.278. 
85 Interview with Amna Mahmoud, deputy manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
86 Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, ‘Transforming Pastoralism: A Case Study of the Rufa’a Al-Hoi Ethnic Group in 
the Blue Nile State of Sudan,’ Nomadic Peoples 13:1 (2009), p.9.  
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land without referring to the Federal Ministry which had caused a conflict of interest between 
the Corporation and the Minister. 87 This overlapping of authorities led to further expansion in 
grazing land to the South of Gedarif province.  
 
Undoubtedly the effect was the dismantling of grazing pasture, congested migration routes 
and dried up water points; inevitably customary seasonal movement north in Butana was 
reduced. The land was no longer under customary rule of the Shukriyya.  The New Halfa 
Agricultural scheme from the east and the Rahad Agricultural Scheme from the west into the 
Butana had left little for the nomads. Even the ‘no man’s land’ along the Ethiopian border 
which was previously a Lahawiyin grazing boundary was taken over by traders and 
businessmen for mechanised schemes,  Little by little the rest of the  umudiyya, like Sowar  
and the unsettled part of Magit, began to settle and the exchange of camels for land began to 
emerge. 88  The two umudiyyas realised that the camels they raised were highly valued as 
racing camels by the Rashaiyda, and that selling them would enable them to purchase land in 
agricultural schemes.    
 
In the early 1970s grazing became confined to what had been formerly recognised as 
Shukriyya land and which primarily fell under the old specific grazing land of the Shukriyia. 
Water resources were limited on this land. Hafirs and wells were privately-owned during the 
1970s, especially by the Bawadra who continuously expanded on mechanised agriculture.89 
The remaining hafirs, which were under the ownership of the Shukriyya, were not 
maintained. Water had become a commodity which the Bawadra seemed to monopolise and 
they commercialised water resources, introducing a new income-generating activity with the 
commercialisation of watering livestock.  Therefore, another dimension in pursuing a 
political legitimacy for the Lahawiyin was not only grazing pasture but water points as well 
which were contended for, by a new rival tribe, the Bawadra.   
 
This system indicated, in essence, that once native administration was abolished, the former 
system of land control by big confederations opened the door to those investors who came to 
exploit uncertain situations of land tenure by establishing large, unauthorised tractor schemes. 
                                                 
87 Interview with four staff members, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, December 2007.  
88 Interview with the late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former khut katib and President of the Pastoralists Union 
of Showak, Mugataa wad al Zein, June 1997.  
89 Interview with Amna Mahmoud, Deputy Manager, Idris Hamid Mohamed, Agricultural Inspector and Ali 
Mohamed, Agricultural Inspector, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
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By this time, the size of granted schemes had reached three times the size of the schemes in 
the early 1960s.90  
 
As part of their grazing movement the Lahawayin, tended to cultivate sorghum as a stable 
crop. They combined sorghum cultivation within their movement with the herds whether in 
the dry season camps or the rainy season pasture. Wherever land was available they made use 
of it. It was noted by Morton that those Lahawiyin who stuck to yearly migration were the 
well-off who were able to afford to take land on large agricultural schemes where hiring 
tractors was essential for agricultural operations. But only 7% of those who had recently 
settled in villages north of Showak continued to practise any seasonal migration and tended to 
lack capital. The average tractor would be hired for £40 per hour and paid in advance in the 
late 1970s. On the other hand, supply of labour did not form a major challenge, it however 
was performed jointly by family and extended family members  as long as division of labour 
and herding role were clearly set.91   
 
According to Assal the merchants who increasingly dominated the area, were not mostly 
from riverain tribes from northern Sudan. These were dominated by Jaaliyin, Shaigiyya and 
some of non-Sudanese origin such as Kurds, Yemeni and Copts. The Bawadra and 
Shukriyya, who were in the minority,92 rejected any interference by traditional authorities 
and, moreover, claimed Government support; in fact they usually obtained some form of 
official authorisation. Such support allowed relatively easy legal access to, and allocation of, 
land by the Mechanised Farming Corporation.93  However, such a situation affected poor 
Lahawiyin families more, preventing them from purchasing agricultural schemes; those who 
were still nomads were also directly affected by this act as they were prevented from 
obtaining agricultural land. Gawamis umudiyya for instance, because they were continuously 
moving and often far off near the Ethiopian borders, were not troubled by the diminishing of 
grazing land in Butana and east to Atbara River. This umudiyya was ranked particularly 
wealthy in camels.94  
                                                 
90Interview with Amna Mahmoud, Deputy Manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
91 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawin pastoralism,’ p.6.  
92 M. Assal, ‘Economy  and Politics in Gedarif,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, 
pp.190-93. 
93 Mechanised Farming Corporation, established with assistance of the World Bank in 1967/68 to supervise the 
rain fed agriculture and to provide ‘mashrooah’ owners with additional finances.  See Bascom, ‘Food, wages, 
and profits,’ p.143. 
94 Interview with Siddig Yousuf, trader, Showak, December 2007. 
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Overall,  the 1970 Act had enhanced the settlement process of the  remaining Lahawiyin who 
were still on the move  in Butana, remapped resources and was  a further step towards the 
dissolution of old tribal allocative power95 by the implementation of the Local Government 
Act, 1971 (LGA) which is discussed below. insult 
 
The abolishing of Native Administration was first raised in 1965 when the October 1964 
Government realised the strong link between the Butana tribal leaders and the traditional 
political parties, especially that of the Shukriyia and the Khatmiyya, and the Lahawiyin with 
both the Ansar and the Khatmiyya, surely this was not a localized issue in Butana. In order to 
control the political situation the government tried to gradually alienate these coalitions by 
attracting the young generation to active participation in the process of rural development. 
The tribal leaders were evidently becoming involved in Government decisions at a higher 
level, which did not please many educated young Sudanese who developed an interest in 
gaining political authority.  Apparently the involvement of the tribal leaders in the higher 
level of Government led to a conflict of interest with the educated groups which subsequently 
led to the abolition of the Native Administration in 1970. Within this context the Government 
adhered to and endorsed the policy of local participation. A.M. Ahmed argued that the 
abolition of the native administration system had created an administrative vacuum with no 
alternative institution to stand for and had deprived certain tribes the political voice, right to 
negotiate and even collect taxes. 96  Abu Shouk has argued that there was a cliental 
relationship between the Sectarian leaders in Khartoum and tribal clients in rural areas which 
depicted a close political relationship of a hierarchical nature where those who ‘have dar’ and 
‘have no dar’ were treated equally.  However, quite interestingly he deviated from Abdullah 
Ali Ibrahim’s concept of cliental relationship that was limited to the relationship between 
Confederations ‘with dar’ and client tribes ‘with no dar’. 97  Cliental relationships existed 
during both political periods yet developed differently.  On one hand, during the 
Condominium it was tribal and horizontally endured between tribes. On the other hand, 
during Nimeiri’s government that same cliental relationship took a different form and was of 
a more vertical nature between the peripheries and the centre. The argument is that the 
Lahawiyin were part of both the horizontal and the vertical relationship whenever it 
interested and benefited them.  
                                                 
95 Awad, ‘The evolution of landownership in the Sudan,’ p.35.  
96 Ahmed, ‘Transforming Pastoralism,’ p. 6.  
97 Ibrahim, Fursan Kanjarat, pp.13-14. 
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The 1971 administrative reform called for keeping the judicial and administrative functions 
separate.  Local courts were resolved during this period and were replaced by popular courts. 
Local courts in Subag, Rufaaa, Marareg, Khashm al-Girba and the special local court in 
Mugataa for Lahawiyin were no longer enforceable either. For instance the former court of 
Showak (al Mahkama ahliya) which had been presided over by the sheikh khut of the 
Lahawiyin and umdas and sheikhs from the Lahawiyin was abolished. This was replaced by a 
‘popular court’ in 1974. The court consisted of a judge, and three senior court members who 
were selected by their localities. This meant that one or two members would often be 
Lahawiyin because of the predominance of Lahawiyin in the rural council.  However the 
court worked on a rotational basis which ensured that every three months one of the three 
members would fill the presidency position. Most of issues related to crop damage or juruf 
would be dealt with locally. However some cases related to land were transferred to Gedarif 
where the courts were ruled by law as opposed to custom. 98  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
98 Interview with sheikhs Siddig Yusuf, Babikir awad al Karim, Yousuf, al-Ruda, Mohmed (teacher) and  Salah 
Shashug (executive director of Showak Rural Council), Showak, December 2007. 
178 
 
6.  Impact of the legislation: internal and external competition 
 
The abolition of the Native Administration in 1971 particularly acute because it dismantled 
institutions that catered for enforcement of grazing lines, at the same time as  an expansion in 
irrigated and rain fed sectors was under way.  Unauthorized schemes traversed the grazing 
lines, blocked access to watering points, and disrupted most of the pastoral routes. The 
abolition of the Native Administration removed pastoralists’ representation in government 
institutions as it formerly existed as venues to express their complaints. According to Shazali 
this was because “changes in the parliamentary electoral system adversely affected the weight 
of pastoralists in Sudanese parliamentary politics”. 99 The Lahawiyin (like many other pastoral 
groups) therefore had to face deteriorating conditions. Some Lahawiyin villages adapted to 
the changes in Butana.   Some leased their rain-fed land to farmers. 100 The confiscation of 
customarily-held lands from some people was justified by an argument put by an official that 
nomads were unable to effectively cultivate; if this task were left to those who could afford 
machinery, and thus fodder would be assured for nomads all seasons.  
 
Butana is a dry land and doesn’t bear pressure. It was a rich pasture and was limited 
to limited groups, couldn’t stand the desert expansion too. Pasture was no longer 
enough but now agricultural remnants can be used by nomads. Pasture becomes 
available all the year.101 
 
This statement reflects the point of view of those who supported mechanised farming. This 
argument disregards the fact that the heavy use of machines and the exhaustion of the soil by 
owners of the schemes had exhausted the soil and the environment of the area had changed 
drastically.  Thus the sustained provision of fodder throughout the year for herders would not 
continue for long. Since the native administration courts had been abolished, cases between 
the Lahawiyin herders and the farmers over residues and migration routes, which were the 
inevitable result of the expansion of agricultural farming schemes, were mostly decided 
against the pastoralists. As mentioned earlier some cases were transferred from local courts to 
Gedarif. However with so many cases in the Gedarif court, transferred cases would not be 
treated with priority, resulting in aggression and conflict by the nomads. 102  There used had 
ben eight migration routes (including the famous Taya-Karkura and Galabat-Mugataa) that 
                                                 
99 Shazali et al., ‘Share the Land or Part the Nation,’ p.13. 
100 Interview with four staff, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
101 Interview with Amna Mahmoud, Deputy Manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
102 Interview with staff members, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
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extended from south to north Butana, linking the summer camps and the rainy-season camps 
(the makharif and masarif).  By the 1970s only three routes were left.  
 
The sons of Sheikh al-Beshir were among the first of members of the Wad Hardan umudiyya 
to enter the governmental and political structure. With entrepreneurial skills, they managed to 
guarantee their own land rights, particularly in the agricultural schemes earlier than other 
umudiyyas, even an umudiyya like Magit who historically held political authority. By the late 
1970s Wad Hardan had developed a distinctive position in terms of individual ownership of 
agricultural farming schemes. The first tractor was owned by Sheikh al Beshir.103 But this did 
not end the communal claims to land of the umudiyya that Sheikh al-Bashir had maintained 
and preserved as the wad Hardan property right. 104  Wad al Faki and Gaborab followed the 
path of wad Hardan, but with the difference that both umudiyyas valued camels much more 
and kept the tradition of herding alive.105  
 
The Lahawiyin were unable to stop the Bawadra’s agricultural expansion. They lacked the 
credit worthiness and initial capital which Assal has identified as the essential for obtaining 
land in mechanized farming. 106   Again this resulted in an inequality which increasingly 
characterized the relationship between members of a section or an umudiyya and the 
Lahawiyin tribe in general. Moreover cliental relationships among certain families began to 
emerge as social networks which often provided some basic support for poor tribal members. 
According to Holter and Kirk ‘social networks within lineages are still remaining important 
means to acquire land, or find work’, 107 or even accumulating herds. This was evident among 
residents of Mugatta al Suq, who relied closely on wad al Faki, as did the the Jaborab. 
However some of the elite Lahawiyin families of Hardan, wad al Faki and al Gaburab began 
to search and strengthen their social networks beyond the tribe, in order to gain political 
support within the Gedarif State vicinity, Kassala and Khartoum, mainly to maintain 
authority and land in the mechanized schemes at the right time and to act as ‘entrepreneurs’ 
for their own tribal members.  
                                                 
103 Interview with late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former khut katib and President of Pastoralists Union 
Showak, Mugataa wad al Zein, June 1997. 
104 Interview with Sheikh al-Bashir Musa, al Mansura, June 1996. 
105 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director Statistic Department, Gedarif, December 2007.  
106 Assal, ‘Economy and politics in Gedarif: a symbiotic encounter,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and 
Political Legitimacy, pp.186-193.   
107 Uta Holter and M. Kirk, ‘Access to resources and social networks,’ Animal Research and Development 39, 
pp.177-187, quoted by Khalid et al. in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.332. 
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In conclusion, al Faki umudiyya therefore faced competition internally with wad Hardan over 
authority and externally with the Bawadra over land title. The crucial problem of access to 
land then went beyond the local level authority; it was more linked to decisions made at 
higher level politics in Khartoum. Following their past political and administrative 
experiences wad al Faki wanted to establish their authority and headship of the tribe and that 
would not have been achieved if they did not have the resources, camels and land. The 
Lahawiyin realised that they needed to acquire stronger political representation within the 
new local political set-up 
 
However, the abolition of the Native Administrative system in 1971, together with other 
factors, contributed to important consequences in eastern Sudan as in other rural and nomadic 
areas of northern Sudan. The new 1971 administrative system quickly proved unable to deal 
with the most crucial issue of these areas: the handling of ethnic conflicts linked with 
competition over resources (land and water). The deterioration of the pastoral grazing land in 
the Butana and Gedarif area has been well documented.108 Changes in land tenure and land 
use systems, as well as uncontrolled expansion of mechanized farming, led to the closing of 
the traditional grazing routes and to the loss of grazing areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
108 Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Sin, ‘Population Mobility in North and Central Sudan’, (PhD thesis, London: 
University of London, 1975); Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Sin, ‘Transformation of Camel Breeding in the Sudan,’ in 
National Seminar on Disaster Prevention and Management in Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 
1991); A.G.M. Ahmed (ed.), Some aspects of pastoral nomadism in the Sudan, (Khartoum: Sudan National 
Population Committee and Economic and Social Research Council, 1976)., Salah Shazali, ‘On Bleeding 
Pastoralism’, (unpublished paper presented to CDEJ workshop in Gedarif, 1996); Sorbo, Tenants and Nomads 
in Eastern Sudan; Hassan Abdel Atti, ‘ A socio –economic Survey of Central Butana’, UNDP/ ADS  Report: 
Central Butana Project, (Khartoum, 1993)  
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7. The 1980s drought and the emergence of the ‘ashraf’ 
 
The prolonged drought which gripped Sudan in the early 1980s impacted on the Lahawiyin in 
a number of ways. In 1984 the drought was followed by a famine in which many lost their 
lives, particularly in Kordofan and Darfur regions. 109  It resulted in the displacement and 
destitution of some Lahawiyin families, and a new identity was formulated: ashraf, the 
collective version of sharif, a title which usually implies a claim to descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad. While Some Lahawiyin were rethinking their nomadic livelihood and another 
stage in the tribe’s settlement came about as a result of the impact of the impoverishment of 
herders.   
 
Livelihood and the movement of the Lahawiyin tribe like many other tribes was disturbed 
and they began to pasture their livestock further south, towards the Rahad River, which lies 
outside the Butana. According to al-Shazali ‘they were among the largest Arab groups 
grazing in the Rahad area and they usually followed the dust roads used by trucks’ 110  which 
had been  recorded as animal corridors by the Ministry of Agriculture. About 41 percent of 
the Lahawiyin who were directly hit by the drought were displaced, and after 1984 the 
majority began to cultivate and settle. 111  However, by the time they started to do so 
conditions were not in their favour. Land was reserved and taken by others, including traders 
from Gedarif.112 With other, more attractive, land now claimed,  the karab land – the hard, 
clayish soil along the Atbara, prone to erosion and previously used only for seasonal grazing, 
was now discovered as a last reservoir of available land and many Lahawiyin began to 
compete for it, drawing even this land into mechanized farming.  
 
Manger, in his study of the Hadendawa, described the different coping mechanisms for 
coping with the  drought very well. The three phases he used in identifying relevant strategies 
and implementing them explained the level of vulnerability of the Hadendawa when faced 
with the drought, in term of selling their herds and accepting external aid. At the last stage 
they resorted to mass migration, as Manger described:  
                                                 
109 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: politics and the disaster relief industry in Africa (London: African Rights & 
the International African Institute, in association with James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1997).  
110 Al-Shazali, South Kassala Nomadic Survey (Khartoum: CARE International, 1988) quoted in Khalid et.al, 
‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethinicity and Political Legitimacy, p.330. 
111 Morton, ‘The decline of the Lahawin pastoralism.’ 
112 Ahmed Mohamed El Hassan, The environmental consequences of open grazing in the central Butana, 
Sudan (Khartoum: Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Khartoum, 1981), pp.1-28. 
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In the third phase of the drought there is mass migration out of the famine 
prone areas …in search of food, mainly to the towns and along main roads 
…Drought … not only leads to destitution of the many, but also to enrichment 
of the few…113 
 
When the 1984 drought hit the Lahawiyin, those who had small herds were more vulnerable 
and their herds mostly perished during the drought. They left the boundary of the Lahawiyin 
villages and moved out to seek jobs. They went south crossing the Bawadra tribal boundary 
near ‘Um Shajara’, the headquarters, and settled nearby.  
 
The degraded pasture and loss of livestock were evident. Some poor Lahawiyin families had 
become waged labourers for the Bawadra; and it was at this time that they were given the 
new name Ashraf 114 . The so-called Ashraf were dispossessed of their Lahawiyin identity 
because they were considered, by the rest of the tribe, as ‘no camel owners and wage 
labourers’. The late Sheikh Ahmed tried to distance this group from the Lahawiyin and thus 
Ashraf to him seems to have been used ironically, and really meant ‘of no origin’.115  This 
view differed from another interesting account told by A. M. Ahmed which explains why the 
late Sheikh Ahmed rejected the Ashraf :  
 
One important point that should be mentioned here is that the identification of 
oneself  as a member of Rufa’a al- Hoi tribe has important significance not 
only vis-à-vis non Arabs, but also in relation to the Arab in  the Sudan as a 
whole . By assuming an identity as a Rofa’a al-Hoi, a nomad is suggesting 
that he belongs to the Rofa’a group which in terms of descent assumes higher 
status vis-a –vis other Arab  groups…. The Rofa’a group appears in all of 
Juhayna genealogy. .. Rofa’a al-Hoi, as part of the large Rufa’a group, should 
thus be classified as Juhyna. However they do not accept this classification. 
Instead they have tried to assume a higher status by tracing their descent to 
Husayn Ibn ‘Ali and saying that they are Ashraf.116 
 
                                                 
113 Manger, Survival on Meagre Resources, pp.138-39; see Alex de Waal, Famine that kills: Darfur, Sudan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) . 
114  Khalid et.al, ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.332-333. 
115 Interview with late Sheikh Ahmed, katib khut and fomer Pastoralist Union member, Mugataa wad al Zein, 
June 1997. 
116 Ahmed, Shaykhs and Followers, p.91. 
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In this view, the adoption of the collective identity of Ashraf by these former Lahawiyin was 
a defiant assertion of Arabness in the context of a new situation. By linking themselves to a 
privileged ethnic group that was genealogically linked to the Prophet Mohammed, they 
sought to safeguard their social status which might otherwise have been lost within the social 
structure of the Lahawiyin, as well as within the Bawadra, their new guardians. Within the 
structure of their new guardians, the Bawadra, they were not fully accepted as full members 
because their status indicated another form of clientship between animal owners and animal 
herders.117  
 
The Ashraf attachment to the Bawadra, and their new role as workers, disturbed the 
Lahawiyin tribal image and pride. In spite of the existence of the Lahawiyin’s disapproval of 
this wage- labouring relation by the Bawadra, it had in fact created a labour market for some 
Lahawiyin. One feels a growing tension between the two tribes. Having realized this 
opportunity which was created because of the Ashraf, the Lahawiyin countered their 
argument and claimed nazirate on the grounds of population increase. Heightening the 
Lahawiyin’s fear regarding this matter the Bawadra Sheikhs once stated that because within 
the Lahawiyin social structure the Ashraf had previously held a lower rank they presented 
themselves as good herders and worked as anagib (shepherds) to the well-off  Lahawiyin as 
well as to their own herds. The new position presented them as absolutely destitute with no 
herds and solely as shepherds to the Bawadra.  
 
This shifted their tribal loyalties in this context and changed their identity. Turning to the 
Bawadra had another aspect. According to the tribal customary laws any tribe has to protect 
its members in times of need. The expulsion of the Ashraf from the Lahawiyin would deprive 
them of that customary right and therefore they had to seek tribal protection. Such protection 
helped to bind these people, who had lost livestock and land, in to providingr services as 
herders, and reduced the possibility of any tribal disputes over herd, land or grazing.  
Sheikh Ahmed Adam, the former katib khut  of the Lahawiyin, brushed off the loss of this 
group as a matter of ‘no origin’.118  But apparently not all Lahawiyin thought along these 
lines; other Lahawiyin thought the Ashraf could and should still remain Lahawiyin.119 For the 
Ashraf some satisfaction was gained from being with the Bawadra. Interestingly enough none 
                                                 
117 Khalid et al, ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.333. 
118 Interview with late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former khut katib and President of Pastoralists Union 
Showak, Mugataa wad al Zein, June 1997.  
119 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General, Statistics Department, Gedarif, January 2008.   
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of the umudiyyas had claimed the Ashraf as a former sub section. However, the Lahawiyin’s 
first reaction was disapproval at an Arab nomad being a waged labourer.  As the late Sheikh 
Ahmed pointed out, ‘A free Arab would not let his life and herds be controlled by others’.120 
 
The Ashraf were satisfied with their new identity because it provided food, shelter and tribal 
protection together with a recognized tribal boundary. As a group they had a leadership who 
represented them to Sheikh al-Bashir of the Bawadra who in turn had to accept them. Some 
Lahawiyin argued that if it was not for their skills they would not be accepted.   The Ashraf 
were a group who were trapped in the dilemmas of the identity debate. The well-off of the 
Lahawiyin tribe, the herd owners, perceived the Ashraf’s new position as a loss of their Arab 
as well as Lahawiyin identity.  
 
One has to bear in mind that in many pastoralist societies, households or 
extended families often favoured recruiting relatives when they needed to 
employ herdsmen121, while they did not mind employing non-relatives for 
agricultural work.122 This indicated a close patron-client relationship between 
the animals' owner and the herder. In the case of the Bawadra and the Ashraf, 
this familial relationship was absent, and this was the reason for the 
Lahawiyin condemning the arrangement. The Bawadra came to be 
considered as the main economic and social threat for many Lahawiyin. Wad 
al Faki feared that if they failed to acquire more land than the Bawadra an 
increasing number of poor families would join the labour market, and that 
this process might affect their tribal identity in the long run. This fear was 
somehow fuelled by the Bawadra sheikh who stated ‘We Bawadra are able to 
accommodate any non-Bawadra who seeks our support and who wants to be 
called a Bawadra.’123 
 
In conclusion the New Halfa scheme granted limited land rights (in tenancy) those who 
owned fewer camels among the Lahawiyin which gave rise to a new form of land ownership 
among them. This was yet another form of confining the Lahawiyin through a new form of 
control, the tenancy system.  From independence up to the 1980s large grazing lands were 
                                                 
120 Interview with late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former khut katib and President of Pastoralists Union 
Showak, Mugataa wad al Zein, June 1997.  
121  Morton, ‘The Decline of the Lahawiyin Pastoralists’, p.5. 
122 Interview with Amna Mohamoud, Deputy Manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008.  
123 An interview with late Sheikh al-Bashir, Bawadra leader, Um Shajara, June 1996. 
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appropriated by the mechanised farming schemes. This impacted differently on resident tribes 
in the area, and the effects were compounded by changes in government, which excluded 
traditional leaders from political representations, depriving them of power and authority and 
rendering their sheikhs and courts inactive to convey demands, express resentments or 
exercise authority.  
 
For the Lahawiyin, internal economic disparities were exacerbated.  Some remained tenants 
with small herds, some combined herds with mechanized farming schemes, some remained 
nomads but all continued to be identified as Lahawiyin – and some who resorted to wage 
labouring were deprived of that tribal identity.  This was the case for the Ashraf whose 
identity was shaped and formed by a new relationship of clientship and labour.    
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Chapter Six 
 New Claims for a Nazirate: the Politics of Native Administration in the 
1990s 
 
The crisis which so drastically affected Lahawiyin and other pastoralists in 1984 was far-
reaching. It was, in many ways, a crisis of the state as well as a crisis in livelihoods. It 
roughly marks the beginning of a shift in the political context in which Lahawiyin sought to 
negotiate their identity, and their access to resources: from the early 1980s, the Sudanese state 
was painfully conscious of its weakness, and began to revise its ambitions accordingly. In 
particular, the developmentalist rhetoric of the 1970s, which had laid emphasis on large-scale 
plans and state control, and which had exalted modernity rather than tradition, was 
considerably modified. From the early 1980s, a succession of regimes in Khartoum was 
increasingly interested in seeking a new accommodation with tradition, and in identifying 
themselves with an ideal of Arabism in which the pastoral nomad figured prominently. This 
did not reverse the multiple changes which were undermining the actual viability of 
pastoralism, but it offered opportunities to the men who competed for leadership of the 
Lahawiyin, and to their followers, to try and improve their political and economic positions. 
 
1. Regime changes 
 
By the early 1980s, the government of Gaafar Nimeiri was in serious difficulty. The 
development schemes of the 1970s had added hugely to Sudan’s debt; the attempts at central 
economic management had been disastrous. 1  These economic problems were matched by 
political difficulties. In the late 1970s Nimeiri, feeling that his political base was weakening, 
had sought rapprochement both with the old sectarian political parties, and with the emerging 
force of Islamic radicalism: known at various times through this period as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Islamic Charter Front, and led by Hassan al-Turabi. 2   Nimeiri’s 
increasing reliance on the support of this group led in 1983 to the passing of the ‘September 
                                                 
1 Peter Woodward (ed.), Sudan after Nimeiri (London: Routledge, 1991). 
2 Abd Allah Ali Ibrahim, Manichaean delirium: decolonizing the judiciary and Islamic renewal in Sudan, 1898-
1985 (Leiden: Brill, 2008);  Musta A. Abdelwahid, The rise of the Islamic movement in Sudan (1945-1989) 
(Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008); Peter Woodward, Sudan: political transitions past and present  
(Durham: Durham University, Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2008);  J. Millard Burr and 
Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist state, 1989-2000  (Leiden: Brill, 
2003). 
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Laws’, which established shari’a as the basis of all law in Sudan. A few months earlier, 
significant armed conflict had already emerged in southern Sudan, as a result of Nimeiri’s 
attempts to redraw boundaries and ensure Khartoum’s dominance over southern Sudan and 
its oil reserves. 3 
 
The civilian government which took power after Nimeiri’s regime was overthrown by 
popular unrest in 1985, headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi, proved unable to improve Sudan’s 
economic or political situation. In 1989 a coup brought in a new military regime – which, as 
soon became apparent, was guided by Hassan al-Turabi and his allies. This group had since 
1985 reconstituted themselves as a new party – the National Islamic Front. The exact power 
relations within the regime, and the relationship between soldiers, al-Turabi and various of 
his allies remain a matter of some debate; but very roughly it would seem that al-Turabi was 
the dominant force in the regime until around 1999, after which his influence rapidly 
diminished, and he became an increasingly vocal critic of the ruling National Congress Party 
and President Omer el-Beshir.4 The position of Beshir’s regime had been very fragile initially, 
but by around 2002 it had become more securely established than any of its predecessors in 
independent Sudan. Its relative stability rested partly on the development of oil production – 
which began to have a significant effect on government revenue from around 2001.  While 
the regime maintained a commitment to radical Islam, it became increasingly pragmatic in 
many ways, and growing oil revenue allowed the development of a corporatist state in which 
a political and business elite were entwined. 
 
The consequences of these changes for those on the margins of the state – like the Lahawiyin 
– were multiple. As Nimeiri’s regime weakened, it had looked to a revival of the structures of 
traditional authority which had been abolished at the beginning of the 1970s. The 
Government passed the Local Government Act in 1981 which created regional 
administrations;5 the Butana came under a region which included the Red Sea and Kassala, 
                                                 
3 Woodward (ed.), Sudan after Nimeiri; Anthony Sylvester, Sudan under Nimeiri (London: Bodley Head, 
1977); Johnson, Root Causes. 
4 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi, Turabi’s revolution: Islam and power in Sudan (London: Grey Seal, 1991). 
5 Al Agab A. al Terafi, ‘Regionalization in the Sudan; Characteristics, problems and prospects,’ in Woodward 
(ed.), Sudan after Nimeiri; Kamal Osman Salih, The Kordfan [Kordofan] Region of the Sudan, 1980-1985: a 
case study of the problems of regionalism (Khartoum: Development Studies and Research Centre, Faculty of 
Economic & Social Studies, University of Khartoum, 1989).  
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with Kassala as the capital. This Act allowed tribal leadership membership in local courts.6 In 
1984 the revival of Native Administration was approved at the Fourth National Conference of 
the Sudanese Socialist Union; and in 1985, the regional headquarters was transferred to 
Gedarif.  
 Sadiq’s brief government followed the same policy. The revival of Native Administration 
was formally effected in 1986, when the government approved the Native Administration 
Bill.7 The Bill then reinstated Native Administration and granted tribal leaders authority in 
administrative, judicial and security matters. After the military coup of 1989, this policy was 
continued; the federal system announced in 1989 was not much of a change  from the regional 
system in terms of jurisdictions or authorities but the Lahawiyin benefited from this federal 
system through the reinstatement of their Native Court in its new form as Showak Court in 
1990.8 The Native Administration Ordinance of 1991/92 marked another important step in 
reviving Native Administration.  
 There were multiple causes for this revival of tradition. Struggling to defeat insurgency, 
Sadiq had encouraged tribal militias to act as proxies for the government; the military 
government continued to do this after 1989, and in doing so encouraged celebration of the 
nomad Arab as an embodiment of virtue.9 Alongside this there was a new enthusiasm for the 
traditional authority, which had been denounced as reactionary and backward in the 1970s, 
abolished in favour of the ‘popular’ structures of the Sudan Socialist Union. Now it was 
idealized for its ‘Arabness’, and for its potential to support the weak structures of the 
bureaucratic state; while  officials also feared that the displacement of nomads would  not 
only cause extra financial burden on the Government but would also create the social 
disintegration of a whole sector.10 The revival of native administration was often perceived, 
at the regional level, as an avenue of participation for new groups or new segments in the 
                                                 
6Most information extracted from Christian Delmet, ‘The Native Administration’, in Miller (ed.) Land, Ethnicity 
and Political Legitimacy, p.155. 
7 The government of Sadiq al Mahdi’ of 1986 introduced the Four-Year Economic Salvation, Recovery, and 
Development Program, which was not different from previous economic development efforts, had broad 
objective of achieving sustained economic growth.   
8 Delmet, ‘Native Administration’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.152.  Interview 
with Abdalla Amir, Former Governor Gezira and Gedarif Provinces, Gedarif, December 2007. 
9 Gunter Schlee and E.E. Watson, Identities on the move: clanship and pastoralism in northern Kenya, Vol. 
3 (Manchester: Manchester Univ. P., 1989), p.9.; P. M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A history of the Sudan from the 
coming of Islam to the present day (Harlow: Longman, 2000). 
10 M. E. Abu Sin, ‘A change in struggle of animal herding among the nomads of the Butana, eastern Sudan,’ in 
G. Heinritz (ed.), Problems of agricultural development in the Sudan (Göttingen: Herodot, c1982), pp.87-104. 
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general context of political detribalization. 11 Yet even as ‘native administration’ was revived, 
the bureaucratic forms which had been originally introduced to supersede it were not only 
maintained but elaborated, as part of a notional process of ‘decentralisation’. 
Moreover, this new enthusiasm for nomadism, and tradition could not undo the economic 
changes of the 1960s and 1970s. If anything, the emerging corporate state, intimately allied 
with wealthy individuals, exacerbated such change. The use of land for mechanized 
agriculture continued; wealth now meant investment in control over land, not in maintaining 
a nomadic livestock economy. So even as the rhetoric and structures of government 
nominally favoured nomad Arabs, their position was further undermined by the continued 
loss of grazing land and of pastoral migration routes: the Lahawiyin were involved in the 
‘process of struggle at every level of existence’ which Vigdis Broch-Due has identified as 
characteristic of many African societies. 12  Even as traditional administration was being 
recreated, more Lahawiyin were forced by economic circumstances to abandon nomadism: 
the settlement of Gawamis umudiyya took place by 1991/92,13 one year before the national 
census of 1993 – a census which put the Lahawiyin population at 50,000, the same size as 
that of the Bawadra. The settlement of the Gawamis at al Madina Arab and Mabruka14 
affected the Showak Rural Council; it increased the population living under the Council, and 
increased demand on juruf land and rain-fed land in the area which implicated friction 
between the newly-settled umudiyya and the already existing population of the Tayesha and 
the Fellata.15  
Prior to 1984 access to and utilization of water were regarded as elements of a common 
property and pastoral groups grazing in the Butana had free access to the traditional wells and 
water points.16 However, none of the existing hafirs17 on the migration routes in Butana - 
                                                 
11 Extracted from Delmet, ‘Native Administration,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, 
pp.154-55. 
12 Vigdis Broch-Due (ed.), Violence and Belonging: the quest for identity in post –colonial Africa (London: 
Routledge, 2005), p.6. 
13 The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 
1996),p.6. 
14 Two villages exclusively inhabited by the Gawamis. 
15 Extracted from the following: interviews with sheikhs Siddig Yusuf, Babikir Awad al Karim, Yousuf, al-Ruda, 
and interviews with Mohmed, teacher, and Salah Shashug, executive director of Showak Mahaliya municipality, 
Showak, January 2008; interview with Awad al Karim Ahmed Adam al Zein, Ministry of Agriculture, Showak, 
December 2007; see also The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference 
coordination committee (this report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the 
Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996). 
16 Kibreab, State Intervention. 
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used for keeping rain water - had been rehabilitated since the sixties, and they could not meet 
the needs of the nomads. Water became privatized. Families or sub sections of the Bawadra, 
who were the nominal owners of the wells, came to see them as private property and began to 
sell water to outsider groups. The Lahawiyin maintained their own water drinking points 
within their villages in Showak Rural Council, on the east bank of the Atbara from the Setit 
south going north parallel to the Atbara River.18  These came to be increasingly used by other 
nomads as common masharib, or watering points. 19  They were originally free of charge, 
except for occasional nominal fees for maintenance purposes. However, with the influx of 
‘strangers’ the Lahawiyin learned from the Bawadra the practice of charging at least a 
nominal fee for water from the masharib. 20 The revived tribal administration was unable to 
solve the conflict which emerged between the Bawadra farmers and the Lahawiyin herders 
over grazing pasture.21  
There were other economic changes in this period too. Since the 1980s northern Sudan had 
been exporting people. The education system established in earlier years had created a 
population with a relatively high skill- level in regional terms. 22  As opportunities within 
Sudan vanished in the economic crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s, Sudanese – especially, 
educated Sudanese – moved overseas. Some went to Europe or North America, but many 
went to the Gulf. The flow of remittances from these migrant workers – the mughtaribin – 
was to become a major economic factor by the 1990s. When these migrants returned to Sudan 
after years of work abroad they brought back with them not only money, but new kinds of 
experience and ideas, in fields which spanned, religion, economics and politics.  Of all the 
Lahawiyin, umudiyya wad Hardan were most involved in such migrations, travelling 
particularly to Saudi Arabia. Gaborab also followed the same path and members of the 
umudiyya also left for Saudi Arabia.  As the umudiyya which was historically poorest in 
livestock, wad Hardan had invested more in education, and so were better placed to take 
these opportunities. This created for them the option of a new identity that might serve both 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Al-Maganis lies in route one, Kasamour in route two and aI- Nawasil in routes three and four. 
18 Remaila, Shagarab, Mugatta'a wad al Zeini , Mugatta'a aI-Sug, Gaborab, aI-Mansura, aI- Tomat, Magait, aI-
Sharif Hassaballah, wad al Hadi, Katuta, Hagar Abied.  See the The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, 
compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this report includes 8 working papers Presented at the 
Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 1996). 
19 These watering points were from wad al-Hilew, Abuda, aI- Amara, Karda, Katuta, al-Mugatta'a East, Khur aI-
Girgif al-Hajiz to Malawiyya.and from Zahana to Khor al-Gardda to aI-Hajiz and Malawiya. 
20 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director, Department of Statistics, Gedarif, December 2008. 
21Interview with Amna Mahmoud, Deputy Manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
22 Ahmed al-Shahi, ‘Response to Nimeiri’s Policies: some observations on social and political changes in 
northern Sudan’, in Woodward (ed.), Sudan after Nimeiri, pp.144-159. 
191 
 
leaders and individuals better in their pursuit of power and authority, aligning them with the 
newly emerged class of agricultural schemes of businessmen and traders in Butana. 
In combination, these factors set the context for renewed internal debates over leadership and 
identity among the Lahawiyin – and for a renewed attempt to secure government recognition 
for a nazirate. This was mostly perpetuated by politicians at the local level, as the transfer of 
political power from the national capital to rural councils that was under way encouraged 
attempts at redefining loyalties. The concern of the Lahawiyin regarding this formation of 
identity, whether social or political, by attaining nazirate was largely determined by one or 
another ‘variable of power’. 23  These variables, as defined by Doornbos, were related to 
migration, and economic change and were evident in the case of the Lahawiyin in their 
livelihood and their integration into the larger political system whether at Showak or 
Khartoum levels. 
Once again, the question of a nazirate was also inextricably linked with the issue of access to 
land. While an outsider might comment that ‘A nazirate is a right of every tribe of population 
and herds’24; the nazir of the Shukriyya explicitly saw the idea of Lahawiyin nazirate as a 
threat to Shukriyya cla ims on land. 
This chapter discusses three main events in the development of the Lahawiyin quest for 
nazirate in the 1990s. These were the 1994 Decree, the Lahawiyin Conference of 1996 and 
the election of the Showak Rural Council in 1996.  
 
 
  
                                                 
23 Martin Doornbos et al., Beyond conflict in the Horn: prospects for peace, recovery and development in 
Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies; London: Currey, 1994). 
24 Interview with Salah Shashug, the Executive Officer of the local government in Showak Rural Council, 
Showak, December 2007. 
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2. 1994 Decree: New Representation for the Lahawiyin 
 
In the early 1990s, there seems to have been a concerted effort by Lahawiyin to establish a 
position on the local government structures which existed alongside the revived ‘native 
administration’. Members of the Rashaida tribe were following the same strategy at this time. 
In each case they focussed on a particular rural council – al-Showak for the Lahawiyin and 
Mabruka for the Rashaida – trying to win control of the popular committees which were the 
lowest level of these, and to win seats on the councils themselves.25  
The 1994 decree on federal administration was a milestone in the native administration 
history of eastern Sudan. 26 Its significance was that it divided Eastern Sudan into three states 
and re-established the Council of Native Administration throughout the country.27  It also 
enabled the government to control all tribes, by, as Lesch puts it, drawing ‘all the influential 
tribes into the local and state governing processes, providing them with a stake in the 
system’.28 This might not have been the case for other tribes in other parts of Sudan such as 
Darfur.  In 1994 another important dimension was added in the eastern Sudan.  The Beja 
Congress, campaigning for improved political and economic position for the Beja of eastern 
Sudan,  had been active since 1989; in the mid-1990s it began to prepare for guerilla action 
along the Eritrean border, led by Mohamed Tahir Abubakr. This complicated tribal 
loyalties.29 This government responded by imprisoning religious leaders of the Beja in the 
town of Hameshkoreb who were resisting government policy to alter the traditional Qur’anic 
schools – which had been a place for recruitment to the Beja Congress. It was against this 
background that the significance of events in 1994 must be understood. By issuing Decree 
No. 89 of 1994 – which was in line with the Native Administration Ordinance of 1992 - the 
                                                 
25 T. Khalid et al, ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.335; also Eman 
Bushra, ‘Local level Political Dynamics in Kasssala State: The Rashayda,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and 
Political Legitimacy, p.301. 
26 The al-Bashir government defines the eastern Sudan region as the Red Sea and Kassala states while the 
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Kassala, and Gedarif) is about 3.7 million of which half are the Beja. The population of the Red Sea state is 
800,000, Kassala state is estimated at 1.5 million, and Gedarif state is approximately 1.8 million. John Young, 
The Eastern front and the struggle against marginalization (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 
Small Arms Survey, 2007), pp.1-53. 
27 Hassan M. Salih et al. (ed.), Federalism in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1995); 
Mohamed al-Amin Khalifah, Reflections on the Sudanese Political System (Khartoum: Sudan House for 
Printing and Publishing, 1995); Al-Agab Ahmed Tarifi, Regionalization in Sudan: an evaluation of the 
Regional Government Act of 1980 (Khartoum: University of Khartoum, Council for Studies on Regionalism, 
1990). 
28 Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: search for national identity (S.I: s.n., 1987), p.127. 
29 ‘The Asmara Conference,’ Indian Ocean Newsletter, 1 July 1995, in International Crisis Group, ‘Sudan: 
Saving Peace in the East,’ Africa Report N°102, 5 January 2006. 
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government launched its first Native Administration Conference. This was held in Kassala 
State, with the aim of settling some of the issues over loyalty and authority among a number 
of tribes in eastern Sudan. The outcome of the conference was   the establishment of a Native 
Administration Council for Kassala State, which was composed of major tribes in the state of 
Kassala and Gedarif, with representatives of other sub-groups: the two nazirates of the 
Hadendowa and the Shukriyya, the  Bani Amer, Halanga, and Rashaida; Nubian residents in 
Khashm al- Girba agricultural scheme; and residents of Kassala umudiyya.  The Lahawiyin 
were represented by the sheikh khut: the long-serving al Zein Adam al Zein. 30At this juncture 
Wad al Faki umudiyya were back at the front line of the Native Administration and 
representing the Lahawiyin. The Council was mandated with several functions which 
included an advisory, consultative role to the Governor – the Wali - of the state, in matters 
regarding tribes’ affairs as well as issues related to native administration and local 
government. 
This 1994 Conference in Kassala was a pioneering event: it took place prior to conferences in 
other states in the Sudan.  This Tribal Council created a new forum for representation, in 
which the Lahawiyin appeared as a political authority in its own right and as an independent 
entity from the Shukriyia.31 It also helped them to revive the idea of a political claim for 
nazirate with the support of an educated younger generation of Lahawiyin.  
From the point of view of the Lahawiyin and, according to al Zein Ahmed al Zein, the main 
reason for the Lahawiyin’s participation in the conference was to address the issue of nazirate 
and what sheikh al Zein Adam had discussed with the government representatives. 32 
However it was argued by some that this was not formally presented but that the Lahawiyin 
leaders lobbied the government authorities, who were dominated by military officers at that 
time, in the corridors of the conference. Whether it was discussed formally or informally, 
inside or outside the conference room, the Lahawiyin employed cunning in bringing this to 
the conference, though it was not on the original agenda, and making it public,  The Shukriya 
were opposed to this move and threatened the authorities and the Lahawiyin with the land 
charter they possessed. This proved to be a good tactic, because the government was not 
                                                 
30 Delmet, ‘Native Administration,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.159.  See also 
Report: The Conference of Native Administration: final Manifesto and Recommendations, Ministry of Social 
Planning, Khartoum Soba, 1995[unpublished, AR]. 
31 The Rashayda as well were represented as an administration in the list of the members of the 1994 Conference. 
See Delmet, ‘Native Administration,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy.  
32 Telephone Interview with Al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein, Member of National Assembly, July 2010. 
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disposed to compromise another influential tribe in eastern Sudan given that the developing 
conflict with the Beja suggested that they had lost already the Hadendowa’s support.33 
The conference was held to promote the policies of federalism and decentralisation, which 
government rhetoric had emphasised. In retrospect, federalism and decentralisation have been 
identified by some observers as simply rhetorical cover for a continuation of strong central 
control, which came to be exercised through informal structures and through the omnipresent 
security and intelligence apparatus.34 In the case of 1994 Conference, it could also be argued 
that the intention was not to revive the Native Administration system but rather to dilute the 
power and authority of big confederations and tribes whose loyalties were doubted by the 
government. The Shukriyya were widely seen to be allied to the old sectarian parties; 
anything which undermined their authority could be useful to the new regime. 
The Council was intended to resolve tribal disputes; but its members were also given the 
responsibility of mobilising supporters for the government: as Delmet observed, ‘The tribal 
leaders are called upon by the state to bring their support to the state political initiatives.35 
The leaders of smaller tribes were more than willing to use this role to try and enhance their 
own positions, and that of their followers. Immediately after the 1994 Conference, Sheikh al 
Zein Adam al Zein visited Khartoum to meet with senior government officials ; it was 
rumoured that he promised his loyalty and support to the Government.36 Some Lahawiyin 
blessed such a move, seeing it as a way to show tribal allegiance and so ensure Government 
support.37 In order to gain the support of the Lahawiyin the government tried to bribe them 
with some administrative rewards, such as allocating exclusive administrative boundaries to 
the tribe. The government also established a new administration structure by dividing Gedarif 
State into a number of governorates. 38   By creating al Fashaga Governorate a different 
boundary was imposed which outlined a new district territorial boundary to Al Showak on the 
east of Atbara River. This reward brought its own limitations: it seriously limited the 
                                                 
33 A telephone interview with Babikir Awad al Karim, historian, July 2010. 
34 Extract from telephone interview with Babikir Awad al Karim, historian, July 2010 and Delmet, ‘Native 
Administration’, in Miller (ed.),  Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.155-61. 
34 Interview with an informant, Showak, December 2007 
35 Delmet, ‘Native Administration’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.155-61. 
36 Interview with an informant, Showak, December 2007.  
37 Interview with late sheik Ahmed Adam al Zein, former president of Pastoralist Union Showak and katib khut, 
Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996. 
38 Gedarif became the capital of Gedarif State which includes Gedarif city, Faw, Gallabat, and Fashaga areas.   
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movements of the Lahawiyin nomads to the vast grazing areas between Atbara and Setit 
Rivers up to the Ethiopian border.39  
Within this process of reviving the Native Administration, other political structures 
developed, which entwined native administration and local government.  The Showak Rural 
Council had in redefined umudiyya boundaries administratively; politically each umudiyya 
was represented by its own popular committee. A new leadership was elevated from within 
the Lahawiyin, deriving administrative and financial support from the state through filling the 
newly-created positions in the political hierarchy at all levels of the federal system.40 This 
leadership was dominated by educated members of the Hardan and Gaborab umudiyya, who 
filled government positions at national and state levels.  
This dominance itself reflected both the consequences of labour migration41, and the political 
calculations of the government in Khartoum. Wad Hardan expatriates were able to invest in 
mechanized agriculture and built strong political connections with the government. On the 
other hand it was believed that many returning Gaborab migrants were members of the 
Salafist religious group known as Ansar al Suna. According to one informant, they were the 
most organised group within the Lahawiyin at that time. They purchased cars, lorries, 
tractors and agricultural schemes (mashruuas), and began to expand in Showak with shops in 
Showak market. They also invested in juruf through owning water pumps. They tried to 
build an economic base to compete with businesses of other ethnic groups in Showak, 
challenging the existing domination of Showak market by the Jaaliyyin and Fellata). This 
helped them to dominate the popular committees within their villages.  However, as another 
informant pointed out, Ansar al Sunna were ‘influenced by the Saudi religious outlook’.42By 
and large the Ansar al-Sunna perceived themselves central to the Muslim world as well as 
pure in principle to the Islamic discourse.  The Ansar al Sunna in Sudan tried to reject and 
oppose any Sufi practives or innovation. Ansar al-Sunna identities were thus constructed by 
the influence of religious, economic, political and social elements that were described as 
being against the ‘traditional’ or ‘orthodox’. Brenner has criticised the Ansar al-Sunna 
                                                 
39 Interview with Mohamed Fadallah, former Governor of Fashaga, Gedarif,1996. 
40 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General, Statistics Department, Gedarif, January 2008.  
41 For more details see Tim Niblock, ‘The background to the change of government in 1985,’ in Woodward (ed.), 
The Sudan after Nimeiri, pp.34-44.  
42 In some African countries they call themselves Ahl al-sunna or the Sunni; Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, 
Manichaean delirium; Khalid et al., ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, 
p.335. 
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movement generally as “associated with being aggressive and self centred”. 43 However this 
was not the case in the Lahawiyin area as they had shown peacefulness, perhaps because of 
the presence of strongly dogmatic followers of the Khatmiyya tariqa.  This might explain 
how much of the tension that naturally might have occurred between the Ansar al-Sunna and 
the Sufi was minimized. A few confrontations were reported but they were in cities like 
Medani and Omdurman, not in rural areas Nonetheless, the presence of Ansar al Sunna 
offered a new version of Islamic discourse and interpretation, which gave a strong motive for 
the government suppressing them and stopping their expansion, fearing that their presence 
would bring a new violent culture. The government was suspicious of the potential influence 
of the Ansar al Sunna since, as Catherine Miller has argued:  ‘Ansar Sunna were able to co-
opt not only rich individuals but also segments of population unsatisfied with the traditional 
parties.44 But the government sought to restrict their influence not by repression but by using 
state patronage, appointing other influential members of the Lahawiyin - particularly Hardan, 
whose returnees were seen as much more loyal to government – to local positions in Showak 
Rural Council, and to more senior positions in state administration. Al-Jaili Karar, a 
Lahawiyi from the Gaborab section, was appointed State Governor of Kassala. The 
government also rewarded their own supporters by granting loans, seeds, machinery and 
land.45  The government also tried to buy off some members of the Hardan through this sort 
of state patronage – Ahmad Mohamed Abdalla Jabel, for example, was made head of the 
Showak Legislative Council. 46 This was a clear indication of the rivalry and competition 
between the two umudiyyas; al Faki and Hardan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
43 Brenner (ed.), Muslim Identity, pp.61-62. 
44 Miller, ‘Introduction,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, ethnicity and Political legitimacy, p.24. 
45 Extracted from interviews with Babikir al Daw Shula, president of Pastoralist Union, Gedarif, December 2007, 
and Ali Suleiman, Director, Statistics Department, Gedarif, January 2008. 
46 Interview with Salah Shashug, Executive director Showak Mahliya municipality, Showak, January 2008.   
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3. Showak Rural Council Election 1996 
 
In addition to the internal competition within the Lahawiyin themselves, between al Faki and 
Hardan, the mid-1990s also witnessed an external challenge by the people from western 
Sudan, particularly Taaisha and Fellata, against the Lahawiyin. The competition was played 
out through a new sort of local politics: for the Lahawiyin, participating in electoral 
procedure i.e. nomination, voting and exercising power was a new experience even though it 
was at the lower level of the local politics structure.47 These procedures were central to the 
struggle for position in the complex structure of local government and native administration 
that had developed: Rural Council, Local Court and Legislative Council. The competition 
was also evident in the Pastoralists Union, which was established in 1994 as a national body 
and in Showak in 1996. The Pastoralists’ Union was meant to formulate livestock policies at 
the national and state levels – but it became another arena for local political competition.  
The 1994 Council created new alliances, and new rivalries. It brought the Lahawiyin and the 
Rashaida close on the basis of a common cause which was their claim to a kind of political 
autonomy which could be used to assert rights over land.48 For the Rashaida, their campaign 
for this led to the  granted of an ‘administration’ – rather than a nazirate - in 1994, after fierce 
opposition from the Hadandowa.49  This was used by the Lahawiyin in their negotiation at a 
higher level. 50  
 This shared cause was complemented by an increased commercial relationship between the 
Lahawiyin and the Rashaida,51 who helped to meet the high demand for camels in the local 
market of al-Showak, much of which came from wad al-Faki. At the same time, other new 
political relationships were developing, driven by the dynamic of local electoral politics. 
Though the 1994 Council had augmented the Lahawiyin position in the Butana it had also 
created increased rivalry between the umudiyyas, especially among wad Hardan and wad-al 
Faki. Wad Hardan and Gaborab returnee migrants competed for offices in the revived native 
                                                 
47 Interview with sheikhs Siddig Yusuf, Babikir awad al Karim, Yousuf Hasb al Gawi, the late al-Ruda, Eid al 
Zein and Salah Shashug, executive director of Showak Mahaliya municipality, Showak, January 2008. 
48 Dalmau, ‘Camel Production and Trade,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.218. 
49 For more details see Eman Bushra, ‘Local level political dynamics in Kasssala State: the Rashayda,’ in Miller 
(ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.227-208. 
50 Interview with Ali Suleiman, director, Statistics Department, and interviews with Siddige Yusof, Gedarif, and 
Yusuf Abdel Gawi, Showak, January 2008. 
51 Dalmau, ‘Camel Production and Trade,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.219. 
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administration, or to acquire other political positions within the developing system of state 
government, such as governor, vice-governor, minister or commissioner etc.52  
Ahmad Mohamed Abdalla Jabel, for example, was made head of the Showak Legislative 
Council and a new focus of leadership for Hardan was created. He became, in effect, on an 
equal footing to Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein. The basis for this appointment was the level of 
educational background and the experience of working for the civil service that Jebel had 
accomplished. However Sheikh al-Zein had much more experience of tribal leadership and 
greater acceptance by other members of the council.  The boundary of the Showak Rural 
Council was from Gaily in the Butan, al Fashaga east to the Ethiopian border, (where a large 
number of long-standing Ethiopian refugees were found) and south to al Rawashada forest in 
north Gedarif.53  This council was mandated to control local issues such as herds’ tax on 
local market days, local transport tax and grain transport tax as well as assisting the Gedarif 
Legislative Council (the state- level council) in performing its duties. The Rural Council 
could not act without the approval of the Gedarif legislative council, however. The council 
represented many ethnic groups that relied heavily on the services provided by this council, 
but the Lahawiyin, whose resident population dominated the northern part from Showak to 
Khashm al Girba, were in the majority. The Showak Council had two components; 
Executive and Legislative. The Legislative Council was often presided over by a tribal figure 
while the Executive Council was the responsibility of a civil servant - at that time Ali al 
Hadab Ali.  As mentioned, Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein served as president of the legislative 
council (Majlis), appointed by Governor of Kassala Mohamed Abdel Gadir with Osman Haj 
Omer al Zaki (from the Ababda tribe) as deputy president and as representative of the other 
resident tribes in Showak town.  
 
Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein left office in 1994 and his post was filled by Ahmed Mohamed 
Abdalla Jebel.54 After this, the post of the President of the Legislative Council was no longer 
appointed, but elected from a list of candidates presented by the popular committees in the 
villages. However, this procedure was not based on open voting; the list of candidates was 
not always announced. Instead the choice of President was the outcome of a kind of 
                                                 
52 Interview with late sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former president of Pastoralists Union and katib khut, 
Mugataa wad al Zein, June 1996. 
53The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 
1996). 
54 Interview with Salah Shashug, executive director of Showak Mahaliya municipality, January 2008. 
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consensus of social and tribal networks within the village committees, mediated by the 
influence of the Gedarif Legislative Council.  This state Legislative Council was presided 
over by the sheikh Ahmed Hamed Abu Sin, nazir of Shukriyia;  Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein 
was his deputy. The presence of Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein in Gedarif showed further 
political representation and recognition of the Lahawiyin. To the Lahawiyin this was a 
confirmation of their tribal territorial boundaries; the Atbara River area. It also meant 
security of their livelihood and an acceptance by the state government of their Arab identity 
in an area subject to a heavy influx of non Arab tribes. 55 
 
Another event that had helped the Lahawiyin to improve their position was the establishment 
of the national Pastoral Union (Itahd al Rua’a Showak) in 1994 by a presidential decree. For 
the first time since independence, the pastoralists had won the support of a government. This 
may be attributed to the fact that the government of al-Bashir had set a target in the 
Comprehensive Strategy document to triple the livestock and increase exports in that sector.  
Following his first decree, President al Bashir issued another in which he announced the re-
opening of pastoralist routes that had been taken over by agricultural schemes. The Pastoralist 
Union was thus mandated to stand for and support the interests of herders to government and  
non-governmental organizations as well as to endorse government policies that aimed to 
upgrade and raise the standard of living of pastoralists.56  However, membership of the Union 
proved to be dominated by traders, veterinarians, and rich herders. Small herders suffered and 
lacked representation. The Union set branches at local, state, and national levels; membership 
varied according to pastoralist population in each rural council while the total number of 
membership in the National Pastoralists Union was about two hundred drawn from the state 
organizations.57  
As was discussed earlier, the challenge and competition between the Lahawiyin and the non-
Arabs in Showak Rural Council was evident. However this did not continue for long.  In 1996, 
immediately after the election of the Showak Council, the Lahawiyin and the Taaisha – an 
immigrant group from the west, but Arabs - went into tribal alliance for more political gains in 
the Showak and at this time for a higher political position, to represent the municipality at a 
                                                 
55 A telephone interview with Babikir Awad al Karim, historian, July, 2010; also interview with Salah Shashug, 
executive director of Showak Mahaliya municipality, January 2008. 
56 Dan Fahey, ‘The political economy of livestock and pastoralism in Sudan,’ Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) Livestock Policy Initiative working papers Nos.06 – 08, pp.7-8. 
57 Shazali et al., ‘Share The Land Or Part The Nation,’ p.23.  
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state level. They agreed to have one candidate from the Lahawiyin to represent both tribes, the 
Lahawiyin and the Taisha. The candidate was Sheikh al Rudda Bakheit, a Lahawi and a trader.  
They allied against the candidate of the ruling National Congress Party, a Bawadra business 
man called Wad Dekain, the Lahawi sheikh won. 58 This raised many questions regarding first 
the alliance and the reasons why and how it took place and second the implication to the 
presence of the National Congress Party in Showak area. As was discussed in Chapter Four, al 
Faki umudiyya had previously made alliances with the Fellata and Tayisha at one point 
regarding the juruf. I argue here that based on this long-standing relation between the two 
groups a mutual interest was expressed and therefore it was nourished and continued to be 
reflected in local level politics. There had always been benefits (trade, land and labour) that 
the two tribes had to protect and this is why such an alliance took place.  Surprisingly the 
government candidate was from the Bawadra who had always challenged the Lahawiyin and 
their grazing rights. With the anticipated political position, the Bawadra might have expected 
and hoped that with support from the Government, they might have defeated the political 
aspirations of the Lahawiyin.  Instead, the implication of this event was that the government 
unexpectedly lost its chance to fully control Showak Rural Council politics. There was also an 
element here of the old sectarian politics of Ansar and the Khatmyia. Wad al faki had a long 
standing loyalty to the Khatmyia as did the Teaisha to the Umma (Ansar); this was to some 
extent a coming together of the old sectarian rivals against al-Bashir’s government, which had 
suppressed both of them. This in turn led the government to change its stand and strategies; 
the consequence was an increasingly official support for the Haradan umudiyya. The election 
caused the government to acknowledge the presence of the Taiysha in Showak town as well.59  
By 1996/97 many of wad Hardan umudiyya’s educated members were absorbed in the new 
government structures.60 They presided over the Showak Rural Council. 61  Members of the 
wad al Faki, in striving for greater representation, were trying to develop a new political 
relationship with their former slaves and other dependants to secure their support as voters in 
election at local levels.  In addition, other formerly-marginalised tribes in the area, such as the 
Fellatta and the Taiysha, were drawn into the on-going power struggle, taking sides in a 
desperate attempt to safeguard their existence in an area dominated by large Arab tribes.  
                                                 
58 Extracted from field notes based on an interview with the late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former president 
of the Pastoralist Union and khatib khut, Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996; also from a telephone interview with 
Babikir Awad al Karim, historian, July 2010. 
59 A telephone interview with Babikir Awad al Karim, Historian, July 2010. 
60 Interview with Dr Abdalla al-Bashir, Ministry of Health, Gedarif, December 2009. 
61 Interview with Babikir Awad al Karim, Historian, Showak, January 2008. 
201 
 
While wad al Faki sought the support of their former slaves and on alliance with the Taisha, 
Wad Hardan counted on the Fellatta.62  I would argue that wad Hardan built a good working 
relationship between themselves and the Fellatta because both of these groups had built their 
strength from agriculture, whether from the private agricultural schemes - as in the case of 
wad Hardan - or from the juruf - as in the case of the Fellatta whose juruf were located 
mostly within the vicinity of the Hardan umudiyya.  Hardan members had, by contrast, owned 
fewer slaves, the majority of whom had belonged to members of the wad el-Faki and Magit, 
who had been so prosperous as nomadic livestock herders.  
Wad al Faki initially sought to maintain their monopoly of the leadership of the Lahawiyin, 
relying on Magit, Gawamis and Gaborab to support them against Hardan, despite the long-
standing animosity between the Magit and wad al Faki over the tribe’s leadership. The reason 
why these umudiyya agreed to follow wad al Faki was that they were all rich in camels and it 
was hard for them to give up their herds and become farmers. Choosing to retain the nomadic 
identity, rather than working on the land, was perceived as fundamental to that Arab identity. 
The tension over leadership between wad Hardan and wad al Faki umudiyya drew in other 
tribes in the area, such as the Shukriyia and the Bawadra; wad Hardan umudiyya 
provisionally leaned more on the Bawadra, while wad al Faki umudiyya kept its old ties with 
the Shukriyya.63 The leaders of the Shukriyya sought to use this split to attempt to regain 
their previous authority over the Lahawiyin political involvement in Gedarif state and the 
national capital.   
The Lahawiyin were a clear majority of the population in the area of Showak Rural Council: 
in 1996 they were said to compose about 75 percent of a population estimated at 38,735.64 
The total number of Lahawiyin who had settled in villages in Showak was 14,401; the rest 
were still formally considered nomads.65  The conflict over leadership raised the possibility 
that the Lahawiyin might nonetheless lose control of the council. But, strikingly, the 
leadership of both wad Hardan and wad el-Faki evidently decided that Lahawiyin unity was 
more important than their rivalry. Aware of the ir disadvantages in terms of education, the 
                                                 
62 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director of Statistics Department, Gedarif, January 2008. 
63 This caused  an internal tension between the two Shukriyya nazirs and this had left the Shukriyya with little 
interest in interfering in an internal affair between the Lahawiyin that might have affect the Shukriyya’s 
resources more than benefiting them as far as land rights and authority were concerned. 
64 The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April  
1996). See also Khalid et al., ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (eds.), Land , Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy. 
65 Information from the Ration Card Section, Showak Rural Council.  
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leaders of wad al Faki allied with those of wad Hardan, when it came to the politics of the 
Showak Rural Council.66  Fearing that the other tribes might take over their constituency in 
al-Showak was a strong factor for wad al Faki in taking that step even though they might not 
have liked to do so. Whether he approved or disapproved of the wad Hardan’s stand against 
wad al Faki, al Zein Adam al Zein had decided to work together with them as one tribe to 
guarantee that the Showak rural council should be a ‘Lahawiyin territory.’67 And so in 1996, 
on the basis of the more or less united support of the wad al Faki, a member of Hardan 
umudiyya won the election for the presidency of Showak Rural Council. In return, Ahmed 
Adam Al Zein had to be content with winning the presidency of the local Pastoralists’ Union 
as al Faki’s domain, in 1996.68  
 
This in turn was the result of an interesting deal between the Lahawiyin and the Bani Amir 
tribe in 1996. Before describing the deal, one has to differentiate between two distinct 
institutions: the Showak Rural Council and Showak Township. The Bani Amir composed the 
majority in al Showak Township as herders while the Lahawiyin made up two thirds of the 
members of the Rural Council, with few living in Showak Township despite being dominant 
in the Rural Council. However other ethnic groups in Showak Township who were 
considered in the majority were the Taisha and the Fellata, while Hawsa, Jaleeyin, Rubatab 
and Nuba and refugees69 were minorities. The most common activities of these tribes were 
agriculture and trade.  Once these two issues are understood the election fin or the president 
and membership of the Showak branch of the Pastoralist Union becomes less complicated to 
comprehend.  The National Pastoralist Union in Khartoum was the only office mandated to 
approve and dissolve the establishment of any Pastoralist Union branch. When the 
establishment of the Pastoralist Union branch was decided by the National Union, an election 
was called in the same year.  There were 11 seats competed for by the Bani Amer, , of whom 
a number lived as dairy cattle-keepers in Showak town, and the Lahawiyin. 130 candidates 
from Bani Amer and 80 candidates from the Lahawiyin competed. It was a tough competition 
and the result, when it was announced, was surprising to all. The Lahawiyin won the majority 
                                                 
66 Interview with Awad al Karim Ahmed al Zein, Ministry of Agriculture, Showak, December 2007. 
67 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General, Statistics Department, Gedarif, December 2007. 
68 Interview with Awad al Karim Ahmed al Zein, Ministry of Agriculture, Showak, December 2007. 
69 Showak town was the headquarters of the UNCHR in the east of Sudan and particularly the refugee 
rehabilitation and repatriation projects. It was mentioned in the report on the Lahawiyin, that the refugee 
population increased and their cattle and sheep also increased, which posed another problem regarding pasturing. 
The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 
1996).pp.73-74. 
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of seats in the Union given the fact that they had presented less candidates. It was obvious 
that the two tribes had reached a compromise. Little information was given out, and hardly 
any knew how a consensus was reached; the late Sheikh Ahmed al Zein mentioned this, but 
he was reluctant to share the details. The eleven seats were divided between them, eight for 
the Lahawiyin and three for the Bani Amer. Interestingly enough this was not proportionate 
to the number of candidates (80-130) but it seems likely that the 130 were not purely Bani 
Amer. They included other tribes such as the Taisha, Fallatta and other smaller tribes. The 
most important posts, those of President and Treasurer, went to the Lahawiyin; that of 
Director General went to the Bani Amer. These positions granted them the facilities and 
opportunities to link with key officials in places like banks and political offices. The 
Lahawiyin argued that having been integrated into this political institution they were able to 
safeguard other aspects such as grazing and pasture rights. In fact the Pastoralist Union had 
also given them more publicity at the national level. 70 
 
 The Lahawiyin’s domination of the al Showak Rural Council71 sent a powerful message to 
the Government that they were a force in the Butana and that they might support the 
Government politically and ideologically, if rewarded. The Government then had to make a 
careful judgement in this partnership as to whom it should rely on and trust.  Should it count 
on a tribe with a history full of intrigues such as the Lahawiyin or should it trust the growing 
economic power of the Bawadra?   
 
 
  
                                                 
70 Extract from field notes collected from the late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former head of Pastoralist 
Union and katib khut, Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996. 
71The Showak Rural Council was established in 1974 by the late president Numeiri, who laid the comer stone of 
the council; Showak Rural Council Documents 1996.  
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4. 1996 Lahawiyin Tribal Conference 
 
In the wake of the elections, the Government allowed the organisation of the first conference 
of the Lahawiyin Tribal Congregation in 1996. The conference aimed to draw attention to the 
tribe’s past, present and future roles in the Butana and the East of Sudan as a strategic region. 
It also meant political recognition as one of the resident tribes of the Butana and Atbara River 
areas. It was an initiation for the young educated Lahawiyin and saw involvement by 
members of all umudiyya, though the wad al-Faki, Hardan and Magit were the leading ones.  
In terms of the individual leaders of native administration, there had been remarkable 
continuity over a period of four decades. Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein remained the sheikh 
khut while Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein remained the katib al khut. But it was Sheikh 
Ahmed who achieved a new kind of status through the Congregation, which brought attention 
to the Lahawiyin as a tribe, not only within the Showak council territory but also at the level 
of the Gedarif State.  In April 1996 Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein organised the first 
Conference on the Lahawiyin, mobilising the Lahawiyin of Atbara River. The event drew on 
the local efforts and resources of local Government, in the form of Showak Rural Council. 
While this support made the event possible, it also limited its inclusiveness, since Lahawiyin 
who lived under other councils were not part of the Conference. But by drawing on local 
government resources Sheikh Ahmed succeeded in securing himself a place at a level of a 
tribal representative similar to his brother Sheikh al Zein.  Ahmed drew the attention of the 
government and enhanced his position within the tribe.72  The Shukriyya were, conversely, 
provoked by the Government’s permission to allow a client tribe such as the Lahawiyin to 
hold their conference after first consulting with the Shukriyya leaders in this place.73   
Building on this new status, Sheikh Ahmed  began to lead and engage much more in formal 
gatherings and meetings, more than Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein whose quiet character and 
poor sight did not allow too much travelling.74  Government officials seemed to be supporting 
Sheikh Ahmed, arguing that he had a natural charisma and proved articulate and well-versed 
                                                 
72 Interviews with: al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein, member of the National Assembly, Gedarif, December 2007; 
al –Igba Ahmed al Zein, Gedarif, December 2007; Ali Sueliman, Director General, Statistics Department, 
Gedarif, January 2008.   
73 All information in this page were extracted from interviews with, Ali Suleiman, Abdalla Amir, Babikir Awad 
al Karim and al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein, in Mugatta, Showak and Gedarif, in December 2007 to January 
2008. 
74 Interview with late sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former head of Pastoralist Union and katib khut, Mugatta 
wad al Zein, June 1996.  
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in tribal politics. This situation led to a subtle internal competition within the al Faki 
umudiyya and, more precisely, within al Zein’s family itself. However Ahmed al Zein’s 
shrewdness and wisdom contained any chances of dividing the family. Thus the status of the 
sheikh khut  was retained symbolically. 75 
The conference was explicitly concerned with the position of nomads.  Thematic papers were 
jointly prepared and presented by Government officials and tribal members who provided 
another level of participation to the Lahawiyin. This conference was seen by the Lahawiyin 
as a victory and was highly appreciated by all Lahawiyin regardless of their differences, 
though some non-Lahawiyin argued that the Lahawiyin were trapped into supporting the 
government. I would argue rather that the conference, like other events discussed in this 
chapter, showed the consistent tendency for Lahawiyin political leaders to pursue what they 
saw as the collective, shared, interest of the Lahawiyin.  
The desire of Lahawiyin leaders for recognition was achieved through the media 
announcement of the Conference and the highly political participation of the Government. 
This worried the Shukriyya and other tribes greatly. The leadership of the Shukriyya had 
made clear their opposition to changes in administrative boundaries which might weaken 
their authority with respect to the Ahamda on the Atbara River, where a proposal for a new 
umudiyya was not approved simply because it meant splitting from the rule of the Shukriyya 
and would be an invitation to other sub-tribes to follow the same path. 76  The Lahawiyin, on 
the other hand, wanted to make the maximum use of the conference by bringing up the issue 
of the land, grazing and nazirate. However there was no opportunity to formally raise the 
issue of nazirate, because the government participants aimed the conference more at 
education and health matters and tried hard to avoid the political issues. This was, on one 
level, a conference about the consequences of marginalization; but it avoided any serious 
consideration of the political basis of the Lahawiyin predicament. Land and grazing was more 
or less discussed from the point of view of the need to regularise pasture routes and services 
needed by the nomads and how co-existence between the nomads and agriculturists might be 
endured.  
                                                 
75 Interview with a Lahwi sheikh, Showak, December 2007. 
76 For more details on Ahmada, see Barabara Casciarri, ‘Dynamics of Tribal Re -composition in an Arab 
Population: the case of Ahamda,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.310-349. 
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The main papers presented as well as the discussion throughout the conference were about 
land, grazing and education and health services. However, land rights were the essence of the 
gathering, both for those who were involved and for the non-participating tribes within the 
constituency of Showak Rural Council who were following the event closely.77 The leaders 
of the Bawadra watched with particular concern; alongside the developing Rashaida role in 
the camel trade, the growing power of the Bawadra in the grain trade was the most significant 
economic feature of the 1990s in Butana. 78 Throughout their history the Bawadra had not had 
strong political representation and they had always been content to be a section of the 
Shukriyya.79 Nevertheless they managed to own the majority of mechanized schemes in the 
Showak area and south Gedarif, largely because they had shifted earlier and more 
successfully to mechanized agriculture as we saw in the previous chapter.80 
Put simply, Bawadra economic prosperity was not based on any tribal claim to autonomy and 
to associated collective land rights. Asked about the idea of the nazirate the late Sheikh al-
Beshir, a Bawadra sheikh, said that  
Our needs are met without a nazirate, it doesn't serve us in any way, it is 
just a symbol. We leave it for the Shukriyya.81  
For many Lahawiyin – both the leaders of the umudiyya and their followers– the new 
economic success of the Bawadra made them the focus of resentment, and the most obvious 
manifestation of the economic processes which were undermining pastoralism. In some ways 
the Bawadra had replaced the Shukriyya as a focus for Lahawiyin resentment, as they 
controlled what had become an important aspect of the Lahawiyin livelihood: the fields of 
sorghum residues which could be used to fed livestock, in the absence of pasture. The 
Bawadra rented access to such land to Lahawiyi herders at an hourly rate; and bought 
Lahawiyi livestock cheaply for grain: ‘They exchange one sheep for three sacks of 
sorghum.’82  
                                                 
77 The Lahawiyin Development Conference Report, compiled by the Conference coordination committee (this 
report includes  8 working papers Presented at the Showak Conference on the Lahawiyin Planned for April 
1996).pp.2-37. 
78 I. Dalmau, C Millar, “I. Dalmau, ‘Camel Production and Trade’in. Miller (eds.), Land, Ethnicity and Political 
Legitimacy, pp. 215-18.   
79 Interview with Ammar Abdalla Suleiman, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 2008. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Interview with Sheikh al-Beshir, Um Shagra village, Gedarif, 1996. 
82 Interview with Yusouf Hasab al Gawi, Showak, January 2008; see also Dalmau, ‘Camel production and trade,’ 
in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.215. 
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Through the mechanized agricultural schemes the Bawadra managed to develop a strong 
economic trade base that enabled them to promote their business skills and gradually control 
the grain market in Gedarif.  Dismantling the pasture line, Sindi Ford, had not only enabled 
the Bawadra to control the grain market but had also deprived vulnerable Lahawi herd owner 
families. The control of marketing sorghum residues and tax levying at times of herding by 
the Bawadra had offended the pride of Lahawiyin, who saw the Bawadra as a minor tribe that 
had never had a sheikh khut or a court, and neither was it rich in camels. The Bawadra cont rol 
over land extended to imposing fines on Lahawiyin herds if the latter entered Bawadra’s 
mechanised farms. On occasion fines of millions of Sudanese pounds were reported to have 
been paid by the Lahawiyin. While it has been argued that there was a level of cooperation 
amongst all Arab tribes in the Butana, which excluded non-Arabs, there were profound 
divisions amongst the Arabs, which set the basis for prolonged political struggle .83   The 
Lahawiyin told stories about the Bawadra which emphasised their lack of status as a proper 
Arab tribe:  according to Lahawiyin legend the Bawadra were cursed by a religious group 
called al Sadgab.  The curse was “Katirkum fil turab wa galilkum far bel gurba,” which 
means ‘may God let the majority of the Bawadra die and the few left be scattered.’  Thus the 
Lahawiyin mocked the Bawadra for being too scattered to possess any tribal cohesion and 
entirely money-oriented: the leadership of the Lahawiyin deliberately cast their own identity 
and political ambitions in contrast to those of the Bawadra.  The Bawadra were too 
fragmented and organizationally weak to make a political demand for a nazirate, as they were 
too busy collecting money and buying more land to get involved in politics. The Lahawiyin, 
on the other hand, would rely on their status as a real tribe to pursue a political strategy which 
would give members of the tribe some sort of claim over land which rested not on money but 
on identity.  Establishing  a nazirate would mean that the Lahawiyin had succeeded in 
becoming a unified tribe clearly distinct from other neighbouring tribes (i.e. the Shukriyia 
who held the traditional political leadership, the Bawadra who held the economic power, 
Bani Amer, Ta'aysha, Fellatta with whom they competed for grazing and arable land, etc.). In 
this process of tribal re-composition they emphasized tribal unity in the face of competition 
from other tribes.84  
                                                 
83Assal discussed the exclusion of the non-Arab in the mechanised farming; see M. Assal, ‘Economy and 
Politics in Gedarif,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.186-89. While camel trade was 
exclusively an Arab tribes’ livelihood in Butana, as explained by Khalid et al., ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), 
Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.309-348. 
84 Khalid et al., ‘The Lahawiyin,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.16. 
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Though the Lahawiyin told these stories of Bawadra fragmentation, it is striking that the 
Bawadra had not experienced internal conflict and friction among its umudiyya. This was in 
direct contrast to the Lahawiyin, where each umudiyya had grown in a political environment 
that was inspired by the Ansar, the Khatmiyya or the Ansar al-Suna. Therefore the sheikhs of 
the umudiyyas obviously sought the help and support of the political parties to which they 
belonged.  The Bawadra were, in fact, quicker than the Lahawiyin in seeking alliance with 
the new regime after 1989, as it was seeking local political support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
209 
 
5. 1996 Claim for Nazirate 
 
As we learned in the previous chapter the Lahawiyin had also claimed a nazirate in 1928 and 
in 1948. Their claim for nazirate this time had a different dimension in that it was not merely 
a result of long-term dissatisfaction, or resentment of their status and a renouncing of the 
cliental relationship with the Shukriyya. This time it revealed a mutual interest of both the 
Lahawiyin and the government which was expressed by the 1994 Decree which developed 
into tribal council in allowing the representation of the Lahawiyin and the Rashaida as 
members of the Council equal to other Confederations in the region. Therefore the 1994 
Council encouraged the Lahawiyin to pursue their claim.85 Ten years earlier the Rashaiyda 
had only three umudiyas moving in the land of the local tribes. However, after the drought of 
1984/84 they considered sedentarization. They cleverly supported the Umma party in a locale 
dominated by the Khatmiyya, and in return the Umma promised them a territory and a 
nazir.86 The Lahawiyin had to follow.  
In 1996 the Lahawiyin made a formal request for a nazirate.  Their timing in raising this issue 
was due to two factors: First, the Lahawiyin thought that by leading a majority of two rural 
councils out of eight, they were indicating to the government and the Shukriyya that the 
weight of their presence could not be avoided and that they should be taken seriously by the 
government. A group of Lahawiyin went to Khartoum and met with al Turabi, the president 
of the National Assembly at that time. The group included, representatives from al-Faki, 
Hardan, Gaborab and other umudiyyas. The trip was initiated by a member of Hardan and 
supported by Faki members, which reveals another level of politics between the two 
umudiyyas. 87 As stated by Ali Suleiman,  
Wad Hardan very much demanded this nazirate because of the educated 
members of the umudiyya, the rest [umudiyyas] are not interested in 
education this may be attributed to the political affiliation of the different 
umudiyyas. Strong reason also is the lifestyle of awlad Hardan; they have 
mixed with other tribes:88  
                                                 
85 Delmet, ‘The Native Administration,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy. 
86 This was utterly refused by the nazir of Halenga, Hedandawa and Bani Amer, to the extent that they claimed 
“they have welcomed and considered as guests (duyuf) and who in fact, tempted to take the land between the 
Atbara and Setit rivers, less to become farmers than to get  more facilities for their smuggling activities through 
that frontier area”.  Despite that Saddiq al Mahdi’s government acknowledged the Rashayda as an independent 
political entity.  Delmet, ‘The Native Administration,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, 
p.165. 
87 Interviews with Al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein, Member of National Assembly, Gedarif, Decemb er 2007, 
Siddig Yousuf, member of the Legislative Council, Showak, January 2008, and Ali Suleiman, Director, 
Statistics Department, Gedarif, January 2008. 
88 Interview with Babikir Awad al-Karim, historian, Showak, January 2008.   
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The decision to contact al-Turabi separately from the rest of the politicians was to do with his 
political position as president of the national assembly. The call for nazirate was a priority on 
the meeting’s agenda and Turabi pledged his support and assistance to the delegation.   
In this third attempt at obtaining nazirate, the Lahawiyin developed a new argument based on 
historical and economical interpretation. Historically the Lahawiyin claimed they were the 
only tribe that had grazed on the land between the Atbara River and the Setit River up to the 
Border of Ethiopia and which the Hadendawa had also strongly considered to be within their 
boundary and part of their dar. The Lahawiyin claimed that these lands used to be forest and 
were previously a habitat for animals. They had cleared them and had become known to the 
Hadendawa and Shukriyya. It should be remembered that this territory belonged to the 
Dabyana nazirate which was dissolved by the British administration in 1910 and attached as 
a client tribe to the Shukriyya.  
This same land was later offered by the Shukriyia to the Lahawiyin and also claimed by the 
Hadendawa as part of the latter’s boundary. Apparently neither the Shukriyya nor the 
Hadandawa had taken the Lahawiyin’s claim sincerely, but having won the majority of seats 
of the Showak Rural Council and the other local political institutions, gave the Lahawiyin a 
new sense of entitlement.  
 It was the wad Hardan section, who were heavily involved in mechanized agriculture, who 
were actually leading the whole issue of the nazirate, a fact which implied a conflict between 
them and the wad al Zein family. This was not an isolated case; in several areas of Sudan, the 
process of revitalising the Native Administration system often led to internal competition 
concerning tribal leadership. In some cases, challenging the traditional leadership came from 
a segment of newly-educated members who improved their economic status. 89 
It is interesting to note the difference in the responses of the Shukriyya nazirs in 1901 and 
1996 respectively, especially when it came to land and to the Lahawiyin’s claim for nazirate. 
In 1901 the Lahawiyin were perceived as a support and a new ally to the Shukriyya by Abu 
                                                 
89Ahmad, Shaykhs and Followers; Eman Bushra, ‘Local level Political Dynamics in Kassala State: The 
Rashayda,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.277-308; Barabara Casciarri, 
‘Dynamics of Tribal Re -composition in an Arab Population: the case of Ahamda,’ in Miller (ed.), Land, 
Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp.310-349. 
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Sin, while in 1996 they were denounced as intruders and as not belonging to Butana. It was 
stated that Kordofan was their land. During the Condominium the Lahawiyin paid taxes to 
the Shukriyia and then to the British administration, while in post independence and in the 
absence of the Native administration the Lahawiyin resumed more autonomy from the 
Shukriyia.  In view of such a claim the Lahawiyin distinctively appeared as rivals to the 
Shukriyia even though the latter had proved their good intentions earlier by welcoming the 
former to Butana. 
Education had played a role in shaping views and decisions at very low level politics that had 
become associated with the claim for a nazirate. 90 Education had also shaped the contest over 
leadership: wad Hardan wanted to represent the Lahawiyin in any national political 
manoeuvre while wad al Faki believed that leadership was their historically-granted and 
unquestionable right.  But despite this competition, the Lahawiyin’s new and active 
involvement in politics was intended to allow at least some of them to preserve their 
livelihood as nomads. 91  The key to activating the claim of the nazirate was the subtle 
competition between the educated younger generation of Gaborab who had the chance to 
migrate to Saudi Arabia and who followed Sunni teachings and principles strictly and those 
who had not left but grew and were saturated by the notion of revived Native Administration 
and development in the area.  
The claim for nazirate was not, however, developed as a consensus among the different  
umudiyya across gender, ethnic and economic status. It was engineered and led by privileged 
umudiyyas, Hardan, Faki and Gaborab, and even by groups within those umudiyyas.  The 
educated elite of wad Hardan who were economically empowered led the issue of nazirate. 
They were interested in transforming the pastoralist nature of the Lahawiyin survival 
mechanism from herders to mechanised farmers with the belief that the future of Sudan was 
in mechanised agriculture. This was the exact opposite of al-Faki’s point of view which 
supported the idea of combining camel herding and agricultural schemes.  These differences 
led to the competitive polarisation of followers over land and pasture and became the essence 
of a hidden tribal contest; but the contesting parties found a temporary common cause in the 
call for a nazirate.   
                                                 
90 Interview with Dr Abdalla al-Bashir Musa, Ministry of Health, Gedarif, December 2009 
91 Interview with the late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, former president of Pastoralist Union and khatib khut , 
Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996.  
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This was a turning point in the story of the Lahawiyin’s claim for a nazirate, which had really 
now come to be primarily a claim for a territorial boundary. 92  Politically, some federal 
government representatives thought that a political solution to this claim to nazirate might be 
a "wali" or a ministerial post, which might have granted the Lahawiyin some political 
authority to compensate for nazirate. The Lahawiyin showed determination in pursuing a 
nazirate and managed to voice their claim at all political levels, not only in terms of political 
representation at the Showak Council level, but also at a higher level in Khartoum where the  
support of Turabi was evident. A dar had always been a precondition for a nazirate but in the 
case of the Lahawiyin this was not so.  
  
                                                 
92 Delmet associated titles and boundaries with full authority yet he divided administrative from judicial powers 
given to tribal leaders in a complete revival of native administration though but for the Lahawiyin the picture 
was different.  Title [nazir], boundaries [territorial] and authority all had to come together to guarantee a non 
clientage relationship with Shukriya particularly.  See Delmet, ‘The Native Administration,’ in Miller (ed.), 
Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, p.157. 
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6. A new trajectory in Lahawiyin identity formation  
 
Previously and for a long time in Kordofan we needed to stick together because we 
were mixed, from all the sections. Our identity was Lahawiyin. Since we moved to 
Butana and after all the Lahawiyin had sedentarized and each section lived in one 
vicinity, we needed to identify ourselves by our umudiyya much more than being a 
‘Lahawi’.93 
Some Lahawiyin see a recent  tendency toward identity construction which gives primacy to 
the umudiyya, rather than to tribal identity as a Lahawi.  This implies a kind of internal 
disintegration. But such disintegration was only partial, and it ran alongside a continuing and 
widespread evocation of the idea of collective Lahawiyi identity. It was merely a matter of 
political gains and positioning oneself within the government structure and system.  Hardan 
were always far-sighted in claiming for themselves a leading position above the al Faki which 
was revealed in this new trend. Yet al Faki with the hereditary tribal leadership would 
continue to gain a unique position, and leaders of all umudiyya could use the idea of 
collective identity to bargain with a government which wanted to preserve that form of native 
administration.  
 
It is a matter of political gains and positioning. The Hardan’s forward thinking is revealed in 
this new trend; if the nazirate is achieved what next? Who gains most from the internal power 
restructuring which implied shift in tribal leadership?  This appears to be a contradictory 
process because the evolvement of an umudiyya might have excluded the Lahawi tribal 
identity. Nevertheless, leaders played on their identity both as Hardani and as Lahawi as they 
strove for power, authority and leadership in an external political environment in the eastern 
region (Butana and Gedarif) which faced considerable instability. 
 
From 1997-98 two members from the Lahawiyin of Atbara, Ahmed Jebel from Hardan and 
Al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein from al Faki, called on Lahawiyin living in six identified states 
– Blue Nile, Gezira, Sennar, Gedarif, Khartoum and Kassala - to support the Lahawiyin of 
Atbara in calling for  a nazirate. This was a direct appeal to tribal identity and their Arabness. 
Central institutions for this would be the ‘Association’ or Rabitaa abnaa al-Lahawiyin and 
the ‘Confederation’ or Hayat al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin, which revolved around the idea of 
consensus on the claim for the nazirate. Although the call was meant to include the entire 
tribe, the executive structure and authority was in the hands of the Lahawiyin from Atbara.  
                                                 
93 Interview with Dr Abdalla al-Bashir Musa, Ministry of Health, Gedarif, December 2009. 
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Within the context of emerging political institutions, the Lahawiyin chose to stick to its old 
‘symbolic’ leadership; in the person of Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein (this might arguably be 
called a ‘leadership without portfolio’). 94  This choice confirmed the continuation of a 
hereditary ruler of al Faki umudiyya over the headship of the Lahawiyin and over the 
Lahawiyin both within and outside the Butana. It also confirms consensus by the Lahawiyin 
umudiyyas to the claim for the nazirate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Interview with Dr Abdalla al-Bashir Musa, Ministry of Health, Gedarif, December 2009. 
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Chapter Seven 
Contemporary Politics of the Lahawiyin 1990-2008 
 
One of the most significant developments which have affected Sudan during the last two 
decades has been the progressive fragmentation of Sudanese politics in general. The country 
has also been faced with a severe national identity crisis. While this has often been presented 
as a north-south dichotomy, 1  equally important has been what de Waal calls ‘the much-
neglected east-west axis,’ 2  which originated in the pre-colonial period, and was reinforced 
by Condominium rule and post- independence governments in the North.  
 
The instability in the South, Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and the East 
were the most palpable demonstration of this trend.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) was signed in 2005 followed by another two peace agreements: the Darfur Peace 
Agreement in 2006 and more recently the Eastern Peace Agreement in 2008. These led to a 
relative peace, but at the same time, as Patey has commented ‘the lack of a peace dividend 
and environmental degradation from oil continue to spawn armed resistance at the local 
level.’ 4 
 
The Lahawiyin did not live in isolation from the ongoing conflict in the eastern region of 
Sudan. They were affected by two different dynamics: regional dynamics on the border with 
Ethiopia and Eritrea; and national dynamics between the Eastern Front and the rest of Sudan. 
Sometimes the challenges this brought were relatively straightforward: the establishment of 
the international highway between Ethiopia and Sudan, which was completed in 2007, 
heralded the encroachment of Ethiopian farmers, a challenge which alarmed many 
Lahawiyin. 5 Other challenges were more protracted and complex.  
                                                 
1 Sharif Harir, ‘“Arab belt” versus “African belt”: ethnic and political strife in Darfur and cultural and regional 
factors’, in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (eds), Sudan: Short Cut to Decay (Nordica Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 
1997), pp. 144–85; Doornbos, Paul, ‘On becoming Sudanese’, in T. Barnett and A. Abdelkarim (eds), Sudan: 
State, capital and transformation (Croom Helm, London, 1988), pp. 99–120.; Heather J. Sharkey, “Arab 
Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race” African Affairs, 107/426, 21–43 
2 2 Alex De Waal, Who Are the Darfurians? Arab And Africans Identities, Violence And External Engagement, 
African Affairs, 104/415, p. 181. 
3 Conference on the current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa, Organized jointly by the 
Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue and Inter Africa Group, March 12-13, 2007, pp.1-108. 
4 Patey, Luke A, ‘Crude Days Ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse in Sudan’, African Affairs, 109/437 (2010), 
pp. 617–636. 
5 For more details see Chapter Three. 
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In eastern Sudan, a new movement of political and military resistance had been formed in the 
1990s which drew together several eastern tribes, members of which argued that they had 
suffered from political marginalization. The Eastern Front was formed after Beja Congress 
joined the National Democratic Alliance in 1996, having launched an armed struggle in the 
early 1990s. 6  This occurred as a result of marginalisation and negligence which was 
exacerbated by the exploration for gold and other resources in the Hadandowa land, which 
led to a loss of grazing land and pasture for many herders. 7  The Bani Amer joined the Front 
when the tribe began to lose its labour market opportunities in the Red Sea state as a result of 
the modernisation of the port.8 The Rashaida joined also, driven by a different grievance, 
which was their claim for a nazirate and recognition by the government that they were 
Sudanese.9 Crucially, the Eastern Front did not recognise the rights of other tribes in the east 
of Sudan because their definition of ‘Eastern Sudan’ consisted of only the Red Sea and 
Kassala states. In consequence, the Eastern Front did not build a wide representation with 
many tribes in the east excluded, and membership remained limited to the Hadandawa, Bani 
Amer and Rashaida tribes. 
 
The consequence was that both peace negotiations raised tensions between these groups and 
others in eastern Sudan. By the government’s definition, Gedarif state was part of ‘Eastern 
Sudan’, and so was affected both by the peace negotiations which began in Asmara in 2003, 
and the eventual ESPA. 10  
Resident Arab tribes in eastern Sudan such as the Shukriyya, Lahawiyin, Bawadra, Dabayna 
and Ahamda had reservations about being represented by members of the Eastern Front 
                                                 
6 At its founding conference in opposition-held areas in March 2005, the Eastern Front attempted to broaden its 
support base to include the Shukriyia and other non-Beja tribes in the East 
7 John Young, ‘The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization’, (Small Arms Survey, Graduate 
Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2007), pp.11-23. 
8 The Bani Amer population predominantly occupied the sea port labour force for many years until 2002-03 
when the modernisation of the port began to take place. Many of them lost their jobs and the impoverishment 
and marginalisation of the tribe was evident. Tamador A. Khalid, ‘Red Sea State’ , un-published report’, 
Khartoum: Dutch Embassy, Nov.2005;  
9 Eman Bushra, ‘Local Level Political Dynamic in Kassala State: The Rashayda’, in Miller (ed.), Land, Ethnicity 
and Political Legitimacy, p.293. William C. Young, The Rashayda Bedouin: Arab Pastoralists of Eastern 
Sudan (Texas: Harcourt Brace, 1996) and Mustafá ‘Al¯i Ahmad.  al-Rash¯ayidah, (al-Khart¯um: Matba'ah 
Misr, 19--?) 
10 John Young, ‘Eastern Sudan: Caught in a Web of External Interests’, Review of African Political Economy,  
Vol. 33, No. 109, Mainstreaming the African Environment in Development (Sep., 2006), pp. 594-601.;Cliffe, 
Lionel (1999), 'Regional dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa.' Third World Quarterly. Vol. 20. No. 1; 
Los Angeles Times (2005), 'Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism', 29 April. Young, 
John. 'Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace' Review of African Political Economy . No. 
103.Vol. 32. (March 2 005), pp 99 — 113.; J.  Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Towards 
Political and Social Change in the Third World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1974),  
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because these tribes saw themselves superior based on their Arabness. 11  Though the 
Rashaida are also an Arab tribe, they had no  dar,  and so were viewed as of lower status by  
dar holders such as the Shukriyya, while others viewed them as late-comers who should not 
represent other tribes; 12 and as Dalmau put it ‘the Rashaida were regularly in conflict with 
the local tribes.’ 13  These tribes resented the status which negotiations and agreement had 
given to the Beja tribes; the Hadandawa were already established while the Bani Amer and 
the Rashaida were gaining authority at the expense of other significant groups.  Lahawiyin 
and others feared a growing influx of non-Butana tribes, including those who had been in 
exile as part of the opposition. Like the conflict in Darfur, that in eastern Sudan could be seen 
as a resource conflict, and could be presented as “between Arab and non Arab.”14  This 
heightened the tension between tribes, and encouraged identity politics. 
 
Apart from the Hadandawa, the other two tribes were not widely popular which can be 
attributed to three reasons: their smuggling habits; their border links with Eritrea and 
Ethiopia; and their links with Saudi Arabia.15 The consequences of the peace negotiations 
were further complicated as each of the three tribes of the Eastern Front experienced internal 
divisions as each umudiyya attempted to secure a bigger share of political power under the 
ESPA. The gains of the three tribes ranged from assistants to the presidency to federal 
ministerial posts.   
 
This chapter looks at the contemporary politics of the Lahawiyin in the context of this period 
of political conflict, peace negotiation and their consequences, during which debate over a 
Lahawiyin identity became very much a matter for negotiation between new elite – which 
shows some continuity with the old – and the government. 
  
                                                 
11 Assal1 and Ali, ‘Eastern Sudan: Challenges Facing the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Gedarif 
State’, p. 7. 
12 Group interview with the Lahawiyin sheikhs, January 2008, Gedarif.  
13 Isabelle Dalmau, ‘Camel Production and Trade in Eastern Sudan: A Case Study of Al-Showak Market’, in 
Miller (ed.), Land, pp. 203-228. 
14 Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 2009), p.71. 
15 Both tribes had a long standing history of arms and border smuggling. See also Dalmau ‘Camel Production 
and Trade in Eastern Sudan’, p. 210 and Bushara, ‘Local Level Political Dynamic in Kassala State’, p. 293, 
Mustafá ‘Al¯i Ahmad, al-Rash¯ayidah [AR], (al-Khart¯um: Matba'ah Misr, 19--?).  
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1. Political dynamics of Gedarif State post 1998 
 
Vered Amit-Talai has commented that “The notion of home (and hence by extension of 
homelessness) is tied to the notion of identity, but equally correct in asserting that ‘identities 
are not free-floating, they are limited by borders and boundaries’”.16 This period has seen new 
developments in Lahawiyin ideas about movement, and boundaries and identity. While the 
Lahawiyin had had resisted the imposition of boundaries since the Condominium, they came 
to accept their recent confinement to the Atbara River area, defining this as  a Lahawiyin 
‘home land’, a territory they had identified with since their move to Butana. 
 
Movements in administrative boundaries, which located Gedarif firmly in ‘Eastern Sudan’  
threatened the traditional authority of some sheikhs, which was already under pressure from 
the authority of other sheikhs and umdas. 17  The Lahawiyin, whose sheikhs resided in 
Mugataa and other villages along the Atbara River, were indifferent to official meetings and 
events in Gedarif that were an attraction to other tribal sheikhs. On the contrary they preferred 
to return to their village on a daily basis. The Lahawiyin, now increasingly sedentarized, 
nonetheless remained independent and developed new waysto maintain and secure their 
identity, linking it to an idea of home. According to one informant ‘we the Lahawiyin, stick 
to our home no matter how far [away] it is.’18 
 
Historically, Lahawiyin identity existed as purely ‘Arab’ and ‘Lahawi’. Since the 1990s, the 
tension between membership of particular umudiyya and membership of the tribe has 
reemerged, as part of the kind of cliental politics Asad, Ibrahim and Southall; 19  some 
Lahawiyin see this as a natural corollary of what has been happening in the Eastern region 
generally. 20 Others argue that these internal divisions are encouraged by educated members of 
                                                 
16 Madan Sarup quoted in Vered Amit-Talai,’ Risky Hiatueses and the limits of Social Imagination:Expatriacy 
in the Cayman Islands’ in Nigel Rapport and Andrew Dawson (eds.), Migrant of Identity; Perception of Home 
in a World of Movement (Oxford: Berg,, 1998), pp 55.  
17 Gedarif had historically been considered part of Eastern Sudan and was specifically part of Kassala province 
until 1994. Kassa Province Annual Report, CEIVSEC, 3/138/610. However, after 1994 the Ingadth government 
re-extended the boundaries of Eastern Sudan region to include Gedarif within its new boundaries. See C. Delmet, 
‘The Native Administration System in Eastern Sudan’, in Miller (ed.), Land, pp. 145-172. 
18 Interview with al-Igba Ahmed al Zein, December 2007, Gedarif State. 
19 Talal Asad, ‘Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe’, in Ian Cunnison and Wendy James (eds.), Essays in 
Sudan Ethnography, presented to Sir Edward Evans-Prichard  (London: Hurst, 1972), pp 126-148; Abdalla Ali 
Ibrahim, ‘The Mahadiyya and the Kababish: Towards Legitimacy and Resistance’, (unpublished MS, University 
of Khartoum, 1976); and Aidan W. Southall, ‘The Illusion of Tribe’, in Roy Richard Grinker and Christopher B. 
Steiner (eds.), Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History and Representation (Oxford, UK ; 
Cambridge, Mass : Blackwell, 1997), 
20 Interview with a group of Lahawiyin from Hardan, Abdalla Musa, Ali Sueliman, Gedarif 2008-09. 
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the Hardan in relation to external territorial dynamics.21 As we shall see, both were intimately 
tied up and closely linked to the government’s attitudes towards the Lahawiyin.  
 
Nonetheless, Lahawiyin ‘Arab identity’ retained continuity and consistency in the face of 
new arrivals and boundaries changes. The period since the 1990s reveals a political and 
economic struggle to maintain and retain the boundaries set by the local government in 
1974.22 The administrative boundaries identified by the Showak Council became the main 
tribal domain and territory. By 1998 the Lahawiyin found themselves confined 
administratively to the Showak Rural Council, in the al Fashaga locality. At the same time, 
Arab identity became very much related to relations with the government, as the tribal 
authority was busy building its economic and political power, and the the leadership of al 
Faki and Hardan tried to  identify politically with the government in order to serve their 
interests. This was parallel to, and regardless of, the growing distances in social terms 
between the different umudiyyas as some grew rich as land owners (al Faki and Hardan) 
while others were unable to benefit because of the limited educational opportunities 
(Gawamis). However, such social divisions did not result in the al-Faki umudiyya being 
abandoned by the rest of the tribe. Nevertheless the centralisation of authority in the hands of 
al-Faki was never able to completely replace the power of the different umudiyyas; 
landowners continued to expand their economic, social and political powers beyond the tribal 
boundary of al-Mugataa, and al-Showak which represented the administrative and political 
boundary. This was achieved by building networks and contacts in Gedarif. 
 
Gedarif state continued to preserve the structure of the five nazirates, each of which was 
bounded within the administrative area:23 the nazirate of Bakur is bounded by the south of 
Gedarif State and is populated by Fur, Masaleet, Fellatta and other west Sudan tribes; the 
Shukriyya nazirate is home to the Bataheen, Kawahla, and Lahawiyin; Dabaina, the smallest 
nazirate in terms of population, is found in the east of Gedarif with a population made up of 
entirely Dabaina and other minor groups; the Bani Amir have traditionally dominated the 
fourth nazirate, Gedarif city; the Nahal nazirate which includes the Nahal and Hawata area 
and is home to the Bargo and other minor groups.  
                                                 
21 Interview with al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein, Eid Al Zein Adam al Zein and Mugatta wad al Zein.  
22 Showak represented them with a clear majority of seats which made the Lahawiyin a majority in the area. The 
Showak election took place in 1998. 
23 Munzoul A. M. Assal, ‘Economy and Politics in Gedarif: A symbiotic Encounter’, in Catherine Miller (ed.), 
Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy (Cairo: CEDEJ-DSRC, 2005), pp. 1-6, 177. 
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Recent changes within Gedarif, including the signing of the Eastern Peace Agreement, 
contributed to bringing to the forefront another dimension of ‘Arab’ identity and to the 
voicing of the issue of representation by the Lahawiyin and other unrepresented tribes in the 
region. The recent changes in Gedarif on the one hand challenged the structure of many 
nomadic tribes as their leaders moved to the city in Gedarif. On the other hand the Lahawiyin 
tribe remained confined to Mugataa wad al Zein, although the new political institutions into 
which they were incorporated required a regular presence of the leadership in Gedarif. 24 
Gedarif has been an urban centre since the nineteenth century, attracting religious and 
political leaders;25 its continued growth in the twentieth century can be explained by the fact 
that Gedarif is strategically located close to Kassala and Gallabat which were considered two 
important administrative centres, close to the border and surrounded by natural open grazing 
areas. 26  Also, in recent times Gedarif became the residence for many nazirs and the 
headquarters of many tribes, including the Shukriyya of Gedarif, the, Bani Amer and the 
Bakur. 
By the 1990s, Lahawiyin perceived al Mugataa wad al Zein27 as their only home and thus a 
place to return to with a principal focus of control. The Lahawiyin opted for this control not 
because they had a sense of ownership of the land in which they lived, but because the home 
as a concept became associated by contrast with the sense of a wider, less controlled space. 
As Douglas has argued of the way that ‘home’ can assume a relationship to community 
identity, , “Home is a physical space in which certain communitarian practices were realised. 
Home began by bringing space under control and thus giving domestic life certain physical 
orientation direction of existence.”28 
 
                                                 
24 Interview with al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein, December 2009, Mugatta wad al Zein; The history of Gedarif 
shows that the town was part of Kassala province until 1994. According to Galal al-Din al Tayeb, quoted in M. 
Assal, ’Economy and Politics in Gedarif’, in C. Miller, Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, pp. 173-201; 
that in the early nineteenth century Saad al-Dibanayi (from the Dabaniya) had established a small village which 
expanded in quarters established by al-Makk Nimir in 1840, Abu Sin in 1865, al-Sufi al-Azrag and al-Nour 
Angara who added Deim al-Nour during the Mahdiyia. See Galal ed-Din al-Tayeb, Gedarif District Study Area 
(Khartoum Institute of Environmental Studies: University of Khartoum, 1985),  
25 The early history of the town can be found in al-Tayeb, Gedarif District Study Area, and Assal ‘Economy and 
Politics in Gedarif’, pp. 178-185. 
26 Assal, ‘Economy and Politics in Gedarif’, pp. 178-185. 
27 Al-Mugataa wad al Zein’ had been always a resident of the al-Feki omudia and the ancestors of Sheikhs 
Adam al Zein, sheikh of the Lahawiyin. Even members of the al Zein family who work as government 
employees in nearby towns like the Gedarif, Al-Showak and Gashm al-Girba still commute on a daily basis. In 
recent years, the village expanded and housed a secondary school which reflects an expansion in social services.  
28 Douglas quoted in Rapport and Dawson (eds.), Migrant of Identity, pp. 7, 55-56.  
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While the situation in the east of Sudan, particularly in Gedarif, encouraged the members – 
and leaders - of some tribes to make their new homes in Gedarif, the Lahawiyin considered al 
Mugataa wad al Zein their actual home. For them the presence of their sheikh and leadership, 
whose political drive maintained the tribe’s identity and secured its physical characteristics, 
had always preserved the Lahawiyin. The link between movement and identity was now 
entirely historical – Lahawiyin identity was rooted in a defined space, not defined by 
movement.29 
  
                                                 
29 Madan Sarup quoted in Rapport and Dawson (eds.), Migrant of Identity, pp 55-56.  
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2. In the Footsteps of the Bawadra  
 
In the course of the peace agreement process, wider economic exchanges took place with new 
forms of entrepreneurship emerging among the Lahawiyin. A group of agricultural scheme 
owners developed different economic links, political affiliations and tribal authority. This 
resulted in new patterns of tribal movements, interactions and political participation whereas 
the contested livelihood strategies of the Lahawiyin in general fostered a new order of 
domination and hegemony by land owners. 
 
The Lahawiyin who owned agricultural schemes began to increase their holdings gradually 
by selling and trading grain similar to the pattern of livelihood adopted in the 1980s by their 
neighbours the Bawadra tribe.30 The Lahawiyin were critical of the Bawadra and dismantled 
the pasture enclosures and crossed grazing lines in Butana. However, after more than 20 
years they followed this lead, openly claiming that this might preserve their right in the 
Butana in the light of the influx of a foreign population. 31 The Lahawiyin’s role and position 
in the tribe took on a different shape. They became creditors. 32  While some Lahawiyin 
families, who were seasonal investors but did not have sufficient capital to buy into schemes, 
began to receive financial support or share crops with others members of the Lahawiyin; most 
of these agr icultural scheme owners were more or less the same as the juruf owners. This 
meant that certain families within certain omudias owned lands and established business 
relationships with the Bawadra, Jaaliyin and Shukriyia agricultural scheme owners and other 
traders in Showak and Gedarif. This gave these families economic power which strengthened 
their role in local politics and thus shaped the politics of the tribe.  
 
The increase in land entitlement among the Lahawiyin not only changed their perception 
from being herders with no  dar, it augmented their Arab identity in their struggle for 
recognition. They were influenced by personal political interests to gain power and authority 
which grew alongside their claims for nazirate. It is necessary to discuss recent developments 
in terms of tribal land rights and in view of the peace process in the last few years. 
Mechanisation increased during the 1990s through foreign investment encouraged by the 
                                                 
30 T. Khalid, I. Dalamu and C. Miller, ‘Lahawiyin in al-Showak Rural Council: Imposed Boundaries and the 
Quest for Political Recognition’, in Miller (ed.), Land, pp. 309-348. Group interview with staff at the Ministry 
of Agriculture, January 2008, Gedarif.  
31 The foreign population here meant Ethiopians, displaced peoples from South Sudan and tribes from the Blue 
Nile region. Group interview with Lahawiyin men, December 2007, Showak. 
32 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director of the Statistics Department, January 2008, Gedarif. 
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government, which indicates that foreign investment would continue. The increase in   
Lahawiyin land holdings to over 500,000 feddans in the last ten years revealed structural 
changes in the Lahawiyin’s livelihood as well as in relation to herds and grazing. 33 But while 
this may seem to be a large area, it is small by comparison with that held by landowners from 
the Bawadra and Shukriyia tribes, where some individuals own as much. 34  Thus, the 
Lahawiyin realised that scheme ownership alone might not enable them to compete with 
other tribes who had been in the business for the last 40 years; and they relied on a 
combination of politics, herding and agricultural schemes to attain their goal. Having large 
agricultural areas in Gedarif require employment of casual and seasonal labourers. 
Newcomers found it difficult to compete with traditional employees, unless they paid higher 
than the established market prices. Almost all of the schemes owned by the Lahawiyin were 
in Butana and were granted by the Mechanised Farming Corporation.  
 
The percentage of those who owned schemes was small, not exceeding 13% of the total 
population. However, this 13% became a class aspiring to a different way of life. They were 
the same group who held political and administrative positions within the local political 
institutions in Gedarif and al-Showak rural councils and the Ministries of Education, 
Agriculture and Social Welfare. In addition, they were represented in the legislative council 
in Showak and Gedarif. Scheme owners also aspired to a good education for their children.  
 
The Pastoralist Union (Itahd al Rua’a Showak 1998) was another new avenue for the 
Lahawiyin to gain power. Those involved in it found that their position granted them the 
facilities and opportunities to link with key officials in places like banks and political offices. 
The Lahawiyin argued that having being integrated into this political institution they were 
able to safeguard the other aspects such as grazing and pasture rights. The Pastoral Union 
also confirmed the position of Ahmed Adam al Zein as president which had added to his 
authority over many tribal issues.  
 
Simultaneously, Lahawiyin presence at the National Assembly (majlis watani) changed the 
perception of the government towards the Lahawiyin and provided the latter with basic 
                                                 
33 Interview with Amna Mahmood, Deputy Manager, Department of Pasture, Ministry of Agriculture, January 
2008, Gedarif state. 
34 The average holding size of agricultural schemes is between 100,000 to 500,000 feddans in Gedarif state. 
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services that had not been available for many years. 35 It is pertinent to mention that the first 
elected Lahawiyi, from the Showak area, to the National Assembly was sheikh al Zein 
Ahmed Adam al Zein who resided in his constituency that was Mugatta wad al Zein, whereas 
the other two Lahawi members lived in Khartoum. This took place after the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement [CPA]. Those members of the National Assembly managed to preserve an 
authoritative image among their people and were keen to keep the Lahawi profile high. The 
damage the tribe faced during the 1980s drought needed to be avoided to provoke a survival 
strategy which called for an association and later a shuraa. However, such a step could not be 
achieved without the educational background to influence the government through being 
members in the National Assembly. 
 
In 1991, the Decree of Local Government for Restoring the Local Courts because this Decree 
had excluded places, mostly inhabited by nomads, where the local population was expected 
to retain hold of their courts. This decree was not effected and according to the Native 
Administration “a nazir remained a nazir and a sheikh remained a sheikh.”36  However, a 
duplication of authority dictated by the Native Administration was kept intact and 
simultaneously the newly-appointed political figures were also devolving authority at 
different levels. However the government of al-Bashir was aware of the continued role of 
traditional authority and thus tried to keep both systems alive; maintaining the position of 
traditional authorities and improving and valuing their work at the same time. Any nazir was 
remunerated and his salary could reach up to one million Sudanese pounds per month37 while 
the umda could get up to half of the nazir’s pay.38 These remunerations were vested to attract 
loyalty and support.  
 
Continuing to revive the Native Administration the government drafted a new law in 1998 in 
which it proposed that any nazir or sheikh had to be elected, but this was not successful, and 
it encouraged competition amongst the younger generation over positions within their tribes. 
                                                 
35 The National Assembly is the National Legislature of Sudan which stands as the Lower House. The 
Legislature was previously one legislative chamber while the Upper House is the Council of States (Majlis 
Welayat). The National Assembly consists of 450 appointed members who represent the government, SPLM 
members, and other opposition political parties. The National Assembly in which a membership served up to 
six-year terms replaced the elected parliament. 
36Interview with Abdalla Suleiman, a former Commissioner of Gezira and Gedarif state, January 2008, Gedarif 
state. 
37 Approximately £250. This figure was given by Abdalla Suleiman, a former Commissioner of Gezira and 
Gedarif States, January 2008, Gedarif.  
38 About £125. This figure was given by Abdalla Suleiman, a former Commissioner of Gezira and Gedarif 
States, January 2008, Gedarif. 
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More generally, governmental initiatives to revive traditional authority, on the one hand, ran 
counter to the other initiatives to create ‘popular committees’ which would be loyal to the 
government. As one informant put it regretfully,  “Old leaders [have] lost their image, a 
Shukri sheikh used to be recognised from a distance.”39 The Shukri sheikh has lost his power 
and authority within his locality because of the growing role of the popular committees The 
president of a committee appears to be more authoritative and important than a traditional 
sheikh.  
 
The growth of the popular committees may explain a shift in terminology. According to the 
former commissioner of Gedarif the estimated number of Lahawiyin sheikhs in the 1990s was 
over 300, while there were only eight umdas and one sheikh khut.40 He attributed the increase 
in the number of sheikhs to the fact that members of popular committees were now called 
sheikhs. As long these members were active, attended meetings and assisted in implementing 
the required work, they received an honorarium from the government as an incentive and thus 
their number increased according to rising needs. 
 
This set-up led the Lahawiyin sheikhs and umdas to engage in those committees and the tribe 
became more organised in addressing issues related to the need for services in the area of 
Showak’s rural council along the Atbara River. This gradually began to attract more umdas 
and sheikhs who were previously not active in politics but were only interested in increasing 
the size of their herds. However, this also revealed an internal competition between sheikhs 
and umdas over political nominations to the rural councils, courts and committees. 41  In 
addition, the educated elite of the Lahawiyin tribe, who had largely used their education to 
secure jobs in the civl service, began to show an interest in the issue of the nazirate and 
offered their expertise in extending their services and contact with officials in the 
government. They were motivated partly by an awareness of the insurgency of the Eastern 
Front.  Land was a central cause of the recent conflicts in Sudan, and Lahawiyin feared that 
they might lose the gains they had made over the years and also the chance to seize more 
agricultural land in the future given the situation in Eastern Sudan.  
 
                                                 
39 Interview with Abdalla Suleiman, a former Commissioner of Gezira and Gedarif States, January 2008, 
Gedarif.  
40 Interview with Abdalla Suleiman, a former Commissioner of Gezira and Gedarif States, January 2008, 
Gedarif. 
41 Interview with Salah Shashog, Director Al-Showak Rural Council, January 2008, Gedarif. 
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The Lahawiyin were consistently attempting to be accepted through asserting collective and 
individual rights to land the use of two parallel dynamics: becoming politically active; and 
being close to financial institutions.   
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3. 1998 Local Government Act     
 
The relationship between the Lahawiyin and the government of President al-Bashir was one 
built on mutual interest. The government issued a number of laws which were favourable to 
the Lahawiyin’s political aspirations but less favourable in terms of their pasture rights. The 
1998 Local Government Act (LGA) authorised the different states to pass their internal 
Native Administration State Acts. It was also meant to establish amirs, a form of native 
administration42 to mobilise the rural population to support the government in its war in the 
south of Sudan. This idea of amirs was similar to the system established during the 
Mahdiyya; like that system, it potentially challenged the existing traditional system because it 
created a parallel authority. The Bill granted authority to non-traditional sheikhs in villages 
and towns, with extra customary usufruct rights within their vicinities. This again put the 
pastoral resources at stake.43 
In this context the government developed an amenable relationship with those Hardan who 
were returning from periods of migrant labour. The government wanted to win their support, 
despite the traditional political affiliation of the Hardan to the Umma party, in a region faced 
with high competition over land rights.44 Granting the nazirate might ensure loyalty, but it 
would also createa more complicated situation whereby new identities were encouraged 
within the political framework set by the higher- level federal government. The political 
framework of federalism also permitted the growth of political and social identity of resident 
tribes in the Butana area as well as constructing an ethnic identity.  
The administrative boundaries were being altered in the years after 1998 by the Native 
Administration State Acts.45 As a result Gedarif state was extended to incorporate the former 
boundaries of al Gezira state on the border of al-Fao locality. This administrative re-planning 
was taken in order to control tribal movements and the influx of labourers and displaced 
people which had entered Gedarif. The impact of these immigrants was perceived by the 
                                                 
42 Most of information extracted from Dr. Omer Awadalla Ali, ‘Local Government in Sudan During The Interim 
Period–Inputs From Switzerland’, Final Draft, May 2008, Khartoum, pp.7-9.; Christian Delmet, ‘The Native 
Administration’, in C. Miller, Land, Ethnicity and Political Legitimacy, , pp.159-169. 
43 This was so because the pasture land was considered to be an unregistered waste land that the Government 
owned and had the right to manage.  
44 As the land issue became problematic between many nomadic tribes in Darfur, Kordofan and Eastern Sudan 
during the early days of the Ingadh government, conflict began to spread rapidly, fuelled by groups who were 
politically marginalised or discontented. 
45 The Local Government Act 1998 was important in terms of decentralising Native Administration. The Act 
authorised the different states to pass their internal Native Administration State Acts. 
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local authorities as damaging to the local infrastructure and resources. Thus, in order to 
control such changes, confinement in some localities was evident.  There were also 
unexpressed political reasons for the change. Gedarif state represented another level of 
political engagement for the Lahawiyin in their quest for the nazirate. After 1998, having 
been actively engaged at the Showak Rural Council level and with the escalating importance 
of politics in Eastern Sudan, the Lahawiyin felt the need to institutionalise their struggle and 
to attract the attention of the national government.  
The government divided each locality into administrative units and assigned specific towns as 
capitals of these localities. Gedarif remained the capital with the headquarters of the 
administrative, executive and judicial powers which were run by borrowing from a federal 
and traditional system of governance. All the nazirs kept their authority, in line with state 
authority, and most had a residence in Gedarif. The proximity between the State government 
and the Wali of Gedarif played an important role in the political situation. 46  Nazirs and 
sheikhs in the area saw it as a privilege to be close to political and social events that the Wali 
would organise and attend in the evenings; each wanted to be publicly associated with 
government power, and to assert his role as representative of a group. Previously, nazirs 
would have lived in the vicinity of their homeland among their people; however with the 
changing political system and norms they divided their time between their villages and the 
Gedarif in order to keep up-to-date with affairs.47 This situation also saw a greater number of 
the tribal population living around their sheikhs and nazirs in order to show support and 
loyalty, which resulted in an expansion of the tribal homeland into a new setting in Gedarif. 
The tribal population was often socially and economically dependent on the nazir. These 
changing relations weakened the tribal authority away from the town, however, because the 
leader was always in town. But the nazir still remained influential in mediating between his 
people and the government. 48 Any problems he was unable to address were dealt with by 
courts of law. As Assal points out, ‘This way, traditional authorities and government 
authorities seem to be parallel, but they collaborate; often the government co-opts traditional 
leadership and uses it for its own purposes.’49 
 
 
                                                 
46 Alwan Newspaper No. , 31 January 2007. 
47 Interview with Abdel Moneim Yousuf, Dean High Studies, University of Gedaef, January 2008, Gedarif.  
48 Interview with Abdel Moneim Yousuf, Dean High Studies, University of Gedaef, January 2008, Gedarif.  
49 Assal1 and Ali, ‘Eastern Sudan’, p.3. 
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4. ‘Rabitaa abnaa al-Lahawiyin’ the Lahawiyin Association 1998  
 
The establishment of the Lahawiyin Association  in 1998 was driven by an internal motive to 
promote  a distinctively Arab Lahawiyin identity that would protect it in the context of the 
increasingly violent political conflicts in eastern Sudan’?. In this context, some  Lahawiyin 
hoped that the Association would assert their autonomy as a tribe; at the same time they 
disconnected themselves genealogically from the dominant tribes, the Shukriyia and the 
Bawadra in Butana. This disconnection offered interesting insights into the tribe’s growing 
political institutions. The Lahawiyin simply no longer wanted to be attached to or represented 
by any other tribe. As one among many tribes the Lahawiyin in 1998 called upon its scattered 
tribe members, concentrating on educated members, to gather and mobilise efforts to initiate 
dialogue at all levels.  
 
Education was now considered a major issue; Lahawiyin argued that they were disadvantaged 
by the Shukriyia’s failure to build schools and khalwas50 in their area. There was only one 
school in the whole Lahawiyin. Although the Lahawiyin argued that education for girls had 
not begun until 1989 attributing this to the discrimination by the Shukriyia, they had not 
shown interest in educating girls. Furthermore, their education was not broadly available in 
Butana. The Lahawiyin were bitter when discussing the issue of illiteracy and they felt that 
was the cause of the tribe lagging behind. As one Lahawi opined:   
 
We were so deprived in the past years from the social services by the 
Shukriyia…and no land;…separation from the Shukriyia is a must…We didn’t 
have any schools except the one in Mugataa wad al Zein.51  
 
The Lahawiyin alleged their loss was twofold; the Shukriyia deprived them of both land and 
education. This was attributed to the firm hold of the old Shukriyia leaders over Lahawiyin 
affairs, and the way in which some leaders abused their power and authority to control the 
Lahawiyin.  
 
In this context it can be presumed that the Lahawiyin asserted their autonomy as a tribe and 
also disconnected themselves genealogically from the dominant tribes, the Shukriyia and the 
Bawadra in Butana. This disconnection offered interesting insights into the tribe’s growing 
                                                 
50 Religious school. 
51  Interview with Sheikh Siddig Yousif, member of the Al-Showak Legislative Council, January 2008, al-
Showak. 
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political institutions. They disconnected from their political proximity to Shukriyia replacing 
it with their own institutions. The Lahawiyin simply no longer wanted to be attached to or 
represented by any other tribe.  
 
The interesting explanation to this is that the Lahawiyin had interpreted political proximity in 
terms of the unavoidable presence of the Shukriyia. As one amongst many tribes the 
Lahawiyin in 1998 called upon its scattered tribe members to join the Rabitta, concentrating 
on educated members, to gather and mobilise efforts to initiate dialogue at all levels.  
 
A natural corollary of this, they had to organise well in advance and had to figure out that the 
only feasible solution was to come under the Rabitaa. The idea was to create a formal 
coalition of the different umudiyyas within the Showak rural council and in other states. The 
immediate objective was to merge all the existing opinions into one voice and promote 
solidarity amongst its tribal members. 
 
Apart from the immediate objective, there was a long-term objective and an agenda far 
beyond the Rabitaa. However, the Lahawiyin realised the more divided the tribe the more it 
would remain subject to be assimilated and being taken over by other tribes. Thus a new form 
of tribal authority began to emerge which resulted in the establishment of ‘Rabitaa abnaa al-
Lahawiyin’ or Lahawiyin Rabitaa in 1998. One informant suggested that the Rabitaa 
instigated another level of subtle ‘generational competition’ among the youth on two levels. 52 
The umudiyyas such as al-Faki, Hardan and Gaborab in the Showak rural council represented 
one level and the Lahawiyin in other states such as Khartoum, Gezira and Sinnar was the 
other level. In addition, competition over executive posts evolved between the two levels 
which indicated that although they all strived for the same objective of Lahawiyin 
recognition; there were differences over authority and offices.  
 
Interestingly, for the Lahawiyin in other states their past experience working in the 
Government civil service helped them win executive posts. At this time some Lahawi figures 
had not been closely engaged in the affairs of the tribe for a long time but had been busy at a 
different level of politics. This can found to be true to a degree when looking at the structure 
of the Rabitaa. The Lahawiyin Rabitaa was chaired by the former Minister of Interior, former 
                                                 
52 Interview with Dr. Abdullahi Musa, State Ministry of Health, May 2009, Gedarif.   
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Minister of Commerce, and other dignitaries of the Lahawiyin including a former Wali of 
Kassala, the head of the Parliamentarians’ Corporation, the president of the Farmers’ Union 
in the Showak Rural Council and other ordinary members.53  
 
This group organized themselves well and surprisingly the newly-selected committee gained 
overwhelming approval from the tribal members, which was a step towards its first 
congregation at which representatives of the Lahawiyin from the six states were gathered. It 
was a difficult task for the Rabitaa executive committee to provide a concrete figure of the 
population as the only statistics to which they had access were based on the 1993 census, and 
a continued degree of nomadism in some areas made it difficult to produce an accurate 
population figure. The Rabitaa executive committee relied on the Lahawiyin who worked 
within the government departments and the rural councils in Showak and al Fashaga where 
the majority of Lahawiyin lived54 to obtain the relevant information. In addition, resources 
were made available through these connections to lay the basis for the work.  
 
Another challenge they faced was the selection of representatives. The leaders of each 
umudiyya had to work on their own to choose their representatives according to the executive 
committee criteria. Representatives were selected from the six states and delegates were 
familiarised with the main goal of the Rabitaa and the tasks that were expected of them. 
These were mainly issues related to their claim for the nazirate and the tribe’s vision to 
consolidate itself in the face of the dynamics in the Sudan. 55  
 
The Lahawiyin of al-Showak were dominant in this process of political institutionalisation 
and manipulated it for their benefit. This put them ahead of the Lahawiyin in other states as 
their concern was based on what was happening in the Eastern Region. The idea of a nazirate 
was the driving force, even more than land. The representatives were given roles to 
communicate and disseminate such information back to their umudiyyas. Therefore they had 
to act on behalf of their own people and thus abide by their constituencies.  
 
Three motives drove the Lahawiyin to establish the Rabitaa. First, since 1928 most of their 
claims had been voiced by either al-Faki or the Hardan umudiyya, and Lahawiyin outside the 
                                                 
53 Rabitaa documents, list of membership, objectives and date of inception, provided by Dr Abdallahi Musa.  
54 Interview with Ahmed Jebel, fromer president of Showak rural council and member of the state legislatie 
Council, December 2009, Gedarif. 
55 Interview with al Zein Ahmed al Zein, member of the National Assembly, January 2008, Gedarif.  
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Butana area had no representation. 56 Second, the Lahawiyin were scattered, as a result there 
was little contact between the Butana and their peers in other states. Third, the Lahawiyin 
were always concerned that the umudiyyas, which were further away, could more easily be 
absorbed or assimilated by others. The three motives are closely inter- linked.  
 
For many years up to 1998 the Lahawiyin had not formed any networks or organisations 
except for the Lahawiyin tribal conference which was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Following that conference the late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, who felt the need to keep 
the momentum going, adopted the idea of initiating a form of association to bring the whole 
tribe together. After his death Sheikh al-Eiser of the Sowar umudiyya pursued the idea and 
cherished it with the help of others until the Rabitaa was registered. It was chaired by the 
Commissioner of al Girba, Sayed Hamduk.57 The Rabitaa developed gradually to become an 
institution that served the political agenda of the tribe. Like many other such associations in 
Sudan, it became attractive to the young generation, particularly among Lahawiyin university 
students. It strengthened their tribal identity and acted as a framework for collective social 
and political activities in the name of the Lahawiyin; however, this was not strongly felt at 
the local political level in Showak area.  
 
A/Salam argued,  
The political impact of social associations based on ethnic ties was tempered by 
circumstances of organizational strength and position. Organizational resources 
are most readily mobilized for defensive politics, that is, when a basic tenet of 
the ethnic group, ultimately its survival, is threatened.58  
 
However, within the outlined policies of the INF government, political and social policies 
could only survive without the support of institutions like al Rabitta and the like through 
transformation of these tribal associations into political parties which would serve the 
interests of a specific ethnic, tribal or regional constituency.  
 
The Lahawiyin were also concerned with the growth of the population of other tribes, such as 
the Shukriyya and the Fellatta. The negotiations between the NCP and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement which led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had encouraged 
                                                 
56 For instance, those Lahawiyin in Gezira were represented by the Masselamia; in Sennar by the Kawahla tribe; 
and in the Blue Nile by the Rufaa al Hoy. 
57 Interview with al Zein Ahmed al Zein, member of the National Assembly, January 2008, Gedarif.  
58 Elfatih A. A/Salam, ‘The politicization of ethnic sentiments in the Sudan: implications for nation-building’, 
the International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/  
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ideas about the sharing of power and wealth, and how these might be linked to population: a 
number of Lahawiyin suggested that the increase in population could be used as a strong 
argument for Lahawiyin claims. This argument was presented not by the everyday Lahawiyin 
but by those who were involved in the civil service.59  It was hoped that having a single 
association would consolidate the tribe’s position, as well as helping them express their need 
for basic services such as education and health. Literacy among the tribe members was low. 
Although Rabitaa abnaa al- Lahawiyin contributed to the consolidation of the tribal position 
it did not receive political recognition from the local authorities and was not taken as a 
legitimate body as it was considered a social organisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
59  This was the pattern of views among most informants who worked in government institutions. Laymen 
Lahawiyin presented another interesting argument which was related to an increase in herds rather than the 
population of the tribe.  
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5. Al -Bayaa: making formal alliances with the National Islamic Party 
1998 
 
The establishment of the Rabitaa coincided with the swearing of an oath of loyaty to the 
government by some Lahawiyin leaders. In 1998, a Lahawiyi delegation to Khartoum swore 
an oath of loyalty to the National Islamic Party when they met with al-Turabi their second 
meeting with him since 1996. The delegation had already visited President al-Bashir, thereby 
putting their claim to the highest authority in the country. However, al-Bashir did not make 
any formal commitment to grant them the nazirate and delegated the Minister of Federal 
Government to pursue the matter. The Lahawiyin meeting with al-Turabi led to both their 
oath and to a verbal commitment from Turabi to support their claim for a anzirate. Obviously, 
al-Turabi felt compelled not to let the Lahawiyin down because as the leader of the Islamic 
Front he wanted to build new alliances in a region that was highly dominated by the 
Khatmiyya. Furthermore, he thought that the rising conflict in the Eastern Region over 
resources might bring him a new footing. It may also have been related to the subtle rivalry 
between al-Turabi and al-Bashir over power, which would soon lead to a rift between the 
two. Whatever the reason, the meeting seemed to be the winning step for the Lahawiyin in 
their quest for land.  
 
This oath, al-Bayaa, filled a gap left by the Rabitaa which was a social-cultural organisation 
from which people expected to hear about welfare issues and services.  Al-Bayaa acted 
complementarily to the Rabitaa by providing the political dimension. Rabitaa and al-Bayaa, 
became two linked processes carefully maintained by the Lahawiyin. However, the two 
processes presented a challenge to neighbouring tribes and threatened the Shukriyia.   
By granting al-Bayaa (oath) to the government the Lahawiyin entered formal political 
alliances. Perhaps as a tribe the Lahawiyin underestimated the impact of such an oath and 
what it would mean in terms of their relationship with the government, which had taken into 
account a long-term commitment defined. More than that the Lahawiyin focused on 
competing with other groups over the emerging boundaries.60  
The Lahawiyin leadership anticipated that the combination of the oath, and the cultural work 
of the Rabitaa, would offer a special position among the alliances which other tribes in 
eastern Sudan had already established with Khartoum. This agreement created a new form of 
                                                 
60 Isak Niehaus ‘Lowveld Ethnicity and the Boundaries of Belonging: Reconfiguring Shangaan Identity in the 
South of African’, 101 African Affairs (2002), pp. 557-583. 
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clientialism between the Lahawiyin and the government which would guarantee the former 
legalised status and space in which to manoeuvre. This was based on long-standing worries 
over the roles of the Shukriyya and Bawadra.   
 
Only by looking at al-Bayaa, can one comprehend the threats posed to the parties in its 
signing. At the time most Lahawiyin, in so far as they had any political allegiance, gave it to 
one of the two parties which were associated with the sectarian leaders: the DUP 
(Khatmiyya) and the Umma (Ansar). These had been excluded from government and banned 
from operation since 1989, but remained influential. Al-Bayaa was undertaken by the leaders 
and sheikhs of the tribe but the majority still supported Ansar or Khatmiyya.  Such multiple 
ties of allegiance did not necessarily trouble individuals; as one professional Lahawi man 
explained: “We are Muslim and this al-bayaa is for the Shari’a, but we remain Ansar and 
Khatmiyya, for a long time we have been so.”61 The Lahawiyin were familiar with crossing 
boundaries that did not contradict tribal independence. 
 
Al-Bayaa showed how the performance of an oath of loyalty by the Lahawiyin contributed 
towards an institutionalisation of an Arab identity, which was depicted in relation to the 
government as suggested by al-Turabi. As has also been argued by Comaroff, ‘their construct 
is wrought in the particularities of ongoing historical construction.’62 
Put more simply, the Lahawiyin presentation of their Arab identity implicated others 
including neighbouring tribes such as ex-slaves, Fellatta and Taisha, and also the 
government.63 A group of former civil servants and politicians deployed this Arab identity to 
mobilise a governmental political constituency for their claim for the nazirate that might 
grant them a dar?64 The manipulation of identity by the tribe was possible precisely because 
the government attached it such importance. 
 
A representative group from the delegation was assigned the task of meeting the Minister of 
the Federal Government in Khartoum. 65  After the meeting with Turabi and the Minister of 
                                                 
61 Interview with a Lahawi man (who requested to remain anonymous), January 2008, Gedarif.   
62J.L. Comaroff, ‘Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Differences’, quoted in Lowveld, [NIEHAUS?] 
‘Ethnicity and the Boundaries of Belonging’, p. 166. 
63 Gerd Bauman, Contesting Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 97-116. Quoted in Lowveld, 
[??] ‘Ethnicity and the Boundaries of Belonging’.  
64 Lowveld, [??]‘Ethnicity and the Boundaries of Belonging’, p. 6. See also Harries, ‘Exclusion, Classification 
and Internal Colonialism’. See Patrick Harries, Works, Culture and Identity: Migrant Labourers in Mozambique 
and South Africa, 1860-1910 (Portsmouth, N.H. : Heinemann, 1994). 
65 Among the representatives were Ahmed Jebel, the late sheikh al Rudda, and sheikh Yousuf Hassab al-Gawi. 
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the Federal Government a sub-committee from the delegation was established and was 
assigned specific tasks. The establishment of a tribal Majlis al-Shuraa and the selection of a 
nazir were close at hand. 
 
Immediately after the delegation returned to al-Showak, they took a number of practical 
measures; the claim of the nazirate at state level had to be presented to the state authorities 
including the state Wali and the State Legislative Assembly. At this point they also 
established a small subcommittee to monitor the issue. The delegation repeated the visit to 
Gedarif Wali Mohamed Ahmed al-Dalil. The Minister of Federal Government responded by 
sending a formal letter to the state government in Gedarif to encourage the establishment of 
the nazirate. 66 The follow-up sub-committee represented al-Faki and Hardan umudiyyas and 
was composed of three members, al Zein Adam al Zein, the Sheikh Khut Lahawiyin (who 
was accompanied by his nephew al Zein Ahmed al Zein), Yousuf Hasab al-Gawi, the Deputy 
President of the Legislative Council for Showak area, and Ahmed Jabal, the Director General 
of Youth and Sport in Gedarif. 
 
It is noteworthy that the nephew of Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein obtained that close position 
and held prominent position at most political and social events. Al Zein Ahmed al Zein, one 
of the five sons of Sheikh Ahmed al Zein, wakil khut of the Lahawiyin, was always the 
closest son to his father. He bore a strong likeness to his father, and was said to have acquired 
much of his late father’s (Sheikh Ahmed al Zein) charismatic character and personality, and 
shrewdness.67  He was actively involved in the purchase of camels and was aware of the 
market transactions and dynamics in Showak. His experience accommodated all sorts of 
skills, from deals to negotiation. Al Zein Ahmed al Zein began his career as a school teacher 
which made him popular among many Lahawiyin because he worked in the Lahawiyin’s only 
primary school. His teaching provided him with the opportunity to become acquainted with 
most of the parents and families, as well as giving him early contact with the Local Council 
Authority and the Ministry of Education. 68    
 
 
                                                 
66 The letter was not available to the researcher but the researcher was informed by sheikh al Zein Ahmed al 
Zein that a letter had been issued on the matter and was held by the State Government of Gedarif.  
67 Interview with a Lahawi man (who requested to remain anonymous), January 2008, Gedarif.   
68 Interview with al Zein Ahmed al Zein, member of the National Assembly, December 2007, January 2008, 
Gedarif. 
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6. Being Arab and being Lahawiyin 
 
The leadership of the Lahawiyin had three encounters with al-Turabi. After the first 
encounter in 1996 and 1998, they paid a third visit to him in 2005  when al-Turabi’s own 
position was very different: no longer a member of the ruling party, he was now a persistent 
(if not entirely consistent) critic of the government, who continued to engage in politics with 
groups who considered themselves to be marginal. The 2005 delegation that went to meet al-
Turabi was a little different in composition to that of 1996, and its nature reflected the 
complex interplay between local and national politics and the changing way in which 
Lahawiyin leaders were trying to build a constituency and reshaping identity as they did so. 
The delegation was composed of five members of the Lahawiyin tribe who were selected as 
representatives to go to Khartoum to meet with al-Turabi, whose opposition party was now 
called the Popular Congress Party. The delegation included Sheikh Yousuf Hasab al-Gawi 
and the late sheikh, the former deputy president of the Legislative Council of al-Showak, 
Araki Mohamed Araki umda of al-Gaborab umudiyya, Sheikh Ahmed Jebel from Hardan 
umudiyya, Sheikh al Zein  Adam al Zein  of al Faki umudiyya and the Sheikh Hassabo. 69 
  
The inclusion of Sheikh Hassabo was crucial, for this made the 2005 delegation a mixture of 
Lahawiyin and members of ex-slave families from Mugataa al-Suq. The intention of the 
Lahawiyin leadership in deciding the composition of the delegation was clear. The delegates 
were eager to impress al-Turabi.70 Al-Turabi himself had been increasingly critical of the 
marginalization of non-Arab groups by the Sudanese government, particularly in the context 
of the developing violent conflicts in northern Sudan. Even before the outbreak of large-scale 
violence in the western Sudanese region of Darfur in 2003, there had been a running low-
level insurgency in eastern Sudan, which drew its energy from the sense of many in the east – 
including non-Arabs – that the Sudanese state was not only indifferent to their needs, but had 
actively contributed to their impoverishment. Al-Turabi was widely suspected of encouraging 
this regional disaffection, in the context of his political dispute with his former colleagues in 
the government, and he had publicly used the universalistic and egalitarian element of Islam 
– the insistence that all Muslims were equal – to critique the policies of the government. Al-
                                                 
69 Late sheikh al-Rudda was the member who was referred to  in al-Turabi’s  statement as an ex-slave  
70 Interview with Sheikh Yousuf Hassab al-Gawi, December 2007, al-Showak 
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Turabi’s vision for an Islamic community ‘without border’ presumably would include both 
Arabs and non-Arabs.71  
 
The Lahawiyin delegation was responding to this wider political dynamic, as they continued 
to pursue their goal of a nazirate, and the control over land which this might offer. They 
wanted to show that diversity mattered to them and that the tribe would cater for all its 
members whether they were ex-slaves or masters. It was all about getting the objectives of 
the visit achieved and therefore was sheer political manoeuvre. There was another reason for 
having an ex-slave in the delegation which was rather linked to his personal qualities.  Sheikh 
Hassabo was articulate and knowledgeable about the history of the other Lahawiyin tribes in 
the Butana as well as the area itself. His ancestors were also ‘privileged among the slaves’72 
and thus close to the ruling family of al Zein  al Faki umudiyya, having attended most of their 
meetings and accompanied them in their movements (particularly Sheikh al Zein  Adam al 
Zein , the head of the tribe and his brother Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein ).73  
 
But this gambit backfired, in ways which were very revealing of the continued power of ideas 
about Arab identity and Arab distinctiveness. The composition of the delegation shocked al-
Turabi when he first saw them. He welcomed the delegation with the words Mali Araa fikum 
Tabayunan – ‘why do I see diversity among you?’ The members of the delegation took this 
as a rebuff, and an explicit criticism of their decision to involve ex-slave families.74 Al-Turabi 
indicated that he had expected all the delegates to be Lahawiyin and not mixed and this 
astonished them: al-Turabi’s message was clearly that being a ‘Lahawi’ was being ‘Arab’.   
 
This contradiction was perhaps unsurprising; when he had been a member of the 
government, al-Turabi had been party to decisions which clearly assumed that Arab tribes 
should be distinct, and should not be subject to non-Arab ‘native administrations’: the 
division of dar Masalit between the Masalit and Arab tribes in Western Darfur State and the 
establishment of Rashaida Administration in a formerly Hadandawa dar each demonstrated 
this belief in the need for Arab distinction. 75 As Burr and Collins argued, ‘al-Turabi had a 
                                                 
71 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan; Hassan al-Turabi, pp.6-75-79. 
72 Interview with Yousuf Hassab al-Gawi, January 2008, al-Showak 
73 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General, Statistic Department, January 2008, Gedarif and with Yousuf 
Hassab al-Gawi, January 2008, al-Showak 
74 Interview with Yousuf Hasab al-Gawi Yousuf , Deputy President al-Showak Legislative Council  , January 
2008, al-Showak 
75 Assal1 and Ali, ‘Eastern Sudan, ‘Challenges facing the implementation of the peace agreement’,pp.1-10 
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strong sense of his own superiority, and was notorious for his arrogance: al-Turabi himself 
was a member of the Sudanese elite and an intellectual snob. He believed that the people 
should be led by the learned in the ICF [Islamic Charter Front]’76 
 
So, despite his rhetoric of equality, the presence of a member of a former slave family 
offended al-Turabi’s sense of propriety and his ideas about Arab identity. The response of the 
delegates varied according to Sheikh Yousuf:  
   
Some had just smiled and some of us had to reply to him but with courtesy and 
keeping a low profile so as not to embarrass ‘akhouna’ [our brother] in the 
delegation.”77  
 
 
To conclude, the 1990s local Government ordinances and revived Native Administration had 
granted the Lahawiyin a limited representation in political institutions. The mechanisation of 
rain-fed areas expanded at the expense of the grazing lands and commercialisation of fodder 
and water set a context in which young, educated Lahawiyin resorted to a new form of power 
and political representations in the hierarchy of political institutions as well as building 
economic authority through ownership of mechanised farming.  Federalism allowed some 
tribes the authority to practise limited power within the new structure of administration of 
local rural councils, alongside the power and authority associated with revived institutions of 
native administration. 
While doing so, internal dynamics between the umudiyyas continued and strong allegiances 
developed to bargain for a Lahawiyin nazirate, and at the same time to challenge wad al Zein 
’s leadership. However, the other Lahawiyin umudiyyas seemed to be ready to accept wad 
Hardan’s leadership on the grounds that the tribe’s political legitimacy would be maintained. 
In other words nazirate was an issue strong enough to unify the Lahawiyin umudiyyas under 
any viable umudiyya leadership. The Lahawiyin case also showed that, at the regional level, 
the issue of revived Native Administration was not simply a matter of marginalizing the 
"educated Sudanese elite" versus "the traditional leadership".  
                                                 
76 J. Millard Burr and Robert O’Collins, Revolutionary Sudan; Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamic State 1989-
2000, (Leiden Bill, 2003), p.7.  
77 Interview with Sheikh Yousuf Hassab al Gawi, December 2007, al-Showak 
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The Shukriyya rejected the Lahawiyin claim for a nazirate and considered it unfounded. They 
believed that this claim would not be awarded as long as the Shukriyya remained the official 
lords of the Butana. The issues of the revival of a kind of Native Administration transcended 
political affiliation. Supporters of or opponents to this kind of administrative system could 
belong to any political party or ideology. The distinction relied mainly on economic criteria. 
Moreover the Lahawiyin’s claim for nazirate combined the issues of pasture and grazing land 
with questions of political gain, position and authority in the Butana. The Lahawiyin, faced 
by new economical and political dynamics, were led to a new way of thinking regarding their 
identity and dar. 
 
 
  
241 
 
7. ‘Majlis Shuraa Al- Lahawiyin’ (Hayat Shuraa Al- Lahawiyin) 2005 
 
The 2003 Local Government Act separated the executive organ from the legislative organ of 
the locality, established an elected legislative council, defined the local council competencies 
and specified local financial resources.78  
In 2005 al Zein Ahmed al Zein was appointed a member of the National Assembly of 
Khartoum. Such a position put him in contact with many politicians and tribal leaders and his 
knowledge, authority and power now exceeded that of his uncle, the head of the Lahawiyin. 
He became an important figure to the Lahawiyin tribe with growing power and authority, and 
hepresented many issues to the local and national authorities; according to some, doing so in 
ways which would ‘suit al-Faki umudiyyas’ interest.’ 79  al Zein Ahmed al Zein was 
sufficiently popular to gain the consent of most of the umudiyya. and he continued to provide 
advice to his uncle on both large and small matters of the Lahawiyin,80 which entailed the 
family’s rule over tribal affairs. In addition, family consent from his brothers and their 
families gave him the necessary loyalty to support him in his new endeavour. This helped to 
remove plots against him by those thinking of competing for the leadership or undermining 
the confidence of his uncle. Furthermore, al Zein Ahmed al Zein did not meet any rivalry 
from his cousins, the sons of Sheikh al Zein Ahmed al Zein.  
 
The leading group of the Lahawiyin began to use diverse processes for manipulating the al-
Bayaa and to encourage ordinary Lahawiyin to adopt terms of their own definition as the 
basis for collective assertion, ‘Majlis [Hayat] al- Shuraa al-Lahawiyin. 
 
On becoming a member of the National Assembly Sheikh al Zein Ahmed al Zein emerged as 
a new leader among the Lahawiyin, leading the tribe vigorously with a political stance almost 
equal to their host, the Shukriyya, and much better than most Lahawiyin had anticipated. He 
was active in certain institutions (the Association and the Shuraa) that were intended to serve 
the quest for the nazirate. 
 
                                                 
78 Dr. Omer Awadalla Ali, ‘Local Government in Sudan during the Interim Period–Inputs from Switzerland’, 
Final Draft, May 2008, Khartoum, pp.7-9. 
79 Interview with a Lahawi man (who requested to remain anonymous), January 2008, Gedarif.   
80 Interview with al Zein Ahmed al Zein, member of the National Assembly, January 2008, Gedarif. In 1996 the 
researcher lived at the premises of the late sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein in Mugataa wad al Zein for two months. 
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In this section the argument is that while the Association would serve the Lahawiyin’s 
internal consolidation and authority it might not grant them the nazirate if the Shukriyya were 
to strongly oppose it. The Lahawiyin assumed tha t by establishing the Confederation they 
would be treated as equals to the Shukriyia which may help the grant ing of the nazirate. The 
absence of client tribes would be a determining factor in the Lahawiyin being given the title 
Confederation unless each umudiyyas was treated as an independent unit and each umda was 
treated as a head of his unit by the ruling family of al-Faki umudiyya. This might bring about 
a notion of a cliental relationship between the various Lahawiyin umudiyyas, which the 
Lahawiyin had previously resisted. However what really mattered to the Lahawiyin was not 
the name, Confederation or Majlis Shuraa, but the authority and power that it would bring.   
 
Majlis Shuraa al-Lahawiyin or Hayat Shuraa al-Lahawiyi’ is a body similar to a 
Confederation to which the Lahawiyin tribe resorted; the titles were used synomously. 
However, for the prupose of consistency the resaerch will use Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin. 
It is always easy to rally people to a cause but not as easy to maintain the momentum after 
achieving the cause. The call for a tribal confederation gradually increased following the 
rapprochement brought about by the peace agreement and the Lahawiyin’s concern about 
losing the opportunity to call for a nazirate. This proved to be the motive for the call for a 
general meeting which took place in 2007.81 
The majlis aimed to enlist the Lahawiyin population and uniting them as one tribe. In a 
complete departure from the cultural idealization of nomadism which had once characterized 
Lahwiyin discourse on identity, it also called for the settlement and sedentarisation of the 
tribe in order to help provide them with basic services. In addition it highlighted the 
importance of obtaining education and literacy for the tribal members. Furthermore it stressed 
the importance of documenting and preserving important tribal culture and norms.  
 
Following the terms of the mandate 82  of the Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin, the council 
worked as an advisory board to the person selected to be the Nazir, al Zein Adam al Zein, and  
would also shoulder the responsibility of running the Lahawiyin nazirate once it gained 
approval. In addition, the council sought to maintain strong relations with neighbouring tribes 
in the Atbara River and Butana areas.  
                                                 
81 Interview with Dr Abdullahi Musa, State Ministry of Health, May 2009, Gedarif.  
82 A draft of the mandate of the Majlis al Shuraa, its constitution and a list of membership of umudiyyas and 
their umdas.  
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All the umudiyya which participated in the formation of Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin 
headed by their umdas (Ahmed Ibrahim Fadallah for Hardan; Ibrahim Jumaa Idris for Sowar; 
Ali Abdel Gadir Abdalla for Magit; Abdalla Ibrahim Ahmed for al-Faki; Barakat Ahmed al-
Eiesir for Isa; Hasab al-Gawi Hasab Allah for Gaborab; Ali al Zein Abu Jumaa for Gawamis; 
and Mohamed Fadallah for Balulab) were members of the council. 83  They acted as one 
constituency for the Lahawiyin tribe and suggested that the council should be the advisory 
body to Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein in order to preserve the right of each umudiyya. 
 
Looking at the composition of the membership list of Majlis al-Shuraa one realises that the 
presidency was given symbolically to the former Sheikh Khut of the tribe, Sheikh al Zein 
Adam al Zein. However, the executive members were carefully chosen. They represented a 
group of educated and senior officials in the civil service belonging to Hardan, Guborab and 
al Faki. However, the majority (44) were from Hardan, highlighting the hegemony of those 
three umudiyyas.84  
 
The dynamic behind the organisation to set up the meeting was characterised by constant and 
committed work that involved several Lahawiyin who had the resources to deliver the 
message attractively to their peers in other states. Any misunderstanding about the agenda of 
the meeting might have might have caused unnecessary delays to the holding of the meeting. 
The Lahawiyin were in a race with events in the east and they wanted to set out their 
demands within the political offices in Gedarif and in Khartoum. They wanted a commitment 
from the government before any changes might take place. However, there was a further level 
of political manipulation from within the Lahawiyin by those who were seeking political 
positions. There was a fresh move by a number of the active elite members of the Eastern 
Front. At this juncture the issues of the nazirate and land became more or less politically 
intolerable and were alternatively used. Having said this, representatives from the six states, 
Khartoum, Gedarif, Gezira, Sinnar, Blue Nile and the White Nile responded to the call for a 
meeting at which the tribe could collectively announce the nazirate. 85  
                                                 
83 List of members (Umdas) of the Majlis al Shuraa. 
84 Majlis al Shuraa Lahawiyin, a document presented by Dr Abdalla Musa al-Bashir. 
85 Majlis al Shuraa Lahawiyin, a document presented by Dr Abdalla Musa al-Bashir. 
244 
 
8. Renewal of “al-bayaa” 2007 
 
A meeting was arranged to take place in 2007 in Gedarif at the Amanat al-Hukuma (the State 
Government Building). The meeting was a venue to renew the Lahawiyin al-bayaa (oath) to 
the government, with much wider participation   at state level to the Wali of Gedarif, who 
also represented the National Islamic Party. The Lahawiyin addressed him in the following 
letter that asserted not only their loyalty but their continuing claim for the nazirate: 
 
We address you today with happiness filling our hearts, we, the sons of the 
Lahawiyin tribe. We address you to meet with you, our dear Governor, in order to 
renew our support for religion, remaining loyal to the support given by our 
forefathers, and to extend this support to the President of the Republic, Field 
Marshal Omer al-Beshir, confirming our previous pledge of allegiance to him. Our 
dear Governor, we come to you not to say that we are oppressed or marginalised, 
for we are certain of this. Rather, we come to you to tell you that we are ready, 
behind the leader, to support the laws of Allah to which we are committed.  
 
Our dear Governor, we come to you to tell you that we have ambitions and 
aspirations to have a nazirate for the Lahawiyin, an institution  that goes in line 
with our abilities and aspiration, not being the enemies of any man, or even the 
enemies of our main opponents, the Shukriyya, the ancient loyal tribe to which we 
have been joined by the closest relations throughout the previous eras, and for 
whom we have complete respect and hold in high esteem, reflected in their great 
leader Abu Sin and those behind him. True to the words of the leader of the Butana 
region, who said that the Butana had become a culture for all who live among its 
tribes, we uphold this culture which was founded by the people of the Butana.  
 
Our dear Governor and President of the National Congress Party in the State, we 
aspire to assimilate with this tribe with respect to various services. We have already 
told you that we are not marginalised, but we are not fully assimilated either. 
Taking part in the different forms of governance, the executive and legislative body 
in particular, is strengthening for the leadership of the tribe, enabling them to 
perform their role among the people effectively in the future, which, through 
elections, requires efforts at securing a project of cultural salvation and the unity of 
Sudan, strong and stable, God willing.  
 
We come to you as a group of leaders to confirm to you that we will be of 
assistance to you in carrying out your development and political projects, through 
our commitment to all of the tasks entrusted to us for this project, assisting with 
both money and manpower.  
 
We would also like to commend your efforts in developing the state that you have 
cherished and cared for. We regard the abundance of agriculture as a good omen, 
and we hope that you will help us to invest completely, ensuring infrastructure such 
as roads and mechanical aids for the modernisation of agric ulture, as well as 
livestock, which we hope will profit from this abundance, as this is an integral part 
of agriculture, ensuring a decent life and stability for the keepers of this livestock.  
 
We are delighted to tell you, our dear Governor, that we have now taken steps to 
set up framework and institutions within the tribe, enabling us to perform our 
active roles in society and in politics, as well as strengthen relations between 
individual tribe members and inter-tribal relations, thus strengthening the principles 
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of peace and peaceful coexistence between citizens, in the hope that the basis of 
any effort will prevail in the state in its entirety, preserving the social fabric within 
the state.  In conclusion, we would like to thank you, our dear Governor, for 
allowing us this opportunity to let you hear of our aspirations and see for yourself 
our stance with regards the National Congress Party and our support for it. May it 
satisfy Allah and His Messenger.86 
 
The letter, in which the Lahawiyin stated their grievances at being not fully assimilated, their 
need for a nazirate, while also offering their respects to neighbouring tribes, specifically the 
Shukriyya tribe, was presented to the Wali. The meeting was headed by the Wali, a minister 
and a commissioner who was the only Lahawi among the higher status attendants. 
Interestingly, the commissioner was there in his capacity as a Lahawi and not as a 
representative of the Eastern Front. Again this shows the strong attachment the Lahawiyin 
have towards their tribal identity. The commissioner was choosing to show his tribal 
membership before his political affiliation, as this would give him protection and strength and 
would also support his authority were he to be appointed for any tribal position. The tribe 
backed him and his involvement in Eastern Front politics might possibly be a facade for his 
possible aspiration to local and regional politics. A second aspect of this situation was the 
intermingling between local politics and internal tribal politics as shown by how each 
umudiyya sought to control or influence tribal affairs; some, notably the Gawamis, were 
deprived and thus excluded from such opportunities having being treated as late-comers to 
the Butana or in other words late sedentarised.  
 
The letter included five objectives in addition to the main goals of achieving the nazirate that 
Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin hoped to implement. The tribe then sought an official reply 
from the Wali on the issue of their claim to the nazirate to authenticate their request. The 
Lahawiyin went further in their demands; they wanted to have constitutional representation of 
the tribe in terms of secured positions such as the Wali, and ministerial posts. They also 
raised the need for specific services such as the extension of the Northern Rural Electricity 
Project to reach their villages along the Atbara River, in addition to a water supply system, 
and restructuring of schools and health services.  
 
After the approval of the Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin by the state authorities, it held four 
meetings during 2007 after the meeting with the Wali and one general meeting for 2008 and 
                                                 
86 Letter [AR] presented to the Wali of Gedarif state by the Lahawiyin representatives in July 2007, Gedarif. 
Translated by Michael Whiteside, Modern Language Centre?, Durham University October 2009.  
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2009. The meetings held showed several levels of participation and introduced new faces to 
tribal politics. One interesting change was the presence of women and youths. It was no 
longer exclusively the domain of the elderly nor a majlis for old men. The issues for 
discussion revolved around the nazirate, education and health. 87 
 
While the Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin was being introduced, the government allocated the 
Majlis a car. However, many of the Lahawiyin took this to be a signal of approval for the 
nazirate. Although the government had made no formal announcement of the nazirate, it had 
begun to offer assistance and to allow the Lahawiyin tribal sheikhs and dignitaries’ public 
space in which to negotiate. The interpretation of the offer of the car might have misled the 
Lahawiyin thus possibly bringing them into confrontation with the Shukriyya. Why would 
the government offer a car to a tribe that had contested with another tribe over land for so 
long? It can be argued that the government had been seriously thinking of the election and 
promising the Lahawiyin a nazirate might have been intended to appear impartial but  at the 
same time preserve the Shukriyya’s traditional and customary right to land. The government 
wanted to please both sides and thus giving the Lahawiyin partial success would serve both 
tribes’ interests while not damaging the government’s relations with either tribe. In doing so 
the government could guarantee security and stability in the region. This was interpreted by 
one Lahawi, thus: 
 
We think that the land we lived in for a century was never being claimed by anyone 
and no one had shared it or fought over it with us and we refer to the east and west 
of Atbara River. The same thing applied to our people in White Nile state. 88 
 
A new trend in the Lahawiyin argument for the nazirate was that land should not be the only 
reason to obtain a nazirate. It should be borne in mind that there was always a linkage of the 
nazirate and dar. However, being Lahawiyin the claim for nazirate was also a matter of status 
and a general assertion of Lahawiyin identity, as one sheikh put it: 
 
Every Sudanese national has a right to land and it is not a condition for nationality. 
We want to have our own identity, to keep our own originality. We rarely marry 
from outside the tribe because of this we preserve our identity.89 
                                                 
87 Most of  information on this page was extracted from documents [AR] on the establishment of the Majlis al-
Shuraa al-Lahawiyin, included list of membership, mandates and objectives.; Interviews  with Dr. Abdalla al 
Basher , Director Ministry of Health, December 2009, Gedarif; Interview with al Zein Ahmed Adam al Zein, 
Member of National Assembly Khartoum,  December 2009, Mugattaa. 
88 Interview with Yusuf Hassab al-Gawi December 2007, al-Showak. 
89 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director, Statistic Department, December 2007, Gedarif.  
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The Lahawiyin maintained that feeling of originality and purity to the extent that they 
believed their Arab identity could be distinguished by anyone entering any Lahawiyin 
village. For the Lahawiyin, identity was not simply a matter of the ‘consolidation of the 
pastoral ideal  which Spear has identified as so important for Maasai; for most Lahawiyin had 
by this time abandoned that idealand turned to land-owning. 90  But their Arab identity 
remained vital, still asserted through physical markers - the concern over skin colour, and the 
refusal to have body-marks. 
 
The Shukriyya response to this Lahawiyin agitation came in a collective decision by the nazir 
and his council members, which was expressedin a Wathiga[document] which was sent to the 
presidential office in Khartoum in 2007. 91  The Wathiga ranks as an official complaint 
presented to the higher authority. In this regard the Shukriyia wanted to confirm their rights 
to the land in Butana as well as in the Atbara River area. The Wathiga established that their 
dar covered the entire area extending from the Blue Nile to the Atbara River.  
 
Negotiations took place to resolve this tension. In this respect the Lahawiyin established that 
the Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin served the tribe socially by addressing the social needs of 
the tribe with the delegated authority of the people and it also addressed their main concern 
which is the nazirate. In addition, it established a mechanism for coordination between the 
tribe’s members all over Sudan. ‘Now we are owned by the Shukriyya. With Majlis al-
Shuraa al-Lahawiyin we can call for a nazirate and we can reach out for constitutional 
posts.’92 
 
The Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin provided the Lahawiyin with confidence to claim the 
nazirate. It was seen as the authority by which the tribe delegated and channelled its demands 
supported by contributions from members of the Majlis. In other words, the growing insights 
and knowledge of the tribe along with their  resources were used to support the argument. For 
instance, the Lahawiyin claimed (although there was no evidence for the figures they 
presented) that the tribe owned seven million camels, one and one half million sheep and one 
                                                 
90 Spear, (Being Maasai; Ethnicity and, Identity), p. 22. 
91 ‘The Lahawiyin is Claiming for a nazirate’, Alwan newspaper No. , 31 January 2007. 
92  Interview with Sheikh Siddig Yousif, member of the al-Showak Legislative Council, January 2008, al-
Showak. 
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million feddans of agricultural schemes.93 In their view this was evidence to back up and 
support being able to run their own affairs separately from the Shukriyya.  
 
In conclusion, the experience of the Lahawiyin was enduring in that there was a clear 
continuity of preserving an Arab identity throughout the process to claim the nazirate through 
social and political organisations (Rabitaa and Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin) as similarly  
argued by Spear that claim of a prestigious origins existed with other means (expansion of 
land rights) to legitimise their authorities. 94 
 
However the establishment of these political institutions helped the Lahawiyin grow 
politically close to the government at all levels which maintained their constructed image in a 
less cliental relationship than with their traditional master, the Shukriyia.  
 
The Lahawiyin also vowed to develop collective and individual land rights that would bring 
them onto an almost equal footing with their former rivals in Butana, the Bawadra. However 
the difference was that the Lahawiyin wanted to preserve the nomadic livelihood alongside 
agricultural scheme owners.  
 
The very recent events regarding the establishment of Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin and the 
reconstruction of an overall tribal unity revealed two aspects: the rejection of the tribal 
confederation; and the adoption of a more Islamic-sounding idea, al-Shuraa, that fitted in 
with al-Turabi’s earlier notion of an Islamic State. In this regard the Lahawiyin considered al-
Turabi an entry point to gain legitimacy and political authority. Their history shows also that 
they were not far from achieving their aspiration of the nazirate while carefully authenticating 
their Arabness. 
 
The peace agreement created havoc among many tribes of which the Lahawiyin was one. The 
opinion was that they were being marginalised and excluded by the main players in the 
region. When it came to peace dividends the Lahawiyin were excluded as Gedarif state was 
considered part of the east by the Eastern Front signatories. This also applied to other resident 
                                                 
93  Interview with Idris Hamid Mohamed and Ali Mohamed, Agric Inspectors, Pasture Department, State 
Ministry of Agriculture, December 2007, Gedarif.  
94 Derek Nurse and Thomas Spear, The Swahili; Reconstructing the History and Language of an African Society 
800-1500 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), pp. 85-98. See also Thomas Spear, Mountain 
farmers: moral economies of land and development in Arusha and Meru  (Oxford: James Currey, 1997).  
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tribes95 in Gedarif State; however, the Lahawiyin had a valid case because they were trying to 
avoid a cliental relationship with the Shukriyia that might curtail their opportunities. The 
Lahawiyin understood the implication of the peace agreement which only included Kassala 
and Red Sea states, thereby excluding Gedarif state. Thus the Lahawiyin expected the 
developmental projects and programmes resulting from the peace agreement to be granted to 
the two states, Kassala and Red Sea. One of the salient outcomes of the agreement related to 
the local government where article 18 stipulated the full right of the Eastern Sudan Front to 
nominate three administrators (mutamedin) in each of the three states (Kassala, Red Sea and 
Gedarif) of Eastern Sudan. In addition, five of the members of the assembly of each local 
government (mehalya) were to be appointed by the Eastern Front.96 This indicated in particular 
that dominance of the appointments would be from the Beja, the Bani Amir or the Rashayda 
minimizing any chance of other tribes being appointed.  Looking back at the Eastern Front and 
with the membership and their marginalisation in mind, the picture in Gedarif state was no 
different. It was evident that those tribes were also marginalised from political participation 
in comparison to the major groups in Khartoum. The Shukriyia, Lahawiyin, Bawadra, Fellatta 
and groups from Western Sudan were also excluded from the Eastern Sudan Front. 
According to Assal and Ali, the signing of the agreement was not warmly welcomed by a 
number of figures in Gedarif and the speaker of the State Legislative Assembly in Gedarif 
who represented the National Congress Party “resigned in protest over the provisions of the 
agreement.”97  
 
One implication that the Lahawiyin anticipated was that if there would be any new re-
structuring to the Butana tribes, the Lahawiyin would still be considered as under the 
Shukriyia. Another implication was that the Lahawiyin were scattered across the country 
which was perceived to weaken their Lahawi identity which underpinned their Arab identity 
and supported their claim for a nazirate. They believed that they needed a strong constituency 
which would enable them to win that claim and which might be the way to achieve their goal. 
                                                 
95 The tribes that constitute the five nazirates discussed earlier include the Teysha, Bakr, Bani Amir, Dabayna 
and Shukriya.  
96 “Two were Mutamedin Mehalyyat and one Mutamed Re’asi ; in Gadaref State one will be Mutamed Mehalyya 
and two will be Mutemedin Re’asi; and in the Red Sea State two will be Mutemedin Mehalyyat and one will be 
Mutemed Re’asi. [Also] The Parties agree that as long as the total number of Eastern Front nominees in the 
assemblies of the local governments is maintained there can be variance in the number of Eastern Front 
nominees in each local government (Meahalya)See    Eastern  Sudan Agreement, www.sudantribune.p. 15.  
97  Manzul A. M. Assal and Samai A. M. Ali, Eastern Sudan: Challenges Facing the Implementation of the 
Peace Agreement in Gedarif State’, ISS Situation Report, 20 Nov. 2007, pp. 1-10. 
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The 2008 census 98 was considered a way of showing the real weight of the tribe; as Suleiman 
put it “we might be the largest in Butana.”99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 See the 2008 Censuses. Arabs constituted the largest proportion of the population but were not an overall 
majority, even in the north, where they accounted for around 40% of the total. They were followed by Dinka 
(12%), Beja (7%) and Fellatta (6%).The census also raised expectation among other ethnic groups in Sudan as 
stated by Santschi “that they would be provided with services by the government”. Martina Santschi,, Breifing 
Counting  ‘New Sudan’, African Affairs, 107/429, p.640. 
99 Interview with Ali Suleiman, Director General, Department of Statistics, December 2008, Gedarif.  
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Conclusion 
 
The main conclusion of this thesis is the enduring Arabness of the Lahawiyin identity. The 
introduction  stated that the history of this identity – and the stories of the past which have 
been told around it – offer a new insight on the nature of Arab identity and the complex 
relationship between authority, land and group identity.   
 
Much of the existing literature on Arab identity in Sudan has tended to view it either as 
something racial and longstanding, or as something recently invented and imposed by 
dominant cultures and government policies. However, this thesis shows a long historical 
process of producing and sustaining an Arab identity by a particular ethnic group which has 
largely been ignored in the existing literature, i.e. the Lahawiyin. By studying one small 
group in detail, the thesis challenges the simplistic assumptions about Arab identity that have 
been so divisive in Sudanese history, and it shows how internal and external factors combine 
to make particular identities valuable and meaningful.  
 
The thesis explains how, at the  beginning of the twentieth century, the Lahawiyin left 
Kordofan because of their reluctance to be incorporated into a ‘Kababish’ identity, and their 
dislike of the tax and tribute requirements imposed by Ali el Tom.  The Lahawiyin expressed 
their concern through questioning the Arabness of the Kababish; and Mohamed wad al-Zein, 
having been an amir during the Mahdiyya, used these concerns to develop a new style of 
leadership for the Lahawiyin as a whole. He led the movement to Butana, a process that 
witnessed internal restructuring of the tribe and more power struggles between its sheikhs.  
 
Under Condominium rule, the administrative demands of the colonial state and its attempts to 
impose grazing controls and boundaries encouraged the emergence of a new, more 
centralized authority within the Lahawiyin. Sheikh el-Igba was removed as a result of 
illegally grazing camels across a boundary, and Sheikh Adam al Zein’s appointment as sheikh 
khut created the Lahawiyin as a single administrative unit in its own right. Now Adam al Zein 
stood between the nazir of Shukriyya and his people, and while the government’s relationship 
with Adam el Zein may have made him unpopular among his own people, it also gave a 
political focus to the feeling of distinctiveness among the Lahawiyin.  
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In Butana, Lahawiyin wealth was initially based on camels; at the same time the cross-border 
trade, particularly in slaves, was an important source of wealth, and Lahawiyin ideas of status 
placed a heavy premium on the use of slaves for certain kinds of work. Maintaining these 
resources, particularly camels, required the crossing of administrative, grazing and national 
boundaries; and was also bound up with the assertion of a distinctive Arabness. As chapter 
four shows, there was a steady process of locating authority in local councils and courts, 
which partly ran against the previous policy of decentralised power through the tribal sheikhs. 
These local government bodies, finances, powers and personnel were more or less dependent 
on the central government.100  
 
 
The later chapters of the thesis show how the post- independence government policies on land 
changed livelihoods and internal relations for the Lahawiyin. The New Halfa scheme offered 
the possibility of a new livelihood to some Lahawiyin who owned fewer camels, turning 
them into tenants on defined areas of land.  From independence up to the 1980s large grazing 
lands were appropriated by the mechanised farming schemes, making camel pastoralism 
effectively unsustainable. At the same time, the model of Lahawiyin engagement with the 
state which had developed since the early Condominium was disrupted by changes in 
government, which excluded traditional leaders from political representations, depriving 
them of power and authority and the ability to express resentments or exercise authority. By 
the mid-1980s increasing numbers of Lahawiyin were no longer camel-owners, but had 
become waged labourers, farmers or traders. This led to questions about an ‘Arab’ identity 
that had been built upon nomadic camel-herding (and slave-owning). But, as these chapters 
show, the Lahawiyin idea of their distinctive Arabness continued to be used by leading 
families to maintain their privileged position within the tribe, and at the same time to be 
central to way that ordinary Lahawiyin thought about their status and history. Only a small 
number of Lahawiyin lost their identity in this period, partly through their own decision, and 
partly through the reaction of others. Having resorted to wage labour to survive, these Ashraf 
developed a new identity which was shaped and formed by a new relationship of clientship 
and labour.    
 
                                                 
100 G.M.A. Bakheit, ‘The Condominium and Indirect Rule,’ in Howell (ed.), Local Government and Politics in 
the Sudan, pp.30-32. 
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Chapter six explores the consequences of the crises in pastoralist livelihood and state 
legitimacy from the mid 1980s. This saw a further shift in the political context in which 
Lahawiyin sought to negotiate their identity, and their access to resources. Although members 
of other umudiyya were increasingly influential and wealthy,  most Lahawiyin chose to 
continue to accept the established, if increasingly nominal hereditary leadership of al Faki 
umudiyya – represented by  Sheikh al Zein Adam al Zein, the holder of what one Lahawiyi 
called ‘leadership without portfolio’.101 This choice affirmed the consensus among the leaders 
of Lahawiyin umudiyyas on the issue of the nazirate; and in subsequent years an educated 
group of Lahawiyin leaders maintained their own claims to status, and the wider Lahawiyin 
claims to a privileged political position and access to land, through social and political 
organisations (Rabitaa and Majlis al-Shuraa al-Lahawiyin) and through seeking to exploit 
the anxieties of the state, offering themselves as loyal allies in a turbulent area. The 
establishment of these political institutions helped the Lahawiyin grow politically close to the 
government at all levels, reducing their cliental relationship with their traditional masters, the 
Shukriyia.  
 
The thesis argues that throughout these multiple changes, Lahawiyin identity has been closely 
linked with a particular idea of 'Arabness', which is defined by a nomadic existence, camel 
keeping, and the independence and mobility of male family heads. The thesis suggests that 
emphasis on an idealized Arabness has been cons istently maintained - even in a period where 
it has no longer been possible for most Lahawiyin to maintain that lifestyle. Unable to live 
the ideal lifestyle, Lahawiyin have nonetheless continued to try and maintain a group 
separation and political distinctiveness, perhaps as a surrogate for the lifestyle itself. 
 
The thesis has addressed the question: why has this relatively small group remained distinct, 
and committed to this particular idea of identity, in the face of enormous changes? The thesis 
suggests that the resilience of a distinctive Lahawiyin identity, which is closely linked to this 
idealized Arabness, has been partly due to the instrumental use of the idea by men who 
sought positions of authority as leaders of the Lahawiyin, and who have served as 
intermediaries between 'the Lahawiyin' and a succession of regimes. But more importantly, 
the self-reproducing culture of 'ordinary' Lahawiyin has also constantly reaffirmed this Arab 
identity. Lahawiyin subscribed to this idea because of an economic and social interest: they 
                                                 
101 Interview with Dr Abdalla al-Bashir Musa, Ministry of Health, Gedarif, December 2009. 
254 
 
believed that this was the best way to maintain their life style as nomads because it provided 
a basis for arguing their rights to move their herds in search of grazing and water, and 
because it underwrote their dominant relationship with slaves (and then ex-slaves). Even 
more fundamentally than this, the idealized idea of Arabness shaped Lahawiyin culture in a 
way that reproduced itself - Lahawiyin constantly talked about their past and their identity, 
and discussed behaviour (who they should marry, how they should relate to other people) in 
ways which asserted the importance of this distinction. This sustained an idea of themselves, 
and their rights and interests. 
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Appendices 
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Interview with Mohamed Fadallah, former Governor of al Fashaga Locality, Gedarif, June 
1996. 
 
Interview with the Late Sheikh Ahmed Adam al Zein, Former President of the Pastoralist 
Union and Khatib Khut, Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996 
 
Interview with the Sheikh al Bashir al Haj Musa, Umda Hardan , al Mansura , June 1996a 
and June 1997 
 
Interview with late Sheikh al-Bashir, Bawadra leader, Um Shajara, June 1996. 
 
Interview with Mohamed Hassan, Staff, Red Crescent, Showak, 1996/ 1997 
 
Interview with Awad al Karim Ahmed Adam al Zein, Ministry of Agriculture, Member of 
the Majlis Shuraa al Lahawiyin Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996, Showak December 2007. 
 
Interview with Babikir al Daw Shula, president of Pastoralist Union, Gedarif, Novembers 
/December 2007  
 
Interview with Siddig Yousef, Trader, Showak, June and 1996 December 2007. 
 
Interview with El Igba Ahmed Adam al Zein, a Driver and ‘Jurif’ Owner, Gedarif, 
December 2007. 
 
Interview with Dr. Adam El Hag Darusa, President Pastoralist Union, Khartoum June 2007. 
 
Interview with Sheikh Hassab al-Gawi, Othman Hasb al Gawi, Omda Jaburab,  Showak. 
December 2007. 
 
Interview with late sheikh al-Ruda, Former Head of Legislative Council, Showak, December 
2007. 
 
Interview with Mohamed Abder Rahman, Post-graduate Student, Faculty of Agriculture, 
Gadarif University, December 2007. 
 
Interview with Ali Abdel Sakhi, Member of the Majlis Shuraa al Lahawiyin, Showak, 
December 2007. 
 
Interview with Ali Al Zein Abu Jumaa, Umda Gawamis, Member of the Majlis Shuraa al 
Lahawiyin Showak, December, 2007. 
 
Interview with Ali Suleiman Ali Bakheit, Director General Department of Statistics, Gedarif, 
Gedarif November/December 2007 and January 2008 
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Interview with Anonymous Informants from Lahawiyin, Showak and Gedarif, December 
2007 and January 2008 
 
Group interview with Sheikhs Siddig Yusuf, Babikir Awad al Karim, Yousuf, al-Ruda, 
Showak, January 2008. 
 
Interview with Amna Mahmoud, Deputy Manager, Ministry of Agriculture, Gedarif, January 
2008. 
 
Interview with Salah Shashug, Executive Director of Showak ‘Mahaliya’ [Municipality], 
Showak, January 2008. 
 
Interview with Mohmed, Ali, Inspector Nomad’s Education, Showak Mahaliya 
[Municipality], Showak, January 2008 
 
Interview with Prof Mohamed Awad Salih, Chancellor, Gedarif University, Gedarif, 
December 2007/January 2008.  
 
Interview with  Dr. Abdel Moneim Yousuf, Historian, Dean High Studies, University of 
Gedaef, Gedarif, December 2007 and January 2008.  
 
Interview with Dr. Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri-
Columbia, Durham, September 2008. 
  
Group interview with Lahawiyin Sheikhs, Gedarif., December 2007 and January 2008.  
 
Interview with Yousuf Hassab al-Gawi, Member of the Majlis Shuraa al Lahawiyin al-
Showak, January 2008. 
 
Interview with Siddig Yusuf, Agricultural Scheme and Jurif Owner  Showak, January 2008. 
 
Interview with Idris Hamid Mohamed, Agricultural Inspector, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Gedarif, January 2008. 
 
Interview with Ali Mohamed, Agricultural Inspector, Ministry of Agriculture, Gadarif, 
January 2008. 
 
Interview with Abdalla Suleiman Amir, Former Deputy Governor of Gezira State and a 
District Administrator for Lahawiyin (1964), Gedarif, December, 2007 and January 2008. 
 
Interview with Eid al Zein Adam al Zein, Agricultural Scheme and jurif Owner, and Member 
of the Majlis Shuraa al Lahawiyin January   2008 and 2009. 
 
Interview with Mohamed??, Primary School Teacher, Mugattaa wad al Zein, December 
2009. 
 
Interview with Dr Abdalla al-Bashir Musa, Director Primary Health Care,, Ministry of 
Health, Gedarif, December 2009. 
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Interview with Ahmed Mohamed Jebel, Former President of Showak Rural Council, former 
Director General of Hihger Council for Sport and Youth and Member of the State Legislative 
Council and Member of the Majlis Shuraa al Lahawiyin, Gedarif, December 2009. 
 
Interview with Mohamed Idris, Representative of National Congress Party for Showak, 
Mugatta wad al Zein, 1996, 2008 and 2009. 
 
Interview with Haja Bakhita, Widow of Late Sheik Ahmed al Zein,  Mugatta a wad al Zein, 
June 1996, December 2008 and December 2009. 
 
Interviews with Anonymous women from Lahawiyin and members of late Sheikh Ahmed al 
Zein Adam al Zein’s Family, Mugatta wad al Zein, 1996, 2007, 2008. 
 
Interviews with Anonymous Women from Mugatta A Suq, 1996, December 2007 
 
Group interview with Lahawi Women, Mugatta wad al Zein, June 1996, December 2008 and 
December 2009. 
 
Interview with Samia Abdalla, Dean Community Development College, Gedarif University 
November/ December 2007 /January 2008 and December 2009. 
 
Interview with al Zein Ahmed al Zein, Member of the National Assembly, Member of the 
Majlis Shuraa al Lahawiyin June 1996 Mugatta wad al Zein, December 2007, Gedarif 
January 2008, Mugatta wad al Zein December 2009 and a telephone interview July 2010. 
 
Interview with Babikir Awad al-Karim Babikir, Historian and Local Radio presenter, 
Showak Rural Council, December 2007, January 2008, December 2009 and . and a telephone 
interview July 2010 
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Main Lahawiyin Settlements in Al Showak Rural Council  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
295 
 
Lahawiyin Grazing Area 
Main Animals Corridors to Butana and North East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 
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Arab Villages in New Halfa Scheme 
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